The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action


Under Washington State law, can racially discriminatory action in employment form the basis for the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, as follows:

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.”

Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 88 Wn.2d 735, 745, n. 1, 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (emphasis added).

The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION & THE TORT OF OUTRAGE

Racially discriminatory action can form the basis for a claim of outrage. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:

In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.

Id.* at 739, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added). Within the context of employment discrimination, positions of authority are significant when evaluating associated claims based on the tort of outrage.

Positions of authority

“When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.” Contreras*, 88 Wn.2d at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e). Thus, “[t]he relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe racially discriminatory actions in employment can form the basis for the tort of outrage. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is a crucial legal framework for addressing severe emotional harm caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. Defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, this tort highlights the accountability of individuals whose actions lead to significant emotional distress, even in the absence of physical injury.

Notably, racially discriminatory actions can serve as a foundation for such claims, as established by Washington case law. Furthermore, the dynamics of authority between the parties play a vital role in evaluating these claims, emphasizing that abusive behavior from those in positions of power can significantly exacerbate the impact of the distress. Depending on the circumstances of each case, understanding these elements may be useful for adequately addressing the complexities of emotional distress claims in civil law.


READ MORE OF OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)



Learn More

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

License Waiver for Dog Guide and Service Animals (WLAD)

License Waiver for Dog Guide and Service Animals (WLAD)


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, is there a license waiver for dog guides and service animals? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added).

LICENSE WAIVER FOR DOG GUIDES AND SERVICE ANIMALS (WLAD)

The WLAD contains a license waiver provision for dog guides and service animals, as follows:

RCW 49.60.380*
License waiver for dog guide and service animals.

A county, city, or town shall honor a request by a blind person or hearing impaired person not to be charged a fee to license his or her dog guide, or a request by a physically disabled person not to be charged a fee to license his or her service animal.

RCW 49.60.380* (emphasis and hyperlinks added).


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Dog Guide (WLAD)

» Definition of Service Animal (WLAD)

» Liability for Killing or Injuring Dog Guide or Service Animal (WA State)


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Employment Law 101: Alternative Dispute Resolution

Employment Law 101: Alternative Dispute Resolution
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Under Washington State laws, what does the term “alternative dispute resolution” mean within the context of civil legal proceedings? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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Introduction: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

Alternative Dispute Resolution plays an important role in Washington State civil law, offering an innovative approach to conflict resolution outside the confines of traditional courtrooms. In this article, I will explore the meaning and importance of Washington State ADR, examining various methodologies and the crucial role it plays in facilitating efficient and harmonious resolutions to civil disputes.

Defining Alternative Dispute Resolution

Alternative Dispute Resolution refers to a range of processes designed to resolve legal conflicts without resorting to formal litigation. In Washington State, ADR encompasses methods such as mediation, arbitration, conciliation, and negotiation. These processes provide disputing parties with alternatives to the adversarial nature of traditional courtroom proceedings, promoting a collaborative and solution-oriented approach to conflict resolution.

Key ADR Methods in Washington State

Mediation:

Mediation employs a neutral third party, the mediator, to facilitate communication between disputing parties and guide them toward a mutually acceptable resolution.

Arbitration:

Arbitration involves presenting evidence and arguments to a neutral arbitrator, who then renders a binding decision.

Conciliation:

Conciliation engages a conciliator who assists parties in reaching a settlement by identifying common ground and fostering compromise. This method is commonly employed in Washington State for employment disputes, contractual disagreements, and interpersonal conflicts; the Washington State Human Rights Commission incorporates this process in its investigation of employment-discrimination complaints.

Significance of ADR in Washington State Civil Law

Efficiency and Timeliness:

ADR processes are recognized for their efficiency and timeliness, enabling parties to resolve disputes more expeditiously than through traditional litigation.

Cost-Effectiveness:

ADR can be a more cost-effective alternative to court proceedings, saving parties both time and financial resources.

Preserving Relationships:

Emphasizing collaboration and communication, ADR is particularly beneficial in preserving relationships strained by adversarial litigation.

