Contracts Archives — LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

April 11, 2024

Is Washington State an at-will employment state?

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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Is Washington State an at-will employment state?

answer:

Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. See Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (referencing Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878 (1928); see also Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 40 Wash. 354, 357, 82 P. 606 (1905) (Mount, C.J., dissenting) (“where [an employment] contract is general and for an indefinite time, it is terminable at will.”)).

According to the at-will doctrine, “an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability.” See id. (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, in the absence of a contract stating otherwise, an employee has the absolute right to abandon … [their] employment at-will.” See id.

However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment rule: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.

(1) STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS

“First, both Congress and the Washington State Legislature have modified the employment at-will doctrine by limiting employers’ rights to discharge employees.” Id. at 153 (referencing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2*(a)(1) (1994); chapter 49.60* RCW (Washington’s law against discrimination); see also chapter 49.12* RCW (prohibiting discharge of employees for testifying in investigations regarding labor conditions, worker earnings, or sex discrimination); RCW 49.44.090* (prohibiting discharge of employee for being age 40 and over)).

These statutory laws provide an exception to the at-will doctrine that protects the employee’s rights and limits the employer’s ability to discharge an employee at-will.

(2) JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS

Second, Washington courts “have recognized a narrow public-policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge an employee”; this exception is commonly known as “wrongful termination in violation of public policy*.” Id. (referencing Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 991 P.2d 1135 (2000) (public policy exception to “for-cause” employees); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (discharge of armored truck driver who abandoned post to prevent murder violated public policy)).

“Under this exception, an employer does not have the right to discharge an employee when the termination would frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. “By recognizing this public policy exception, … [Washington State Supreme Court has] expressed its unwillingness to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(3) CONTRACTUAL EXCEPTIONS

“Third, employers and employees can contractually modify the at-will employment relationship, eschewing the common law rule in favor of negotiated rights and liabilities.” Id. at 154 (internal citation omitted). “An employer can bargain away its right to discharge an employee without cause by contracting not to do so.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

“The law governing this exception is not a species of the employment at-will doctrine; it is the law of contracts. Therefore, the law of contracts governs an injured party’s right to recover damages under this exception.” Id. at 155 (internal citation omitted). “Unlike a wrongful discharge, a breach of contract is neither immoral nor wrongful; it is simply a broken promise.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Constructive Discharge in WA State*

» Effective Date For Constructive Discharge (WA State)

» Retaliatory Discharge (WA State)

» The Prima Facie Case: Discriminatory Discharge

» WA State Torts: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy*

» What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?

» WLAD: The Discriminatory Discharge Provision*

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June 22, 2023June 22, 2023

Noncompetition Covenants (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, when are employee noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS (WA STATE)

Generally, a noncompetition covenant is “[a] promise , usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 392 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). In Washington State, a “‘[n]oncompetition covenant’ includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” RCW 49.62.010(4)*.

The Washington State Legislature has found both that “workforce mobility is important to economic growth and development[ ]” and that “agreements limiting competition or hiring may be contracts of adhesion** that may be unreasonable.” RCW 49.62.005* (hyperlink added). Washington’s noncompetition covenants law (hereinafter, “law”), RCW 49.62*, took effect on January 1, 2020 and establishes when such noncompetition covenants are void and unenforceable. See RCW 49.62.900*.

WHEN VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE

In Washington State, a noncompetition covenant is considered void and unenforceable against an employee unless certain conditions are met. The relevant law follows:

RCW 49.62.020*

(1) A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an employee:

(a)(i) Unless the employer discloses the terms of the covenant in writing to the prospective employee no later than the time of the acceptance of the offer of employment and, if the agreement becomes enforceable only at a later date due to changes in the employee’s compensation, the employer specifically discloses that the agreement may be enforceable against the employee in the future; or

(ii) If the covenant is entered into after the commencement of employment, unless the employer provides independent consideration for the covenant;

(b) Unless the employee’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement, when annualized, exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year. This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*;

(c) If the employee is terminated as the result of a layoff, unless enforcement of the noncompetition covenant includes compensation equivalent to the employee’s base salary at the time of termination for the period of enforcement minus compensation earned through subsequent employment during the period of enforcement.

