Determining Pretext Comparators: The Disparate-Discipline Method

Determining Pretext Comparators: The Disparate-Discipline Method


Under Washington State laws, what is the Disparate-Discipline Method of determining pretext comparators when litigating a claim of wrongful discharge? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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Wrongful Discharge — Determining Pretext Comparators — The Disparate-Discipline Method (WA State)

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) “prohibits employers from discharging any employee on the basis of a protected characteristic[.]” Litvack v. Univ. of Wash, 546 P.3d 1068, 1077 (Div. I 2024) (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 526, 404 P.3d 464 (2017); RCW 49.60.180*) (hyperlink added).

“Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, however, because [d]irect, ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since [t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 179, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated in part by Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).

“Because intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, Washington follows the three-part evidentiary burden-shifting formula set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464). “The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” Id. at 1077-78 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original).

the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework — three steps

For purposes of wrongful discharge claims, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework has three steps, or prongs:

First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that

(1) she was within a statutorily protected class,

(2) she was discharged by the defendant,

(3) she was doing satisfactory work, and

(4) after her discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff.

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.

Second, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext.

See id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis, hyperlinks, and paragraph formatting added).

the third STEP — pretext PRONG

In Scrivener v. Clark College*, the Washington State Supreme Court “explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the pretext prong[:]

An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either

(1) that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or

(2) that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.

An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.

Litvack, 546 P.3d at 1078 (citing Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (paragraph formatting added). There are various ways of proving pretext.

proving pretext — the disparate-discipline method

In Washington, “[o]ne test for pretext is whether[:]

(1) an employee outside the protected class[;]

(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness[;]

(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.

Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash. App. 212, 227, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996); Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541 (“employer’s reason ‘was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances'”)). I call this approach the disparate-discipline method.

Accordinly, under the disparate-discipline method of proving pretext, “[t]he appropriate comparators are employees that are ‘similarly situated‘ to the plaintiff and doing ‘substantially the same work‘ as the plaintiff.” Id. at 1079-80 (citing Johnson, 80 Wash. App. at 227, 907 P.2d 1223; Ellingson v. Spokane Mortg. Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978)) (emphasis added).

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added). “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

Substantial Factor:

“A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Id. at 1078-79 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The protected characteristic need not be the sole factor in the decision.” Id. at 1079 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant motivating factor means that the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons.” Id. (citing Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wash.2d 618 n.32, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s (employee’s) Burden:

“Because an employer may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, an employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464). “A plaintiff need not ‘disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons.'” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation omitted).

Circumstantial, Indirect, and Inferential Evidence — opinions & conclusory statements:

“Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“But an employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements; the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 20 Wash. App. 2d 493, 510, 500 P.3d 203 (2021)). “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Chen v. State*, 86 Wash. App. 183, 191, 937 P.2d 612 (1997).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework plays a vital role in advancing wrongful discharge claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), particularly in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. By establishing a structured, three-step process, the framework provides a clear path for plaintiffs to make their case, starting with the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in making this initial showing, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The final step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, meaning that discrimination was either the true motivation or a substantial factor in the decision.

The pretext inquiry, as clarified by Washington case law, allows plaintiffs to challenge an employer’s defense by presenting evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Methods such as the disparate-discipline test provide a framework for comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees outside the protected class, thereby helping to uncover discriminatory motives hidden behind seemingly legitimate reasons. Importantly, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, but they are not required to disprove every reason articulated by the employer.

Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework serves not only as a procedural tool but also as a safeguard for employees, ensuring they have a fair opportunity to seek redress when faced with unjust dismissal. By facilitating a fair and systematic evaluation of discrimination claims, the framework upholds the principles of equality and accountability in the workplace, giving plaintiffs the necessary tools to contest unlawful employment practices and promoting broader compliance with anti-discrimination laws.


Read our related articles

» Disparate Treatment: Pretext by Comparison

» Pretext: Scrivener Corrects the Fulton Error*

» The Pretext Element: Self-Evaluations*

» The Pretext Element: Six Limitations*

» The Pretext Element: Two Methods of Proof*



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If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

Notices of Disqualification

Notices of Disqualification


Under Washington State laws and court rules, what are notices of disqualification when engaged in civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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NOTICES OF DISQUALIFICATION — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

The General Law

“Notices of disqualification” concern disqualification of judges during civil litigation. The relevant Washington State law concerning disqualification of judges is, in part, as follows:

Disqualification of judge, transfer to another department, visiting judge—Change of venue generally, criminal cases.

(1) No judge of a superior court of the state of Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding if that judge has been disqualified pursuant to RCW 4.12.050. …

RCW 4.12.040(1) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The Notice of Disqualification — RCW 4.12.050

Thus, pursuant to RCW 4.12.050*, any party to a lawsuit may disqualify a judge of a superior court from hearing a matter–subject to certain limitations–as follows:

Notice of disqualification.

(1) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any action or proceeding in a superior court may disqualify a judge from hearing the matter, subject to these limitations:

(a) Notice of disqualification must be filed and called to the attention of the judge before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the case.

(b) In counties with only one resident judge, the notice of disqualification must be filed not later than the day on which the case is called to be set for trial.

(c) A judge who has been disqualified under this section may decide such issues as the parties agree in writing or on the record in open court.

(d) No party or attorney is permitted to disqualify more than one judge in any matter under this section and RCW 4.12.040*.

(2) Even though they may involve discretion, the following actions by a judge do not cause the loss of the right to file a notice of disqualification against that judge: Arranging the calendar, setting a date for a hearing or trial, ruling on an agreed continuance, issuing an arrest warrant, presiding over criminal preliminary proceedings under CrR 3.2.1*, arraigning the accused, fixing bail, and presiding over juvenile detention and release hearings under JuCR 7.3* and 7.4*.

RCW 4.12.050* (emphasis, hyperlinks, and asterisks added).

The Discretionary Ruling Limitation — Timeliness

There are several limitations concerning disqualification of judges. “One limitation is that a notice of disqualification must be filed ‘before the judge has made a discretionary ruling in the case.'” Austin v. King Cnty., 58124-8-II (Wash. App. Jul 02, 2024) (footnote omitted). NOTE:

[The affidavit of prejudice]

“What RCW 4.12.050* calls a ‘notice of disqualification’ is also referred to as an ‘affidavit of prejudice,’ based on previous versions of RCW 4.12.050.”

