Category: WLAD History

This is a case summary of Cert. From U.S. District Court in Zhu v. North Central ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2017). Subjects include, but are not limited to the following:

»  UNLWAFUL RETALIATION

»  JOB APPLICANTS

»  PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS

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case summarY – 21 Facts:

[1]  Zhu is a United States citizen who emigrated from China in 2004.

[2]  Waterville School Disrict no. 209 hired Zhu as a math teacher in 2006.

[3]  In 2010, Waterville issued a notice of probable cause for Zhu’s discharge, which he appealed.

[4]  The hearing officer determined that there was not probable cause for discharge and restored Zhu to his position.

[5]  Zhu then sued Waterville in federal district court, alleging that Waterville had subjected him to racially motivated disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 2000e-2 and 2000e-3.

[6]  His complaint alleged that he filed multiple grievances with Waterville regarding hostile and abusive actions by his students.

[7]  Zhu described being called a chink, a communist, and gay by his students; in 2008 Zhu was the subject of a cartoon that depicted a border patrol shooting someone described as a communist chink; and in May, 2009 a student scrawled a hateful racial attack against Zhu on a bathroom wall, saying he hoped Zhu’s new house would burn down.

[8]  Zhu alleged that instead of attempting to remedy the situation, Waterville took retaliatory actions against him for filing the grievances, including attempting to discharge him without probable cause.

[9]  After the district court denied Waterville’s motion for summary judgment dismissal, the parties settled and Zhu resigned from Waterville in March 2012.

[10]  Three months after resigning from Waterville, Zhu applied for a position as a “Math-Science Specialist” with ESD 171.

[11]  ESD 171 is an educational service district that provides cooperative and informational services to local school districts, including Waterville . . . and it is undisputed that members of ESD 171’s hiring committee were aware of Zhu’s lawsuit against Waterville.

[12]  Zhu was one of three candidates interviewed, but ESD 171 ultimately hired a different candidate, whom Zhu claims was far less qualified for the position.

[13]  Zhu sued ESD 171 in federal district court, alleging that it refused to hire him in retaliation for his prior lawsuit against Waterville, thereby violating WLAD’s antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1), as well as other state and federal laws.

[14]  ESD 171 moved for summary judgment dismissal asserting that Zhu’s WLAD antiretaliation claim should fail for the same reasons that his federal antiretaliation claim should fail.

[15]  However, the district court correctly noted that WLAD is not identical to federal law, analyzed the WLAD antiretaliation claim on its merits, and denied summary judgment.

[16]  ESD 171 moved to reconsider, arguing that Zhu’s WLAD antiretaliation claim must fail because RCW 49.60.210(1) does not prohibit retaliatory discrimination against job applicants by prospective employers.

[17]  The court denied reconsideration.

[18]  Following a jury trial, Zhu prevailed on his WLAD antiretaliation claim and was awarded damages.

[19]  ESD 171 then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, and asking in the alternative that the district court certify to . . . [the Washington State Supreme Court] the question of RCW 49.60.210(1)’s scope.

[20]  [T]he district court granted the motion in part and certified the following question regarding the scope of RCW 49.60.210(1) to . . . [the Washington State Supreme [C]ourt]: “Does RCW 49.60.210(1) create a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer?”

[21]  The court otherwise denied the motion . . . .

Certification From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Zhu v. North Central ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations & quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

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ISSUE #1:  Does RCW 49.60.210(1) create a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer?

[1-1]  GENERALLY

WLAD’S ANTIRETALIATION POLICY: The primary purpose of WLAD’s antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1), is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Certification From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Zhu v. North Central ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504, 508 (Wash. 2017) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)) (alteration in original). If the court “does not provide . . . [people] some measure of protection against retaliation[,]” then “[people will be less likely to oppose discrimination by bringing claims or testifying. Id. (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 94, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)).

WLAD’S ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION: “[I]n order to encourage people to oppose discrimination, RCW 49.60.210(1) provides in full:

It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)).

