Under Washington State laws, what is the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Here’s my point of view.
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THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is based upon the “principle that a promise made without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to the promisee’s detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 591 (8th ed. 2004). Accordingly, to establish a viable claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must show:
(1) a promise which
(2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and
(3) which does cause the promisee to change his position
(4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that
(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Chen v. State, 86 Wn.App. 183, 194 n.1 (Div. 2 1997), petition denied, 133 Wn.2d 1020, 948 P.2d 387 (1997) (citing Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 158, 172, 876 P.2d 435 (1994), quoting Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 255, 259 n. 2, 616 P.2d 644 (1980)) (emphasis added).
THE “PROMISE” REQUIREMENT
“Promissory estoppel requires the existence of a promise.” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435) (hyperlink added). “A promise is defined as ‘a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.'” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 2(1))).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as a vital legal principle that ensures fairness and prevents unjust outcomes when a promise, lacking formal consideration, leads a promisee to alter their position based on that promise. By establishing specific criteria—including the existence of a promise, reasonable reliance, and the necessity of enforcement to avert injustice—this doctrine safeguards individuals from detrimental reliance on assurances that may otherwise go unfulfilled. As courts continue to interpret and apply this doctrine, it underscores the importance of honoring commitments in both personal and commercial contexts, fostering trust and accountability in our interactions.
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THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE (WA STATE)
In Washington State, “[t]he ‘litigation privilege’ is a judicially created privilege that protects participants—including attorneys, parties, and witnesses—in a judicial proceeding against civil liability for statements they make in the course of that proceeding.” Young v. Rayan, 27 Wn.App. 2d 500, 533 P.3d 123 (Wash. App. 2023), review denied, 2 Wash.3d 1008 (Wash. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
witness immunity
When applied to witnesses, this privilege is often referred to as “witness immunity.” See id. Under this principle, witnesses in judicial proceedings are generally granted absolute immunity from legal action based on their testimony, provided their statements are related to the litigation at hand. See id. “Statements are absolutely privileged if they are pertinent or material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally sufficient to obtain that relief.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
However, statements that are unrelated to the litigation do not receive this protection; not every incidental remark made in court will escape liability. See id. But the threshold for determining relevance is not overly stringent: “As the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates, a statement ‘need not be strictly relevant to any issue’ so long as it bears ‘some reference to the subject matter of the … litigation.'” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 586, comment c).
THE GENERAL RULE
Thus, the Litigation Privilege “prohibits liability stemming from statements
(1) made in the course of a judicial proceeding
(2) that are pertinent to the litigation.
Id. “Pertinency is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
THE POLICY
“The purpose of the litigation privilege doctrine is to encourage frank, open, untimorous argument and testimony and to discourage retaliatory, derivative lawsuits.” Id.
ATTORNEYS
“As applied to attorneys, it furthers ‘a public policy of securing to [counsel] as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
WITNESS TESTIMONY
“As applied to witness testimony, it preserves ‘the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging full and frank testimony.'” Id. (internal citations omitted). “The rule addresses the concern that a witness may either be reluctant to come forward to testify in the first place or shade their testimony ‘to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Under Washington State laws, what is the direct-evidence method (hereinafter, “Direct-Evidence Method”) of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION — THE PRIMA FACIE CASE (2 OPTIONS)
In Washington State, “[a] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case [of employment discrimination] by either[:]
[1.] offering direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent, or …
(1) the defendant employer acted with a discriminatory motive and
(2) the discriminatory motivation was a significant or substantial factor in an employment decision.
Id.* at 744 (citing Kastanis, 122 Wn.2d at 491) (paragraph formatting, hyperlink, and emphasis added).
THE 2ND ELEMENT: DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATION WAS SIGNIFICANT/SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR
To satisfy the second element of the Direct-Evidence Method, the plaintiff–employee “must … [establish that] the discriminatory motive was a significant or substantial factor in an employment decision relating to … [plaintiff].” Id.* at 746 (referencing Kastanis, 122 Wn.2d at 491). This can be done by identifying associated adverse employment actions.
ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
“An adverse employment action involves a change in employment conditions that is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities, such as reducing an employee’s workload and pay.” Id.* (citing Campbell v. State, 129 Wn.App. 10, 22, 118 P.3d 888 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1002 (2006)). “A demotion or adverse transfer, or a hostile work environment, may also amount to an adverse employment action.” Id.* (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 465, 98 P.3d 827 (2004), review denied, 154 Wn.2d 1007 (2005)) (hyperlink added).
EMPLOYER’S DISCRIMINATORY REMARKS GENERALLY CONSIDERED DIRECT EVIDENCE
Washington Courts “generally consider an employer’s discriminatory remarks to be direct evidence of discrimination.” Id.* (referencing Johnson v. Express Rent & Own, Inc., 113 Wn.App. 858, 862-63, 56 P.3d 567 (2002) (“reversing summary judgment based on supervisor’s ageist comments that plaintiff did not fit company’s image of a youthful, fit, ‘GQ’ looking mold”)).
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What is considered retaliatory action against state-employee whistleblowers (WA State)?
The relevant law concerning retaliation against state-employee whistleblowers is found under RCW 42.40.050*, as follows:
RCW 42.40.050.
Retaliatory action against whistleblower—Remedies.
(1)(a) Any person who is a whistleblower, as defined in RCW 42.40.020*, and who has been subjected to workplace reprisal or retaliatory action is presumed to have established a cause of action for the remedies provided under chapter 49.60* RCW [(i.e., The Washington Law Against Discrimination)].
(b) For the purpose of this section, “reprisal or retaliatory action” means, but is not limited to, any of the following:
(i) Denial of adequate staff to perform duties;
(ii) Frequent staff changes;
(iii) Frequent and undesirable office changes;
(iv) Refusal to assign meaningful work;
(v) Unwarranted and unsubstantiated letters of reprimand or unsatisfactory performance evaluations;
(vi) Demotion;
(vii) Reduction in pay;
(viii) Denial of promotion;
(ix) Suspension;
(x) Dismissal;
(xi) Denial of employment;
(xii) A supervisor or superior behaving in or encouraging coworkers to behave in a hostile manner toward the whistleblower;
(xiii) A change in the physical location of the employee’s workplace or a change in the basic nature of the employee’s job, if either are in opposition to the employee’s expressed wish;
(xiv) Issuance of or attempt to enforce any nondisclosure policy or agreement in a manner inconsistent with prior practice; or
(xv) Any other action that is inconsistent compared to actions taken before the employee engaged in conduct protected by this chapter, or compared to other employees who have not engaged in conduct protected by this chapter.
(2) The agency presumed to have taken retaliatory action under subsection (1) of this section may rebut that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there have been a series of documented personnel problems or a single, egregious event, or that the agency action or actions were justified by reasons unrelated to the employee’s status as a whistleblower and that improper motive was not a substantial factor.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits an agency from making any decision exercising its authority to terminate, suspend, or discipline an employee who engages in workplace reprisal or retaliatory action against a whistleblower. However, the agency also shall implement any order under chapter 49.60* RCW (other than an order of suspension if the agency has terminated the retaliator).
