{"id":176,"date":"2021-06-29T13:47:56","date_gmt":"2021-06-29T20:47:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/?p=176"},"modified":"2024-10-20T12:21:33","modified_gmt":"2024-10-20T19:21:33","slug":"contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\/","title":{"rendered":"Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>This is a case summary of <a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\">Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.<\/a>, 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977). Subjects include:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><em><strong>\u00bb<\/strong>\u00a0 TORT OF &#8220;OUTRAGE&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><em><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>IMPORTANT:<\/strong> <\/span><\/span><span style=\"color: #800000;\">This article is for informational purposes only and<\/span><span style=\"color: #800000; font-size: 1rem;\"> is based upon my point of view. This is not a resource for the actual and complete appellate court opinion. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our <\/span><a style=\"color: #800000;\" href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/disclaimer\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy<\/a><span style=\"color: #800000; font-size: 1rem;\"> before proceeding.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><center><em><span style=\"color: #00ffff;\">Advertisement<\/span><\/em><\/center><br \/>\n<script async src=\"https:\/\/pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js?client=ca-pub-6555531347302259\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"><\/script><br \/>\n<!-- Responsive 2017 --><br \/>\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display: block;\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-6555531347302259\" data-ad-slot=\"3088293120\" data-ad-format=\"auto\" data-full-width-responsive=\"true\"><\/ins><br \/>\n<script>\n     (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\n<\/script><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<figure id=\"attachment_132\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-132\" style=\"width: 300px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-132 size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/cropped-WELD-1.png?resize=300%2C200&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977)\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/cropped-WELD-1.png?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/cropped-WELD-1.png?w=375&amp;ssl=1 375w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-132\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><center><b>Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977)<\/b><\/center><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h5 style=\"text-align: left;\">case summarY &#8211; 4 PRIMARY Facts:<\/h5>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\"><strong>[1]<\/strong> David Contreras and his wife brought an action against Crown Zellerbach Corporation alleging five causes of action based upon allegedly abusive and improper conduct of Crown Zellerbach&#8217;s employees and supervisory personnel.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\"><strong>[2]<\/strong> Appellants&#8217; complaint alleges the following facts:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[a]<\/strong>\u00a0 David Contreras and his wife lived in Cathlamet where Mr. Contreras was employed by respondent through the fall and winter of 1973.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[b]<\/strong>\u00a0 He was wrongfully terminated on January 24, 1974.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[c]\u00a0<\/strong> During the time of his employment he was subjected to continuous humiliation and embarrassment by reason of racial jokes, slurs and comments made in his presence by agents and employees of the defendant corporation on the job site and during working hours.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[d]<\/strong>\u00a0 Respondent&#8217;s foreman and managing agents failed to control their employees and to accord appellant the right to work free of racial discrimination, slurs, comments and pressures.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[e]<\/strong>\u00a0 Respondent&#8217;s agents and employees, while acting within the scope of their employment, both while appellant was employed and after his discharge, made numerous statements accusing appellant wrongfully of stealing property owned by respondent.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[f]\u00a0<\/strong> The effect of these untrue statements was to prevent appellant from seeking and holding permanent employment in the Cathlamet area and to hold him and his wife up to public scorn and ridicule.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[g]<\/strong>\u00a0 Some of the statements made by respondent&#8217;s agents and employees were made maliciously or with knowledge of their falsity or when they should have known the statements were false.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[h]<\/strong>\u00a0 This conduct resulted in an inability of appellant to obtain employment which in turn made him unable to pay his bills and ruined an otherwise excellent credit rating.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[i]<\/strong>\u00a0 His failure to find full-time employment is a direct and proximate result of respondent&#8217;s agents and employees&#8217; slander and racial actions.