Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE
“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).
Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY
For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.
CONCLUSION
In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements. See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:
RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.
(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.
Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.
The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.
(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.
RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT
Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:
RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.
…
(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.
The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.
For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.
RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)
GUIDING POLICIES
the CLAIM FILING STATUTE
“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571 (emphasis added).
The TORT CLAIM
“The purpose of … [the tort] claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citingMedina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)) (emphasis added).
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Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements:
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,
(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and
(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.
Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192(footnote omitted).
LEVEL OF OUTRAGE
“Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citingGrimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH
“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY
“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology
In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology
However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citingRobel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).
Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:
Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.
Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (internal citations omitted). However, this tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. Lastly, objective symptomatology is not required to establish the tort of outrage.
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We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):
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Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).
CONCLUSION
If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).
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Under Washington State laws, what is a retainer fee? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their professional conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:
…
The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
The retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” RPC 1.5. Importantly, a retainer fee:
• must be agreed to in writing.
• must be signed by the client.
• is the lawyer’s property as soon as it is received and is not to be put into the lawyer’s trust account, unless otherwise agreed.
See id. This fee structure is sometimes referred to as an “availability retainer,” “engagement retainer,” “true retainer,” “general retainer,” or “classic retainer.” See id. (Washington Comment 13).
RETAINER FEE SECURES AVAILABILITY ALONE
As mentioned above, retainer fees in Washington State are also known as “availability retainers.” That’s because “[a] retainer secures availability alone, i.e., it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed.” Id. (Washington Comment 13). Thus, “a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer’s availability, but that will be applied to the client’s account as the lawyer renders services, is not a retainer under … [RPC 1.5](f)(1).” Id. (Washington Comment 13).
GOOD PRACTICES
For those drafting retainers, “[a] written retainer agreement should clearly specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer’s availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer’s property immediately on receipt and will not deposit the fee into a trust account.” Id. (Washington Comment 13).
CONCLUSION
A retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” Id.
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Under Washington State laws, what is an attorney’s contingency fee? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their ethical conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:
…
The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
The contingency fee is regulated by RPC 1.5. Accordingly, an attorney’s fee “may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See id. The relevant portions of that RPC describe the contingency fee in detail, as follows:
…
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following
(1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client;
(2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;
(3) upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination; and
(4) a contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only
(i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or
(ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.
The contingency fee has limitations. One limitation prohibits lawyers in Washington from entering into contingency fee agreements for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances. The relevant rule follows:
…
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
Under RPC 1.5 (Fees), an attorney may charge a contingency fee: meaning, one that is “contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See RPC 1.5. However, an attorney may not charge a contingency fee for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances.
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Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of constitutional presumption? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION
According to the canon of constitutional presumption, Washington courts “presume statutes are constitutional, and the party challenging constitutionality bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, 481 P.3d 1060, 1064 (Wash. 2021) (citing Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals , 158 Wash.2d 208, 215, 143 P.3d 571 (2006), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wash.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019)).
There are two types of lawsuits that challenge the constitutionality of a statute: (1) the as-applied challenge; and (2) the facial challenge.
THE AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE
The as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is based on “a party’s allegation that application of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). According to the Washington Supreme Court in Woods, “Holding a statute unconstitutional as-applied prohibits future application of the statute in a similar context, but the statute is not totally invalidated.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
THE FACIAL CHALLENGE
A facial challenge is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face — that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally. To ascertain whether a law is facially invalid, “courts must be careful not to exceed the facial requirements and speculate about hypothetical cases.” Id. (citingWash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449-50, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 170 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2008)). Washington courts generally disfavor facial claims. See id. (citing State v. McCuistion, 174 Wash.2d 369, 389, 275 P.3d 1092 (2012). Accordingly, a “facial challenge must be rejected unless there is no set of circumstances in which the statute[, as currently written,] can constitutionally be applied.” Id. (In re Det. of Turay , 139 Wash.2d 379, 417 n.27, 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (emphasis and alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this article only, the following definitions apply unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
…
(1) “Criminal record” includes any record about a citation or arrest for criminal conduct, including records relating to probable cause to arrest, and includes any record about a criminal or juvenile case filed with any court, whether or not the case resulted in a finding of guilt.
(2) “Employer” includes public agencies, private individuals, businesses and corporations, contractors, temporary staffing agencies, training and apprenticeship programs, and job placement, referral, and employment agencies.
(3) “Otherwise qualified” means that the applicant meets the basic criteria for the position as set out in the advertisement or job description without consideration of a criminal record.
In 2018, the Washington State Legislature passed the Washington Fair Chance Act (Act), RCW Chapter 49.94. The Act is designed “to protect job applicants with a criminal record so they may fairly compete for job opportunities for which they are otherwise qualified.” See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022). It contains several sections, and the primary section follows:
RCW 49.94.010
Inquiries about criminal records—Timing—Advertisements—Exceptions.
(1) An employer may not include any question on any application for employment, inquire either orally or in writing, receive information through a criminal history background check, or otherwise obtain information about an applicant’s criminal record until after the employer initially determines that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Once the employer has initially determined that the applicant is otherwise qualified, the employer may inquire into or obtain information about a criminal record.
(2) An employer may not advertise employment openings in a way that excludes people with criminal records from applying. Ads that state “no felons,” “no criminal background,” or otherwise convey similar messages are prohibited.
(3) An employer may not implement any policy or practice that automatically or categorically excludes individuals with a criminal record from consideration prior to an initial determination that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Prohibited policies and practices include rejecting an applicant for failure to disclose a criminal record prior to initially determining the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position.