Tailored Solutions:

ADR allows parties to craft customized solutions that better suit their unique circumstances, fostering a sense of ownership and satisfaction with the resolution.

Conclusion

In Washington State, the adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution reflects a commitment to creating a legal environment that prioritizes efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and collaboration. As ADR continues to evolve and gain prominence, it underscores the state’s dedication to providing its citizens with diverse and effective means of resolving civil disputes outside the traditional courtroom setting.


Read Our Related Articles

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Definition of Pleading

» Employment Law 101: Depositions

» Employment Law 101: Discovery (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: Legal Theory

» Employment Law 101: Mediation

» Employment Law 101: Motions

» Employment Law 101: Remedies

» Employment Law 101: Statute of Limitations

» Employment Law 101: Summary Judgment (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: The Complaint

» Employment Law 101: The Defendant

» Employment Law 101: The Plaintiff

» Employment Law 101: The Summons


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Civil Procedure: The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

Civil Procedure: The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement


Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), what is the CR 26(i) conference requirement? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules is paramount for the smooth functioning of the legal system and ensuring fairness for all parties involved. One such rule that holds significant importance concerning the discovery process is CR 26(i)*. In this article, I delve into what this rule entails and why it’s crucial for civil attorneys practicing in Washington State to understand and comply with it.

Understanding CR 26(i)

Requirement for Conference of Counsel

CR 26(i)* mandates that before presenting any motion or objection concerning Rules 26 through 37 (Depositions and Discovery) of the Washington State Rules of Superior Court*, counsel for the parties involved must confer with each other. This conference should be arranged at a mutually convenient time and can take place either in person or via telephone.

Good Faith Conferencing

The rule emphasizes the necessity of conducting the conference in good faith. This implies that the parties involved should engage in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving issues or reaching agreements regarding the motion or objection at hand.

Sanctions for Non-Compliance

Should the court determine that counsel for any party has willfully refused or failed to confer in good faith as required by CR 26(i)*, it holds the authority to apply sanctions as outlined under Rule 37(b)*. These sanctions can encompass a range of punitive measures, highlighting the seriousness with which the court views non-compliance with procedural requirements.

Certification Requirement

Importantly, any motion seeking an order to compel discovery or obtain protection must include certification from counsel affirming that the conference requirements of CR 26(i)* have been met. This certification serves as evidence of compliance and ensures transparency in the litigation process.

Importance of Compliance

Compliance with CR 26(i)* is not merely a procedural formality; it serves several crucial purposes:

1. Facilitating Communication

By necessitating conference among counsel, the rule promotes open communication and collaboration between parties. This can often lead to the resolution of disputes without the need for court intervention, thereby saving time and resources.

2. Efficient Case Management

Ensuring that parties engage in pre-motion conferences helps streamline the litigation process. By addressing potential issues early on, the court can better manage its docket and expedite proceedings.

3. Promoting Fairness

The requirement for good-faith conferencing underscores the principle of fairness in litigation. It encourages parties to engage in constructive dialogue and seek mutually acceptable solutions, ultimately promoting equitable outcomes.

4. Enhancing Accountability

The certification requirement adds an extra layer of accountability for counsel, reinforcing the importance of compliance with procedural rules. It acts as a safeguard against frivolous or improper motions, thereby promoting the integrity of the legal process.

Conclusion

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules like CR 26(i) is indispensable. By mandating pre-motion conferences and ensuring good faith engagement among counsel, this rule serves to foster communication, streamline proceedings, and uphold the principles of fairness and accountability within the legal system. Attorneys practicing in Washington State must familiarize themselves with CR 26(i) and diligently adhere to its requirements to navigate civil litigation successfully. Failure to do so can not only result in sanctions but may also undermine the integrity of the litigation process itself.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators


Under Washington State Court Rules, how may litigators utilize WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 (Pretrial Procedure and Formulating Issues)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

In the legal arena, rules and procedures govern every aspect of a case, ensuring fairness and efficiency in the pursuit of justice. Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16* is one such crucial guideline that sets the stage for the orderly progression of civil litigation. Understanding CR 16 is essential for attorneys and litigants alike to navigate the complexities of the legal process in Washington State courts effectively.