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IS MATTER OF LAW: The issue of whether RCW 49.60.210(1) creates a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer is a question of statutory interpretation and therefore a matter of law. See Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508.

WLAD PROVISIONS (LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION): “When interpreting WLAD, we are particularly mindful that ‘a plaintiff bringing a discrimination case in Washington assumes the role of a private attorney general, vindicating a policy of the highest priority.” Id. at 508 (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 109, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)). “To further this important purpose, both the legislature and Washington courts require that even in a plain language analysis, WLAD’s provisions must be given liberal construction.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

FUNCTIONALLY SIMILAR TEST: “Washington courts employ the ‘functionally similar’ test to determine whether the defendant had sufficient control over the plaintiff’s employment to be held personally liable for discriminatory actions.” Id. at 510 (citing Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930, 965 P.2d 1124 (1998) (“coworker without supervisory authority is not personally liable for retaliation”)).

[1-2]  DEFINITIONS

WLAD DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER: “For purposes of WLAD, an ’employer’ is broadly defined as ‘any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit.'” Id. at 508 (citing RCW 49.60.040(11)).

DEFINITION INCLUDES PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS: “This definition clearly includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates that ‘any employer’ means something different for purposes of the antiretaliation statute than it does for the purposes of the rest of WLAD.” Id. at 509 (referencing Champion v. Shoreline Sch. dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (we assume that when the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout)).”

Washington courts have “always treated WLAD references to employers to include prospective employers where appropriate.” Id. at 509-10 (citing Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)).

WLAD DEFINITION OF PERSON: “WLAD defines a ‘person’ in extremely broad terms to include one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees and receivers, or any group of persons; it includes any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent, or employee, whether one or more natural persons; and further includes any political or civil subdivisions of the state and any agency or instrumentality of the state or of any political or civil subdivision thereof.” Id. at 508 (citing RCW 49.60.040(19)).

WLAD DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION: “[W]hile WLAD does not define ‘discrimination,’ it would defy the ordinary meaning of that word to hold that it excludes an employer’s differentiation between people in the hiring process based on an observable characteristic, such as whether or not they have previously filed antidiscrimination lawsuits.” Id. at 508-09.

OPPOSING PRACTICES FORBIDDEN BY WLAD: “D]iscriminating against a person in ‘terms or conditions of employment’ because of race is clearly a practice forbidden by WLAD, and filing a lawsuit for damages based on such discrimination is clearly opposing that practice.” Id. at 509 (citing RCW 49.60.180(3)).

[1-3]  STRUCTURE

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS (RCW 49.60.180): “RCW 49.60.180 defines practices by employers that are unfair when based on a person’s protected characteristics, including refusing to hire the person, discharging the person, discriminating against the person in the terms and conditions of employment, and inquiring into the person’s protected characteristics in the hiring process.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (hyperlink added).

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF LABOR UNIONS (RCW 49.60.190): “RCW 49.60.190 defines practices by labor unions that are unfair when based on a person’s protected characteristics, including denying the person membership to the union, expelling the person from the union, and discriminating against the person in the union’s duty of representation.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (hyperlink added).

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES (RCW 49.60.200): “RCW 49.60.200 defines practices by employment agencies that are unfair when based on a person’s protected characteristics, including refusal to refer the person for employment and inquiring into the person’s protected characteristics in connection with prospective employment.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (hyperlink added).

WLAD ANTIRETALIATION (RCW 49.60.210): “RCW 49.60.210 provides that it is an unfair practice for any employer, labor union, or employment agency to discriminate against any person for opposing practices forbidden by WLAD.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511; WLAD’s Antiretaliation Provision, supra (emphasis added).

[1-4]  PURPOSE

GENERALLY: “WLAD’s purpose is plain: the ‘elimination and prevention of discrimination in employment, in credit and insurance transactions, in places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, and in real property transactions.” Id. at 512 (citing RCW 49.60.010).

RIGHT TO OBTAIN & HOLD EMPLOYMENT: Regarding the instant case, “the right to be free from invidious discrimination includes ‘the right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination.'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.030(1)(a)).

DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING & EMPLOYMENT: “Such discrimination in hiring and employment based on protected characteristics ‘threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.010).

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION: “The overarching importance of eradicating such discrimination requires that WLAD’s provisions ‘be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.020).

ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS: “[W]LAD, like other laws prohibiting discrimination based on protected characteristics, relies heavily on private individuals for its enforcement.” Id. (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 86, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)).

[1-5]  GIVING EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT

Prior to the instant case, “[v]ery few opinions by this court have discussed . . . [RCW 49.60.210(1)], and no Washington court has considered whether . . . [that statute] prohibits retaliatory discrimination against job applicants by prospective employers.” Id. at 508 (hyperlink added). The certified question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law. Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (citing Allen v. Dameron, 187 Wn.2d 692, 701, 389 P.3d 487 (2017)).

Accordingly, the Court determined both of the following:

(1) “When interpreting WLAD, [WA courts] . . . are particularly mindful that ‘a plaintiff bringing a discrimination case in Washington assumes the role of a private attorney general, vindicating a policy of the highest priority.” Id. (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 109, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)).

(2) “To further this important purpose, both the legislature and Washington courts require that even in a plain language analysis, WLAD’s provisions must be given ‘liberal construction.'” Id. (citing Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 108) (internal citation omitted).

[1-6]  “THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RCW 49.60.210(1) SHOWS THAT THE ANSWER [TO THE CERTIFIED QUESTION] IS YES”

The Court initially examined the relevant statue finding that “[t]he plain language of RCW 49.60.210(1), in and of itself, strongly indicates that the answer to the certified question is yes.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (hyperlink added). That statute declares that “it is an unfair practice for ‘any employer … [to] discriminate against any person discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter.” Id.  (alteration in original).

Thus, “if (1) ESD 171 is an employer, (2) Zhu is a person, (3) refusal to hire is discrimination, and (4) suing for racial discrimination is opposition to practices forbidden by WLAD, then RCW 49.60.210(1) clearly applies to Zhu’s claim.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (hyperlink added).

In this case, the Court determined that:

(1) “ESD 171 is clearly ‘any employer’ in accordance with [the WLAD definition] … as there is no dispute that it employs eight or more people and is not a religious or sectarian organization[ ]”;

(2) “Zhu is obviously a person[ ]”;

(3) “[W]hen ESD 171 refused to hire Zhu because he had previously sued Waterville for racial discrimination, ESD 171 discriminated against Zhu[ ]”; and

(4) “Therefore, Zhu’s prior lawsuit against Waterville for racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment constituted opposition to a practice forbidden by WLAD.”

Id. at 508-9.

[1-7]  “UNDER WLAD, AN ‘EMPLOYER’ IS NOT LIMITED TO PLAINTIFF’S CURRENT EMPLOYER FOR PURPOSES OF RCW 49.60.210(1)”

“ESD 171 argue[d] that RCW 49.60.210(1)’s reference to ‘any employer’ should be read as ‘the plaintiff’s current employer.'” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 509 (hyperlink added). However, the Court rationalized that:

A prospective employer, including ESD 171, easily fits within WLAD’s definition of an ’employer,’ and RCW 49.60.210(1) explicitly applies to ‘any employer.’ There is nothing in the statutory language or context to indicate that RCW 49.60.210(1) does not mean exactly what it says.

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 510 (hyperlinks added).

The Court also reasoned that “as the entity making the hiring decision, ESD 171 had complete control over Zhu’s possible employment, and the ‘functionally similar’ test has no relevance” in this case. Id.

[1-8]  “RCW 49.60.210(1) PROHIIBITS ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS EMPLOYERS”

ESDs ARGUMENT: “ESD 171 . . . takes the position that RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits retaliatory discrimination only in the context of an established employment relationship because the only forms of prohibited retaliation that the statue explicitly mentions are ‘discharg[ing]’ and ‘expel[ling],’ both of which contemplate a preexisting relationship.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 510 (alteration in original) (hyperlink added).