Austin, 58124-8-II at 3 n.1 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 961-62, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

“In other words, an affidavit of prejudice is timely if it is filed before the superior court judge makes any order or ruling involving discretion.” Id. at 3 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 962, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A Matter of Right if All Requirements Met

“If the requirements of RCW 4.12.050(1)* are met, a party can disqualify the judge presiding over the action as a matter of right.” Id. (citing State v. Gentry, 183 Wn.2d 749, 759, 356 P.3d 714 (2015)) (hyperlink added). “A timely notice of disqualification must be granted.” Id. (citing Godfrey, 194 Wn.2d at 961).

A Question of Law Reviewed De Novo

“Whether a judge has made a discretionary decision under RCW 4.12.050* is a question of law that … [courts] review de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 776, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017)) (hyperlink added).


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Civil Procedure: The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

Civil Procedure: The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement


Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), what is the CR 26(i) conference requirement? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules is paramount for the smooth functioning of the legal system and ensuring fairness for all parties involved. One such rule that holds significant importance concerning the discovery process is CR 26(i)*. In this article, I delve into what this rule entails and why it’s crucial for civil attorneys practicing in Washington State to understand and comply with it.

Understanding CR 26(i)

Requirement for Conference of Counsel

CR 26(i)* mandates that before presenting any motion or objection concerning Rules 26 through 37 (Depositions and Discovery) of the Washington State Rules of Superior Court*, counsel for the parties involved must confer with each other. This conference should be arranged at a mutually convenient time and can take place either in person or via telephone.

Good Faith Conferencing

The rule emphasizes the necessity of conducting the conference in good faith. This implies that the parties involved should engage in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving issues or reaching agreements regarding the motion or objection at hand.

Sanctions for Non-Compliance

Should the court determine that counsel for any party has willfully refused or failed to confer in good faith as required by CR 26(i)*, it holds the authority to apply sanctions as outlined under Rule 37(b)*. These sanctions can encompass a range of punitive measures, highlighting the seriousness with which the court views non-compliance with procedural requirements.

Certification Requirement

Importantly, any motion seeking an order to compel discovery or obtain protection must include certification from counsel affirming that the conference requirements of CR 26(i)* have been met. This certification serves as evidence of compliance and ensures transparency in the litigation process.

Importance of Compliance

Compliance with CR 26(i)* is not merely a procedural formality; it serves several crucial purposes:

1. Facilitating Communication

By necessitating conference among counsel, the rule promotes open communication and collaboration between parties. This can often lead to the resolution of disputes without the need for court intervention, thereby saving time and resources.

2. Efficient Case Management

Ensuring that parties engage in pre-motion conferences helps streamline the litigation process. By addressing potential issues early on, the court can better manage its docket and expedite proceedings.

3. Promoting Fairness

The requirement for good-faith conferencing underscores the principle of fairness in litigation. It encourages parties to engage in constructive dialogue and seek mutually acceptable solutions, ultimately promoting equitable outcomes.

4. Enhancing Accountability

The certification requirement adds an extra layer of accountability for counsel, reinforcing the importance of compliance with procedural rules. It acts as a safeguard against frivolous or improper motions, thereby promoting the integrity of the legal process.

Conclusion

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules like CR 26(i) is indispensable. By mandating pre-motion conferences and ensuring good faith engagement among counsel, this rule serves to foster communication, streamline proceedings, and uphold the principles of fairness and accountability within the legal system. Attorneys practicing in Washington State must familiarize themselves with CR 26(i) and diligently adhere to its requirements to navigate civil litigation successfully. Failure to do so can not only result in sanctions but may also undermine the integrity of the litigation process itself.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators


Under Washington State Court Rules, how may litigators utilize WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 (Pretrial Procedure and Formulating Issues)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

In the legal arena, rules and procedures govern every aspect of a case, ensuring fairness and efficiency in the pursuit of justice. Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16* is one such crucial guideline that sets the stage for the orderly progression of civil litigation. Understanding CR 16 is essential for attorneys and litigants alike to navigate the complexities of the legal process in Washington State courts effectively.

What is CR 16?

CR 16, short for Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure 16, outlines the requirements and procedures for pretrial conferences and the development of a litigation plan. It serves as a roadmap for streamlining the litigation process, promoting early settlement, and ensuring that cases proceed expeditiously through the court system. The court rule states as follows:

CR 16
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE AND FORMULATING ISSUES

(a) Hearing Matters Considered. By order, or on the motion of any party, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:

(1) The simplification of the issues;

(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;

(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;

(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.

(b) Pretrial Order. The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.

CR 16* (emphasis and hyperlink added).

Key Components of CR 16

1. Pretrial Conferences: CR 16 allows–by order, or on the motion of any party–pretrial conferences to facilitate communication between parties and the court during the litigation process. These conferences aim to identify and narrow the issues in dispute, explore opportunities for settlement, and establish a framework for the efficient resolution of the case.

2. Litigation Plan: One of the central features of CR 16 is the formulation of a litigation plan. This plan outlines the parties’ proposed course of action, including simplifying the issues, amendments to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents, limiting the number of expert witnesses, and any other pertinent matters essential for the progression of the case. The litigation plan helps parties and the court manage expectations and timelines effectively.

3. Pretrial Orders: The court must issue an order documenting the proceedings of the conference, including any amendments permitted to the pleadings and agreements reached by the parties on relevant matters. The order must delineate the issues remaining for trial, excluding those resolved through admissions or agreements of counsel. Once entered, this order governs the subsequent progression of the case unless modified during the trial to prevent clear injustice. Additionally, the court, at its discretion, may institute a pretrial calendar system for cases to undergo similar consideration. This calendar may be limited to either jury or nonjury cases, or expanded to encompass all types of actions.

Benefits of CR 16

1. Efficiency: By promoting early communication and establishing clear guidelines for case management, CR 16 helps expedite the litigation process, reducing delays and unnecessary expenses for all parties involved.

2. Clarity and Predictability: The requirement to develop a litigation plan provides clarity and predictability regarding the progression of the case, enabling parties to allocate resources more effectively and plan their litigation strategies accordingly.

3. Encouragement of Settlement: Through pretrial conferences and the exploration of settlement options, CR 16 encourages parties to resolve their disputes outside of court, potentially saving time, money, and emotional energy associated with protracted litigation.

4. Judicial Oversight: By empowering the court to actively manage the case through case management orders, CR 16 ensures that proceedings are conducted in a fair and orderly manner, with judicial oversight to address any procedural issues that may arise.

Conclusion

Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 plays a vital role in promoting efficiency, fairness, and effective case management in civil litigation. By allowing pretrial conferences, formulating litigation plans, and providing for judicial oversight, CR 16 helps streamline the litigation process and facilitates the early resolution of disputes. Attorneys and litigants should familiarize themselves with CR 16’s requirements to navigate the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State courts successfully.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)

How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts construe legal privileges? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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HOW COURTS CONSTRUE LEGAL PRIVILEGES (WA STATE)

Generally, a “privilege” is “[a] special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. [ ] A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004).