Under Washington State laws, state-employee whistleblowers who experience retaliatory actions have various remedies available to them. As defined under RCW 42.40.050, retaliatory actions encompass a wide range of behaviors, including but not limitedto denial of adequate staff, unwarranted demotion, and hostile behavior from supervisors or coworkers. However, agencies have the opportunity to rebut these claims by demonstrating documented personnel issues or justifying actions unrelated to whistleblowing.
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Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), what is the CR 26(i) conference requirement? Here’s my point of view.
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The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)
In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules is paramount for the smooth functioning of the legal system and ensuring fairness for all parties involved. One such rule that holds significant importance concerning the discovery process is CR 26(i)*. In this article, I delve into what this rule entails and why it’s crucial for civil attorneys practicing in Washington State to understand and comply with it.
Understanding CR 26(i)
Requirement for Conference of Counsel
CR 26(i)* mandates that before presenting any motion or objection concerning Rules 26 through 37 (Depositions and Discovery) of the Washington State Rules of Superior Court*, counsel for the parties involved must confer with each other. This conference should be arranged at a mutually convenient time and can take place either in person or via telephone.
Good Faith Conferencing
The rule emphasizes the necessity of conducting the conference in good faith. This implies that the parties involved should engage in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving issues or reaching agreements regarding the motion or objection at hand.
Sanctions for Non-Compliance
Should the court determine that counsel for any party has willfully refused or failed to confer in good faith as required by CR 26(i)*, it holds the authority to apply sanctions as outlined under Rule 37(b)*. These sanctions can encompass a range of punitive measures, highlighting the seriousness with which the court views non-compliance with procedural requirements.
Certification Requirement
Importantly, any motion seeking an order to compel discovery or obtain protection must include certification from counsel affirming that the conference requirements of CR 26(i)* have been met. This certification serves as evidence of compliance and ensures transparency in the litigation process.
Importance of Compliance
Compliance with CR 26(i)* is not merely a procedural formality; it serves several crucial purposes:
1. Facilitating Communication
By necessitating conference among counsel, the rule promotes open communication and collaboration between parties. This can often lead to the resolution of disputes without the need for court intervention, thereby saving time and resources.
2. Efficient Case Management
Ensuring that parties engage in pre-motion conferences helps streamline the litigation process. By addressing potential issues early on, the court can better manage its docket and expedite proceedings.
3. Promoting Fairness
The requirement for good-faith conferencing underscores the principle of fairness in litigation. It encourages parties to engage in constructive dialogue and seek mutually acceptable solutions, ultimately promoting equitable outcomes.
4. Enhancing Accountability
The certification requirement adds an extra layer of accountability for counsel, reinforcing the importance of compliance with procedural rules. It acts as a safeguard against frivolous or improper motions, thereby promoting the integrity of the legal process.
Conclusion
In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules like CR 26(i) is indispensable. By mandating pre-motion conferences and ensuring good faith engagement among counsel, this rule serves to foster communication, streamline proceedings, and uphold the principles of fairness and accountability within the legal system. Attorneys practicing in Washington State must familiarize themselves with CR 26(i) and diligently adhere to its requirements to navigate civil litigation successfully. Failure to do so can not only result in sanctions but may also undermine the integrity of the litigation process itself.
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IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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Is Washington State an at-will employment state?
answer:
Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. SeeFord v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (referencing Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878 (1928); see also Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 40 Wash. 354, 357, 82 P. 606 (1905) (Mount, C.J., dissenting) (“where [an employment] contract is general and for an indefinite time, it is terminable at will.”)).
According to the at-will doctrine, “an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability.” See id. (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, in the absence of a contract stating otherwise, an employee has the absolute right to abandon … [their] employment at-will.” See id.
However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.
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Introduction
In Washington State civil litigation, the commencement of a legal action is a critical step that sets the stage for the entire legal process. Let’s delve into the key aspects of initiating a civil action as outlined in the state’s rules and statutes. NOTE: this article only addresses commencement in Washington State Superior Courts*.
How to Commence a Civil Legal Action
Except as provided in Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (CR), CR 4.1*, a civil action in Washington State can be commenced in two primary ways:
1. Service of Summons and Complaint:
The action is initiated by serving a copy of a summons along with a copy of the complaint, as outlined in Rule 4* of the state’s legal procedures. This service of documents is a fundamental step in officially notifying the defendant of the legal proceedings against them.
2. Filing a Complaint:
Alternatively, a civil action can also be commenced by directly filing a complaint with the court. This formal submission of the complaint initiates the legal process and sets the case in motion.
Upon commencing the action, there are specific timelines and requirements that parties must adhere to:
Written Demand for Filing:
If any other party in the case makes a written demand, the plaintiff instituting the action must pay the filing fee and file the summons and complaint within 14 days after service of the demand. Failure to do so renders the service void.
Effect on Statute of Limitations:
It’s important to note that an action is not considered commenced for the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations unless specified otherwise in RCW 4.16.170*. This statute outlines exceptions where the commencement of an action may affect the timeline within which legal actions can be pursued.
Ensuring Legal Compliance and Timely Action
Complying with the rules regarding commencement of civil actions is crucial for all parties involved. It ensures that legal proceedings are initiated in a timely and legally valid manner, preventing potential disputes or challenges regarding the validity of service or commencement.
Conclusion
Initiating a civil action in Washington State involves careful adherence to procedural rules regarding service, filing, and responding to demands. Understanding these rules and timelines is essential for legal practitioners and parties involved in civil litigation, ensuring a smooth and legally compliant commencement of the legal process.
—–
*NOTE: Links with a single asterisk (*) will take the reader away from our website to an external governmental website.
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Under Washington State laws, what is an “affirmative defense” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.
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Definition of Affirmative Defense
In civil litigation under Washington State laws, the concept of affirmative defense plays a crucial role in legal proceedings. An affirmative defense is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant in response to a plaintiff‘s claim. Unlike a denial or a simple assertion that the plaintiff’s allegations are false, an affirmative defense asserts new facts or legal theories that, if proven, would defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims.
examples
One common example of an affirmative defense is the statute of limitations. This defense asserts that even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true, the claim is barred because it was not brought within the time period specified by law. Other affirmative defenses may include, but are not limitedtofailure to mitigate damages, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and duress, among others.
TIMING
In Washington State, it is essential for defendants to raise affirmative defenses promptly during litigation according to court rules. A defendant’s failure to timely do so can lead to the affirmative defense being forfeited and rendered unusable in subsequent stages of the litigation process.
burden of proof
It’s important to note that the burden of proof for an affirmative defense usually falls on the defendant. This means that the defendant must present evidence and convince the court that the affirmative defense applies to the case and should result in a favorable outcome for the defendant.
Conclusion
In summary, an affirmative defense in Washington State civil litigation is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant to defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims. It introduces new facts or legal theories that, if proven, can provide a legal basis for the defendant’s position in the case. Understanding affirmative defenses is essential for both plaintiffs and defendants in navigating the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State.
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HOW COURTS CONSTRUE LEGAL PRIVILEGES (WA STATE)
Generally, a “privilege” is “[a] special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. [ ] A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004).
In Washington State, “[t]here are two types of privileges: common law privileges and statutory privileges. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).
COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES: courts have more latitude to interpret
“Common law privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, are those privileges whose codifications are ‘merely declaratory of the common law.'” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)) (emphasis added).
“The court has more latitude to interpret common law privileges.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 815, 259 P.2d 845 (although not specified in the statute codifying the attorney-client privilege, we held that “[t]he same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule (citing State v. Ingels, 4 Wash.2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940))).
STATUTORY PRIVILEGES: courts strictly construe
“In contrast, when a privilege is created by statute and thus is not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly construed.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychologist-client privilege is created by statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed); Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 212-13, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (physician-patient privilege is created by statute and is strictly construed (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979))) (parenthetical emphasis added).
“Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the marital counseling privilege is [also] created by statute and must be strictly construed by interpreting the specific words in the statute that the legislature has codified.” Id. at 802-03 (citing Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 429, 671 P.2d 230).
CONCLUSION
In Washington State, there are common-law privileges and statutory privileges. Common-law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are “declaratory of the common law,” and courts have more freedom to construe them. Whereas statutory privileges such a the psychologist-client privilege, physician-patient privilege, and marital-counseling privilege are considered to be an “exemption from the common law,” and courts must strictly construe them.
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Q: What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?
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What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?
(This article will only address claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. However, there are other laws (both state and federal) that might support a claim of wrongful termination.)
(Warning: It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for administrative relief (see below) and prospective lawsuits (see above). Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to contact an employment attorney to determine both the statute of limitations and when it begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.)
Administrative Agencies (WSHRC & EEOC):
Generally, the jurisdictional time limitation for filing wrongful-termination complaints through administrative agencies such as the Washington State Human Rights Commission(WSHRC) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is significantly shorter; however, this topic is beyond the scope of this article — speak to an attorney for more information. See “Warning,” above.
Other Relevant Laws:
Other employment laws (both state and federal) might also support a claim of “wrongful termination” in Washington State including, but not limited to the following:
→ Section 1981 (42 U.S.C. §1981) (when the termination supports a viable legal theory of racial discrimination)
Talk to an attorney to determine the statute of limitations for relevant state and federal laws. See “Warning,” above.
Additional Information:
A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.
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Under Washington State laws, what is the meaning of “statute of limitations” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.
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Introduction: Statute of Limitations
Within the context of Washington State civil litigation, the concept of the statute of limitations serves as an essential thread that weaves together justice, fairness, and practicality. Rooted in the belief that legal actions should be pursued within a reasonable timeframe, the statute of limitations imposes a temporal boundary on the initiation of lawsuits. This legal doctrine aims to strike a delicate balance between the need for timely resolution and the preservation of fundamental fairness. In this article, I will define the term, address its key principles, and discuss exceptions and tolling.
Defining Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations is a legal principle that dictates the maximum time allowed for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or legal action against a defendant. Its primary purpose is to ensure that legal disputes are resolved promptly, avoiding the complications that arise from the passage of time, such as fading memories, lost evidence, and changes in circumstances.
Statutes of limitations can vary depending on the legal theory; to learn about the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), we invite you to read our article entitled: WLAD Statute of Limitations.
Key Principles
1. Preserving Evidence and Witness Testimony:
The statute of limitations acts as a safeguard against the deterioration of evidence and witness testimony over time. It recognizes the inherent challenges of litigating a case where memories may fade, documents may be lost, and witnesses may become unavailable.
2. Promoting Judicial Efficiency:
Efficiency is a cornerstone of the American legal system, and the statute of limitations plays a vital role in achieving this goal. By encouraging prompt legal action, it helps prevent the clogging of court dockets with stale claims, allowing the legal system to focus on resolving current and pressing issues.
3. Balancing Fairness and Finality:
The statute of limitations embodies the principle of fairness by providing a degree of legal certainty for potential defendants. Once the prescribed time limit has passed, individuals and entities can reasonably expect to be free from the threat of litigation related to a particular incident, promoting finality in legal matters.
Exceptions and Tolling
While the statute of limitations is generally rigid, exceptions and tolling provisions exist. These may include circumstances such as the discovery of fraud or the minority of the plaintiff at the time of the incident, which can extend the time frame within which legal action can be initiated. To learn more about tolling the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims under the WLAD, we invite you to read our article entitled: WLAD Statute of Limitations: Equitable Tolling.
Conclusion
The statute of limitations serves as a guardian of justice, ensuring that legal disputes are resolved in a timely manner while balancing the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Understanding the nuances of these temporal boundaries is vital for anyone handling lawsuits or legal actions, highlighting the intricate interplay between fairness, efficiency, and the pursuit of justice within the bounds of time.
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Under Washington State laws, must a nonmoving party’s “self-serving” declarations be taken as true on summary judgment in a civil lawsuit? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT: CIVIL CASES
In my Washington State employment law practice (I only represent employee-plaintiffs), employer-defendants typically file motions for summary judgment against my clients. “Summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another party without a full trial.” See Summary Judgment, Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/summary_judgment (last visited August 3, 2023). “In civil cases, either party may make a pre-trial motion for summary judgment.” Id.
In Washington, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to show sufficient evidence to establish a question of fact as to the existence of an element on which he or she will have the burden of proof at trial.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 569 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (citing Lake Chelan Shores Homeowners Ass’n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 176 Wn.App. 168, 179, 313 P.3d 408 (2013)).
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS (WA STATE)
When defending against motions for summary judgment, my clients often file declarations that employers claim are “self-serving.” But “on summary judgment a nonmoving party’s declaration must be taken as true and can create a genuine issue of material fact even if it is ‘self-serving.'” Id. at 575 (citing Reagan v. Newton, 7 Wn.App.2d 781, 806, 436 P.3d 411, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1030 (2019)) (emphasis added).
However, “[a] plaintiff cannot contradict unambiguous deposition testimony with a subsequent declaration.” Id. at 587, fn. 3 (citing Robinson v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 106 Wn.App. 104, 121, 22 P.3d 818 (2001)).
CONCLUSION
Thus, under Washington State laws, I believe that a nonmoving party’s “self-serving” declaration must be taken as true on summary judgment of a civil lawsuit unless it contradicts unambiguous deposition testimony.
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THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
“Under the public duty doctrine, no liability may be imposed for a public official’s negligent conduct unless it is shown that the duty breached was owed to the injured person as an individual and was not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the public in general.” Specialty Asphalt & Construction, LLC v. Lincoln County, 191 Wn.2d 182, 198 (Wash. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).
EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE (SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS)
“An exception to the public duty doctrine applies if there is a ‘special relationship’ between the parties.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “A special relationship arises where[:]
(1) there is direct contact or privity between the public official and the injured plaintiff which sets the latter apart from the general public, and
(2) there are express assurances given by a public official, which
(3) give[ ] rise to justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff.
Id. (second alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (paragraph formatting added).
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Under WA State laws, what is the proper inquiry for vicarious liability within the scope of employment law? Here’s my point of view.
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Vicarious liability is “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).
Under Washington State law, after “an employee’s underlying tort is established, the employer will be held vicariously liable if ‘the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.'” Robel v. Roundup Corporation*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 53 (Wash. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 469, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)).
The proper vicarious-liability inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct. See id. An employer may not insulate itself from vicarious liability merely by adopting a general policy proscribing bad behavior that would otherwise be actionable. Id.
