The Tort of Outrage

The Tort of Outrage


Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements:

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and

(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.

Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (footnote omitted).

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:

Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.

Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (internal citations omitted). However, this tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. Lastly, objective symptomatology is not required to establish the tort of outrage.


READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine


Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).

CONCLUSION

If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, how does a plaintiff establish similarly situated employees for purposes of raising a reasonable inference of discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment is a legal theory that occurs “when an employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of membership in a protected classSee Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App.Div. 2 2013). “To esablish a prima facie* disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)) (hyperlink added).

There are various formulations for the prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Washington State, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (remainder of footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.

REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)

Plaintiff-employees typically use similarly-situated employees (also known as “comparators”) to show that their employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on one or more protected classes. Accordingly, to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, a “[s]imilarly situated employee[ ] must have[:]

[1] the same supervisor,

[2] be subject to the same standards, and

[3] have engaged in the same conduct.

Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 475 n.16, 98 P.3d 827 (2004); see also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (paragraph formatting added).

(NOTE: additional elements are required to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, however this article only addresses the “reasonable inference of discrimination” element.)

EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY

For example, in Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016), Plaintiff-employee Marin worked for King County as an operator at a wastewater treatment plant. Therein, Marin alleged King County unlawfully discriminated against him based on a variety of incidents. In one incident, Marin “did not follow the correct procedure to ‘lock out’ and ‘tag out’ a sewage pump.” Id. at 803. Consequently, Marin’s supervisor, Read, issued Marin a Teach/Lead/Coach memo, or TLC. “A TLC is not discipline, though management may base future discipline on a TLC.” Id. “Read saw it as a basic error for someone with Marin’s experience. Marin perceived Read to be yelling at him and became anxious.” Id. “Marin eventually gave notice he would retire in May 2011.” Id. at 804.

trial court

Thereafter, “Marin sued the County in July 2011[,] alleg[ing] six causes of action: disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate disabilities under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), wrongful discharge, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id.  (footnote omitted). Inter alia, “[t]he trial court dismissed Marin’s disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.” Id. at 801.

court of appeals — division one

Marin appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. See id. at 801. On appeal, Division One, held that Marin failed to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Different Supervisor

“Marin … contended the County treated him differently than a nonprotected employee, … Burton, who also made a lockout error. ” Id at 810. However, the Court found that “[e]ven if Marin had shown Burton’s error to be analogous to his own, Burton is still not a valid comparator because he worked under a different supervisor.” Id. (footnote omitted).

same treatment

The Court then found that “the record does not show that the County treated Marin differently than Burton, who also received a TLC–albeit an oral one–after his error.” Id. It reasoned: “A reasonable employee would not interpret Marin’s TLC as setting ‘impossible or terrifying unique performance standards’ or threatening termination.”

HOLDING

Accordingly, the Court held that “the trial court properly dismissed Marin’s claim of disparate treatment based on protected status.” Id. at 810-11.

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

 

The Retainer Fee (WA State)

The Retainer Fee (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what is a retainer fee? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their professional conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the retainer fee.

RPC 1.5: THE RETAINER FEE

The retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” RPC 1.5. Importantly, a retainer fee:

  must be agreed to in writing.

  must be signed by the client.

  is the lawyer’s property as soon as it is received and is not to be put into the lawyer’s trust account, unless otherwise agreed.

See id. This fee structure is sometimes referred to as an “availability retainer,” “engagement retainer,” “true retainer,” “general retainer,” or “classic retainer.” See id. (Washington Comment 13).

RETAINER FEE SECURES AVAILABILITY ALONE

As mentioned above, retainer fees in Washington State are also known as “availability retainers.” That’s because “[a] retainer secures availability alone, i.e., it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed.” Id. (Washington Comment 13). Thus, “a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer’s availability, but that will be applied to the client’s account as the lawyer renders services, is not a retainer under … [RPC 1.5](f)(1).” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

GOOD PRACTICES

For those drafting retainers, “[a] written retainer agreement should clearly specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer’s availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer’s property immediately on receipt and will not deposit the fee into a trust account.” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

CONCLUSION

A retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” Id.


RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» The Contingency Fee (WA State)



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The Contingency Fee (WA State)

The Contingency Fee (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what is an attorney’s contingency fee? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their ethical conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the contingency fee.

RPC 1.5: THE CONTINGENCY FEE

The contingency fee is regulated by RPC 1.5. Accordingly, an attorney’s fee “may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See id. The relevant portions of that RPC describe the contingency fee in detail, as follows:

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following

(1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client;

(2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;

(3) upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination; and

(4) a contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only

(i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or

(ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.

RPC 1.5(c).

CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITATIONS

The contingency fee has limitations.  One limitation prohibits lawyers in Washington from entering into contingency fee agreements for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances. The relevant rule follows:

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

RPC 1.5(d)

CONCLUSION

Under RPC 1.5 (Fees), an attorney may charge a contingency fee: meaning, one that is “contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See RPC 1.5. However, an attorney may not charge a contingency fee for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances.


RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» The Retainer Fee (WA State)



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Negligent Retention (WA State)

Negligent Retention (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what is the tort of negligent retention? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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NEGLIGENT RETENTION IN WASHINGTON STATE

To successfully litigate an employment-based negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish the basic elements of negligence: duty; breach of duty; causation; and damages. The theory of negligent retention is a tort. A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, entitling the victim to remedies typically in the form of damages. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:

Negligent retention consists of … retaining the employee with knowledge of his unfitness, or of failing to use reasonable care to discover it before … retaining him.

Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist., 423 P.3d 197, 206 (Wash. 2018) (citing Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 288, 827 P.2d 1108 (1992)) (alterations in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

NEGLIGENT RETENTION VS. NEGLIGENT HIRING

Negligent hiring is also a Washington State tort. According to the Anderson Court:

The difference between negligent hiring and negligent retention is timing. Negligent hiring occurs at the time of hiring, while negligent retention occurs during the course of employment.

Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Negligent retention occurs when an employer either retains an employee with knowledge of the employee’s unfitness, or fails to use reasonable care to discover unfitness before retaining the employee.

RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Supervision (WA State)


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If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue

EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue


Under federal laws and regulations, what is the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOCs) Notice of Right to Sue? NOTE: This article addresses public and private employment and does not address federal government employees or applicants.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)

The EEOC is a federal agency “responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited 11/29/22).

eeoc functions

“The laws apply to all types of work situations, including hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and benefits.” Id. Accordingly, the EEOC has authority to perform several functions:

(1) To investigate charges of discrimination against employers who are covered by the law.

(2) To prevent discrimination before it occurs through outreach, education, and technical assistance programs.

(3) To provide leadership and guidance to federal agencies on all aspects of the federal government’s equal employment opportunity program.

Id. As part of its investigative function, the EEOC is responsible for issuing the Notice of Right to Sue.

THE 90-DAY NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE

Charge Filing

The claimant must first file a charge with the EEOC if the claimant plans “to file a lawsuit under federal law alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic information, or retaliation, …  (except for lawsuits under the Equal Pay Act, see below).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22). I will explain certain exceptions later in this article.

Notice of Right to Sue

The EEOC Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See id. The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can  request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id. 

90-Day Limitation

When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. Id. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).

Federal Government Employees and Applicants

This article does not address federal government employees or applicants. “The procedures for filing a complaint of discrimination against a federal government agency differ from those for filing a charge against a private or public employer.” Id. To learn more, visit the EEOC Website page: Overview Of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process.

EXCEPTIONS WHEN FILING A LAWSUIT

Age Discrimination Lawsuits (ADEA)

“If you plan to file an age discrimination lawsuit, you must have filed a charge but you don’t need a Notice of Right to Sue to file a lawsuit in court. You can file a lawsuit in court any time after 60 days have passed from the day you filed your charge (but no later than 90 days after you receive notice that our investigation is concluded).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).