ESD 171s PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF RCW 49.60.210(1) IS UNREASONABLE: The Court found that “ESD 171’s proposed interpretation of RCW 49.60.210(1) is an unreasonable application of that general rule.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 510 (hyperlink added). The Court determined that “[s]ince the time that WLAD was first enacted, it has included the provisions, now codified at RCW 49.60.180 [(Unfair Practices of Employers), RCW 49.60.190 (Unfair Practices of Labor Unions), RCW 49.60.200 (Unfair Practices of Employment Agencies), and RCW 49.60.210 (Antiretaliation Provision)].” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (hyperlinks added).

WLAD PROVISIONS INDICATE DISCRIMINATION UNDER RCW 49.60.210(1) INCLUDES AN EMPLOYER’S REFUSAL TO HIRE: These provisions “have always maintained the same basic form, and they have always been set forth in the same order.” Id. (Comparing RCW 49.60.180-210, with Laws of 1949, ch. 183 § 7(1)-(4)). Accordingly, “[t]his structure strongly suggests that ‘otherwise discriminat[ing]’ for the purposes of RCW 49.60.210(1) must, at a minimum, include the preceding explicitly specified unfair practices, one of which is an employer’s refusal to hire.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (citing RCW 49.60.180(1), supra) (emphasis added) (hyperlink added).

NO PUBLISHED WA CASE HAS CONSIDERED WHETHER RCW 49.60.210(1) PROHIBITS RETALIATORY DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING: ESD 171 further contended and offered caselaw to support its proposition that “RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits only an ‘adverse employment’ action or decision that affects the terms or conditions of an established employment relationship.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (emphasis & hyperlink added). But the Court found that “[n]o published Washington case has ever considered, much less rejected, the question of whether RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits retaliatory discrimination in hiring.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511 (hyperlink added).

As a result, the Court decided that it must therefore “apply the language of the statute, rather than the language of distinguishable cases.” Id. It further refused to extend the holding of Warnek v. ABB Combustion Engineering Services, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 450, 972 P.2d 453 (1999), to the instant case, because Warnek “interpreted materially different statutes and its conclusions were based on ‘the limited facts’ presented.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 511-12.

“[B]ased on its language, context, and structure, the nonexclusive list of prohibited unfair retaliatory practices in RCW 49.60.210(1) does not indicate a legislative intent to allow retaliatory discrimination in hiring by a prospective employer against a job applicant.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 512 (hyperlink added).

[1-9]  “THE PURPOSES OF WLAD WOULD BE SEVERELY UNDERMINED BY ESD 171’S INTERPRETATION”

The Court found that “[t]he purposes of WLAD would be severely undermined by ESD 171’s interpretation.” Id. It considered plain language interpretation of a WLAD provision within the scope of the “legislature’s express statement of purpose and mandate for liberal construction.” Id. Accordingly, it concluded:

(1) “It is well recognized that WLAD, like other laws prohibiting discrimination based on protected characteristics, relies heavily on private individuals for its enforcement . . . Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d [79], . . . 86 [(1991); and] . . . [t]his reliance would be unrealistic, to say the least, if this court does not provide them some measure of protection against retaliation[ ]”; and

(2) “[I]t would make little sense to hold that the legislature intentionally undercut its own purposes in enacting WLAD by adopting an antiretaliation provision that allows employers to compile an unofficial ‘do not hire’ list of individuals who have previously opposed discrimination against themselves and others.”

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

The Court ultimately found that “RCW 49.60.210(1)’s plain language, read in context, does make retaliatory refusal to hire an unfair practice, and RCW 49.60.030(2) plainly provides that any person who has been subjected to an unfair practice has the right to bring a civil cause of action.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 513 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

Accordingly, “Zhu’s claim that ESD 171 refused to hire him in retaliation for his prior opposition to Waterville’s discriminatory practices stated a viable cause of action in accordance with the plain language of WLAD.” Id.