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[j]<\/strong>\u00a0 Appellant&#8217;s [(i.e., the Contreras&#8217;)] claim for relief is that respondent&#8217;s conduct was intentional or reckless and so extreme in degree as to be beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[k]<\/strong>\u00a0 Such conduct in turn caused him severe emotional distress by reason of the acts of intimidation, demotions, humiliations and public exposure to scorn and ridicule when respondent&#8217;s agents knew or should have known that appellant, by reason of his nationality and background as a Mexican-American, was particularly susceptible to emotional distress from defendant&#8217;s conduct.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\"><strong>[l]<\/strong>\u00a0 He alleges respondent&#8217;s conduct thereby amounts to the tort of outrage.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\"><strong>[3]<\/strong> Crown Zellerbach moved to dismiss the first claim for relief, which is premised upon the tort of outrage, for failure to state a claim.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 30px;\"><strong>[4]<\/strong> The trial court granted this motion to dismiss and Contreras appeals.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\"><em>Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.<\/em>,<\/a> 88 Wn.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (internal citations omitted).<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<hr \/>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h1><strong><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">ISSUE #1:\u00a0 <\/span><\/strong><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">Did the trial court err in granting Crown Zellerbach&#8217;s motion to dismiss Contreras&#8217; first claim for relief premised upon the tort of outrage?<\/span><\/h1>\n<figure id=\"attachment_147\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-147\" style=\"width: 150px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-147 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/RULE-1.png?resize=150%2C150&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Rules\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/RULE-1.png?w=150&amp;ssl=1 150w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/RULE-1.png?resize=100%2C100&amp;ssl=1 100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-147\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><center><b>-RULES-<\/b><\/center><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><strong>[1-1]\u00a0 TORT OF OUTRAGE &#8212; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS \u00a7 46: <\/strong>The &#8220;Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 reads as follows:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\">(a) to a member of such person&#8217;s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\">(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\"><em>Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.<\/em>,<\/a> 88 Wn.2d 735, 745, n. 1 (Wash. 1977).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-2]\u00a0 LIMITATIONS (INTENTIONAL\/RECKLESS):<\/strong> &#8220;In <em>Grimsby v. Samson<\/em>, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (1975), we adopted many of the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, and stressed: <strong><em>First<\/em><\/strong>, the emotional distress must be inflicted intentionally or recklessly ; mere negligence is not enough.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 744, n.2, 565 P.2d 1173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-3]\u00a0 LIMITATIONS (OUTRAGEOUS &amp; EXTREME):<\/strong> &#8220;In <em>Grimsby v. Samson<\/em>, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (1975), we adopted many of the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, and stressed:\u00a0 . . .\u00a0 <em><strong>Second,<\/strong><\/em> the conduct of the defendant must be outrageous and extreme. . . . it is not enough that a defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by &#8216;malice,&#8217; or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 745, n.2,\u00a0 565 P.2d 1173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Liability exists &#8216;only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.&#8217; (Italics ours.)&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Comment d further points out that liability in the tort of outrage &#8216;does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.&#8217; &#8221; <em>Id.\u00a0<\/em>&#8220;In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em>\u00a0&#8220;Clearly a case-by-case approach will be necessary to define the precise limits of such conduct.&#8221; <em>Id. <\/em><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Nevertheless, among the factors a jury or court should consider are the position occupied by the defendant (comment e ), whether plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress and defendant&#8217;s knowledge of this fact (comment f ), and whether defendant&#8217;s conduct may have been privileged under the circumstances (comment g ).&#8221;<em> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-4]\u00a0 LIMITATIONS (SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS):<\/strong> &#8220;In <em>Grimsby v. Samson,<\/em> 85 Wash.2d 52, 59, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (1975), we adopted many of the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, and stressed:\u00a0 . . .\u00a0 <em><strong>Third<\/strong><\/em>, the conduct must result in severe emotional distress to the plaintiff (comment j ).&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 745, n.2,\u00a0 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Resulting bodily harm would, of course, be an indication of severe emotional distress, but a showing of bodily harm is not necessary.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-5]\u00a0 THE INITIAL DETERMINATION: <\/strong>&#8220;With the[ ] limitations in mind, the trial court first determines whether the defendant&#8217;s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 740, 565 P.2d 1173 (internal citations omitted).