DEFEATING A CLAIM OF VICARIOUS LIBAILITY
“An employer can defeat a claim of vicarious liability by showing that the employee’s conduct was[:]
(1) ‘intentional or criminal’ and
(2) ‘outside the scope of employment.’
Id. (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 56, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)) (paragraph formatting added).
However, intentional or criminal conduct is not per se outside the cope of employment. Id. at 53. Moreover, it is not the case that an employer will be vicariously liable only where it has specifically authorized an employee to act in an intentionally harmful or negligent manner. See id.
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Under Washington State laws, when are employee noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable? Here’s my point of view.
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NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS (WA STATE)
Generally, a noncompetition covenant is “[a] promise , usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 392 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). In Washington State, a “‘[n]oncompetition covenant’ includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” RCW 49.62.010(4)*.
The Washington State Legislature has found both that “workforce mobility is important to economic growth and development[ ]” and that “agreements limiting competition or hiring may be contracts of adhesion** that may be unreasonable.” RCW 49.62.005* (hyperlink added). Washington’s noncompetition covenants law (hereinafter, “law”), RCW 49.62*, took effect on January 1, 2020 and establishes when such noncompetition covenants are void and unenforceable. See RCW 49.62.900*.
WHEN VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE
In Washington State, a noncompetition covenant is considered void and unenforceable against an employee unless certain conditions are met. The relevant law follows:
(1) A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an employee:
(a)(i) Unless the employer discloses the terms of the covenant in writing to the prospective employee no later than the time of the acceptance of the offer of employment and, if the agreement becomes enforceable only at a later date due to changes in the employee’s compensation, the employer specifically discloses that the agreement may be enforceable against the employee in the future; or
(ii) If the covenant is entered into after the commencement of employment, unless the employer provides independent consideration for the covenant;
(b) Unless the employee’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement, when annualized, exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year. This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*;
(c) If the employee is terminated as the result of a layoff, unless enforcement of the noncompetition covenant includes compensation equivalent to the employee’s base salary at the time of termination for the period of enforcement minus compensation earned through subsequent employment during the period of enforcement.
(2) A court or arbitrator must presume that any noncompetition covenant with a duration exceeding eighteen months after termination of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. A party seeking enforcement may rebut the presumption by proving by clear and convincing evidence that a duration longer than eighteen months is necessary to protect the party’s business or goodwill.
The law also protects independent contractors to a certain extent. “A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an independent contractor unless the independent contractor’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars per year.” RCW 49.62.030* (emphasis added). “This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*.” Id. In addition, “[t]he duration of a noncompetition covenant between a performer and a performance space, or a third party scheduling the performer for a performance space, must not exceed three calendar days.” Id.
UNENFORCEABLE COVENANT PROVISIONS
Lastly, the law determines when noncompetition covenant provisions are unenforceable. “A provision in a noncompetition covenant signed by an employee or independent contractor who is Washington-based is void and unenforceable:
(1) If the covenant requires the employee or independent contractor to adjudicate a noncompetition covenant outside of this state; and
(2) To the extent it deprives the employee or independent contractor of the protections or benefits of this chapter[, RCW 49.62*].”
RCW 49.62.050* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).
Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.
(1) “Earnings” means the compensation reflected on box one of the employee’s United States internal revenue service form W-2 that is paid to an employee over the prior year, or portion thereof for which the employee was employed, annualized and calculated as of the earlier of the date enforcement of the noncompetition covenant is sought or the date of separation from employment. “Earnings” also means payments reported on internal revenue service form 1099-MISC for independent contractors.
(2) “Employee” and “employer” have the same meanings as in RCW 49.17.020*.
(3) “Franchisor” and “franchisee” have the same meanings as in RCW 19.100.010*.
(4) “Noncompetition covenant” includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. A “noncompetition covenant” does not include:
(a) A nonsolicitation agreement;
(b) a confidentiality agreement;
(c) a covenant prohibiting use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions;
(d) a covenant entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest; or
(e) a covenant entered into by a franchisee when the franchise sale complies with RCW 19.100.020(1)*.
(5) “Nonsolicitation agreement” means an agreement between an employer and employee that prohibits solicitation by an employee, upon termination of employment:
(a) Of any employee of the employer to leave the employer; or
(b) of any customer of the employer to cease or reduce the extent to which it is doing business with the employer.
(6) “Party seeking enforcement” means the named plaintiff or claimant in a proceeding to enforce a noncompetition covenant or the defendant in an action for declaratory relief.
RCW 49.62.010* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS (EMPLOYERS)
When an employer’s accommodation is ineffective, the employee’s corresponding duty to communicate mandates: “If the employee does not communicate to the employer that an accommodation was not effective, he or she cannot maintain a failure to accommodate claim.” Id. at 587 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis and hyperlinks added). The basis for this duty is that “an employer must be able to ascertain whether its efforts at accommodation have been effective, and therefore an employee has a duty to communicate to the employer whether the accommodation was effective.” Id. at 586-87 (citing Frisino v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn.App. 765, 783, 249 P.3d 1044 (2011)) (hyperlinks added).
EXAMPLE: MACKEY v. HOME DEPOT USA, INC.
In Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., “Mackey began working at Home Depot[] … in 2006.” Id. at 564. “During her employment, Mackey suffered from depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and degenerative disc disease. She asked for accommodations related to all these conditions.” Id.
home depot’s DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE (EMPLOYER)
“Home Depot accommodated Mackey’s degenerative disc disease by allowing [her] … to have other employees do any required lifting.” Id. at 586.
mackey’s FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE CLAIM
“Home Depot [eventually] terminated Mackey’s employment after an investigation determined that she had been violating company policies regarding discounts on customer orders.” Id. at 563. “Mackey asserted claims for[, inter alia,] failure to reasonably accommodate her physical disability.” Id. “Mackey argue[d] that [Home Depot’s disability] … accommodation was unreasonable because it required her to seek out the help of other employees and tell them about her disability before completing the lifting tasks assigned to her.” Id.
mackey’s DUTY TO COMMUNICATE (EMPLOYEE)
The employer defended by asserting, “Mackey failed to notify Home Depot that the [disability] accommodation it provided to her was insufficient or unreasonable.” Id. at 586. The Court also noted: “Mackey admitted that she never complained to Home Depot that she did not have someone to lift for her or that the accommodation was not adequate.” Id. at 587.
THE COURT’S HOLDING
The Washington State Court of Appeals held, “[T]he trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Mackey’s failure to reasonably accommodate claim because Mackey never notified Home Depot that the accommodation it provided was ineffective or unreasonable.” Id. at 564.
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Under Washington State laws, what are employer limitations when disclosing employee information in response to employment reference checks and verifications? Here’s my point of view.
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EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE CHECKS AND VERIFICATIONS — IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL/CRIMINAL LIABILITY — PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH
Under Washington State law, if an employer discloses information to a prospective employer or employment agency concerning a current or former employee–and that disclosure was specifically requested by the prospective employer or employment agency–then the disclosing employer “is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil and criminal liability for such disclosure or its consequences if the disclosed information relates to:
(a) the employee’s ability to perform his or her job;
(b) the diligence, skill, or reliability with which the employee carried out the duties of his or her job; or
(c) any illegal or wrongful act committed by the employee when related to the duties of his or her job.