(4) This section does not apply to:
(a) Any employer hiring a person who will or may have unsupervised access to children under the age of eighteen, a vulnerable adult as defined in chapter 74.34 RCW, or a vulnerable person as defined in RCW 9.96A.060;
(b) Any employer, including a financial institution, who is expressly permitted or required under any federal or state law to inquire into, consider, or rely on information about an applicant’s or employee’s criminal record for employment purposes;
(c) Employment by a general or limited authority Washington law enforcement agency as defined in RCW 10.93.020 or by a criminal justice agency as defined in RCW 10.97.030(5)(b);
(d) An employer seeking a nonemployee volunteer; or
(e) Any entity required to comply with the rules or regulations of a self-regulatory organization, as defined in section 3(a)(26) of the securities and exchange act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(26).
RCW 49.94.010 (emphasis added) (hyperlinks in original).
LIMITATIONS
The Act also contains several significant limitations concerning collective bargaining agreements, conflict of laws, accommodations/job modifications, baselines, and private right of actions, as follows:
RCW 49.94.020
Limitations on application of chapter.
(1) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish any provision in a collective bargaining agreement or the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing concerning wages, standards, and conditions of employment.
(2) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied to diminish or conflict with any requirements of state or federal law, including Title VII of the civil rights act of 1964; the federal fair credit reporting act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681; the Washington state fair credit reporting act, chapter 19.182 RCW; and state laws regarding unsupervised access to children or vulnerable persons, RCW 43.43.830 through 43.43.845.
(3) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied as imposing an obligation on the part of an employer to provide accommodations or job modifications in order to facilitate the employment or continued employment of an applicant or employee with a criminal record or who is facing pending criminal charges.
(4) This chapter may not be construed to discourage or prohibit an employer from adopting employment policies that are more protective of employees and job applicants than the requirements of this chapter.
(5) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with local government laws that provide additional protections to applicants or employees with criminal records, nor does it prohibit local governments from enacting greater protections for such applicants or employees in the future. Local government laws that provide lesser protections to job applicants with criminal records than this chapter conflict with this chapter and may not be enforced.
(6) This chapter may not be construed to create a private right of action to seek damages or remedies of any kind. The exclusive remedy available under this chapter is enforcement described in RCW 49.94.030. This chapter does not create any additional liability for employers beyond that enumerated in this chapter.
(1) The state attorney general’s office shall enforce this chapter. Its powers to enforce this chapter include the authority to:
(a) Investigate violations of this chapter on its own initiative;
(b) Investigate violations of this chapter in response to complaints and seek remedial relief for the complainant;
(c) Educate the public about how to comply with this chapter;
(d) Issue written civil investigative demands for pertinent documents, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony as required to enforce this chapter;
(e) Adopt rules implementing this chapter including rules specifying applicable penalties; and
(f) Pursue administrative sanctions or a lawsuit in the courts for penalties, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
(2) In exercising its powers, the attorney general’s office shall utilize a stepped enforcement approach, by first educating violators, then warning them, then taking legal, including administrative, action. Maximum penalties are as follows:
A notice of violation and offer of agency assistance for the first violation; a monetary penalty of up to seven hundred fifty dollars for the second violation; and a monetary penalty of up to one thousand dollars for each subsequent violation.
Lastly, the Act contains a provision addressing potential conflicts with federal requirements when federal funds are involved. The relevant provision follows:
RCW 49.94.900
Conflict with federal requirements—2018 c 38.
If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and this finding does not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. Rules adopted under this act must meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to the receipt of federal funds by the state.
As mentioned above, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AG) is solely responsible for enforcing the Washington Fair Chance Act. Accordingly, the AG Civil Rights Division accepts complaints that a covered employer has used criminal-record information to exclude an applicant from a job opportunity before determining whether the applicant is otherwise qualified for the job. Complainants may contact the AG Civil Rights Division at either [email protected] or by leaving a message on their toll-free line at (833) 660-4877. Complainants may also submit a complaint using the AGs online form and a staff member will follow up. See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022) (hyperlink in original).
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THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The doctrine of stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 756, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is a “doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, but is not an absolute impediment to change.” State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d 673, 678, 374 P.3d 1108 (2016) (citing In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court will typically consider a party’s request for it to reject its prior decision when it’s based upon either one or both of the following two approaches: (1) clear showing; and (2) intervening authority. See State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
1. The Clear-Showing Approach
The clear-showing approach is far more common than the intervening-authority approach, and it requires the requesting party to clearly show the following:
a. That the established rule is incorrect; and
b. That the established rule is harmful.
See id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
2. The Intervening-Authority Approach
The intervening-authority approach is relatively rare. The requesting party essentially asks the court to “eschew prior precedent in deference to intervening authority where the legal underpinnings of … [the court’s] precedent have changed or disappeared altogether.” See id. (citing W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. P. Nw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
FRAMING THE ISSUE
When a party asks the Washington State Supreme Court to reject its prior decision, “it is an invitation … [it] … [does] not take lightly.” Id. (citing State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 863, 248 P.3d 494 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the court, the issue is framed as follows:
The question is not whether we would make the same decision if the issue presented were a matter of first impression. Instead, the question is whether the prior decision is so problematic that it must be rejected, despite the many benefits of adhering to precedent–” ‘promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'”
Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (citing Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 831, 935 P.2d 588 (1997)) (internal citation omitted) (alteration to original) (emphasis added).
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