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-6]\u00a0 RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION:<\/strong> According to the Washington State Supreme Court: &#8220;In <em>Browning v. Slenderella Systems<\/em>, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 739, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The court there recognized that the 1948 supplement to Restatement of Torts \u00a7 46 changed the language in the initial statement in Restatement, Torts (1934), \u00a7 46, to allow recovery from &#8216;(o)ne who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another . . .&#8217; &#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (alteration in original).\u00a0&#8220;In its opinion this court quoted subsection (g) of the then section 46:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">(g) In short, the rule stated in this section imposes liability for intentionally causing severe emotional distress in those situations in which the actor&#8217;s conduct has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency. The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of decent men and women in a civilized community is considered outrageous and intolerable. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim &#8216;Outrageous!&#8217; &#8220;<\/p>\n<p><em>Id.<\/em> at 740, 565 P.2d 1173 (<em>citing Browning v. Slenderella Systems<\/em> at 447-48, 341 P.2d at 864).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-7]\u00a0 POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY &amp; OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOR: <\/strong>&#8220;When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 comment e).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (internal citations omitted).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-8]\u00a0 FORCED TO REMAIN IN PHYSICAL PROXIMITY OF RACIAL SLURS &amp; COMMENTS: <\/strong>&#8220;Where a person is not free to leave but must remain in physical proximity to others who continually make racial slurs and comments, it is for the jury to determine both whether this is a factor in making the claim one of extreme outrage and the extent to which the employer was or should have been aware of these conditions, through its supervisory personnel or by other means.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 741, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-9]\u00a0 PLAINTIFF&#8217;S OWN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT: <\/strong>&#8220;Plaintiff&#8217;s own susceptibility to racial slurs and other discriminatory conduct is a question for the trier of fact, and cannot be determined on demurrer.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 742, 565 P.2d 1173. &#8220;It is for the trier of fact to determine, taking into account changing social conditions and plaintiff&#8217;s own susceptibility, whether the particular conduct was sufficient to constitute extreme outrage.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-10]\u00a0 MOTION TO DISMISS &#8212; CR 12(b)(6): <\/strong>&#8220;In determining whether to dismiss appellants&#8217; claim, this court must consider respondent&#8217;s challenge within the framework of CR 12(b)(6).&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 742, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> &#8220;The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (<em>citing Brown v. MacPherson&#8217;s, Inc.<\/em>, 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (<em>citing Barnum v. State<\/em>, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); <em>Grimsby v. Samson<\/em>, <em>supra<\/em> 85 Wash.2d at 55, 530 P.2d 291).<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_148\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-148\" style=\"width: 150px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-148 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/ANALYSIS-1.png?resize=150%2C150&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Analysis\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/ANALYSIS-1.png?w=150&amp;ssl=1 150w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/ANALYSIS-1.png?resize=100%2C100&amp;ssl=1 100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-148\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><center><b>-ANALYSIS-<\/b><\/center><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><strong>[1-11]\u00a0 STANDING:<\/strong> In this case, the Court initially determined that the trial court misapplied <em>Grimsby v. Samson<\/em>, 85 Wash.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) to the instant case; essentially, the trial court, in misapplying <em>Grimsby<\/em>, &#8220;believed by our emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff must be an immediate family member of the person who is the object of the defendant&#8217;s actions, that it was our intent to limit this tort to <em>third-person situations only<\/em>.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 738, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p>The Court clarified that &#8220;[t]here is no reason to limit recovery on the tort of outrage to members of the family of those directly injured while excluding recovery by the person primarily injured and we decline to do so.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 738 (internal citations omitted).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;A vast majority of cases involving the tort of outrage have been actions brought by the recipient of the conduct.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 738 (<em>citing Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., Mass.