RCW 4.24.730(1) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
WRITTEN RECORDS
An employer that discloses employee information pursuant to this section (RCW 4.24.730) to a prospective employer or employment agency “should retain a written record of the identity of the person or entity to which information is disclosed under this section for a minimum of two years from the date of disclosure.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).
“The employee or former employee has a right to inspect any such written record upon request and any such written record shall become part of the employee’s personnel file, subject to the provisions of chapter 49.12 RCW.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH
To rebut the presumption of good faith under this section (RCW 4.24.730), there must be “a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the information disclosed by the employer was knowingly false, deliberately misleading, or made with reckless disregard for the truth.” RCW 4.24.730(3) (emphasis added).
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.
Actions limited to three years. Within three years:
* * *
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated;
Lewis, 36 Wn.App. at 609, 676 P.2d 545 (hyperlink to external website and emphasis added).
“Further support for applying the 3-year statute [to the WLAD] is found in the Legislature’s directive that RCW 49.60 be liberally construed.” Id. (citing Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 334, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 103 S.Ct. 730, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash.2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857 (1980)) (hyperlink to external website added).
WARNING
It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for prospective lawsuits and administrative relief.
Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to use the assistance of legal counsel to determine when the statute of limitations (or jurisdictional time limitation for administrative agencies) begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.
“In Fowler v. Guerin, our [Washington State] Supreme Court explained that ‘statutes of limitation reflect the importance of finality and settled expectations in our civil justice system.'” Campeau v. Yakima HMA LLC, 38152-8-III (Wash. App. May 02, 2023) (citing Fowler v. Guerin, 200 Wn.2d 110, 118, 515 P.3d 502 (2022)). Accordingly, “[a] statutory time bar is a legislative declaration of public policy which the courts can do no less than respect, with rare equitable exceptions.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 118, 515 P.3d 502) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
eQUITABLE TOLLING (WA state): tHE MILLAY STANDARD
“In civil cases, Washington has consistently required a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to demonstrate [the following:]
(1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence,
(2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception interfered with the plaintiff’s timely filing,
(3) tolling is consistent with
(a) the purpose of the underlying statute and
(b) the purpose of the statute of limitations, and
(4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations.
Campeau, 38152-8-III (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 125, 515 P.3d 502 (“describing the four predicates as the Millay standard[, Millay v. Cam, 135 Wn.2d 193, 955 P.2d 791 (1988)]”)) (emphasis added).
However, Washington courts have “cautioned against broadly applying equitable tolling in a manner that would substitute for a positive rule established by the legislature a variable rule of decision based upon individual ideas of justice.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 119, 515 P.3d 502) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.
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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE
“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).
Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY
For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.
CONCLUSION
In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.
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Under Washington State law, what is the purpose of the local government tort-claim filing statute? Here’s my point of view.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements. See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:
RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.
(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.
Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.
The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.
(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.
RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT
Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:
RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.
…
(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.
The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.
For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.
RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)
THE POLICIES
CLAIM FILING STATUTE
“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571. “The legislature illustrated the general nature of this purpose, stating that ‘[t]he laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.'” Id. (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)) (alteration in original). “Under this directive, exact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents.” Id.
TORT CLAIM
“The purpose of this claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citingMedina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)). “The claim filing statute provides further that it is to be liberally construed such that substantial compliance is satisfactory.” Id; see also RCW 4.96.020(5).
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
…
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]
CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.
MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.” Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).
HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)
“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citingBarnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).
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THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
According to the canon of administrative-agency interpretations:
Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight.
Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 177, 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) (“[The Washington Law Against Discrimination,] RCW 49.60[,] does not define ‘handicap’; deference is given by court to Human Rights Commission administrative rule defining ‘handicap'”).
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Under federal laws and regulations, what is the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOCs) Notice of Right to Sue? NOTE: This article addresses public and private employment and does not address federal government employees or applicants.
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THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)
The EEOC is a federal agency “responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” U.S. EEOC Website,https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited 11/29/22).
eeoc functions
“The laws apply to all types of work situations, including hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and benefits.” Id. Accordingly, the EEOC has authority to perform several functions:
(1) To investigate charges of discrimination against employers who are covered by the law.
(2) To prevent discrimination before it occurs through outreach, education, and technical assistance programs.
(3) To provide leadership and guidance to federal agencies on all aspects of the federal government’s equal employment opportunity program.
Id. As part of its investigative function, the EEOC is responsible for issuing the Notice of Right to Sue.
THE 90-DAY NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
Charge Filing
The claimant must first file a charge with the EEOC if the claimant plans “to file a lawsuit under federal law alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic information, or retaliation, … (except for lawsuits under the Equal Pay Act, see below).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22). I will explain certain exceptions later in this article.
Notice of Right to Sue
The EEOC Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See id. The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id.
90-Day Limitation
When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. Id. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
Federal Government Employees and Applicants
This article does not address federal government employees or applicants. “The procedures for filing a complaint of discrimination against a federal government agency differ from those for filing a charge against a private or public employer.” Id. To learn more, visit the EEOC Website page: Overview Of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process.
EXCEPTIONS WHEN FILING A LAWSUIT
Age Discrimination Lawsuits (ADEA)
“If you plan to file an age discrimination lawsuit, you must have filed a charge but you don’t need a Notice of Right to Sue to file a lawsuit in court. You can file a lawsuit in court any time after 60 days have passed from the day you filed your charge (but no later than 90 days after you receive notice that our investigation is concluded).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
Equal Pay Lawsuits (EPA)
“If you plan to file a lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act, you don’t have to file a charge or obtain a Notice of Right to Sue before filing. Rather, you can go directly to court, provided you file your suit within two years from the day the pay discrimination took place (3 years if the discrimination was willful).” Id.
Filing a Lawsuit Before Investigation is Completed
“If you want to file a lawsuit before … [the EEOC has] finished … [their] investigation, you can request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.
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HOW TO REQUEST A NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
There are a few ways to request a Notice of Right to Sue depending on your circumstances. “If you have registered in EEOC’s Public Portal, you can submit your request by logging in to your charge account and uploading your request. If you don’t have an online charge account, send your request for a Notice of Right to Sue to the EEOC office responsible for investigating your charge and include your EEOC charge number and the names of the parties.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
In any event, the EEOC has time limitations in fulfilling requests for Notices of Right to Sue.
Before 180 Days Have Passed
Before 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC will give the claimant the notice only if the EEOC will be unable to complete their investigation within 180 days. See id. According to the EEOC, “If you want the EEOC to continue investigating your charge, don’t request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.
After 180 Days Have Passed
After 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC is required by law to give the claimant the notice upon their request. See id.
CONCLUSION
The EEOCs Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id. When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” Id.
The reader is strongly encouraged to seek legal counsel when first considering claims of employment discrimination.