What is CR 16?

CR 16, short for Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure 16, outlines the requirements and procedures for pretrial conferences and the development of a litigation plan. It serves as a roadmap for streamlining the litigation process, promoting early settlement, and ensuring that cases proceed expeditiously through the court system. The court rule states as follows:

CR 16
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE AND FORMULATING ISSUES

(a) Hearing Matters Considered. By order, or on the motion of any party, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:

(1) The simplification of the issues;

(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;

(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;

(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.

(b) Pretrial Order. The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.

CR 16* (emphasis and hyperlink added).

Key Components of CR 16

1. Pretrial Conferences: CR 16 allows–by order, or on the motion of any party–pretrial conferences to facilitate communication between parties and the court during the litigation process. These conferences aim to identify and narrow the issues in dispute, explore opportunities for settlement, and establish a framework for the efficient resolution of the case.

2. Litigation Plan: One of the central features of CR 16 is the formulation of a litigation plan. This plan outlines the parties’ proposed course of action, including simplifying the issues, amendments to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents, limiting the number of expert witnesses, and any other pertinent matters essential for the progression of the case. The litigation plan helps parties and the court manage expectations and timelines effectively.

3. Pretrial Orders: The court must issue an order documenting the proceedings of the conference, including any amendments permitted to the pleadings and agreements reached by the parties on relevant matters. The order must delineate the issues remaining for trial, excluding those resolved through admissions or agreements of counsel. Once entered, this order governs the subsequent progression of the case unless modified during the trial to prevent clear injustice. Additionally, the court, at its discretion, may institute a pretrial calendar system for cases to undergo similar consideration. This calendar may be limited to either jury or nonjury cases, or expanded to encompass all types of actions.

Benefits of CR 16

1. Efficiency: By promoting early communication and establishing clear guidelines for case management, CR 16 helps expedite the litigation process, reducing delays and unnecessary expenses for all parties involved.

2. Clarity and Predictability: The requirement to develop a litigation plan provides clarity and predictability regarding the progression of the case, enabling parties to allocate resources more effectively and plan their litigation strategies accordingly.

3. Encouragement of Settlement: Through pretrial conferences and the exploration of settlement options, CR 16 encourages parties to resolve their disputes outside of court, potentially saving time, money, and emotional energy associated with protracted litigation.

4. Judicial Oversight: By empowering the court to actively manage the case through case management orders, CR 16 ensures that proceedings are conducted in a fair and orderly manner, with judicial oversight to address any procedural issues that may arise.

Conclusion

Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 plays a vital role in promoting efficiency, fairness, and effective case management in civil litigation. By allowing pretrial conferences, formulating litigation plans, and providing for judicial oversight, CR 16 helps streamline the litigation process and facilitates the early resolution of disputes. Attorneys and litigants should familiarize themselves with CR 16’s requirements to navigate the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State courts successfully.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The Virtual Law Office (WA State)

The Virtual Law Office (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, rules, and regulations, what is a virtual law office?  Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE VIRTUAL LAW OFFICE (WA STATE)

The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) recently released an Advisory Opinion concerning the “Ethical Practices of the Virtual or Hybrid Law Office.” Therein, WSBA determined, as follows:

Many lawyers are choosing to do some or all their work remotely, from home or other remote locations. Advances in the reliability and accessibility of on-line resources, cloud computing, video conferencing, and email services have allowed the development of the virtual law office, by which the lawyer does not maintain a physical office. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this trend, causing many lawyers to work remotely (virtually), or to split their time between a traditional office and a remote office (a hybrid office)….

Although this modern business model may appear radically different from the traditional brick and mortar law office model, the underlying principles of an ethical law practice remain the same. The core duties of diligence, loyalty, and confidentiality apply whether the office is virtual or physical. For the most part, the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) apply no differently in the virtual office context. However, there are areas that raise special considerations in the virtual law office.