In Washington State, “[t]here are two types of privileges: common law privileges and statutory privileges. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES: courts have more latitude to interpret

“Common law privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, are those privileges whose codifications are ‘merely declaratory of the common law.'” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)) (emphasis added).

“The court has more latitude to interpret common law privileges.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 815, 259 P.2d 845 (although not specified in the statute codifying the attorney-client privilege, we held that “[t]he same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule (citing State v. Ingels, 4 Wash.2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940))).

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES: courts strictly construe

“In contrast, when a privilege is created by statute and thus is not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly construed.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychologist-client privilege is created by statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed); Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 212-13, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (physician-patient privilege is created by statute and is strictly construed (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979))) (parenthetical emphasis added).

“Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the marital counseling privilege is [also] created by statute and must be strictly construed by interpreting the specific words in the statute that the legislature has codified.” Id. at 802-03 (citing Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 429, 671 P.2d 230).

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, there are common-law privileges and statutory privileges. Common-law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are “declaratory of the common law,” and courts have more freedom to construe them. Whereas statutory privileges such a the psychologist-client privilege, physician-patient privilege, and marital-counseling privilege are considered to be an “exemption from the common law,” and courts must strictly construe them.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)

Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts proceed in the absence of agency implementing rules when addressing associated statute-based issues? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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ABSENCE OF AGENCY IMPLEMENTING RULES (WA STATE)

A Washington State agency “cannot promulgate a rule that exceeds its statutory mandate … neither can it diminish statutory protections by failing to act.Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 495, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, when authorized Washington agencies fail to promulgate any implementing rules for statutes, courts must still recognize implicit requirements in those subject statutes. See id. at 496 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'”)) (internal citation omitted).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

EXAMPLE: KUMAR v. GATE GOURMET, INC.

For example, in Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014), an employer’s meal policy that was based on security concerns barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch; it required employees to eat only employer-provided food. However, the policy forced a group of plaintiff-employees to either work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs (i.e., a protected class falling under “creed“).

the plaintiffs filed suit

The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit and alleged that the employer maintained a facially neutral meal policy that fell more harshly on those within a protected class. “The trial court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety, finding that the WLAD [(i.e., Washington Law Against Discrimination)] contains no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious practices.” Id. at 486. The plaintiffs appealed to the WA State Supreme Court.

defendant’s argument

Therein, Defendant-employer, Gate Gourmet, “[made] much of the fact that the HRC [(i.e., WA State Human Rights Commission)] has promulgated rules requiring employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, arguing that the HRC would have issued an identical rule mandating religious accommodations if it believed the WLAD required them.” Id. at 495.

Court’s ANALYSIS

The Court concluded, inter alia, that “the HRC’s rules did not create the reasonable accommodation requirement for disability–they merely implemented a requirement already inherent in the WLAD itself.” Id. (referencing Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 388-89, 583 P.2d 621 (1978) (finding “a reasonable-accommodation-for-disability requirement inherent in the ‘legislative policy’ embodied in the WLAD, even though that statute did not employ the term ‘accommodation'” )) (footnote omitted).

However, the Court declared that “[e]ven if the HRC had failed to promulgate any rules requiring reasonable accommodations for employee disabilities, this court would still have been required to recognize that implicit requirement in the WLAD’s provisions.” Id. at 495-96 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'” (citing State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)))) (emphasis added).

the court must implement rcw 49.60.180 so as to give effect to legislature’s intent

Thus, the Court found that “with or without recourse to implementing rules, this court must interpret RCW 49.60.180** so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. In this case, that means choosing between two competing interpretations of the statute: the interpretation that says it implies a reasonable-accommodation-for-religion requirement and the interpretation that says it lacks such a requirement.” Id. at 496. Ultimately, the Court found, inter alia, that “the employees … stated a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate their religious practices[ ]” – reversing the trial court’s previous dismissal and remanding the case for further proceeding consistent with the opinion. Kumar*, 180 Wn.2d at 503.

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

(**NOTE: The link will take the reader to an external Washington State website.)

CONCLUSION

“[W]ith or without recourse to implementing rules, … [Washington] court[s] must interpret … [statutes] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 496.


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Removal of State Civil Actions: Time Limitation

Removal of State Civil Actions: Time Limitation


Under federal laws, what is the time limitation for removal of Washington State civil actions to U.S. District Courts? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WHY DO DEFENDANTS REMOVE LAWSUITS FROM STATE COURT TO FEDERAL COURT?

In my practice, I only represent employees and former employees against their employers based upon violations of state and federal employment discrimination laws. I typically file such lawsuits in Washington State superior courts where the number of jurors required to render a verdict for my plaintiff-clients is less than unanimous. In such circumstances, employer-defendants typically attempt to remove my cases to a U.S. district court for a variety of reasons — one likely being the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for a plaintiff victory. However, defendant-employers are sometimes oblivious to the time limitation for removal of state civil actions to federal court, and I’ve successfully used the following statue as a “shield” against removal under similar circumstances.

FEDERAL COURT: TIME LIMITATION FOR REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS

The relevant statue is 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (Procedure for removal of civil actions), and it states as follows:

(a) Generally.—

A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) Requirements; Generally.—

(1) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

CONCLUSION

A state-court movant must file a notice of removal of a civil action/proceeding in U.S. district court within 30 days after receipt by the defendant of a copy of the initial pleading; or within 30 days after service of summons upon defendant (if such initial pleading has been filed in court and is not required to be served upon defendant — whichever period is shorter).


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Vicarious Liability (WA State)

Vicarious Liability (WA State)


Under WA State laws, what is the proper inquiry for vicarious liability within the scope of employment law? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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VICARIOUS LIABILITY

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Vicarious liability is “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).

Under Washington State law, after “an employee’s underlying tort is established, the employer will be held vicariously liable if ‘the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.'” Robel v. Roundup Corporation*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 53 (Wash. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 469, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Washington Employment Law Digest.)

THE PROPER INQUIRY

The proper vicarious-liability inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct. See id. An employer may not insulate itself from vicarious liability merely by adopting a general policy proscribing bad behavior that would otherwise be actionable. Id.

DEFEATING A CLAIM OF VICARIOUS LIBAILITY

“An employer can defeat a claim of vicarious liability by showing that the employee’s conduct was[:]

(1) ‘intentional or criminal’ and

(2) ‘outside the scope of employment.’

Id. (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 56, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)) (paragraph formatting added).