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Under Washington State law, what is the failure-to-mitigate-damages affirmative defense and how is it typically applied in Washington State employment-discrimination cases? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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MITIGATING DAMAGES
In Washington State, plaintiffs have “a duty to use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. To mitigate means to avoid or reduce damages.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.83 (7th ed.).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
An affirmative defense is a defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true. Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 451, “defense (affirmative defense)” (Rev 8th Ed. 2004); Bernsen v. Big Bend Elec. Co-op., Inc., 68 Wn.App. 427, 433, 842 P.2d 1047 (1993); CR 8(c).
Defendant-employers usually assert the affirmative defense of “failure to mitigate damages” against plaintiff-employees during litigation of employment-discrimination claims. This particular defense is most often asserted when the plaintiff-employee challenges as discriminatory a discrete employment decision, such as a termination or a failure to hire. 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.83 (7th ed.).
FAILURE TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
In an employment-discrimination suit, the burden of proving a failure to mitigate damages is on the employer, and the employer must show the following to satisfy its burden:
1. There were openings in comparable positions available for plaintiff elsewhere after defendant terminated or refused to hire plaintiff;
2. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking those openings;
3. The amount by which damages would have been reduced if the plaintiff had used reasonable care and diligence in seeking those openings.
Juries are typically instructed that they should take into account the characteristics of the plaintiff and the job market in evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s efforts to mitigate damages. Id. Importantly, the plaintiff’s failure to make an ongoing, concerted effort to find comparable employment does not preclude a back pay award. Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc., 9 P.3d 948, 102 Wn.App. 828 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2000).
AN EXAMPLE: HENNINGSEN v. WORLDCOM, INC.
For example, in Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc., a plaintiff-employee (Henningsen) brought a sex discrimination lawsuit against her defendant-employer (Worldcom), and the trial court (bench trial) entered judgment in Henningsen’s favor; the award included full back pay. Id.
Worldcom then appealed alleging, inter alia, the trial court erred, because Henningsen failed to mitigate her damages. Id. Worldcom claimed that “there was evidence that she traveled extensively, had a baby, married the baby’s father, and then proceeded to assist him in the management of his own business after she left Worldcom.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The Court found that there was “evidence that Henningsen failed to make an ongoing, concerted effort to find comparable employment” and that the trial court even “expressed some concerns about [Henningsen’s] underemployment[.]” Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). But the Court also found that there was “evidence that she worked on a limited basis for her husband’s business and tried to start a home business.” Id.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “Worldcom presented no evidence that employment comparable to her position at Worldcom was in fact available” and, therefore, ruled that “substantial evidence support[ed] the trial court’s finding that Worldcom did not prove that Henningsen failed to mitigate her back pay damages.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, in the case of Henningsen v. Worldcom, the issue of mitigation of damages was determined in favor of the employee as a result of the employer’s failure to satisfy the first element of the test—evidence that there were openings in comparable positions available for plaintiff elsewhere after defendant terminated (or refused to hire) plaintiff.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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CLAIM SPLITTING
The general rule for claim splitting is that “if an action is brought for part of a claim, a judgment obtained in the action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 782, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999) (Plaintiffs prohibited from suing for personal injuries after obtaining judgment for property damage arising out of same accident) (emphasis added); see also, Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Medical Center, 97 Wn. App. 728, 987 P.2d 634 (1999) (Plaintiff prohibited from raising a new claim on appeal after summary judgment).
RES JUDICATA
The theory of dismissal based upon claim splitting is “variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 783, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999); see also, Sound Build Homes, Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate/ South, Inc., 118 Wn.App. 617, 628, 72 P.3d 788 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2003) (theory on which dismissal is granted is variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action) (hyperlink added). Thus, the rules of res judicata are typically applied to determine if improper claim splitting has occurred.
DISMISSAL BASED ON RES JUDICATA
Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects:
(1) persons and parties;
(2) cause of action;
(3) subject matter; and
(4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.
Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting added). This res judicata test is a conjunctive one requiring satisfaction of all four elements. Hisle v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108 (Wash. 2004).
However, the Washington State Supreme Court has been abundantly clear: “[R]es judicata does not bar claims arising out of different causes of action, or intend to deny the litigant his or her day in court.” Id at 865, 93 P.3d 108 (hyperlink added). Ultimately, res judicata will not apply until there has been a final judicial judgment. See Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 807 (1985) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects: (1) persons and parties; (2) cause of action; (3) subject matter; and (4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted).
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE (OBJECTIVE STANDARD)
“To establish constructive discharge, an employee must show that an employer engaged in a deliberate act, or a pattern of conduct, that made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 174 Wn.App. 475, 485 (Div. 2 2013) (citing Sneed v. Barna, 80 Wn.App. 843, 849-50, 912 P.2d 1035, review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1023, 919 P.2d 600 (1996)).
“This is an objective standard and an employee’s subjective belief that he had no choice but to resign is irrelevant.” Id. (citing Travis v. Tacoma Pub. Sch. Dist., 120 Wn.App. 542, 551, 85 P.3d 959 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
EFFECTIVE DATE
“A constructive discharge becomes effective on either[:]
[1] the date the employee gives notice to the employer or
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Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon regarding presumption of acquiescence? Here’s my point of view.
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PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE
Under the Presumption-of-Acquiescence canon, “Legislative silence regarding the construed portion of the statute in a subsequent amendment creates a presumption of acquiescence in that construction.” Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Company, 129 Wn.2d 572, 581 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (concluding that the Washington State Legislature “clearly understood it was adopting exemplary damages as part of Washington’s antidiscrimination law when it amended RCW 49.60.030(2) in 1993 and 1995.” (citing Baker v. Leonard, 120 Wash.2d 538, 545, 843 P.2d 1050 (1993). State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 393, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995). See also State v. Young, 125 Wash.2d 688, 696, 888 P.2d 142 (1995); In re King County Foreclosure of Liens, 117 Wash.2d 77, 86, 811 P.2d 945 (1991) (“the Legislature is presumed to know existing case law in areas in which it is legislating”))). Id.
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Under Washington State laws, are employee-handbook promises enforceable, when they address specific treatment in specific situations on which an employee justifiably relies? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
“Generally, an employment contract indefinite in duration is terminable at will.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). According to the “at-will” doctrine, an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability. SeeFord v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002)(citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, an employee has the absolute right to quit his or her employment at-will. See id. However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment rule: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS: PROMISES OF SPECIFIC TREATMENT IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
“[U]nder certain circumstances, employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees.” Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 539-40 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).
ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY
“Under this theory, [a plaintiff] … must show [the following:]
[a)] … that a statement (or statements) in an employee manual or handbook or similar document amounts to a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, …
[b)] that the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and …
[c)] that the promise was breached.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (paragraph formatting added).
CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Crucial Question
“[T]he crucial question is whether the employee has a reasonable expectation the employer will follow the discipline procedure, based upon the language used in stating the procedure and the pattern of practice in the workplace.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).
2. Questions of Fact
“[W]hether an employment policy manual issued by an employer contains a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, whether the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and whether the promise was breached are questions of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Therefore, summary judgment is proper only if reasonable minds could not differ in resolving these questions.”Id.(internal citation omitted).
3. Ambiguous Discipline Policies Create Issue of Fact
“The Court of Appeals has held that ambiguous discipline policies create an issue of fact as to whether the employer made a binding promise to follow certain discipline procedures.” Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted).