Equal Pay Lawsuits (EPA)

“If you plan to file a lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act, you don’t have to file a charge or obtain a Notice of Right to Sue before filing. Rather, you can go directly to court, provided you file your suit within two years from the day the pay discrimination took place (3 years if the discrimination was willful).” Id.

Filing a Lawsuit Before Investigation is Completed

“If you want to file a lawsuit before … [the EEOC has] finished … [their] investigation, you can request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.


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HOW TO REQUEST A NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE

There are a few ways to request a Notice of Right to Sue depending on your circumstances. “If you have registered in EEOC’s Public Portal, you can submit your request by logging in to your charge account and uploading your request. If you don’t have an online charge account, send your request for a Notice of Right to Sue to the EEOC office responsible for investigating your charge and include your EEOC charge number and the names of the parties.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).

In any event, the EEOC has time limitations in fulfilling requests for Notices of Right to Sue.

Before 180 Days Have Passed

Before 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC will give the claimant the notice only if the EEOC will be unable to complete their investigation within 180 days. See id. According to the EEOC, “If you want the EEOC to continue investigating your charge, don’t request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.

After 180 Days Have Passed

After 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC is required by law to give the claimant the notice upon their request. See id.

CONCLUSION

The EEOCs Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22). The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can  request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id. When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” Id.

The reader is strongly encouraged to seek legal counsel when first considering claims of employment discrimination.

READ MORE OF OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning the EEOC:

» Fair Employment Practice Agencies

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)



need help?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our office handles EEOC Notices of Right to Sue. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Using Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Employment Discrimination

Using Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Employment Discrimination


As an employment attorney in Washington, I often converse with employment discrimination victims that believe their cases are weak, because they lack direct evidence. They’re unaware that using circumstantial evidence to prove employment discrimination is a common litigation practice that can sometimes lead to successful outcomes.

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), may an employment discrimination victim rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to prove employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS

Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer:

[REFUSE TO HIRE]

(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.

[dISCHARGE OR BAR FROM EMPLOYMENT]

(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]

(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.

[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]

(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.

RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis and hyperlinks added). NOTE: WLAD rights are based upon protected classes and may be litigated based upon direct and/or circumstantial evidence.

USING CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDIRECT EVIDENCE TO PROVE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

“Because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare, an employee may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 500 P.3d 203, 211 (Wash. App. 2021) (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 526, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

“Where the employee lacks direct evidence, Washington has adopted the three step evidentiary burden shifting framework* announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) for discriminatory discharge claims.” Id. (citing Scrivener v. Clark Coll.*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 445-46, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (hyperlinks added). Although the framework* was originally applied to solely discriminatory-discharge claims, courts have expanded its scope to include other theories of employment discrimination (e.g., <disparate treatment>, <disparate impact>, <hostile work environment>, <unlawful retaliation>, etc.).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.)


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THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK

The McDonnell Douglas Evidentiary Burden-Shifting Framework* has three steps:

STEP 1 – prima facie case

“First, [under the burden-shifting framework,] an employee must make a prima facie case …[.]” Crabtree*, 500 P.3d at 211 (Wash. App. 2021) (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)) (hyperlinks added). “Where the employee establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination exists. Id. at 211-12 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464).

STEP 2 – LEGITIMATE NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON

“Second, the burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the … [adverse employment action].” See id. at 212 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added). “The employer is not required to persuade the court that it actually was motivated by the nondiscriminatory reason, the employer need only show that the employer’s evidence, if taken as true would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 533, 404 P.3d 464).

STEP 3 – PRETEXT

“Third, if the employer meets this burden, the employee must produce sufficient evidence showing that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge was a pretext*.” Crabtree*, 500 P.3d at 212 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (hyperlinks added).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.)

WLAD REMEDIES

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, I believe employment-discrimination plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to prove employment discrimination. This is primarily because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare.