However, intentional or criminal conduct is not per se outside the cope of employment. Id. at 53. Moreover, it is not the case that an employer will be vicariously liable only where it has specifically authorized an employee to act in an intentionally harmful or negligent manner. See id.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our tort-related blog articles:

» Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Retention (WA State)

» The Tort of Battery

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA State Torts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)


Under Washington State court rules, how do judges generally address a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

Pursuant to the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) may be presented as follows:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]

CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.”  Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE  MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citing Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).



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Dismissal Based on Claim Splitting

Dismissal Based on Claim Splitting


Under Washington State law, what are the requirements for dismissal based on claim splitting? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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CLAIM SPLITTING

The general rule for claim splitting is that “if an action is brought for part of a claim, a judgment obtained in the action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 782, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999) (Plaintiffs prohibited from suing for personal injuries after obtaining judgment for property damage arising out of same accident) (emphasis added); see also, Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Medical Center, 97 Wn. App. 728, 987 P.2d 634 (1999) (Plaintiff prohibited from raising a new claim on appeal after summary judgment).

RES JUDICATA

The theory of dismissal based upon claim splitting is “variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 783, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999); see also, Sound Build Homes, Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate/ South, Inc., 118 Wn.App. 617, 628, 72 P.3d 788 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2003) (theory on which dismissal is granted is variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action) (hyperlink added). Thus, the rules of res judicata are typically applied to determine if improper claim splitting has occurred.

DISMISSAL BASED ON RES JUDICATA

Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects:

(1) persons and parties;

(2) cause of action;

(3) subject matter; and

(4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.

Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting added). This res judicata test is a conjunctive one requiring satisfaction of all four elements. Hisle v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108 (Wash. 2004).

However, the Washington State Supreme Court has been abundantly clear: “[R]es judicata does not bar claims arising out of different causes of action, or intend to deny the litigant his or her day in court.” Id at 865, 93 P.3d 108 (hyperlink added). Ultimately, res judicata will not apply until there has been a final judicial judgment. See Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 807 (1985) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects: (1) persons and parties; (2) cause of action; (3) subject matter; and (4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted).


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Overcoming Stare Decisis (WA State)

Overcoming Stare Decisis (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how does one overcome the doctrine of stare decisis? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS

The doctrine of stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 756, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is a “doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, but is not an absolute impediment to change.” State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d 673, 678, 374 P.3d 1108 (2016) (citing In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court will typically consider a party’s request for it to reject its prior decision when it’s based upon either one or both of the following two approaches: (1) clear showing; and (2) intervening authority. See State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

1. The Clear-Showing Approach

The clear-showing approach is far more common than the intervening-authority approach, and it requires the requesting party to clearly show the following:

a. That the established rule is incorrect; and

b. That the established rule is harmful.

See id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

2. The Intervening-Authority Approach

The intervening-authority approach is relatively rare. The requesting party essentially asks the court to “eschew prior precedent in deference to intervening authority where the legal underpinnings of … [the court’s] precedent have changed or disappeared altogether.” See id. (citing W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. P. Nw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

FRAMING THE ISSUE

When a party asks the Washington State Supreme Court to reject its prior decision, “it is an invitation … [it] … [does] not take lightly.” Id. (citing State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 863, 248 P.3d 494 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the court, the issue is framed as follows:

The question is not whether we would make the same decision if the issue presented were a matter of first impression. Instead, the question is whether the prior decision is so problematic that it must be rejected, despite the many benefits of adhering to precedent–” ‘promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'”

Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (citing Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 831, 935 P.2d 588 (1997)) (internal citation omitted) (alteration to original) (emphasis added).



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Disparate Treatment: Pretext by Comparison

Disparate Treatment: Pretext by Comparison


Under the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Scheme (hereinafter, “McDonnell Douglas“), may a Washington State plaintiff establish the pretext-prong by comparison, when pursuing a claim of disparate treatment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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MCDONNELL DOUGLAS BURDEN-SHIFTING SCHEME

In the summary judgment context, to succeed on a claim of disparate treatment using McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).

If the plaintiff states a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. Of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).

If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show a triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s stated reason is mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt, Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). This last requirement is know as the prextext prong.

THE PRETEXT PRONG

Generally, to prove pretext under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s articulated reasons

(1) had no basis in fact,

(2) were not really motivating factors for its decision,

(3) were not temporally connected to the adverse employment action, or

(4) were not motivating factors in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances.

Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). The fourth element allows a plaintiff to prove pretext by using comparison.

PROVING PRETEXT BY COMPARISON

Accordingly, to prove pretext by comparison in Washington State, a plaintiff must show that

(1) an employee outside the protected class

(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness

(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.

Johnson v. Department of Social & Health Services, 907 P.2d 1223, 80 Wn.App. 212, 227 (Wash.App. Div. 2 1996) (referencing Hiatt v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir.1994)) (paragraph formatting added).

Arguably, acts of comparable seriousness need not be violations of identical company disciplinary rules. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1994) (Court previously held that “acts of comparable seriousness need not be violations of identical company disciplinary rules”) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs are free to compare similar conduct, focusing more on the nature of the misconduct rather than on specific company rules. Id. (internal citation omitted).

OCCASIONAL LENIENCY NOT ENOUGH

However, plaintiffs may need to demonstrate more than occasional leniency toward other employees who had engaged in conduct of a similar nature. See id. at 771 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “incomplete or arbitrary comparisons reveal nothing concerning discrimination.” Id. (internal citations omitted).


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment: A Closer Look**

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment vs. Disparate Impact Discrimination**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)



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Rendering a Verdict: WA State Versus Federal Court

Rendering a Verdict: WA State Versus Federal Court


Under both Washington State and federal statutes and court rules, what is the difference in number of jurors required to render a jury verdict in a civil trial? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON STATE

In Washington, only five jurors in a jury of six, or ten jurors in a jury of twelve, are required to render a verdict in a civil trial. RCW 4.44.380. The relevant text is as follows:

In all trials by juries of six in the superior court, except criminal trials, when five of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be signed by the presiding juror, and the verdict shall stand as the verdict of the whole jury, and have all the force and effect of a verdict agreed to by six jurors. In cases where the jury is twelve in number, a verdict reached by ten shall have the same force and effect as described above, and the same procedures shall be followed.

Id. However, pursuant to the Superior Court Civil Rules, “The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.” CR 48.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Alternatively, in the United States District Court, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least six members; and a jury must begin with at least six and no more than twelve members. FRCP 48. Each juror must partake in the verdict unless they are excused pursuant to Rule 47(c). Id.