4. Summary Judgment May Not Be Appropriate When Discretionary Language Negated by Other Representations
“[T]he presence of discretionary language may not be sufficient for summary judgment when other representations negate that language.” Id. at 544 (referencing, e.g., Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wn.2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664 (1992) (“We reject the premise that this disclaimer can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an eternal escape hatch for an employer who may then make whatever unenforceable promises of working conditions it is to its benefit to make.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
Under the Washington State law, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS
A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS
Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.
STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).
STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).
THE POLICY
Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.
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Under Washington State law, what is the Express Direction Rule and how is it applied to judgments in Washington State Superior Courts? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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CIVIL RULE 54(b) — JUDGMENTS ON MULTIPLE CLAIMS
Washington State Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b) governs entry of judgments on multiple claims and provides that “the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination in the judgment, supported by written findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter Construction, LTD., 141 Wn.App. 761, 766, 172 P.3d 368, (Div. I 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the courts have held that four things are required for entry of a final judgment under CR 54(b):
(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought;
(2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay;
(3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and
(4) an express direction for entry of the judgment.
Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 141 Wn.App. at 766-67 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
EXPRESS DIRECTION FOR ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT
Washington State appellate courts have clarified that element four–an express direction for entry of the judgment–requires that the trial court’s order must expressly direct entry of a CR 54(b) final judgment or it will not meet the requirements of CR 54(b). Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 141 Wn.App. at 769.
In Fluor Enterprises, Inc., there was more than one claim for relief and the trial court’s order on one of the claims did not expressly direct entry of a CR 54(b) final judgment. Consequently, the court held that the trial court’s order as to that claim did not meet the requirements of CR 54(b). Id.
ALL CLAIMS FOR & AGAINST ALL PARTIES
It is worth noting that Washington State appellate courts have expressly mandated that entry of a final judgment should await the resolution of all claims for and against all parties. Id. at 767 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now (C.L.E.A.N.), 119 Wn.App. 665, 82 P.3d 1199, rev. denied, 152 Wn.2d 1023, 101 P.3d 107 (2004)).
Furthermore, the appellate courts have held that the following reasons justify a trial court’s delay of the entry of a final judgment until all claims had been resolved:
(1) to offset judgments favorable to each side before any enforcement activity takes place;
(2) to preclude the disruptive effects of enforcement and appellate activity while trial court proceedings are still ongoing; and
(3) to avoid a multiplicity of appeals.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Under federal law, does a plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress place his/her mental condition in controversy for purposes of FRCP 35 exams? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE GENERAL RULE
If a plaintiff objects to a FRCP 35 exam, the court has discretion to enter an order compelling examination only if the employer can establish:
(A) that a physical or mental condition of the person sought to be examined is “in controversy,” and
(B) that “good cause” exists.
See Houghton v. M & F Fishing, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 666, 667 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Courts in jurisdictions throughout the country are divided on the issue as to whether a claim of emotional distress places the plaintiff’s mental condition at issue (in controversy). But the modern trend in courts is to increasingly find that it does not.
FRCP 35 EXAMS BASED ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: 9TH CIRCUIT
The general position of courts in the 9th Circuit appears to be that a claim for emotional distress damages, by itself, is not sufficient to place the plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy for purposes of FRCP 35(a). Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579, 580 (N.D.Cal. 1998) (referencing, Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 92-97 (S.D.Cal.1995) (thoroughly surveying the relevant case law, distinguishing several unconventional cases including Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, hastings & Dodson, 820 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Cal.1993), and determining not to set Smedly, inter alia, as precedent)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, the trend for 9th Circuit courts is as follows:
[T]he movant must also demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff has pled a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff has alleged a specific mental or psychiatric injury; (3) the plaintiff has pled a claim for unusually severe emotional distress; (4) the plaintiff plans to offer expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress and/or (5) the plaintiff has conceded that his or her mental condition is ” in controversy” for purposes of FRCP 35(a).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
These courts have further found that a Plaintiff merely seeking damages in excess of a million dollars for humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress does not justify a request for a mental examination. Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. at 97.
GARDEN VARIETY EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Thus, for example, a plaintiff seeking “garden variety emotional distress” damages in excess of one million dollars, pursuant to claims solely under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may argue that he/she is not subject to FRCP 35 examination, because his/her mental condition is not in controversy (provided he/she does not satisfy the additional above mentioned requirements set forth in Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. at 580 (N.D.Cal. 1998), supra); but whoever asserts this type argument should be prepared to fight it out in Court — the defendant(s) will likely file a motion.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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SAME ACTOR INFERENCE DEFENSE
The “Same-Actor-Inference” (Inference) is a potential employer defense to a claim of employment discrimination under federal law. It is applicable where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time; in that case, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory action. Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Inference is based on the principle that an employer’s initial willingness to hire the employee-plaintiff is strong evidence that the employer is not biased against the protected class to which the employee belongs. Id. The Inference can be further described in terms of scope and proximity.
SCOPE
The scope of the Inference makes it is also applicable where the employee was not actually fired but merely offered a less desirable job assignment. Id. Moreover, the Same-Actor Inference is neither a mandatory presumption nor a mere possible conclusion for the jury to draw; it is a strong inference that a court must take into account on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 1098.
Thus, it is not valid to argue that the Inference is not a proper consideration at summary judgment.
PROXIMITY
As far as proximity: for the Inference to apply, it is not required that the alleged discrimination take place within a “short” period of time after the favorable action; for example, a 3 year gap in time was held to be short enough in time for the Inference to apply. Id. at 1097 (citing Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2000) (basing affirmance of summary judgment in an employment discrimination case in part on the fact that the plaintiff “was fired by the same man who had hired him three years earlier”)).
However, proximity becomes a potential plaintiff rebuttal when there is an allegation that unlawful bias developed by employer-actor after the favorable action and proximate to the negative employment action. See id.
The bottom line is that the Inference, if properly raised by the employer, is difficult for a plaintiff to overcome.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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PRIORITY OF ACTION RULE
The Washington Priority of Action Rule (Rule) will only apply if the two relevant cases involve identical (1) subject matter, (2) parties, and (3) relief. Am. Mobile Homes of Wash. Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990).
These factors must be established before the Rule should be applied. Id. The identity of the above elements must be such that a decision in one tribunal would bar proceedings in the other because of res judicata. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Foundation v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 111 Wn.App. 586, 607, 49 P.3d 894 (Div. 2 2002).
If the Rule applies, the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved. Am. Mobile Home, 115 Wn.2d at 316-17.
ELEMENT #3: IDENTICAL RELIEF
The Washington State Supreme Court has established the following factors to determine if “the relief is the same” for purposes of the Washington Priority of Action Rule:
(1) whether the form of relief available to each tribunal is the same (FORM OF RELIEF); and
(2) whether the first tribunal can resort to another to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available between the first and second lawsuits (EQUALIZE DISPARITY)?
See, State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found., 111 Wn. App. at 607, 49 (holding that the remedy was the same in both suits, because the type of relief available to both courts was the same, and because the administrative agency could otherwise seek relief in superior court in the first case to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available in the administrative tribunal).
