FAQ: What qualifies as wrongful termination in Washington?
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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What qualifies as wrongful termination in Washington?
answer:
The terms “wrongful termination” and “wrongful discharge” are synonymous in Washington State and are typically evaluated within the scope of the “at-will” doctrine (hereinafter, “Doctrine”); Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. Under this doctrine, an employer can terminate an at-will employee for any reason—whether it’s no reason at all, a legitimate reason, or even an unethical one—without worrying about legal repercussions. Likewise, unless there is a contract that specifies different terms, employees have the unrestricted right to leave their job at any time (i.e., at will). However, the following three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine qualify as wrongful termination in Washington:
(1) The Statutory Exception;
(2) The Judicial Exception; and
(3) The Contractual Exception.
(1) THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION
“First, both Congress and the Washington State Legislature have modified the employment at-will doctrine by limiting employers’ rights to discharge employees.” Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 153, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)* (1994); chapter 49.60* RCW (Washington’s law against discrimination); see also chapter 49.12* RCW (prohibiting discharge of employees for testifying in investigations regarding labor conditions, worker earnings, or sex discrimination); RCW 49.44.090* (prohibiting discharge of employee for being age 40 and over)).
These statutory laws provide an exception to the at-will doctrine that protects the employee’s rights and limits the employer’s ability to discharge an employee at-will.
(2) THE JUDICIAL EXCEPTION
Second, Washington courts “have recognized a narrow public-policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge an employee”; this exception is commonly known as “wrongful termination in violation of public policy*.” Id. (referencing Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 991 P.2d 1135 (2000) (public policy exception to “for-cause” employees); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (discharge of armored truck driver who abandoned post to prevent murder violated public policy)).
“Under this exception, an employer does not have the right to discharge an employee when the termination would frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. “By recognizing this public policy exception, … [Washington State Supreme Court has] expressed its unwillingness to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
(3) THE CONTRACTUAL EXCEPTION
“Third, employers and employees can contractually modify the at-will employment relationship, eschewing the common law rule in favor of negotiated rights and liabilities.” Id. at 154 (internal citation omitted). “An employer can bargain away its right to discharge an employee without cause by contracting not to do so.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“The law governing this exception is not a species of the employment at-will doctrine; it is the law of contracts.Therefore, the law of contracts governs an injured party’s right to recover damages under this exception.” Id. at 155 (internal citation omitted). “Unlike a wrongful discharge, a breach of contract is neither immoral nor wrongful; it is simply a broken promise.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Did you resign from your job?
Even if you resigned from your job, you might still be able to claim wrongful termination in Washington. Take our Constructive Discharge Test (video) to learn more:
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
“Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, however, because [d]irect, ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since [t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 179, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated in part by Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
“Because intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, Washington follows the three-part evidentiary burden-shifting formula set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464). “The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” Id. at 1077-78 (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original).
the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework — three steps
For purposes of wrongful discharge claims, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework has three steps, or prongs:
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that
(4) after her discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
Second, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext.
See id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis, hyperlinks, and paragraph formatting added).
the third STEP — pretext PRONG
In Scrivener v. Clark College*, the Washington State Supreme Court “explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the pretext prong[:]
An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either
(1) that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or
(2) that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.
An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.
Litvack, 546 P.3d at 1078 (citing Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (paragraph formatting added). There are various ways of proving pretext.
proving pretext — the disparate-discipline method
In Washington, “[o]ne test for pretext is whether[:]
(1) an employee outside the protected class[;]
(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness[;]
(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash. App. 212, 227, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996); Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541 (“employer’s reason ‘was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances'”)). I call this approach the disparate-discipline method.
Accordinly, under the disparate-discipline method of proving pretext, “[t]he appropriate comparators are employees that are ‘similarly situated‘ to the plaintiff and doing ‘substantially the same work‘ as the plaintiff.” Id. at 1079-80 (citingJohnson, 80 Wash. App. at 227, 907 P.2d 1223; Ellingson v. Spokane Mortg. Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978)) (emphasis added).
Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added). “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).
Substantial Factor:
“A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Id. at 1078-79 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The protected characteristic need not be the sole factor in the decision.” Id. at 1079 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant motivating factor means that the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons.” Id. (citingFell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wash.2d 618 n.32, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s (employee’s) Burden:
“Because an employer may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, an employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464). “A plaintiff need not ‘disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons.'” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation omitted).
Circumstantial, Indirect, and Inferential Evidence — opinions & conclusory statements:
“Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“But an employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements; the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 20 Wash. App. 2d 493, 510, 500 P.3d 203 (2021)). “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Chen v. State*, 86 Wash. App. 183, 191, 937 P.2d 612 (1997).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework plays a vital role in advancing wrongful discharge claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), particularly in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. By establishing a structured, three-step process, the framework provides a clear path for plaintiffs to make their case, starting with the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in making this initial showing, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The final step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, meaning that discrimination was either the true motivation or a substantial factor in the decision.
The pretext inquiry, as clarified by Washington case law, allows plaintiffs to challenge an employer’s defense by presenting evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Methods such as the disparate-discipline test provide a framework for comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees outside the protected class, thereby helping to uncover discriminatory motives hidden behind seemingly legitimate reasons. Importantly, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, but they are not required to disprove every reason articulated by the employer.
Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework serves not only as a procedural tool but also as a safeguard for employees, ensuring they have a fair opportunity to seek redress when faced with unjust dismissal. By facilitating a fair and systematic evaluation of discrimination claims, the framework upholds the principles of equality and accountability in the workplace, giving plaintiffs the necessary tools to contest unlawful employment practices and promoting broader compliance with anti-discrimination laws.