CONCLUSION

A significant difference between federal and Washington State court systems appears to be that, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, Washington Superior Courts generally require a specific majority of jurors to render a verdict whereas the United States District Court requires unanimity.


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Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity


Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter, “Section 1983“), may a state official sued in their individual capacity be entitled to qualified immunity? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.

STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

THE POLICY

Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.


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Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard


Under Washington State law, how is the actual-knowledge standard applied to causation issues for purposes of unlawful retaliation cases? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show three things: (1) the employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link [(i.e., causation)] between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018) (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn.App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp, 118 Wn.2d 46, 68, 821 P.2d 18 (1991) (“establishing the retaliation test in the worker’s compensation context”)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The focus of this article is the third element: causal link (or causation). “An employee [shows a causal link (i.e., causation)] ‘by [revealing] … that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.’ ” Id. at 235 (Wash. 2018) (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

“[T]o avoid summary judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 235 (internal citation omitted). “Employees may rely on the following facts to show this: (1) the employee took a protected action, (2) the employer had knowledge of the action, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69, 821 P.2d 18) (emphasis added).

The 2nd element (i.e., the employer had knowledge of the action) is at issue; one associated standard of causation applied to unlawful retaliation cases is the “actual knowledge” standard (hereinafter, “actual-knowledge standard”).

CAUSATION: THE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE STANDARD (WA STATE)

Under this standard, “the employer [must] have actual knowledge of the employee’s protected action in order to prove causation.” Id. at 235. (internal citations omitted).

The policy behind the actual-knowledge standard is that “[b]ecause retaliation is an intentional act, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an action of which the employer is unaware.” Id. at 235-36.

But “[a] decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action.” Id. at 236 (emphasis added). “Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

At summary judgment, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the … evidence suggests a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).


READ MORE ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, may an employee-plaintiff build a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on a hostile work environment when using the direct evidence approach? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment is a form of employment discrimination, and it occurs when an employer treats some people less favorably than others based on protected class.

Accordingly, to establish a prima facie disparate treatment discrimination case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status. Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC, 178 Wn.App. 734, 743, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2013) (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)).

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by either offering direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent, or by satisfying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. at 743-44 (citing Kastanis v. Educ. Emps. Credit Union, 122 Wn.2d 483, 491, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1993)). This article solely addresses the direct evidence approach.

DIRECT EVIDENCE TEST

The plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under the direct evidence test by offering direct evidence of the following:

1. The defendant employer acted with a discriminatory motive; and

2. The discriminatory motivation was a significant or substantial factor in an employment decision.

Id. at 744 (citing Kastanis, 122 Wn.2d at 491).

SIGNIFICANT/SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR

The 2nd second element–discriminatory motivation was a significant or substantial factor in an employment decision–is at issue here. Stated differently, the plaintiff must establish that the discriminatory motive (1st element) was a significant or substantial factor in the subject employment decision. Obviously, employee-plaintiffs will be claiming that the subject employment decision was adverse to their interests.

However, an adverse employment action involves a change in employment conditions that is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities, such as reducing an employee’s workload and pay. Id. at 748 (citing Campbell v. State, 129 Wn.App. 10, 22, 118 P.3d 888 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1002 (2006)).

A demotion or adverse transfer, or a hostile work environment, may amount to an adverse employment action. Id. at 746 (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 465, 98 P.3d 827 (2004), review denied, 154 Wn.2d 1007 (2005)) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

An employee-plaintiff might be able to build a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on a hostile work environment. However, the prima facie case will be incomplete unless the employee-plaintiff is also able to establish the 1st element of the direct evidence test; this article only addresses the 2nd element.


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment: A Closer Look**

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment vs. Disparate Impact Discrimination**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» Disparate Treatment: Pretext by Comparison

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Express Direction Rule & Final Judgments: WA State

Express Direction Rule & Final Judgments: WA State


Under Washington State law, what is the Express Direction Rule and how is it applied to judgments in Washington State Superior Courts? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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CIVIL RULE 54(b) — JUDGMENTS ON MULTIPLE CLAIMS

Washington State Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b) governs entry of judgments on multiple claims and provides that “the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination in the judgment, supported by written findings, that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter Construction, LTD., 141 Wn.App. 761, 766, 172 P.3d 368, (Div. I 2007) (quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the courts have held that four things are required for entry of a final judgment under CR 54(b):

(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought;

(2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay;

(3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and

(4) an express direction for entry of the judgment.

Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 141 Wn.App. at 766-67 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

EXPRESS DIRECTION FOR ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT

Washington State appellate courts have clarified that element four–an express direction for entry of the judgment–requires that the trial court’s order must expressly direct entry of a CR 54(b) final judgment or it will not meet the requirements of CR 54(b). Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 141 Wn.App. at 769.

In Fluor Enterprises, Inc., there was more than one claim for relief and the trial court’s order on one of the claims did not expressly direct entry of a CR 54(b) final judgment. Consequently, the court held that the trial court’s order as to that claim did not meet the requirements of CR 54(b). Id.

ALL CLAIMS FOR & AGAINST ALL PARTIES

It is worth noting that Washington State appellate courts have expressly mandated that entry of a final judgment should await the resolution of all claims for and against all parties. Id. at 767 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now (C.L.E.A.N.), 119 Wn.App. 665, 82 P.3d 1199, rev. denied, 152 Wn.2d 1023, 101 P.3d 107 (2004)).

Furthermore, the appellate courts have held that the following reasons justify a trial court’s delay of the entry of a final judgment until all claims had been resolved:

(1) to offset judgments favorable to each side before any enforcement activity takes place;

(2) to preclude the disruptive effects of enforcement and appellate activity while trial court proceedings are still ongoing; and

(3) to avoid a multiplicity of appeals.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

FRCP 35 Exams Based on Emotional Distress (9th Circuit)

FRCP 35 Exams Based on Emotional Distress (9th Circuit)


Under federal law, does a plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress place his/her mental condition in controversy for purposes of FRCP 35 exams? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE GENERAL RULE

If a plaintiff objects to a FRCP 35 exam, the court has discretion to enter an order compelling examination only if the employer can establish:

(A) that a physical or mental condition of the person sought to be examined is “in controversy,” and

(B) that “good cause” exists.

See Houghton v. M & F Fishing, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 666, 667 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Courts in jurisdictions throughout the country are divided on the issue as to whether a claim of emotional distress places the plaintiff’s mental condition at issue (in controversy). But the modern trend in courts is to increasingly find that it does not.