WSBA Advisory Opinion 201601 (2022) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Must in-state attorneys have a physical office address?

In its advisory opinion, the WSBA also addressed whether in-state attorneys are required to have a physical office address by evaluating both its bylaws and Admission to Practice Rules, as follows:

[WSBA BYLAWS]

There is no requirement that WSBA members have a physical office address. Section III(C)(1) of the Bylaws of the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) requires that each member furnish both a “physical residence address” and a “principal office address.” The physical residential address is used to determine the member’s district for Board of Governors elections. The Bylaws do not require that a principal office address be a physical address….

[WSBA ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULES]

Similarly, Admission and Practice Rule (APR) 13(b) requires a lawyer to advise the WSBA of a “current mailing address” and to update that address within 10 days of any change. Nothing in that rule indicates the mailing address must be a physical address.

WSBA Advisory Opinion 201601 (emphasis, and hyperlinks added). Thus, the WSBA and its relevant Advisory Opinion do not require attorneys to have a physical office address.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the landscape of legal practice in Washington State has seen a significant evolution with the emergence of virtual law offices, a trend accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The recent Advisory Opinion by the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) underscores that while the setting may differ from traditional brick-and-mortar establishments, the fundamental ethical principles governing legal practice remain unwavering. Despite the absence of a physical office, attorneys must adhere to core duties of diligence, loyalty, and confidentiality, as outlined in the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC).

Importantly, the opinion clarifies that in-state attorneys are not mandated to maintain a physical office address, as confirmed by both WSBA Bylaws and Admission to Practice Rules. This recognition signals a progressive shift in the legal profession, accommodating modern realities without compromising ethical standards. As attorneys continue to embrace virtual or hybrid models, this guidance provides clarity and assurance, ensuring a seamless integration of technology and tradition in the pursuit of justice and legal excellence.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Can lawyers provide clients with financial assistance for lawsuits?

Can lawyers provide clients with financial assistance for lawsuits?
Q: Can lawyers provide clients with financial assistance for lawsuits?

IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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FAQs: Can lawyers provide clients with financial assistance for lawsuits?

Can lawyers provide clients with financial assistance for lawsuits?

answer:

In Washington State, a lawyer cannot, “while representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses; and

(2) in matters maintained as class actions only, repayment of expenses of litigation may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.

Washington State Court Rules: Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(e) (emphasis added).

THE POLICY:

According to the Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct, the policy for this financial-assistance limitation is as follows:

Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation.

Id. at Rule 1.8 (comment 10) (internal citation omitted).


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The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

The Campbell & Gwinn Framework


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Campbell & Gwinn Framework? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION: THE CAMPBELL & GWINN FRAMEWORK

A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ambiguous Statutes (WA State)

Washington State courts use the Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 803, 805, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

Courts apply the Campbell & Gwinn Framework as follows:

(1) DETERMINE the legislative intent OF the STATUTE

When a Washington State court construes “a statute, … [its] goal is to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Magney, 195 Wash.2d at 803, 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash.2d 571, 581, 311 P.3d 6 (2013); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

(2) EVALUATE the plain and unambiguous language OF the STATUTE

The court will “start with the plain and unambiguous language of a statute.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4).

(3) if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning

“[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original). “[T]he plain meaning is … derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Id (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

(4) if the statute is ambiguous, then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction

“[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

Conclusion

Washington State courts use Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. If the interpretation of the statute is clear at first glance, the court is obligated to uphold that straightforward interpretation as reflective of the legislature’s intent. Alternatively, if the statute is determined to be ambiguous–meaning, “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning”–then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. See id.


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How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)

How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts construe legal privileges? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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HOW COURTS CONSTRUE LEGAL PRIVILEGES (WA STATE)

Generally, a “privilege” is “[a] special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. [ ] A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004).

In Washington State, “[t]here are two types of privileges: common law privileges and statutory privileges. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES: courts have more latitude to interpret

“Common law privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, are those privileges whose codifications are ‘merely declaratory of the common law.'” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)) (emphasis added).