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
FAQ: What is constructive termination in WA State?
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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What is constructive termination in WA State?
answer:
In WA State, a constructive termination (or discharge) arises “where an employerdeliberately makes an employee‘s working conditions intolerable, thereby forcing the employee to resign.” Sneed v. Barna, 80 Wash. App. 843, 849-50, 912 P.2d 1035, review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1023, 919 P.2d 600 (1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
The term “deliberately” entails a deliberate act or a pattern of conduct “of the employer creating the intolerable condition, without regard to the employer’s mental state as to the resulting consequence.” Sneed, 80 Wash.App. at 849-50; Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 174 Wn.App. 475, 485, 302 P.3d 500 (Div. 2 2013) (internal citation omitted).
INTOLERABLE WORKING CONDITIONS
Typically, the question of “whether working conditions have risen to an ‘intolerable’ level is a factual question for the jury.” Sneed, 80 Wash.App. at 849 (internal citations omitted). Often, the courts will “look for evidence of either ‘aggravating circumstances’ or a ‘continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment’ to support a constructive discharge claim.” Id. at 850 (internal citations omitted).
THE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED (OBJECTIVE STANDARD)
The question to be answered is “whether working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. at 849 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “This is an objective standard and an employee’s subjective belief that he had no choice but to resign is irrelevant.” Barnett, 174 Wn.App. at 485 (citing Travis v. Tacoma Pub. Sch. Dist., 120 Wash.App. 542, 551, 85 P.3d 959 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FAQ: What is WA State’s law against employment discrimination?
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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FAQ: What is WA State’s law against employment discrimination?
answer:
The Washington Law Against Discrimination* (WLAD), enacted in 1949, is a potent statute that covers a broad array of categories, including, but not limited to, employment discrimination. The relevant statute states as follows:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.
UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS
Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
The WLAD also outlaws certain types of retaliation: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination], or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination].” RCW 49.60.210*. Moreover, “[i]t is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40* RCW.” RCW 49.60.210*.
WLAD REMEDIES
“Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter* or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964* as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601* et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2)*.
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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Is Washington State an at-will employment state?
answer:
Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. SeeFord v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (referencing Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878 (1928); see also Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 40 Wash. 354, 357, 82 P. 606 (1905) (Mount, C.J., dissenting) (“where [an employment] contract is general and for an indefinite time, it is terminable at will.”)).
According to the at-will doctrine, “an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability.” See id. (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, in the absence of a contract stating otherwise, an employee has the absolute right to abandon … [their] employment at-will.” See id.
However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.
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Q: What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?
IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?
(This article will only address claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. However, there are other laws (both state and federal) that might support a claim of wrongful termination.)
(Warning: It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for administrative relief (see below) and prospective lawsuits (see above). Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to contact an employment attorney to determine both the statute of limitations and when it begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.)
Administrative Agencies (WSHRC & EEOC):
Generally, the jurisdictional time limitation for filing wrongful-termination complaints through administrative agencies such as the Washington State Human Rights Commission(WSHRC) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is significantly shorter; however, this topic is beyond the scope of this article — speak to an attorney for more information. See “Warning,” above.
Other Relevant Laws:
Other employment laws (both state and federal) might also support a claim of “wrongful termination” in Washington State including, but not limited to the following:
→ Section 1981 (42 U.S.C. §1981) (when the termination supports a viable legal theory of racial discrimination)
Talk to an attorney to determine the statute of limitations for relevant state and federal laws. See “Warning,” above.
Additional Information:
A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.
Actions limited to three years. Within three years:
* * *
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated;
Lewis, 36 Wn.App. at 609, 676 P.2d 545 (hyperlink to external website and emphasis added).
“Further support for applying the 3-year statute [to the WLAD] is found in the Legislature’s directive that RCW 49.60 be liberally construed.” Id. (citing Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 334, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 103 S.Ct. 730, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash.2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857 (1980)) (hyperlink to external website added).
WARNING
It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for prospective lawsuits and administrative relief.
Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to use the assistance of legal counsel to determine when the statute of limitations (or jurisdictional time limitation for administrative agencies) begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.
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Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.
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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).
CONCLUSION
If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).
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As an employment attorney in Washington State, I often litigate claims on behalf of employee-plaintiffs based on several common employment discrimination laws. Here are the top 3 employment discrimination laws that I litigate in Washington State . . .
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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#3 — THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (§ 1981)
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981) is a federal law that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2006). And the employment-at-will relationship is a contract for Section 1981 purposes.
Section 1981 is also known as “Equal rights under the law” and it states as follows:
(a) STATEMENT OF EQUAL RIGHTS
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) “MAKE AND ENFORCE CONTRACTS” DEFINED
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) PROTECTION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) “makes it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex[;] … makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit[;] … and requires that employers reasonably accommodate applicants’ and employees’ sincerely held religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.” U.S. EEOC Website (emphasis added).
Two other federal anti-discrimination laws, inter alia, broaden the protected classes, as follows:
(1) Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA) which protects people who are 40 or older from both discrimination on account of age and unlawful retaliation against a person “because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit”; and
(2) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that prohibits discrimination and unlawful retaliation against a qualified person with a disability. The ADA also “makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.” Further, the ADA requires that “employers reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.”
It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee, because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit. See id.
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DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE (WA STATE)
“[T]he WLAD prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of certain protected characteristics, including[, but not limited to age, sex, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or] a sensory, mental, or physical disability.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 570 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (citing RCW 49.60.180(2)).
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