[1-10]  RCW 49.60.210(1) PROHIBITS PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYERS FROM ENGAGING IN RETALIATORY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JOB APPLICANTS: The Court declared that “[i]n accordance with the language, context, and purpose of WLAD, we hold that RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits prospective employers from engaging in retaliatory discrimination against job applicants.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 513 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

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ISSUE #2:  Is Zhu entitled to attorneys fees on review?

 

[2-1]  RAP 18.1(a): “If applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review before either the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the party must request the fees or expenses as provided in this rule, unless a statute specifies that the request is to be directed to the trial court.” See id. at 513 (citing RAP 18.1(a)).

[2-2]  RCW 49.60.030(2): “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” See Zhu, 404 P.3d at 513 (citing RCW 49.60.030(2)); RCW 49.60.030(2).

[2-3]  ZHU IS THE PREVAILING PARTY: In this case, the Court explicitly determined that Zhu was the prevailing party; and the Court implicitly determined both that RCW 49.60.030(2) was the applicable law granting Zhu the right to recover reasonable attorney fees/expenses and that Zhu properly requested fess/expenses as provided in RAP 18.1 before the WA Supreme Court. See Zhu, 404 P.3d at 513.

[2-4]  ZHU IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES: “Because Zhu [was] the prevailing party,” the Court granted “his request for reasonable attorney fees on review pursuant to RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 49.60.030(2).” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 513 (hyperlinks added).

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NOTABLES & IMPLICATIONS:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

(1)  “[D]iscerning a statute’s plain meaning requires . . . [the court] to consult the statute itself, ‘as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found.’” Id. at 509 (citing Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).

(2)  “[S]pecific statutory terms may reasonably inform courts as to the meaning of broader statutory terms.” Id. at 510.

WLAD ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION

(3)  “Since its inception in 1949, WLAD has always contained an antiretaliation statute.” Id. at 507-08 (citing Laws of 1949, ch. 183, § 7(4))

(4)  “[T]he list of prohibited retaliatory actions in RCW 49.60.210(1) is explicitly not exclusive.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 510 (hyperlink added).

(5)  The antiretaliation provision is not limited to solely employers, employment agencies, and labor unions. “[I]n order to encourage people to oppose discrimination, RCW 49.60.210(1) provides in full:

It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

In 1997, “the Court of Appeals . . . held that it is an unfair practices for a credit union to expel a member because he assisted credit union employees in an antidiscrimination lawsuit, persuasively reasoning that a credit union is an ‘other person’ for purposes of RCW 49.60.210(1).” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 510 (citing Galbraith v. TAPCO Credit Union, 88 Wn.App. 939, 951, 946 P.2d 1242 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(6)  The “Court of Appeals has persuasively applied precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that ‘[a]n employment action is adverse if it is harmful to the point that it would dissuade a reasonable employee from making complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation.'” Id. at 511 (citing Boyd v. State, 187 Wn.App. 1, 15, 349 P.3d 864 (2015) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).

(7)  “If prospective employers are allowed to engage in retaliatory refusals to hire, a reasonable employee might well be dissuaded from opposing discriminatory practices for fear of being unofficially ‘blacklisted’ by prospective future employers.” Id. at 511.

WLAD GENERALLY

(8)  “WLAD ‘create[s] a private cause of action against any employer engaging in an ‘unfair practice.'” Id. at 507 (citing Kumar v. Gate Gormet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 489, 325 P.3d 193 (2014) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).

WLAD POLICY

(9)  The primary purpose of WLAD’s antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1), is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Zhu, 404 P.3d at 508 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)) (alteration in original).

(10)  If the court “does not provide . . . [people] some measure of protection against retaliation[,]” then “[people will be less likely to oppose discrimination by bringing claims or testifying. Id. (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 94, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)).

(11)  “When interpreting WLAD, [WA courts] . . . are particularly mindful that ‘a plaintiff bringing a discrimination case in Washington assumes the role of a private attorney general, vindicating a policy of the highest priority.” Id. (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 109, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)).

“To further this important purpose, both the legislature and Washington courts require that even in a plain language analysis, WLAD’s provisions must be given ‘liberal construction.'” Id. (citing Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 108) (internal citation omitted).

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