(2) A court or arbitrator must presume that any noncompetition covenant with a duration exceeding eighteen months after termination of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. A party seeking enforcement may rebut the presumption by proving by clear and convincing evidence that a duration longer than eighteen months is necessary to protect the party’s business or goodwill.

RCW 49.62.020*.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The law also protects independent contractors to a certain extent. “A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an independent contractor unless the independent contractor’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars per year.” RCW 49.62.030* (emphasis added). “This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*.” Id. In addition, “[t]he duration of a noncompetition covenant between a performer and a performance space, or a third party scheduling the performer for a performance space, must not exceed three calendar days.” Id.

UNENFORCEABLE COVENANT PROVISIONS

Lastly, the law determines when noncompetition covenant provisions are unenforceable. “A provision in a noncompetition covenant signed by an employee or independent contractor who is Washington-based is void and unenforceable:

(1) If the covenant requires the employee or independent contractor to adjudicate a noncompetition covenant outside of this state; and

(2) To the extent it deprives the employee or independent contractor of the protections or benefits of this chapter[, RCW 49.62*].”

RCW 49.62.050* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).

OTHER SECTIONS OF THE LAW

There are additional provisions in the law (e.g., Franchisor Restrictions*, Employees Having an Additional Job*, Remedies*, etc.*) that are beyond the scope of this article. For more information, I encourage the reader to review the entire act* — RCW 49.62*.

DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

RCW 49.62.010*

Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) “Earnings” means the compensation reflected on box one of the employee’s United States internal revenue service form W-2 that is paid to an employee over the prior year, or portion thereof for which the employee was employed, annualized and calculated as of the earlier of the date enforcement of the noncompetition covenant is sought or the date of separation from employment. “Earnings” also means payments reported on internal revenue service form 1099-MISC for independent contractors.

(2) “Employee” and “employer” have the same meanings as in RCW 49.17.020*.

(3) “Franchisor” and “franchisee” have the same meanings as in RCW 19.100.010*.

(4) “Noncompetition covenant” includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. A “noncompetition covenant” does not include:

(a) A nonsolicitation agreement;

(b) a confidentiality agreement;

(d) a covenant entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest; or

(e) a covenant entered into by a franchisee when the franchise sale complies with RCW 19.100.020(1)*.

(5) “Nonsolicitation agreement” means an agreement between an employer and employee that prohibits solicitation by an employee, upon termination of employment:

(a) Of any employee of the employer to leave the employer; or

(b) of any customer of the employer to cease or reduce the extent to which it is doing business with the employer.

(6) “Party seeking enforcement” means the named plaintiff or claimant in a proceeding to enforce a noncompetition covenant or the defendant in an action for declaratory relief.

RCW 49.62.010* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).

(*This link refers the visitor to an external website: Washington State Legislature: Revised Code of Washington (RCW).)

(**This link refers the visitor to our external website: Williams Law Group Blog.)

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

April 27, 2023April 27, 2023

Illegal Contracts in Washington State

Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.

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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).

Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.

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June 23, 2022June 23, 2022

Unpaid Contract Wages (WA State)

Under Washington State labor regulations, what are employee remedies for unpaid contract wages? Here’s my point of view.

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UNPAID CONTRACT WAGES — BLACK LETTER LAW

The applicable law is found under both RCW 49.52.050 and .070 — Rebates of Wages and Civil Liability for Double Damages, respectively. The relevant portions of RCW 49.52.050 state as follows:

[RCW 49.52.050 – Rebates of wages–False records–Penalty.]

Any employer or officer, vice principal or agent of any employer, whether said employer be in private business or an elected public official, who

(1) Shall collect or receive from any employee a rebate of any part of wages theretofore paid by such employer to such employee; or

(2) Willfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages, shall pay any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract[ ] …

…

Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Id. (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). The relevant portions of RCW 49.52.070 state as follows:

[RCW 49.52.070 – Civil liability for double damages.]

