This is a case summary of Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229 (Wash. 2018). Subjects include:
» UNLAWFUL RETALIATION
» CAUSATION
» THREE ASSOCIATED EVALUATION STANDARDS:
(1) “Actual Knowledge” Standard;
(2) “Knew or Suspected” Standard, and
(3) “General Corporate Knowledge” Standard.
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CASE SUMMARY – 20 Facts:
[1] While working for Microsoft, Cornwell believed that her then-supervisor was discriminating against her on the basis of sex, engaging in romantic favoritism, and taking retaliatory action against her.
[2] She hired an attorney and settled the case with Microsoft.
[3] The settlement was confidential, and Cornwell was no longer required to work under her then-manager, … Parsons.
[4] Seven years later, Cornwell’s new manager, … Blake, asked Cornwell to mentor under another Microsoft employee.
[5] After learning that the employee reported to Parsons, Cornwell told Blake that she could not mentor under the employee.
[6] Blake asked Cornwell why, and Cornwell responded that it was because she had filed a “lawsuit” against Microsoft and could not report to Parsons.
[7] Cornwell also told Blake that the suit involved a review score issue and was confidential.
[8] Blake sought more information about the lawsuit from human resources and her direct supervisor, McKinley.
[9] Human resources did not have any information on file about the lawsuit and promised to follow up on the issue.
[10] Cornwell informed Blake that she was unable to discuss the lawsuit further because of the confidentiality agreement and expressed dissatisfaction that Blake had contacted human resources about the matter.
[11] Shortly after Cornwell told her about the suit, Blake conducted a mandatory performance review of Cornwell.
[12] During that year, Cornwell had received positive reviews from her peers[ ][.]
[13] During her previous years working for Microsoft, Cornwell also had received good performance ratings and promotions.
[14] Despite this positive employment history, Blake informed Cornwell that she was trending toward a rating of “4,” the second lowest possible score.
[15] Ultimately, Blake and McKinley recommended that Cornwell be rated “5,” the lowest possible score.
[16] Other managers disagreed with the rating, believing that Cornwell was a higher performer.
[17] Despite these disagreements, McKinley said that she and Blake would “take the conversation ‘off-line,’ ” meaning that Blake and McKinley would make the final decision about Cornwell’s performance rating without the involvement of the other managers.
[18] Cornwell’s final performance rating was assessed as a “5”— the lowest possible score.
[19] Cornwell was then laid off as part of a larger reduction in force.
[20] [C]ornwell did not learn about her low score until several years later when she was told that she could not be rehired at Microsoft because her final performance rating was so poor.
Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 232-33 (Wash. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
procedural HISTORY – 8 facts:
[21] Based on these events, Cornwell filed suit against Microsoft, alleging retaliation in violation of WLAD [(i.e., Washington Law Against Discrimination)].
[22] The trial court granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment because the judge believed that “there isn’t evidence that Ms. Blake, who gave [Cornwell] the bad [review] score, knew that there was a complaint under WLAD.”
[23] As a result, the judge believed that Cornwell had failed to show a causal link between the adverse employment action taken against her and her prior lawsuit against Microsoft.
[24] Cornwell appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals.
[25] The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in an unpublished opinion.
[26] But it declined to address whether Cornwell’s prior lawsuit was “protected activity” under WLAD.
[27] The court also declined to adopt Cornwell’s proposed standards of review for the claim.
[28] Cornwell appealed the Court of Appeals’ adverse decision to … [the Washington State Supreme Court], and … [it] accepted review of all issues.
Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 233 (Wash. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
ISSUE #1: Did plaintiff Cornwell present “enough evidence to show that her supervisors had sufficient knowledge that she had taken a protected action under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60.030?” Id. at 232.
[1-1] STANDARD OF REVIEW: “[The Court] … review[s] a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 233 (Wash. 2018) (citing Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)).
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[The Court] must also consider all facts and make all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 234 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[B]ecause of the difficulty of proving a discriminatory motivation … [s]ummary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in the employment discrimination context[.]” Id. at 233-34 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
[1-2] RETALIATION UNDER WLAD: “WLAD proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, sexual orientation, and other protected characteristics.” Id. at 234 (citing RCW 49.60.030).
“WLAD also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose discriminatory practices.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)).
“To further these purposes, the legislature has directed … [the courts] to liberally construe the provisions of WLAD.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.020).
[1-3] THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK: “When evaluating the merits of cases brought under WLAD, … [the courts] employ the McDonnell Douglas ‘evidentiary burden-shifting’ framework.” Id. at 234 (citing Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District, 189 Wn.2d 516, 526, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)) (internal footnote and associated citation omitted).
