Miscellaneous Archives — LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

June 29, 2023October 21, 2024

Vicarious Liability (WA State)

Under WA State laws, what is the proper inquiry for vicarious liability within the scope of employment law? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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VICARIOUS LIABILITY

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Vicarious liability is “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).

Under Washington State law, after “an employee’s underlying tort is established, the employer will be held vicariously liable if ‘the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.'” Robel v. Roundup Corporation*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 53 (Wash. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 469, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Washington Employment Law Digest.)

THE PROPER INQUIRY

The proper vicarious-liability inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct. See id. An employer may not insulate itself from vicarious liability merely by adopting a general policy proscribing bad behavior that would otherwise be actionable. Id.

DEFEATING A CLAIM OF VICARIOUS LIBAILITY

“An employer can defeat a claim of vicarious liability by showing that the employee’s conduct was[:]

(1) ‘intentional or criminal’ and

(2) ‘outside the scope of employment.’

Id. (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 56, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)) (paragraph formatting added).

However, intentional or criminal conduct is not per se outside the cope of employment. Id. at 53. Moreover, it is not the case that an employer will be vicariously liable only where it has specifically authorized an employee to act in an intentionally harmful or negligent manner. See id.

We invite you to read more of our tort-related blog articles:

» Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Retention (WA State)

» The Tort of Battery

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA State Torts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 22, 2023October 21, 2024

Noncompetition Covenants (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, when are employee noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable? Here’s my point of view.

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NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS (WA STATE)

Generally, a noncompetition covenant is “[a] promise , usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 392 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). In Washington State, a “‘[n]oncompetition covenant’ includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” RCW 49.62.010(4)*.

The Washington State Legislature has found both that “workforce mobility is important to economic growth and development[ ]” and that “agreements limiting competition or hiring may be contracts of adhesion** that may be unreasonable.” RCW 49.62.005* (hyperlink added). Washington’s noncompetition covenants law (hereinafter, “law”), RCW 49.62*, took effect on January 1, 2020 and establishes when such noncompetition covenants are void and unenforceable. See RCW 49.62.900*.

WHEN VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE

In Washington State, a noncompetition covenant is considered void and unenforceable against an employee unless certain conditions are met. The relevant law follows:

RCW 49.62.020*

(1) A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an employee:

(a)(i) Unless the employer discloses the terms of the covenant in writing to the prospective employee no later than the time of the acceptance of the offer of employment and, if the agreement becomes enforceable only at a later date due to changes in the employee’s compensation, the employer specifically discloses that the agreement may be enforceable against the employee in the future; or

(ii) If the covenant is entered into after the commencement of employment, unless the employer provides independent consideration for the covenant;

(b) Unless the employee’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement, when annualized, exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year. This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*;

(c) If the employee is terminated as the result of a layoff, unless enforcement of the noncompetition covenant includes compensation equivalent to the employee’s base salary at the time of termination for the period of enforcement minus compensation earned through subsequent employment during the period of enforcement.

(2) A court or arbitrator must presume that any noncompetition covenant with a duration exceeding eighteen months after termination of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. A party seeking enforcement may rebut the presumption by proving by clear and convincing evidence that a duration longer than eighteen months is necessary to protect the party’s business or goodwill.

RCW 49.62.020*.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The law also protects independent contractors to a certain extent. “A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an independent contractor unless the independent contractor’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars per year.” RCW 49.62.030* (emphasis added). “This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*.” Id. In addition, “[t]he duration of a noncompetition covenant between a performer and a performance space, or a third party scheduling the performer for a performance space, must not exceed three calendar days.” Id.

UNENFORCEABLE COVENANT PROVISIONS

Lastly, the law determines when noncompetition covenant provisions are unenforceable. “A provision in a noncompetition covenant signed by an employee or independent contractor who is Washington-based is void and unenforceable:

(1) If the covenant requires the employee or independent contractor to adjudicate a noncompetition covenant outside of this state; and

(2) To the extent it deprives the employee or independent contractor of the protections or benefits of this chapter[, RCW 49.62*].”

RCW 49.62.050* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).