FRCP 35 EXAMS BASED ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS:  9TH CIRCUIT

The general position of courts in the 9th Circuit appears to be that a claim for emotional distress damages, by itself, is not sufficient to place the plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy for purposes of FRCP 35(a). Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579, 580 (N.D.Cal. 1998) (referencing, Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 92-97 (S.D.Cal.1995) (thoroughly surveying the relevant case law, distinguishing several unconventional cases including Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, hastings & Dodson, 820 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Cal.1993), and determining not to set Smedly, inter alia, as precedent)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead, the trend for 9th Circuit courts is as follows:

[T]he movant must also demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff has pled a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff has alleged a specific mental or psychiatric injury; (3) the plaintiff has pled a claim for unusually severe emotional distress; (4) the plaintiff plans to offer expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress and/or (5) the plaintiff has conceded that his or her mental condition is ” in controversy” for purposes of FRCP 35(a).

Id. (internal citation omitted).

These courts have further found that a Plaintiff merely seeking damages in excess of a million dollars for humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress does not justify a request for a mental examination. Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. at 97.

GARDEN VARIETY EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Thus, for example, a plaintiff seeking “garden variety emotional distress” damages in excess of one million dollars, pursuant to claims solely under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may argue that he/she is not subject to FRCP 35 examination, because his/her mental condition is not in controversy (provided he/she does not satisfy the additional above mentioned requirements set forth in Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. at 580 (N.D.Cal. 1998), supra); but whoever asserts this type argument should be prepared to fight it out in Court — the defendant(s) will likely file a motion.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The Same Actor Inference Defense

The Same Actor Inference Defense


Under federal law, what is the “same actor inference” defense? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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SAME ACTOR INFERENCE DEFENSE

The “Same-Actor-Inference” (Inference) is a potential employer defense to a claim of employment discrimination under federal law. It is applicable where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time; in that case, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory action. Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Inference is based on the principle that an employer’s initial willingness to hire the employee-plaintiff is strong evidence that the employer is not biased against the protected class to which the employee belongs. Id. The Inference can be further described in terms of scope and proximity.

SCOPE

The scope of the Inference makes it is also applicable where the employee was not actually fired but merely offered a less desirable job assignment. Id. Moreover, the Same-Actor Inference is neither a mandatory presumption nor a mere possible conclusion for the jury to draw; it is a strong inference that a court must take into account on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 1098.

Thus, it is not valid to argue that the Inference is not a proper consideration at summary judgment.

PROXIMITY

As far as proximity: for the Inference to apply, it is not required that the alleged discrimination take place within a “short” period of time after the favorable action; for example, a 3 year gap in time was held to be short enough in time for the Inference to apply. Id. at 1097 (citing Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2000) (basing affirmance of summary judgment in an employment discrimination case in part on the fact that the plaintiff “was fired by the same man who had hired him three years earlier”)).

However, proximity becomes a potential plaintiff rebuttal when there is an allegation that unlawful bias developed by employer-actor after the favorable action and proximate to the negative employment action. See id.

The bottom line is that the Inference, if properly raised by the employer, is difficult for a plaintiff to overcome.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Washington Priority of Action Rule: Same Relief

Washington Priority of Action Rule: Same Relief


Under the Washington Priority of Action Rule, how do Washington State courts determine if the relief is the same? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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PRIORITY OF ACTION RULE

The Washington Priority of Action Rule (Rule) will only apply if the two relevant cases involve identical (1) subject matter, (2) parties, and (3) relief. Am. Mobile Homes of Wash. Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990).

These factors must be established before the Rule should be applied. Id. The identity of the above elements must be such that a decision in one tribunal would bar proceedings in the other because of res judicata. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Foundation v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 111 Wn.App. 586, 607, 49 P.3d 894 (Div. 2 2002).

If the Rule applies, the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved. Am. Mobile Home, 115 Wn.2d at 316-17.

ELEMENT #3: IDENTICAL RELIEF

The Washington State Supreme Court has established the following factors to determine if “the relief is the same” for purposes of the Washington Priority of Action Rule:

(1) whether the form of relief available to each tribunal is the same (FORM OF RELIEF); and

(2) whether the first tribunal can resort to another to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available between the first and second lawsuits (EQUALIZE DISPARITY)?

See, State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found., 111 Wn. App. at 607, 49 (holding that the remedy was the same in both suits, because the type of relief available to both courts was the same, and because the administrative agency could otherwise seek relief in superior court in the first case to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available in the administrative tribunal).

EXAMPLE: EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUND v. WASHINGTON EDUC. ASS’N

In Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, plaintiff attempted to amend its citizens lawsuit in superior court by adding claims that were contemporaneously being pursued by an administrative agency with statutory authority to preempt plaintiffs’ lawsuit; plaintiff sought, inter alia, the same form of remedy (i.e., a fine) as the administrative agency based on the same statute.

The court ruled that the relief was the same in both actions and upheld the trial court’s application of the priority of action rule, because the relief in both cases was a monetary fine pursuant to RCW 42.17.395(4), and because any disparity in the amount of relief available could be eliminated if the administrative tribunal ushered the claim to superior court.

The court then analyzed res judicata and concluded jurisdiction in the second court was improper under Washington Priority of Action Rule. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ., 111 Wn. App. 586, 49 P.3d 894 (2002).


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Affirmative and Negative Defenses

Affirmative and Negative Defenses


Under federal law, are defendants allowed to plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

“An affirmative defense, under the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.” Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 598 (D.N.M. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (hyperlinks added). The burden for establishing affirmative defenses generally lies on the defendant. Id. (internal citation omitted).

NEGATIVE DEFENSES

However, “negative” defenses are merely rebuttal to plaintiff’s claims and should be stricken; the courts have held these so-called affirmative defenses (or negative defenses) simply provide a basis to negate an element of the prima facie case for relief and are restatements of denials present in earlier parts of the complaint. See id. (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking eight “negative” defenses); see Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof [as to an element plaintiff is required to prove] is not an affirmative defense.”(citing Flav-O-Rich v. Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir.1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

CONCLUSION

It appears that under federal law, defendants may plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court, but such negative defenses are not affirmative defenses and should be stricken as a defense. A fundamental consideration is whether the time, expense, and risk in bringing the motion to strike is outweighed by the benefit. Obviously, that is only a question for a party or party representative to answer relative to their particular matter.


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Behind Closed Doors: WLAD & ESD Appeals

Behind Closed Doors: WLAD & ESD Appeals


Under Washington State law, may an employment discrimination plaintiff use favorable findings from a previous unemployment benefits appeal against the associated defendant employer, when pursuing a claim under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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A COMMON ISSUE

Occasionally, one of my employment discrimination clients will vigorously attempt to convince me that they received favorable findings against their employer during their unemployment benefits appeal conducted through the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings; and that the findings will help them win their subsequent discrimination lawsuit under WLAD. Unfortunately, I usually have bad news for those clients.