“This framework involves three steps, but … [the court] is concerned with only the first step in this case — the plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. (citing Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 446, 334 P.3d 541).
“Ordinarily the prima facie case must, in the nature of things, be shown by circumstantial evidence, since the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as his motive.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[1-4] THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION: “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show three things: (1) the employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 234 (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn.App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp, 118 Wn.2d 46, 68, 821 P.2d 18 (1991) (“establishing the retaliation test in the worker’s compensation context”)) (emphasis added).
[1-5] THE COURT ONLY CONSIDERED THE 3RD ELEMENT (CAUSATION): “Microsoft alleges that Cornwell has failed to produce sufficient evidence for the first and third elements of her prima facie case.” Id. at 234. However, the Court elected to consider only the third element–causation–as follows:
Because the Court of Appeals declined to address whether Cornwell’s lawsuit against Microsoft was a protected activity, and because the parties did not brief the issue to us, we do not reach that issue on appeal. We instead address only whether Cornwell presented sufficient evidence to show a potential causal link between her performance rating score, her termination, and her prior lawsuit.
Id. at 234-35 (emphasis added).
[1-6] PROVING CAUSATION: “An employee proves causation ‘by showing that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.’ ” Id. at 235 (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)) (emphasis added).
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — PROXIMITY IN TIME: “That an employer’s actions were caused by an employee’s engagement in protected activities may be inferred from proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Id. at 236 (referencing Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE RATINGS: Circumstantial evidence that an employee experienced an abrupt downward change in performance reviews can support a reasonable inference of causation. See id. at 236-37.
[1-7] CAUSATION & THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN OF PRODUCTION AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff’s burden is one of production, not persuasion.” Id. at 235 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 445, 334 P.3d 541).
“Thus, to avoid summary judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“Employees may rely on the following facts to show this: (1) the employee took a protected action, (2) the employer had knowledge of the action, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69, 821 P.2d 18) (emphasis added). In this case, the 2nd element (i.e., the employer had knowledge of the action) was at issue.
[1-8] THE 3 STANDARDS OF CAUSATION: The Court considered three standards of causation: the “actual knowledge” standard; the “knew or suspected” standard; and the “general corporate knowledge” standard.
[1-8a] CAUSATION — “ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE” STANDARD: “Both the Court of Appeals and several federal courts require that the employer have actual knowledge of the employee’s protected action in order to prove causation.” Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted).
POLICY (ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE): “Because retaliation is an intentional act, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an action of which the employer is unaware.” Id. at 235-36.
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF “LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE” NOT REQUIRED (ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE): But “[a] decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action.” Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT EMPLOYEE TOOK THE ACTION IS REQUIRED (ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE): “Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
SURVIVING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE): “The proper inquiry is whether the … evidence suggests a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).
[1.8b] CAUSATION — “KNEW OR SUSPECTED” STANDARD: “The ‘knew or suspected’ standard incorporates the ‘actual knowledge’ standard and also encompasses cases in which the employer suspects that an employee engaged in protected action.” Id. at 237 (trailing footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
PROTECTED ACTION & THE CASUSAL CONNECTION (KNEW OR SUSPECTED): This standard “[r]equires sufficient evidence to reasonably infer ‘both that [a supervisor] either knew or suspected’ that an employee took a protected action ‘and that there was a causal connection between this knowledge or suspicion and [the employee’s] termination.’ ” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original).
EXAMPLE BASED ON MERE SUSPICION (KNEW OR SUSPECTED): “This standard applies, for example, when a supervisor has actual knowledge that a complaint was made but has only a suspicion regarding who made the complaint and subsequently takes an adverse employment action based on that suspicion.” Id.
SURVIVING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (KNEW OR SUSPECTED): “So long as an employee produces evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that retaliation had taken place, this is sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Hernandez at 1114). “And while, a jury could believe the supervisor’s version of events rather than the employee’s, the jury must be permitted to consider and weigh evidence.” Id. (citing Hernandez at 1114).
[1-8c] CAUSATION — “GENERAL CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE” STANDARD: “Under this standard, the jury can still find retaliation in circumstances where the particular decision-maker denies actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activities, ‘so long as … the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.’ ” Id. at 241, n. 6 (citing Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original).
This standard “may be useful in situations where many individuals act collectively in a large company[ ] [.]” Id.