<\/em>, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); <em>Womack v. Eldridge<\/em>, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974); <em>Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc.<\/em>, 2 Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 (1970); <em>see<\/em> Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959)).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-12]\u00a0 LIABILITY BASED ON RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION:<\/strong> The Court then determined that &#8220;[i]n <em>Browning v. Slenderella Systems<\/em>, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 739, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, the Court found that &#8220;liability could be premised on outrageous conduct such as that alleged [in the instant case].&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 740 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-13]\u00a0 ADEQUACY OF CLAIM:<\/strong> Next, the Court considered the Respondent&#8217;s argument: &#8220;[E]ven if it is held the direct recipient of allegedly outrageous conduct may bring suit based upon the tort of outrage, the claim here stated is inadequate.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 740, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>The Court concluded that &#8220;[w]ith the limitations in mind, the trial court first determines whether the defendant&#8217;s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 740.<\/p>\n<p>The Court then addressed the law regarding positions of authority, relationship between the parties, and issues regarding physical proximity to those making racial slurs and comments.<\/p>\n<p><strong>[1-14]\u00a0 PLAINTIFF&#8217;S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RACIAL SLURS &amp; OTHER DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT:<\/strong> Lastly, the Court considered the &#8220;defendants&#8217; contention that plaintiff, as a truckdriver must have become accustomed to such abusive language.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 742, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>The Court concluded that &#8220;[i]t is for the trier of fact to determine, taking into account changing social conditions and plaintiff&#8217;s own susceptibility, whether the particular conduct was sufficient to constitute extreme outrage.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_149\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-149\" style=\"width: 150px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-149 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/CONCLUSION-1.png?resize=150%2C150&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Conclusion\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/CONCLUSION-1.png?w=150&amp;ssl=1 150w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/CONCLUSION-1.png?resize=100%2C100&amp;ssl=1 100w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-149\" class=\"wp-caption-text\"><center><b>-CONCLUSION-<\/b><\/center><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p><strong>[1-15]\u00a0 PLAINTIFF&#8217;S EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM WITHIN PARAMETERS OF TORT OF OUTRAGE:<\/strong> The Court first declared that &#8220;[i]n determining whether to dismiss appellants&#8217; claim, this court must consider respondent&#8217;s challenge within the framework of CR 12(b)(6).&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 742.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, the Court held as follows:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Viewed in this light, appellant&#8217;s claim that he was subjected to intentional or reckless conduct on the part of respondent which was beyond all reasonable bounds of decency and caused him severe emotional distress by reason of acts of intimidation, demotions, humiliation in public and exposure to scorn and ridicule, when respondent&#8217;s agents knew or should have known that by reason of his Mexican nationality and background he was particularly susceptible to emotional distress as a result of respondent&#8217;s conduct,<em> is within the parameters of the tort of outrage as defined by our cases and the Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46(1)<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p><em>Id.<\/em> at 742-43, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court&#8217;s judgment of dismissal. <em>Id.<\/em> at 743.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<hr \/>\n<hr \/>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h1><span style=\"color: #333399;\"><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">NOTABLES &amp; IMPLICATIONS<\/span>:<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n<p><strong>1. CONCURRENCE &#8212; IN THE RESULT ONLY (JUDGES STAFFORD, HICKS &amp; BRACHTENBACH)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In this case, Judge Stafford wrote a concurrence <em>in result only<\/em> wherein Judges Hicks and Brachtenbach concurred; Stafford asserted, in part, as follows:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">We cannot say, as a matter of fact or a matter of law, that the alleged conduct in this case is the equivalent of the tort of outrage. It is actionable only, if after considering all of the surrounding circumstances, a jury concludes that the conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and should be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. We hold only that the allegations, if proved, provide a jury question. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 comment h.<\/p>\n<p><em>Id.<\/em> at 744-45, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p><strong>2. HISTORY OF THE TORT OF OUTRAGE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Liability for outrage is of ancient lineage.