Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity


Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter, “Section 1983“), may a state official sued in their individual capacity be entitled to qualified immunity? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.

STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

THE POLICY

Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability


Under Section 1983, may an individual bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an illegal custom — even if the custom was not officially established? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

Local governmental entities may be sued under Section 1983 for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom,’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity’s official decisionmaking channels.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 412 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

“Showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity is one way to establish municipal liability.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) a police officer turned a police dog loose on Chew and it assaulted Chew directly causing injury; the city argued that the unofficial policy of using dogs to apprehend suspects was attributable only to the non-policymaking officers responsible for training the canine units and not the police chief or commission — policymaking officials.

The court found that “[a] city could not escape liability for the consequences of established and ongoing departmental policy regarding the use of force simply by permitting such basic policy decisions to be made by lower level officials who are not ordinarily considered policymakers.” Id. at 1445.

Furthermore, the court found that “if the city in fact permitted departmental policy regarding the use of canine force to be designed and implemented at lower levels of the department, a jury could, and should, nevertheless find that the policy constituted an established municipal ‘custom or usage’ regarding the use of police dogs for which the city is responsible.” Id. (referencing City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127)

Thus, the court held that the city acted under color of law in injuring Chew.

CONCLUSION

Under § 1983, I believe an individual may bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an unofficial illegal custom.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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