[1-9] RESTATING THE CAUSATION ISSUE (SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE): “At issue is whether [Cornwell] … presented enough evidence to show that her supervisors had sufficient knowledge that she had taken a protected action under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60.030.” Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
“Without establishing this knowledge, Cornwell cannot demonstrate a potential causal link between the adverse employment action taken against her and her protected activity.” Id. (emphasis added).
[1-10] MICROSOFT’S ARGUMENT (NO CAUSAL LINK): In this case, “Microsoft argues that Cornwell failed to present sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact that there is a causal link between her prior lawsuit and the adverse employment action taken against her.” Id. at 235. However, the Court disagreed with Microsoft’s argument for the following reasons.
[1-11] COURT DECLINES TO ADDRESS THE “GENERAL CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE” STANDARD: In this case, the Court “decline[d] to address the “general corporate knowledge” standard, because “[w]hile the standard may be useful in situations where many individuals act collectively in a large company, it is not applicable here where Cornwell’s two supervisors had actual knowledge of her prior lawsuit.” Id. at 241, fn. 6.
[1-12] CORNWELL PASSED THE “ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE” STANDARD: In this case, “Microsoft argue[ed] that Blake and McKinley did not have actual knowledge of Cornwell’s suit because they did not know the specific nature of the lawsuit— i.e., that it involved an allegation of discrimination in violation of WLAD.” Id. at 236 (internal citation omitted).
The Court found that “Microsoft’s focus on the managers’ knowledge about the substance of the suit [was] … misplaced.” Id. It then determined the relevant rule regarding causal connections:
A decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action. Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that “Cornwell has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under the actual knowledge standard.” Id. at 235 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:
Both Blake and McKinley had actual knowledge that Cornwell filed the prior lawsuit against Microsoft. Shortly after leaning this, and over the objection of other managers, they gave Cornwell the lowest possible rating, and Cornwell was laid off.
Id. at 239 (emphasis added). Thus, Cornwell presented satisfactory circumstantial evidence meeting both the proximity-in-time and abrupt-change-in-performance tests.
[1-13] CORNEWELL PASSED THE “KNEW OR SUSPECTED” STANDARD: In this case, the Court determined that “Cornwell easily meets the ‘knew or suspected’ standard to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim.” Id. at 238 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned as follows:
[C]ornwell had to prove that Microsoft knew or suspected that she had taken a prior legal action. As previously discussed, Cornwell produced sufficient evidence showing that both Blake and McKinley had actual knowledge that Cornwell had filed a previous lawsuit against Microsoft.
Id. at 237-38 (emphasis added).
[1-14] CORNWELL PRESENTED ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CREATE A DISPUTE OF FACT ABOUT A CAUSAL LINK: The Court held that “Cornwell presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the issues of knowledge and causation.” Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
KNOWLEDGE: The Court found that “[t]he evidence tends to show that both of Cornwell’s supervisors had actual knowledge that Cornwell had previously engaged in protected activity before they subjected her to adverse employment action.” Id. at 232. “Both Blake and McKinley had actual knowledge that Cornwell filed the prior lawsuit against Microsoft.” Id. at 239.
CAUSATION: The Court found that “Cornwell presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact about whether there was a causal link between her poor performance rating and termination and the previous lawsuit she filed against Microsoft.” Id. “Shortly after [both Blake and Mckinley] learn[ed] [about Cornwell’s protected activity], and over the objection of other managers, Blake and McKinley gave Cornwell the lowest possible review rating, and Cornwell was laid off. ” Id.
The Court concluded that “[i]n light of this evidence, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Microsoft.” Id. The Court “reverse[d] [the Court of Appeals] and remand[ed] the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id.
ISSUE #2: Should the Court adopt the “knew or suspected” standard for evaluating retaliation claims? Id. at 238-39.
[2-1] POLICY/PURPOSE – THE KNEW OR SUSPECTED STANDARD: “The purpose behind the ‘knew or suspected’ test is to protect employees from retaliation to the fullest extent possible:
It seems clear to this Court that an employer that retaliates against an employee because of the employer’s suspicion or belief that the employee filed a[ ] … complaint has as surely committed a violation of [the statute] as an employer that fires an employee because the employer knows that the employee filed a[ ] … complaint. Such construction most definitely furthers the purposes of the Act generally and the anti-retaliation provision specifically.
Id. at 238 (citing Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original).