Any employer and any officer, vice principal or agent of any employer who shall violate any of the provisions of RCW 49.52.050(1) and (2) shall be liable in a civil action by the aggrieved employee or his or her assignee to judgment for twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld by way of exemplary damages, together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the benefits of this section shall not be available to any employee who has knowingly submitted to such violations.

RCW 49.52.070 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

UNPAID CONTRACT WAGES — CASE LAW

The court in Clipse v. Commercial Driver Services, Inc., 189 Wn.App. 776, 358 P.3d 464 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2015), found that RCW 49.52.050(2) prohibits an employer from paying an employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract. Clipse, 189 Wn.App. at 776 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

The court further determined that RCW 49.52.070 creates civil liability, including double damages, costs, and attorney fees, for violations of RCW 49.52.050. Id.

CONCLUSION

Under Washington State labor regulations, employee remedies for unpaid contract wages can include double damages, costs, and attorney fees.

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March 24, 2022March 24, 2022

Employee-Handbook Liability

Under Washington State laws, are employee-handbook promises enforceable, when they address specific treatment in specific situations on which an employee justifiably relies? Here’s my point of view.

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THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

“Generally, an employment contract indefinite in duration is terminable at will.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). According to the “at-will” doctrine, an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability. See Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, an employee has the absolute right to quit his or her employment at-will. See id. However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment rule: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.

EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS: PROMISES OF SPECIFIC TREATMENT IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

“[U]nder certain circumstances, employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees.” Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 539-40 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).

ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY

“Under this theory, [a plaintiff] … must show [the following:]

[a)] … that a statement (or statements) in an employee manual or handbook or similar document amounts to a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, …

[b)] that the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and …

[c)] that the promise was breached.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Crucial Question

“[T]he crucial question is whether the employee has a reasonable expectation the employer will follow the discipline procedure, based upon the language used in stating the procedure and the pattern of practice in the workplace.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).

2. Questions of Fact

“[W]hether an employment policy manual issued by an employer contains a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, whether the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and whether the promise was breached are questions of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Therefore, summary judgment is proper only if reasonable minds could not differ in resolving these questions.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

3. Ambiguous Discipline Policies Create Issue of Fact

“The Court of Appeals has held that ambiguous discipline policies create an issue of fact as to whether the employer made a binding promise to follow certain discipline procedures.” Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted).

4. Summary Judgment May Not Be Appropriate When Discretionary Language Negated by Other Representations

“[T]he presence of discretionary language may not be sufficient for summary judgment when other representations negate that language.” Id. at 544 (referencing, e.g., Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wn.2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664 (1992) (“We reject the premise that this disclaimer can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an eternal escape hatch for an employer who may then make whatever unenforceable promises of working conditions it is to its benefit to make.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington State law, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations omitted).

RELATED: Read more about this topic by viewing our article entitled: Unenforceable Employment-Contract Provisions and Discrimination Claims.

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September 14, 2021December 16, 2021

Independent Contractors and Gender Discrimination

Under Washington State laws, may independent contractors bring gender discrimination actions in the making and performance of contracts for personal services? Here’s my point of view.

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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: GENDER

In Washington State, “an independent contractor may bring an action for discrimination in the making or performance of [a] contract for personal services.” Specialty Asphalt & Construction, LLC v. Lincoln County, 191 Wn.2d 182 (Wash. 2018). at 192 (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 100-01, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Such discrimination claims may be “based on sex [or gender] ….” Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 100-01.

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

The relevant law concerning the prima facie case is found under Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. However, because “RCW 49.60.030 does not provide the criteria for a prima facie claim, … [the court] crafted criteria through case law[ ][:]

[T]he plaintiff in a sex discrimination case must show (1) membership in a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was similarly situated to members of the opposite sex, i.e., that he or she was qualified for the position applied for or was performing substantially equal work; (3) because of plaintiff’s sex he or she was treated differently than members of the opposite sex.