Stated differently, the issue is whether findings made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing may be admitted in a separate employment discrimination lawsuit outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer?

WA STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT

The Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD) was created in 1939. Its mission is to “partner to connect employers and job seekers – supporting transitions to new jobs and empowering careers.”

If an individual applies for unemployment benefits through the ESD and is denied; then the individual can request an appeal. In that case, the ESD will forward the appeal to the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) which is not part of the ESD. The OAH will then assign an administrative law judge to hear the case.

TITLE 50 RCW

The Washington State laws relating to the ESD are contained in Title 50 RCW, and the relevant law states as follows:

Any finding, determination, conclusion, declaration, or final order made by the commissioner, or his or her representative or delegate, or by an appeal tribunal, administrative law judge, reviewing officer, or other agent of the department for the purposes of Title 50 RCW, shall not be conclusive, nor binding, nor admissible as evidence in any separate action outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts or was reviewed pursuant to RCW 50.32.120.

RCW 50.32.097 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

CONCLUSION

Findings made by an administrative law judge during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing are generally not admissible in a subsequent WLAD employment discrimination lawsuit (before an arbitrator, court, or judge) outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between the employee and the employee’s present or prior employer.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Property Interests in Continued Employment: WA State

Property Interests in Continued Employment: WA State


In Washington State, do Washington State civil service employees–dischargeable only for cause–have property interests in continued employment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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GOLDBERG TWO-STEP PROCESS

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), “[t]he Supreme Court … enunciated a two-step process for analyzing cases involving deprivation of a governmental benefit” in violation of due process, as follows:

1. it must first be ascertained whether the interest at issue is a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and

2. if the interest is a protected one, the court must determine if the deprived beneficiary has been afforded due process.

See Belnap v. Chang, 707 F.2d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In relation to element 1 above, “property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created, and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state law. . . .” Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 53 USLW 4306 (1985) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

RELEVANT WA STATE LAW

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that “protected property interests can arise from express or implied contracts for continued employment, objective representations of tenure, . . . or even collective bargaining agreements providing for continued employment.” Danielson v. City of Seattle, 108 Wn.2d 788, 796, 742 P.2d 717 (1987) (internal citations omitted). As a result, “constitutionally protected property interests may arise in public employment where civil service laws provide an express or implied contract for continued employment.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Thus, I believe that civil service employees dischargeable only for cause have protected property interests in continued employment. See id. at 796-97 (internal citations omitted).

Example: Danielson v. City of Seattle

For example, in Danielson, a Seattle police officer committed theft and was subsequently discharged. The Seattle Municipal Code and the Seattle City Charter established that no civil service employees may be discharged from employment except for cause. As a result, the court held that the police office had a property interest in continued employment. Id.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WLAD Civil Suits & Administrative Actions

WLAD Civil Suits & Administrative Actions


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), may plaintiffs bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

“Washington’s law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, is a broad remedial statute, the purpose of which is to eliminate and prevent discrimination on the basis of” specific protected classes. Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries, 143 Wn.App. 832, 181 P.3d 843 (Wash.App. Div. 3 3008) (citing RCW 49.60.010).

THE CIVIL SUIT REQUIREMENT

“[WLAD] declares that the right to be free from such discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil action by members of the enumerated protected classes.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.030(1), (2)) (emphasis added).

The issue is whether an administrative proceeding is considered a civil action for purposes of WLAD claims. The Washington State Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries. Id.

EXAMPLE: RHOADES v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES

In Rhoades, plaintiff Tammy Rhoades “filed a claim with the Department [of Labor and Industries] after she was injured in the course of employment[.]” Rhoades, 143 Wn.App. at 836. “The Department awarded her a permanent partial disability benefit.” Id. She appealed, and “in March 2001, the Department determined that Ms. Rhoades was totally disabled and she was placed on the pension rolls.” Id. “The Department affirmed this order after reconsideration in September 2002.” Id.

However, “Ms. Rhoades disagreed with the Department’s calculation of her monthly pension amount [and] appealed the September 2002 pension order to the Board of Industrial Appeals (Board).” Id. In 2004, “the Board found that the Department’s September 2002 order was correct” except for a small interest calculation. Id. at 837.

Plaintiff Rhoades “appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board’s order.” Id. She then appealed to Division 3 of the Washington State Court of Appeals wherein she included, inter alia, a claim that the Department violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Id. at 835-36. The court of appeals found that “an administrative action and appeal is an inappropriate vehicle for” claims under RCW 49.60. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). “[A] civil suit is required.” Id.

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), plaintiffs cannot bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals.


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National Bank Act Preemption & Title VII

National Bank Act Preemption & Title VII


Within the 9th Circuit, does the National Bank Act preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE NATIONAL BANK ACT

The National Bank Act provides, inter alia, that a national bank shall have the power “[t]o elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.” 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth) (emphasis added).

This is also known as the “at-pleasure provision” of § 24(Fifth) that is part of the scheme of federal laws governing the duties and powers of federally chartered banks. Thus, as a threshold matter, a federally chartered bank seeking to utilize the at-pleasure provision to preempt an employee’s claims for relief under other laws must first show that the employee was (1) appointed by the board of directors, (2) terminated by the board of directors, and (3) an officer.

THE PURPOSE

The original congressional intent behind the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act was to ensure the financial stability of the banking institutions by affording them the means to discharge employees who were felt to compromise an institution’s integrity. Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, courts uniformly have concluded that a bank’s power to dismiss at pleasure is analogous to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship between employer and employee. Id. at 984 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for certain employers (e.g., a bank) to discriminate against an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex; additional organizational forms are within purview of Title VII, but they are beyond the scope of this article.

Title VII also makes it illegal to retaliate against an individual because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

THE INTERSECTION

The intersection of the at-pleasure provision and Title VII presents a potential conflict of laws; and the 9th Circuit, in Kroske v. US Bank Corp, resolved the conflict in favor of bank officers both hired and fired by the board of directors. See Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Kroske, Kathy Kroske was a bank officer that was both hired and fired by the board of directors, and Kroske subsequently filed suit against the bank alleging age discrimination under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). Accordingly, one of the issues the court addressed was whether the at-pleasure provision preempted her age discrimination claim under WLAD?

The court, in reaching its conclusion (the analysis is beyond the scope of this article), found, inter alia, that federal anti-discrimination statutes were relevant to its inquiry because federally chartered banks are not exempt from liability under those laws. Id. at 986 (see Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (holding that members of a class of black employees of a Federal Reserve Bank could maintain separate actions against the bank under Title VII); see also Enforcement Guidance on Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC Decision No. N-915-002 (1993) (concluding that Federal Reserve Banks are not executive agencies and are covered by Title VII, the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as private employers)).