[2-2] POLICY/PURPOSE – WLAD RELIES ON ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS: “It is well recognized that WLAD … relies heavily on private individuals for its enforcement. This reliance would be unrealistic, to say the least, ‘if this court does not provide them some measure of protection against retaliation.’ ” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
[2-3] POLICY/PURPOSE – RESTRICTING APPLICATION OF WLAD’S ANTIRETALIATION PROVISIONS CREATES INCONSISTENCIES: Restricting the application of WLAD’s antiretaliation provisions to instances of actual knowledge results in inconsistent protection of employees:
It would be a strange rule, indeed, that would protect an employee discharged because the employer actually knew he or she had engaged in protected activity but would not protect an employee discharged because the employer merely believed or suspected he or she had engaged in protected activity.
Id. (citing Reich, 32 F.3d at 368).
[2-4] POLICY/PURPOSE – EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS CAN BE BASED ON SUSPICION OR BELIEF: “Employers are not limited to retaliation decisions based on information they actually know to be true.” Id. at 238 (internal citation omitted). “Instead, ‘common sense and experience establish that employers also make employment decisions on what they suspect or believe to be true.’ ” Id.
[2-5] THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION: “[A[s long as ‘[a] reasonable jury could infer from [a plaintiff’s] evidence’ that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision, that plaintiff has satisfied his or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. at 239 (internal citation omitted) (alteration within original internal quote).
[2-6] THE KNEW OR SUSPECTED STANDARD IS CONSISTENT WITH PURPOSES OF WLAD: In this case, the Court first determined that “construing WLAD ‘to protect employees from adverse employment actions because they are suspected of having engaged in protected activity is consistent with the general purposes of the Act and the specific purposes of the antiretaliation provisions.’ ” Id. at 238 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
[2-7] DEFENDANT MIRCORSOFT’S ARGUMENT: THE STANDARD LEADS TO STRICT LIABILITY, ELIMINATES CAUSATION ELEMENT, AND INVITES SPECULATION : The Court then considered that “Microsoft and amici curiae the Association of Washington Business and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America contest adoption of the ‘knew or suspected’ standard.” Id.
Accordingly, “[both] … argue[d] that adopting the standard leads to strict liability for employers, eliminates the causation element of a retaliation prima facie case, and invites speculation into the summary judgment phase.” Id. The Court found each of their arguments unpersuasive.
[2-7a] THE KNEW OR SUSPECTED STANDARD DOES NOT LEAD TO STRICT LIABILITY OR ELIMINATE THE CAUSATION ELEMENT: In this case, the Court found that “[t]he ‘knew or suspected’ test does not lead to strict liability or eliminate the requirement that a retaliation be intentional.” Id. at 238.
“Instead, the test eliminates the right of employers to intentionally retaliate against employees that they suspect but do not actually know to have taken protected action.” Id.
“An employee must still produce sufficient evidence that his or her protected activity was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action against the employee.” Id. (citing Allison, 118 Wn.2d at 96, 821 P.2d 34) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the causation element is preserved.
[2-7b] THE KNEW OR SUSPECTED STANDARD DOES NOT INVITE SPECULATION INTO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PHASE: In this case, the Court asserted that “the [‘knew or suspected’] standard requires the production of evidence; mere speculation will not suffice to defeat summary judgment.” Id. at 238-39 (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 359-60, 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (“The ‘facts’ required by CR 56(e) to defeat a summary judgment motion are evidentiary in nature. Ultimate facts or conclusions are insufficient. Likewise, conclusory statements of fact will not suffice.” (citation omitted) ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court concluded that “as long as ‘[a] reasonable jury could infer from [a plaintiff’s] evidence’ that the plaintiff’s protected activity was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision, that plaintiff has satisfied his or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. at 239 (internal citation omitted) (alteration, within internal quote, in original ) (emphasis added).
[2-8] THE COURT ADOPTS THE “KNEW OR SUSPECTED” STANDARD: “For these [above] reasons, [the Court] … adopt[ed] the “knew or suspected” standard because it furthers WLAD’s purpose of protecting employees from retaliation.” Id. at 239.
NOTABLES & IMPLICATIONS:
(1) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: THE PROXIMITY-IN-TIME CLOCK STARTS WHEN WRONGDOER LEARNS OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY: “To properly evaluate whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation, we must focus on the proximity between when [the actual wrongdoer(s)] … learned of the [protected activity] … and the adverse employment actions that they subsequently took.” See id. at 241, n. 10.
In this case, Blake and McKinley, as wrongdoers, learned about Cornwell’s protected activity when Blake and McKinley (i.e., wrongdoers) had actual knowledge that Cornwell filed the prior lawsuit against Microsoft; not when Cornwell actually filed the prior lawsuit against Microsoft. See id.