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OTHER SECTIONS OF THE LAW

There are additional provisions in the law (e.g., Franchisor Restrictions*, Employees Having an Additional Job*, Remedies*, etc.*) that are beyond the scope of this article. For more information, I encourage the reader to review the entire act* — RCW 49.62*.

DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

RCW 49.62.010*

Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) “Earnings” means the compensation reflected on box one of the employee’s United States internal revenue service form W-2 that is paid to an employee over the prior year, or portion thereof for which the employee was employed, annualized and calculated as of the earlier of the date enforcement of the noncompetition covenant is sought or the date of separation from employment. “Earnings” also means payments reported on internal revenue service form 1099-MISC for independent contractors.

(2) “Employee” and “employer” have the same meanings as in RCW 49.17.020*.

(3) “Franchisor” and “franchisee” have the same meanings as in RCW 19.100.010*.

(4) “Noncompetition covenant” includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. A “noncompetition covenant” does not include:

(a) A nonsolicitation agreement;

(b) a confidentiality agreement;

(d) a covenant entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest; or

(e) a covenant entered into by a franchisee when the franchise sale complies with RCW 19.100.020(1)*.

(5) “Nonsolicitation agreement” means an agreement between an employer and employee that prohibits solicitation by an employee, upon termination of employment:

(a) Of any employee of the employer to leave the employer; or

(b) of any customer of the employer to cease or reduce the extent to which it is doing business with the employer.

(6) “Party seeking enforcement” means the named plaintiff or claimant in a proceeding to enforce a noncompetition covenant or the defendant in an action for declaratory relief.

RCW 49.62.010* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).

(*This link refers the visitor to an external website: Washington State Legislature: Revised Code of Washington (RCW).)

(**This link refers the visitor to our external website: Williams Law Group Blog.)

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June 8, 2023October 21, 2024

Employment Reference Checks and Verifications (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what are employer limitations when disclosing employee information in response to employment reference checks and verifications? Here’s my point of view.

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EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE CHECKS AND VERIFICATIONS — IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL/CRIMINAL LIABILITY — PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

Under Washington State law, if an employer discloses information to a prospective employer or employment agency concerning a current or former employee–and that disclosure was specifically requested by the prospective employer or employment agency–then the disclosing employer “is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil and criminal liability for such disclosure or its consequences if the disclosed information relates to:

(a) the employee’s ability to perform his or her job;

(b) the diligence, skill, or reliability with which the employee carried out the duties of his or her job; or

(c) any illegal or wrongful act committed by the employee when related to the duties of his or her job.

RCW 4.24.730(1) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

WRITTEN RECORDS

An employer that discloses employee information pursuant to this section (RCW 4.24.730) to a prospective employer or employment agency “should retain a written record of the identity of the person or entity to which information is disclosed under this section for a minimum of two years from the date of disclosure.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).

“The employee or former employee has a right to inspect any such written record upon request and any such written record shall become part of the employee’s personnel file, subject to the provisions of chapter 49.12 RCW.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).

REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

To rebut the presumption of good faith under this section (RCW 4.24.730), there must be “a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the information disclosed by the employer was knowingly false, deliberately misleading, or made with reckless disregard for the truth.” RCW 4.24.730(3) (emphasis added).

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May 4, 2023October 21, 2024

WLAD Statute of Limitations: Equitable Tolling

Under Washington State law, what must a civil plaintiff demonstrate to obtain equitable tolling of the statute of limitations when pursuing a Washington Law Against Discrimination (hereinafter, “WLAD”) claim? Here’s my point of view.

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WLAD STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: EQUITABLE TOLLING

THE WLAD

The WLAD, chapter 49.60 RCW, “is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower[*] complaints.” Washington State Human Rights Commission Official Website, https://www.hum.wa.gov/about-us (last visited 5/3/23).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.