Specialty Asphalt, 191 Wn.2d at 204 n.6 (citing Marquis, 130 Wn.2d at 113-14) (alteration in original) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM SIMILARLY SITUATED MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX BECAUSE OF GENDER

Moreover, “[t]he Marquis case provides three examples … [of how a plaintiff–in an action for discrimination in the making and performance of an employment contract–may show that the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated members of the opposite sex because of plaintiff’s gender]:

[ (1) ] [T]hat he or she was denied the position,

[ (2) ] was offered a contract only on terms which made the performance of the job more onerous or less lucrative than contracts given to members of the opposite sex, or,

[ (3) ] once offered the contract, was treated in a manner that made the performance of the work more difficult than that of members of the opposite sex who were similarly situated.

Specialty Asphalt, 191 Wn.2d at 193 (internal citation omitted) (second-fifth alterations in original).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: EVIDENCE

CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDIRECT, & INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE: “To establish discriminatory action, plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence.” Id. at 192 (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 526, 404 P.3d 464 (2017) (“assessing a claim under RCW 49.60.180“) (internal quotation marks omitted).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER: Summary judgment is improper “[w]hen the record contains reasonable but competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination[ ][; in that case,] the trier of fact must determine the true motivation.” Id. at 191-92 (citing Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 445, 334 P.3d 541 (2014) (citing Rice v. Offshore Sys., Inc., 167 Wn.App. 77, 90, 272 P.3d 865 (2012))).

TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE: “[E]vidence should be taken together when considering whether there are ‘reasonable but competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination.'” See id. at 192 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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June 26, 2021December 8, 2021

Section 1981 & Non-Employment Contracts (Ninth Circuit)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under The Law, are non-employment contracts protected in the Ninth Circuit? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer and Terms of Use before proceeding.)

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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

The problem is how to adapt the four elements of a prima facie case established in the employment discrimination context to claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Plaintiff-Appellant (“Lindsey” dba “E-Jays Panache Images”) was a business that presented fashion shows; all representatives were African-American, and audience members were primarily African-American as well. The Defendant-Appellee (“SLT Los Angeles” or “the Westin”) owned and operated, inter alia, a Grand Ballroom in their subject Westin Hotel.

Lindsey contracted for use of the Grand Ballroom for an event, but on the day of the event, there was an apparent mix up by the Westin. He essentially alleged that they were denied the Grand Ballroom in favor of a Bar Mitzvah because of their race.

Lindsey sued in U.S. District Court for, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and “the district court concluded that Appellant … [Lindsey] had failed to prove that the Westin’s actions, which had prevented Panache from hosting its annual Mother’s Day Fashion Show in the Grand Ballroom of the Westin Hotel, presented a prima facie case of race discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 1141.

Lindsey appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and it reversed the district court and remanded for trial. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the decisions of other circuits that “the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id.

Accordingly, “the first three elements require a plaintiff to show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right to contract for those services.” Id. (referencing Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir.2001); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir.1996)) (emphasis added).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

However, the court identified that “the Seventh and Sixth Circuits conflict over adaptation of the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement, which, as applied by the district court … [in Lindsey], requires that such services remained available to similarly-situated individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court then pointed out that “the Seventh Circuit adopts this requirement … but the Sixth Circuit concludes that this flat requirement is too rigorous in the context of the denial of services by a commercial establishment, because customers often have no way of establishing what treatment was accorded to other customers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The 9th Circuit reasoned that “the Sixth Circuit distinguishes the commercial services context from the employment context, where records are kept and there is a paper trail disclosing what treatment is given to similarly-situated others.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “the Sixth Circuit alters the elements to require: (a) that plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not; and/or (b) that plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning compelling, but did not decide whether its modification/relaxation of the fourth element of a prima facie case under Section 1981 is required in many or all cases arising in a commercial, non-employment context. The court found that the plaintiff in Lindsey offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, and, thus, it applied all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed.

CONCLUSION

It appears that in the Ninth Circuit, the following may be required to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:

1) membership in a protected class;

2) an attempt to contract for certain services;

3) denial of the right to contract for those services; and (possibly);

4) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not [AND/OR] plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.

See Lindsey, 447 F.3d at 1145. When the plaintiff offers clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, the court will likely apply all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed. See id.

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June 26, 2021June 30, 2021

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State

Under Washington State law, how do courts view ambiguous contracts at summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”

However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”

The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.