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 738, 565 P.2d 1173. &#8220;The law in the classical age of the Roman Empire allowed recovery for outrage or insult as the delict of &#8216;iniuria.&#8217; &#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> &#8220;It required an intent to insult and that anger be shown as soon as the facts were known. Intent to insult, however, could be presumed from the facts, which spoke for themselves.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 738-39.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Defamation under Roman law was also a case of &#8216;iniuria,&#8217; where the basis of liability was not loss of reputation but outrage to feelings.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 739. &#8220;Publication to a third party was thus arguably unnecessary.&#8221;<em> Id.<\/em> (citing W. Buckland and A. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 295-300 (1936)).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Acceptance of the tort of outrage has undergone a remarkable evolutionary process in the United States in a relatively short time.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 739, 565 P.2d 1173.\u00a0&#8220;Section 46 of the Restatement of Torts in its original form stated flatly there was no liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, or for bodily harm resulting from it, except in cases of assault and of the special liability of carriers covered in section 48.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> &#8220;This position was reversed in the 1948 supplement and the comments were completely rewritten.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46 at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957)).<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The Restatement and courts supporting it have since drastically changed their position, from denial of liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress to the allowance of liability against one who intentionally caused emotional distress without privilege to do so, and later to the present rule which requires that the conduct be extreme and outrageous Before liability will attach.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> (<em>citing Pakos v. Clark<\/em>, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969)).<\/p>\n<p><strong>3. RACIAL SLURS AND OTHER DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>PHYSICAL PROXIMITY: &#8220;Where a person is not free to leave but must remain in physical proximity to others who continually make racial slurs and comments, it is for the jury to determine both whether this is a factor in making the claim one of extreme outrage and the extent to which the employer was or should have been aware of these conditions, through its supervisory personnel or by other means.&#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 741, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<p>QUESTION FOR TRIER OF FACT: &#8220;As we as a nation of immigrants become more aware of the need for pride in our diverse backgrounds, racial epithets which were once part of common usage may not now be looked upon as &#8216;mere insulting language.&#8217; &#8221; <em>Id.<\/em> at 741, 565 P.2d 1173. &#8220;Changing sensitivity in society alters the acceptability of former terms.&#8221;<em> Id.<\/em> &#8220;It is noted in <em>Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc.<\/em>, [2 Cal.3d 493, 498 n.4, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 91, 468 P.2d 216 (1970)] . . . :<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">[P]laintiff&#8217;s own susceptibility to racial slurs and other discriminatory conduct is a question for the trier of fact, and cannot be determined on demurrer.<\/p>\n<p><em>Id.<\/em> at 742, 565 P.2d 1173.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h5>LEARN MORE<\/h5>\n<p>If you would like to learn more, consider contacting an <a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/attorney-gregory-williams\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">experienced employment discrimination attorney<\/a> to discuss your case.\u00a0This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Washington Employment Law Digest or the <a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/attorney-gregory-williams\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">author of this article<\/a>. By reading this article, you agree to our <a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/disclaimer\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Disclaimer \/ Terms-of-Use \/ Privacy Policy<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is a case summary of Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977). Subjects include: \u00bb\u00a0 TORT OF &#8220;OUTRAGE&#8221; IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. This is not a resource for the actual and complete appellate court opinion. Due to the rapidly &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/gwilliamslaw.com\/wa-employment-law-digest\/contreras-v-crown-zellerbach-corp\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977)&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[71,69,47,67,1,60,58],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-176","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-national-origin","category-race-or-color","category-supreme-court","category-tort-of-outrage","category-uncategorized","category-washington-law-against-discrimination","category-wrongful-termination-generally"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977) - Washington Employment Law Digest<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This article is a summary of Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735 (Wash. 1977). 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