“The court has more latitude to interpret common law privileges.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 815, 259 P.2d 845 (although not specified in the statute codifying the attorney-client privilege, we held that “[t]he same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule (citing State v. Ingels, 4 Wash.2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940))).

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES: courts strictly construe

“In contrast, when a privilege is created by statute and thus is not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly construed.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychologist-client privilege is created by statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed); Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 212-13, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (physician-patient privilege is created by statute and is strictly construed (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979))) (parenthetical emphasis added).

“Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the marital counseling privilege is [also] created by statute and must be strictly construed by interpreting the specific words in the statute that the legislature has codified.” Id. at 802-03 (citing Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 429, 671 P.2d 230).

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, there are common-law privileges and statutory privileges. Common-law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are “declaratory of the common law,” and courts have more freedom to construe them. Whereas statutory privileges such a the psychologist-client privilege, physician-patient privilege, and marital-counseling privilege are considered to be an “exemption from the common law,” and courts must strictly construe them.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)

Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts proceed in the absence of agency implementing rules when addressing associated statute-based issues? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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ABSENCE OF AGENCY IMPLEMENTING RULES (WA STATE)

A Washington State agency “cannot promulgate a rule that exceeds its statutory mandate … neither can it diminish statutory protections by failing to act.Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 495, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, when authorized Washington agencies fail to promulgate any implementing rules for statutes, courts must still recognize implicit requirements in those subject statutes. See id. at 496 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'”)) (internal citation omitted).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

EXAMPLE: KUMAR v. GATE GOURMET, INC.

For example, in Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014), an employer’s meal policy that was based on security concerns barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch; it required employees to eat only employer-provided food. However, the policy forced a group of plaintiff-employees to either work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs (i.e., a protected class falling under “creed“).

the plaintiffs filed suit

The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit and alleged that the employer maintained a facially neutral meal policy that fell more harshly on those within a protected class. “The trial court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety, finding that the WLAD [(i.e., Washington Law Against Discrimination)] contains no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious practices.” Id. at 486. The plaintiffs appealed to the WA State Supreme Court.

defendant’s argument

Therein, Defendant-employer, Gate Gourmet, “[made] much of the fact that the HRC [(i.e., WA State Human Rights Commission)] has promulgated rules requiring employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, arguing that the HRC would have issued an identical rule mandating religious accommodations if it believed the WLAD required them.” Id. at 495.

Court’s ANALYSIS

The Court concluded, inter alia, that “the HRC’s rules did not create the reasonable accommodation requirement for disability–they merely implemented a requirement already inherent in the WLAD itself.” Id. (referencing Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 388-89, 583 P.2d 621 (1978) (finding “a reasonable-accommodation-for-disability requirement inherent in the ‘legislative policy’ embodied in the WLAD, even though that statute did not employ the term ‘accommodation'” )) (footnote omitted).

However, the Court declared that “[e]ven if the HRC had failed to promulgate any rules requiring reasonable accommodations for employee disabilities, this court would still have been required to recognize that implicit requirement in the WLAD’s provisions.” Id. at 495-96 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'” (citing State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)))) (emphasis added).

the court must implement rcw 49.60.180 so as to give effect to legislature’s intent

Thus, the Court found that “with or without recourse to implementing rules, this court must interpret RCW 49.60.180** so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. In this case, that means choosing between two competing interpretations of the statute: the interpretation that says it implies a reasonable-accommodation-for-religion requirement and the interpretation that says it lacks such a requirement.” Id. at 496. Ultimately, the Court found, inter alia, that “the employees … stated a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate their religious practices[ ]” – reversing the trial court’s previous dismissal and remanding the case for further proceeding consistent with the opinion. Kumar*, 180 Wn.2d at 503.

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

(**NOTE: The link will take the reader to an external Washington State website.)

CONCLUSION

“[W]ith or without recourse to implementing rules, … [Washington] court[s] must interpret … [statutes] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 496.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.