Category: Supreme Court (WA)

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The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Campbell & Gwinn Framework? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION: THE CAMPBELL & GWINN FRAMEWORK

A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ambiguous Statutes (WA State)

Washington State courts use the Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 803, 805, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

Courts apply the Campbell & Gwinn Framework as follows:

(1) DETERMINE the legislative intent OF the STATUTE

When a Washington State court construes “a statute, … [its] goal is to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Magney, 195 Wash.2d at 803, 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash.2d 571, 581, 311 P.3d 6 (2013); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

(2) EVALUATE the plain and unambiguous language OF the STATUTE

The court will “start with the plain and unambiguous language of a statute.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4).

(3) if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning

“[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original). “[T]he plain meaning is … derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Id (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

(4) if the statute is ambiguous, then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction

“[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

Conclusion

Washington State courts use Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. If the interpretation of the statute is clear at first glance, the court is obligated to uphold that straightforward interpretation as reflective of the legislature’s intent. Alternatively, if the statute is determined to be ambiguous–meaning, “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning”–then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. See id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination’s antiretaliation provision, RCW 49.60.210, is there a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status*.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader directly to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

WLAD ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION

The relevant WLAD antiretaliation provision is as follows:

Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

RCW 49.60.210(1) (emphasis added). The term “employer” is vague.

WLAD DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER

The WLAD definition of the term “employer” is found under RCW 49.60.040(11) and states as follows:

(11) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit.

Id. The issue is whether this definition also applies to prospective employers. In other words, does the WLAD prohibit retaliatory discrimination by prospective employers against job applicants? The Washington State Supreme Court addressed this issue in Certification From the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of WA in Jin Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2017) .

CERTIFICATION FROM U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR EASTERN DIST. OF WA in JIN ZHU v. NORTH CENTRAL EDUCATIONAL SERVICE DISTRICT–ESD 171

In Cert. From U.S. District Court for Eastern Dist. of WA in Jin Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-ESD 171, the plaintiff (Zhu) was a job applicant who claimed that “a prospective employer refused to hire [him] in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer[.]” See id. at 506. Zhu subsequently filed suit against the prospective employer in federal district court alleging, inter alia, that it violated WLAD’s antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1).

Plaintiff Zhu ultimately “prevailed on his WLAD antiretaliation claim and was awarded damages.” Id. at 507. The defendant (ESD 171) then filed a motion asking, inter alia, “that the district court certify to . . . [the Washington State Supreme Court] the question of RCW 49.60.210(1)’s scope.” Id. (hyperlink added). Accordingly, “the district court granted the motion in part and certified the following question regarding the scope of RCW 49.60.210(1) to . . . [the Washington State Supreme Court]:”

Does RCW 49.60.210(1) create a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer?

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader directly to our  Washington Employment Law Digest Blog.)

DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER NOT LIMITED TO CURRENT EMPLOYER

The Washington State Supreme Court answered the certified question in Zhu affirmatively and addressed the plain language and scope of WLAD’s antiretaliation provision, WLAD’s definition of employer, and the policy of WLAD.

The Court ultimately held that “[i]n accordance with the plain language of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Chapter 49.60 RCW, retaliatory discrimination against job applicants by prospective employers is prohibited by RCW 49.60.210(1)”; therefore, Zhu stated a valid cause of action based on his claim of unlawful retaliation. See Zhu, 404 P.3d at 506 (hyperlinks added).

During its analysis, the Court also expounded on WLAD’s definition of the term “employer” as follows:

[The WLAD definition of employer (RCW 49.60.040(11))] clearly includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates that ‘any employer’ means something different for purposes of the antiretaliation statute than it does for the purposes of the rest of WLAD.

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 509 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination’s antiretaliation provision, RCW 49.60.210, there is a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our blog articles about this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of administrative-agency interpretations? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

According to the canon of administrative-agency interpretations:

Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight.

Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 177, 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) (“[The Washington Law Against Discrimination,] RCW 49.60[,] does not define ‘handicap’; deference is given by court to Human Rights Commission administrative rule defining ‘handicap'”).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices

Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), how does one establish a prima facie claim of Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Religious Practices? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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FEDERAL LAW

“In the employment context, the WLAD has three federal counterparts:

[(1)]  Title VII, [42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,]

[(2)]  [T]he Age discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), [29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,] … and

[(3)]  [T]he Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)[, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.].

Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 490, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnotes omitted) (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added). However, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never listed the elements of a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate religious practices.” Id. at 501 (footnote omitted).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS: A TEST BASED UPON THE DISPARATE IMPACT BURDEN-SHIFTING SCHEME

“Several Courts of Appeals … have adopted a [failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices] test based on the ‘disparate impact’ burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Kumar, 180 Wn.2d at 490 (referencing, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013); Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008); Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).

WA STATE: FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 

In Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, the Washington State Supreme Court applied the above failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices test for the first time. According to that test, “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate religious practices by showing that[:]

(1) he or she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with employment duties;

(2) he or she informed the employer of the beliefs and the conflict; and

(3) the employer responded by subjecting the employee to threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.

Id. at 501-02 (citing Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012); Lawson v. Washington, 296 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2002)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

THE 3RD ELEMENT: IMMEDIATE RISK OF ACTUAL FIRING/DEMOTION IS IRRELEVANT

Regarding the third element of the prima facie case: “An employee need not be at immediate risk of actual firing or demotion to demonstrate threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.” Id. at 514 n.30 (referencing, e.g., Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (“employee established an ‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of prima facie religious accommodation claim where employer ‘formally instruct[ed] him not to pray with or proselytize to clients'” ); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“An employee does not cease to be discriminated against because he temporarily gives up his religious practice and submits to the employment policy.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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