“In Fowler v. Guerin, our [Washington State] Supreme Court explained that ‘statutes of limitation reflect the importance of finality and settled expectations in our civil justice system.'” Campeau v. Yakima HMA LLC, 38152-8-III (Wash. App. May 02, 2023) (citing Fowler v. Guerin, 200 Wn.2d 110, 118, 515 P.3d 502 (2022)). Accordingly, “[a] statutory time bar is a legislative declaration of public policy which the courts can do no less than respect, with rare equitable exceptions.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 118, 515 P.3d 502) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

eQUITABLE TOLLING (WA state): tHE MILLAY STANDARD

“In civil cases, Washington has consistently required a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to demonstrate [the following:]

(1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence,

(2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception interfered with the plaintiff’s timely filing,

(3) tolling is consistent with

(a) the purpose of the underlying statute and

(b) the purpose of the statute of limitations, and

(4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations.

Campeau, 38152-8-III (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 125, 515 P.3d 502 (“describing the four predicates as the Millay standard[, Millay v. Cam, 135 Wn.2d 193, 955 P.2d 791 (1988)]”)) (emphasis added).

However, Washington courts have “cautioned against broadly applying equitable tolling in a manner that would substitute for a positive rule established by the legislature a variable rule of decision based upon individual ideas of justice.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 119, 515 P.3d 502) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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April 27, 2023October 21, 2024

Illegal Contracts in Washington State

Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.

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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).

Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.

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April 13, 2023November 27, 2024

The Local Government Tort-Claim Filing Statute: Guiding Policies

Under Washington State law, what are the guiding policies (i.e., purposes) of the local government tort-claim filing statute? Here’s my point of view.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements. See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:

RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.

Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.

The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.

(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.

RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT

Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:

RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

…

(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.

The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.

For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.

RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)

GUIDING POLICIES

the CLAIM FILING STATUTE

“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571 (emphasis added).

The TORT CLAIM

“The purpose of … [the tort] claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citing Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)) (emphasis added).

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April 6, 2023October 21, 2024

The Tort of Outrage

Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

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**THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)**

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and

(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.

Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (footnote omitted).

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

“Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:

Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.

Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (internal citations omitted). However, this tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. Lastly, objective symptomatology is not required to establish the tort of outrage.

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

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March 30, 2023October 21, 2024

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.

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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).

CONCLUSION

If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).

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January 5, 2023October 21, 2024

The Retainer Fee (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what is a retainer fee? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their professional conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

…

The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the retainer fee.

RPC 1.5: THE RETAINER FEE

The retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” RPC 1.5. Importantly, a retainer fee:

• must be agreed to in writing.

• must be signed by the client.

• is the lawyer’s property as soon as it is received and is not to be put into the lawyer’s trust account, unless otherwise agreed.

See id. This fee structure is sometimes referred to as an “availability retainer,” “engagement retainer,” “true retainer,” “general retainer,” or “classic retainer.” See id. (Washington Comment 13).

RETAINER FEE SECURES AVAILABILITY ALONE

As mentioned above, retainer fees in Washington State are also known as “availability retainers.” That’s because “[a] retainer secures availability alone, i.e., it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed.” Id. (Washington Comment 13). Thus, “a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer’s availability, but that will be applied to the client’s account as the lawyer renders services, is not a retainer under … [RPC 1.5](f)(1).” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

GOOD PRACTICES

For those drafting retainers, “[a] written retainer agreement should clearly specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer’s availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer’s property immediately on receipt and will not deposit the fee into a trust account.” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

CONCLUSION

A retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” Id.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» The Contingency Fee (WA State)

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

December 29, 2022October 21, 2024

The Contingency Fee (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what is an attorney’s contingency fee? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their ethical conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

…

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the contingency fee.

RPC 1.5: THE CONTINGENCY FEE

The contingency fee is regulated by RPC 1.5. Accordingly, an attorney’s fee “may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See id. The relevant portions of that RPC describe the contingency fee in detail, as follows:

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(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following

(1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client;

(2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;

(3) upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination; and

(4) a contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only

(i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or

(ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.

RPC 1.5(c).

CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITATIONS

The contingency fee has limitations. One limitation prohibits lawyers in Washington from entering into contingency fee agreements for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances. The relevant rule follows:

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(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

RPC 1.5(d)

CONCLUSION

Under RPC 1.5 (Fees), an attorney may charge a contingency fee: meaning, one that is “contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See RPC 1.5. However, an attorney may not charge a contingency fee for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances.

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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

RPC 1.5: THE RETAINER FEE

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**THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)**