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Fair Employment Practice Agencies

Fair Employment Practice Agencies


Under the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission laws and regulations, what are Fair Employment Practice Agencies? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, “EEOC”) is an independent federal agency, headquartered in Washington, D.C., that maintains 53 field offices serving the entire country. It’s charged with “enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, transgender status, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” See Official EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last accessed 11/2/22).

The EEOC “laws apply to all types of work situations, including hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and benefits”; those same laws also cover most labor unions and employment agencies. See id.

DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER

Generally, employers with at least 15 employees (20 employees in age discrimination cases) are subject to EEOC laws, however there are a few exceptions. For example, the EEOC is responsible for enforcing, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”); under Title VIIs definition of employer, not all are subject to its reach. The relevant provision states as follows:

(b) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include[:]

(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or

(2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(Definitions) (NOTE: the EEOC also enforces other laws beyond Title VII; the preceding was only one example) (emphasis added).

FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AGENCIES (FEPAs)

The term Fair Employment Practices Agency or FEPA is a term coined by the EEOC. They are state and local government agencies charged with enforcing their own jurisdictional laws prohibiting discrimination; and their laws are similar to those enforced by the EEOC. However, it’s important to note:

In some cases, these agencies enforce laws that offer greater protection to workers, such as protection from discrimination because you are married or unmarried, have children or because of your sexual orientation. There also may be different deadlines for filing a charge, different standards for determining whether you are protected by these laws, and different types of relief available to victims of discrimination.

See Official EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/fair-employment-practices-agencies-fepas-and-dual-filing (last accessed 11/2/22).

READ MORE RELATED ARTICLES

» Read our article entitled: EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue.

» Visit the EEOCs website to read more about FEPAs, Dual Filing, and how to file an EEOC charge of discrimination.



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If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Job Applicants and Criminal Records (WA State)

Job Applicants and Criminal Records (WA State)


Under Washington State law, may an employer use criminal-records information in job hiring? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this article only, the following definitions apply unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

(1) “Criminal record” includes any record about a citation or arrest for criminal conduct, including records relating to probable cause to arrest, and includes any record about a criminal or juvenile case filed with any court, whether or not the case resulted in a finding of guilt.

(2) “Employer” includes public agencies, private individuals, businesses and corporations, contractors, temporary staffing agencies, training and apprenticeship programs, and job placement, referral, and employment agencies.

(3) “Otherwise qualified” means that the applicant meets the basic criteria for the position as set out in the advertisement or job description without consideration of a criminal record.

RCW 49.94.005.

THE WASHINGTON FAIR CHANCE ACT — RCW 49.94

In 2018, the Washington State Legislature passed the Washington Fair Chance Act (Act), RCW Chapter 49.94. The Act is designed “to protect job applicants with a criminal record so they may fairly compete for job opportunities for which they are otherwise qualified.” See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022). It contains several sections, and the primary section follows:

RCW 49.94.010

Inquiries about criminal records—Timing—Advertisements—Exceptions.

(1) An employer may not include any question on any application for employment, inquire either orally or in writing, receive information through a criminal history background check, or otherwise obtain information about an applicant’s criminal record until after the employer initially determines that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Once the employer has initially determined that the applicant is otherwise qualified, the employer may inquire into or obtain information about a criminal record.

(2) An employer may not advertise employment openings in a way that excludes people with criminal records from applying. Ads that state “no felons,” “no criminal background,” or otherwise convey similar messages are prohibited.

(3) An employer may not implement any policy or practice that automatically or categorically excludes individuals with a criminal record from consideration prior to an initial determination that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Prohibited policies and practices include rejecting an applicant for failure to disclose a criminal record prior to initially determining the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position.

(4) This section does not apply to:

(a) Any employer hiring a person who will or may have unsupervised access to children under the age of eighteen, a vulnerable adult as defined in chapter 74.34 RCW, or a vulnerable person as defined in RCW 9.96A.060;

(b) Any employer, including a financial institution, who is expressly permitted or required under any federal or state law to inquire into, consider, or rely on information about an applicant’s or employee’s criminal record for employment purposes;

(c) Employment by a general or limited authority Washington law enforcement agency as defined in RCW 10.93.020 or by a criminal justice agency as defined in RCW 10.97.030(5)(b);

(d) An employer seeking a nonemployee volunteer; or

(e) Any entity required to comply with the rules or regulations of a self-regulatory organization, as defined in section 3(a)(26) of the securities and exchange act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(26).