EXAMPLE: EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUND v. WASHINGTON EDUC. ASS’N
In Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, plaintiff attempted to amend its citizens lawsuit in superior court by adding claims that were contemporaneously being pursued by an administrative agency with statutory authority to preempt plaintiffs’ lawsuit; plaintiff sought, inter alia, the same form of remedy (i.e., a fine) as the administrative agency based on the same statute.
The court ruled that the relief was the same in both actions and upheld the trial court’s application of the priority of action rule, because the relief in both cases was a monetary fine pursuant to RCW 42.17.395(4), and because any disparity in the amount of relief available could be eliminated if the administrative tribunal ushered the claim to superior court.
The court then analyzed res judicata and concluded jurisdiction in the second court was improper under Washington Priority of Action Rule. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ., 111 Wn. App. 586, 49 P.3d 894 (2002).
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Under federal law, are defendants allowed to plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
“An affirmative defense, under the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.” Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 598 (D.N.M. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (hyperlinks added). The burden for establishing affirmative defenses generally lies on the defendant. Id. (internal citation omitted).
NEGATIVE DEFENSES
However, “negative” defenses are merely rebuttal to plaintiff’s claims and should be stricken; the courts have held these so-called affirmative defenses (or negative defenses) simply provide a basis to negate an element of the prima facie case for relief and are restatements of denials present in earlier parts of the complaint. See id. (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking eight “negative” defenses); see Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof [as to an element plaintiff is required to prove] is not an affirmative defense.”(citing Flav-O-Rich v. Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir.1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).
CONCLUSION
It appears that under federal law, defendants may plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court, but such negative defenses are not affirmative defenses and should be stricken as a defense. A fundamental consideration is whether the time, expense, and risk in bringing the motion to strike is outweighed by the benefit. Obviously, that is only a question for a party or party representative to answer relative to their particular matter.
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Under Washington State law, may an employment discrimination plaintiff use favorable findings from a previous unemployment benefits appeal against the associated defendant employer, when pursuing a claim under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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A COMMON ISSUE
Occasionally, one of my employment discrimination clients will vigorously attempt to convince me that they received favorable findings against their employer during their unemployment benefits appeal conducted through the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings; and that the findings will help them win their subsequent discrimination lawsuit under WLAD. Unfortunately, I usually have bad news for those clients.
Stated differently, the issue is whether findings made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing may be admitted in a separate employment discrimination lawsuit outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer?
WA STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
The Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD) was created in 1939. Its mission is to “partner to connect employers and job seekers – supporting transitions to new jobs and empowering careers.”
If an individual applies for unemployment benefits through the ESD and is denied; then the individual can request an appeal. In that case, the ESD will forward the appeal to the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) which is not part of the ESD. The OAH will then assign an administrative law judge to hear the case.
TITLE 50 RCW
The Washington State laws relating to the ESD are contained in Title 50 RCW, and the relevant law states as follows:
Any finding, determination, conclusion, declaration, or final order made by the commissioner, or his or her representative or delegate, or by an appeal tribunal, administrative law judge, reviewing officer, or other agent of the department for the purposes of Title 50 RCW, shall not be conclusive, nor binding, nor admissible as evidence in any separate action outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts or was reviewed pursuant to RCW 50.32.120.
RCW 50.32.097 (emphasis and hyperlink added).
CONCLUSION
Findings made by an administrative law judge during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing are generally not admissible in a subsequent WLAD employment discrimination lawsuit (before an arbitrator, court, or judge) outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between the employee and the employee’s present or prior employer.
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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
“Washington’s law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, is a broad remedial statute, the purpose of which is to eliminate and prevent discrimination on the basis of” specific protected classes. Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries, 143 Wn.App. 832, 181 P.3d 843 (Wash.App. Div. 3 3008) (citing RCW 49.60.010).
THE CIVIL SUIT REQUIREMENT
“[WLAD] declares that the right to be free from such discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil action by members of the enumerated protected classes.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.030(1), (2)) (emphasis added).
The issue is whether an administrative proceeding is considered a civil action for purposes of WLAD claims. The Washington State Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries. Id.
EXAMPLE: RHOADES v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
In Rhoades, plaintiff Tammy Rhoades “filed a claim with the Department [of Labor and Industries] after she was injured in the course of employment[.]” Rhoades, 143 Wn.App. at 836. “The Department awarded her a permanent partial disability benefit.” Id. She appealed, and “in March 2001, the Department determined that Ms. Rhoades was totally disabled and she was placed on the pension rolls.” Id. “The Department affirmed this order after reconsideration in September 2002.” Id.
However, “Ms. Rhoades disagreed with the Department’s calculation of her monthly pension amount [and] appealed the September 2002 pension order to the Board of Industrial Appeals (Board).” Id. In 2004, “the Board found that the Department’s September 2002 order was correct” except for a small interest calculation. Id. at 837.
Plaintiff Rhoades “appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board’s order.” Id. She then appealed to Division 3 of the Washington State Court of Appeals wherein she included, inter alia, a claim that the Department violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Id. at 835-36. The court of appeals found that “an administrative action and appeal is an inappropriate vehicle for” claims under RCW 49.60. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). “[A] civil suit is required.” Id.
CONCLUSION
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), plaintiffs cannot bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS
Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).
AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY
In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”
However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”
The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.
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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The Washington State Supreme Court developed two relevant tests to determine whether a waiver of affirmative defenses has occurred:
(1) waiver based on civil rules; and
(2) common law waiver.
Compare, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) (explaining waiver pursuant to civil rules), with Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc., 163 Wn.2d 236, 178 P.3d 981 (2008) (explaining common law doctrine of waiver).
It is not uncommon for defendant-employers in employment discrimination cases to inadvertently waive the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and/or claim splitting under the civil rules (this article does not address common law waiver).
WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES: RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING
Under CR 8(c), res judicata is listed as an affirmative defense and must be specifically pled. See, e.g., Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 422, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1981) (holding “failure of consideration” is an affirmative defense under CR 8(c) and must be specifically pled).
Particularly, in order for res judicata to have a preclusive effect, the second court must be advised of the prior proceeding, and the burden of pleading “res judicata” is listed among the affirmative defenses. See, Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 812 (1985) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, although CR 8(c) specifically delineates 20 affirmative defenses, parties must also affirmatively plead “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 575, 166 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2007). Thus, “claim splitting” and “priority of action” must also be specifically pled as affirmative defenses.
If specific defenses are not (1) affirmatively pled, (2) asserted with a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they will be deemed to have been waived and may not thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case. Rainier Nat. Bank, 30 Wn.App. at 422 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976))(emphasis added).
This affirmative defense requirement will not be abrogated where it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
EXAMPLE: RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS
For example, in Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, the plaintiff-bank brought an action to recover funds from a default loan guaranteed by defendants, and defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of “failure of consideration” for the first time at summary judgment; the court held that defendants failed to specifically plead the affirmative defense “failure of consideration” in their answer and it was therefore waived. Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div 1 1981) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, or claim splitting may be inadvertently waived if not properly plead.
An employment discrimination plaintiff facing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon defenses of priority of action rule, claim splitting, and/or res judicata would be wise to evaluate whether the defendant has properly asserted such affirmative defenses at the beginning of the case in their responsive pleading; there might be a strong argument for waiver based on the civil rules. I have successfully made this argument on multiple occasions against defendant-employers at summary judgment.
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