PROXIMITY IN TIME: A FEW MONTHS IS ENOUGH TO GIVE RISE TO INFERENCE OF RETALIATORY MOTIVE: Moreover, a few months time between when the wrongdoers “learned of the lawsuit and the adverse employment actions that they subsequently took” is considered “enough to give rise to a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive. Id. at 241, n. 10. In this case:
Cornwell told Blake about the lawsuit in late 2011. In July 2012, Blake and McKinley rated Cornwell as a “5,” and Cornwell was laid off in September 2012.
Id. at 241, n. 9. These timeframes were enough for Cornwell to establish a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive.
(2) THE DISSENT (GORDON MCCLOUD, J.): MAJORITY’S ANALYSIS IS OVER-INCLUSIVE AS TO TORTS & UNDERINCLUSIVE AS TO GENDER DISCRIMINATION: In this case, Judge Gordon McCloud dissented and both agreed and disagreed with the majority. The dissent agreed as follows:
[I] agree with the majority’s main conclusion that a plaintiff can show retaliatory discharge in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60.030, without showing that the employer had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s prior protected activity. A plaintiffs showing that the employer suspected that the plaintiff had previously engaged in WLAD-protected activity is enough to establish the causation requirement of a WLAD retaliatory discharge claim.
Id. at 239. However, the dissent disagreed with the majority as follows:
But I disagree with the majority’s application of that legal standard to the facts of this case. The majority identifies nothing in the record showing that Dawn Cornwell’s current supervisors knew or suspected that her prior lawsuit involved the WLAD-prohibited activity of sex discrimination.
Id. (emphasis added).
The dissent reasoned that the majority’s “analysis creates a standard that is both significantly over-inclusive in certain respects and significantly under-inclusive in other respects.” Id. at 239-240 (emphasis added).
DISSENT ASSERTS MAJORITY’S STANDARD IS OVER-INCLUSIVE: The dissent argued that “the majority’s analysis is [incorrectly] over-inclusive because it assumes that a female employee’s lawsuit about a male supervisor and a review score could not have alleged anything but sex discrimination.” Id. at 240. However, “[b]esides common law torts, such a lawsuit could allege any number of statutory retaliation claims that do not implicate the WLAD.” Id.
DISSENT ASSERTS MAJORITY’S STANDARD IS UNDERINCLUSIVE: Here, the dissent essentially argued that “the majority’s approach is also under-inclusive[,]” because sex discrimination in employment could also include “female supervisors vis-a-vis female or male employees.” Id. at 241.
(3) THE MAJORITY’S REBUTTAL TO THE DISSENT: DISSENT’S ANALYSIS IS TOO LIMITED & HYPOTHETICAL CLAIMS ARE SURPLUSAGE: In this case, the Court majority rebutted the dissent as follows:
Contrary to the dissent’s criticisms, it is because of all of the facts here discussed, not merely because Cornwell’s prior suit involved a male supervisor, that her claim survives summary judgment. Further, also despite the dissent’s assertions, we know that Cornwell’s prior suit related to sex discrimination; we do not make (or need to make) the “over-inclusive” assumption that all suits by a female employee against a male supervisor involve sex discrimination. Accordingly, the dissent’s list of hypothetical claims that might have been brought is surplusage.
Id. at 241 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
(4) THE “KNEW OR SUSPECTED” STANDARD: APPLIED IN 9TH CIRCUIT: “The ‘knew or suspected’ standard has been applied by the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, as well as by other federal courts in the OSHA context.” Id. at 241, n. 11 (“See, e.g., Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2003); Reich, 32 F.3d 361″).
(5) UNLAWFUL RETALIATION: ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS: POOR PERFORMANCE RATINGS: For purposes of proving a claim of unlawful retaliation, a poor employment performance evaluation rating that prevents an employee “from being considered for future rehiring … qualifies as an adverse employment action.” See id. at 241, n. 4 (referencing Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. Dist. — ESD 171, 189 Wn.2d 607 , 619, 404 P.3d 504 (2017) (“An employment action is adverse if it is harmful to the point that it would dissuade a reasonable employee from making complaints of … retaliation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
(6) UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WLAD): ISSUE OF 1ST IMPRESSION: QUANTUM OF EMPLOYMENT KNOWLEDGE: This WLAD unlawful-retaliation case presented the Washington State Supreme Court with an issue of first impression, as follows:
At issue here is the quantum of employer knowledge about the employee’s prior protected activity. We have yet to address this question in a case.
Id. at 235.
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