RCW 49.94.010 (emphasis added) (hyperlinks in original).

LIMITATIONS

The Act also contains several significant limitations concerning collective bargaining agreements, conflict of laws, accommodations/job modifications, baselines, and private right of actions, as follows:

RCW 49.94.020

Limitations on application of chapter.

(1) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish any provision in a collective bargaining agreement or the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing concerning wages, standards, and conditions of employment.

(2) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied to diminish or conflict with any requirements of state or federal law, including Title VII of the civil rights act of 1964; the federal fair credit reporting act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681; the Washington state fair credit reporting act, chapter 19.182 RCW; and state laws regarding unsupervised access to children or vulnerable persons, RCW 43.43.830 through 43.43.845.

(3) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied as imposing an obligation on the part of an employer to provide accommodations or job modifications in order to facilitate the employment or continued employment of an applicant or employee with a criminal record or who is facing pending criminal charges.

(4) This chapter may not be construed to discourage or prohibit an employer from adopting employment policies that are more protective of employees and job applicants than the requirements of this chapter.

(5) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with local government laws that provide additional protections to applicants or employees with criminal records, nor does it prohibit local governments from enacting greater protections for such applicants or employees in the future. Local government laws that provide lesser protections to job applicants with criminal records than this chapter conflict with this chapter and may not be enforced.

(6) This chapter may not be construed to create a private right of action to seek damages or remedies of any kind. The exclusive remedy available under this chapter is enforcement described in RCW 49.94.030. This chapter does not create any additional liability for employers beyond that enumerated in this chapter.

RCW 49.94.020.


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ENFORCEMENT & PENALTIES

The Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AG) is solely responsible for enforcing the Washington Fair Chance Act. The AGs enforcement powers (including penalties) follow:

RCW 49.94.030

Attorney general’s enforcement powers—Penalties.

(1) The state attorney general’s office shall enforce this chapter. Its powers to enforce this chapter include the authority to:

(a) Investigate violations of this chapter on its own initiative;

(b) Investigate violations of this chapter in response to complaints and seek remedial relief for the complainant;

(c) Educate the public about how to comply with this chapter;
(d) Issue written civil investigative demands for pertinent documents, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony as required to enforce this chapter;

(e) Adopt rules implementing this chapter including rules specifying applicable penalties; and

(f) Pursue administrative sanctions or a lawsuit in the courts for penalties, costs, and attorneys’ fees.

(2) In exercising its powers, the attorney general’s office shall utilize a stepped enforcement approach, by first educating violators, then warning them, then taking legal, including administrative, action. Maximum penalties are as follows:

A notice of violation and offer of agency assistance for the first violation; a monetary penalty of up to seven hundred fifty dollars for the second violation; and a monetary penalty of up to one thousand dollars for each subsequent violation.

RCW 49.94.030.

CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS

Lastly, the Act contains a provision addressing potential conflicts with federal requirements when federal funds are involved. The relevant provision follows:

RCW 49.94.900

Conflict with federal requirements—2018 c 38.

If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and this finding does not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. Rules adopted under this act must meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to the receipt of federal funds by the state.

RCW 49.94.900.

THE COMPLAINT PROCESS

As mentioned above, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AG) is solely responsible for enforcing the Washington Fair Chance Act. Accordingly, the AG Civil Rights Division accepts complaints that a covered employer has used criminal-record information to exclude an applicant from a job opportunity before determining whether the applicant is otherwise qualified for the job. Complainants may contact the AG Civil Rights Division at either fairchancejobs@atg.wa.gov or by leaving a message on their toll-free line at (833) 660-4877. Complainants may also submit a complaint using the AGs online form and a staff member will follow up. See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022) (hyperlink in original).



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.