The court went on to find that courts that have addressed the issue consistently have held that banks are subject to liability for discrimination under federal anti-discrimination laws irrespective of the bank’s right to dismiss an officer (or employee) at pleasure. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Thus, it would appear that the National Bank Act does not preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Section 1981 & Non-Employment Contracts (Ninth Circuit)

Section 1981 & Non-Employment Contracts (Ninth Circuit)


Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under The Law, are non-employment contracts protected in the Ninth Circuit? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer and Terms of Use before proceeding.)


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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

The problem is how to adapt the four elements of a prima facie case established in the employment discrimination context to claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Plaintiff-Appellant (“Lindsey” dba “E-Jays Panache Images”) was a business that presented fashion shows; all representatives were African-American, and audience members were primarily African-American as well. The Defendant-Appellee (“SLT Los Angeles” or “the Westin”) owned and operated, inter alia, a Grand Ballroom in their subject Westin Hotel.

Lindsey contracted for use of the Grand Ballroom for an event, but on the day of the event, there was an apparent mix up by the Westin. He essentially alleged that they were denied the Grand Ballroom in favor of a Bar Mitzvah because of their race.

Lindsey sued in U.S. District Court for, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and “the district court concluded that Appellant … [Lindsey] had failed to prove that the Westin’s actions, which had prevented Panache from hosting its annual Mother’s Day Fashion Show in the Grand Ballroom of the Westin Hotel, presented a prima facie case of race discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 1141.

Lindsey appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and it reversed the district court and remanded for trial. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the decisions of other circuits that “the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id.

Accordingly, “the first three elements require a plaintiff to show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right to contract for those services.” Id. (referencing Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir.2001); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir.1996)) (emphasis added).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

However, the court identified that “the Seventh and Sixth Circuits conflict over adaptation of the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement, which, as applied by the district court … [in Lindsey], requires that such services remained available to similarly-situated individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court then pointed out that “the Seventh Circuit adopts this requirement … but the Sixth Circuit concludes that this flat requirement is too rigorous in the context of the denial of services by a commercial establishment, because customers often have no way of establishing what treatment was accorded to other customers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The 9th Circuit reasoned that “the Sixth Circuit distinguishes the commercial services context from the employment context, where records are kept and there is a paper trail disclosing what treatment is given to similarly-situated others.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “the Sixth Circuit alters the elements to require: (a) that plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not; and/or (b) that plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning compelling, but did not decide whether its modification/relaxation of the fourth element of a prima facie case under Section 1981 is required in many or all cases arising in a commercial, non-employment context. The court found that the plaintiff in Lindsey offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, and, thus, it applied all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed.

CONCLUSION

It appears that in the Ninth Circuit, the following may be required to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:

1) membership in a protected class;

2) an attempt to contract for certain services;

3) denial of the right to contract for those services; and (possibly);

4) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not [AND/OR] plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.

See Lindsey, 447 F.3d at 1145. When the plaintiff offers clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, the court will likely apply all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed. See id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer and Terms of Use for more information.

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State


Under Washington State law, how do courts view ambiguous contracts at summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”

However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”

The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit

The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit


Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, entitled to costs when the court finally adjudges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, United States District Courts have original jurisdiction (Diversity Jurisdiction) of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States; there are additional provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Further, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have Supplemental Jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution; but, there are exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b).

In Washington State, employment discrimination cases typically involve these two jurisdictional bases; Plaintiffs often combine Title VII claims with Washington Law Against Discrimination claims and associated state tort claims. Employer-defendants in such cases are often incorporated out of state. This article addresses the scenario wherein the plaintiff elects to initially file suit in federal court based on similar circumstances.

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

There may be risks for the discrimination plaintiff that initially files in Federal court. The relevant law is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b), and it states as follows:

(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.

Id. According to this statute, a plaintiff may be denied costs and/or required to pay costs in the event of a favorable verdict that is below $75,000.

CONCLUSION

Subject to exceptions, a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court based on diversity jurisdiction must, arguably, recover $75,000 or more (without regard to setoff and counterclaim; and exclusive of interest and costs), or the court may deny costs authorized by statute to the plaintiff. Moreover, the court may also impose costs on the plaintiff.

But this law may be superseded by an express provision in a statute of the United States. In any event, this is a gambit that some plaintiffs may not want to take – proceed with caution.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability


Under Section 1983, may an individual bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an illegal custom — even if the custom was not officially established? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

Local governmental entities may be sued under Section 1983 for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom,’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity’s official decisionmaking channels.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 412 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

“Showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity is one way to establish municipal liability.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) a police officer turned a police dog loose on Chew and it assaulted Chew directly causing injury; the city argued that the unofficial policy of using dogs to apprehend suspects was attributable only to the non-policymaking officers responsible for training the canine units and not the police chief or commission — policymaking officials.

The court found that “[a] city could not escape liability for the consequences of established and ongoing departmental policy regarding the use of force simply by permitting such basic policy decisions to be made by lower level officials who are not ordinarily considered policymakers.” Id. at 1445.

Furthermore, the court found that “if the city in fact permitted departmental policy regarding the use of canine force to be designed and implemented at lower levels of the department, a jury could, and should, nevertheless find that the policy constituted an established municipal ‘custom or usage’ regarding the use of police dogs for which the city is responsible.” Id. (referencing City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127)

Thus, the court held that the city acted under color of law in injuring Chew.

CONCLUSION

Under § 1983, I believe an individual may bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an unofficial illegal custom.

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Inadvertent Waiver of Res Judicata

Inadvertent Waiver of Res Judicata


Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, how is the inadvertent waiver of the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and claim splitting addressed? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Washington State Supreme Court developed two relevant tests to determine whether a waiver of affirmative defenses has occurred:

(1) waiver based on civil rules; and

(2) common law waiver.

Compare, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) (explaining waiver pursuant to civil rules), with Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc., 163 Wn.2d 236, 178 P.3d 981 (2008) (explaining common law doctrine of waiver).

It is not uncommon for defendant-employers in employment discrimination cases to inadvertently waive the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and/or claim splitting under the civil rules (this article does not address common law waiver).

WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES:  RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING

Under CR 8(c), res judicata is listed as an affirmative defense and must be specifically pled. See, e.g., Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 422, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1981) (holding “failure of consideration” is an affirmative defense under CR 8(c) and must be specifically pled).

Particularly, in order for res judicata to have a preclusive effect, the second court must be advised of the prior proceeding, and the burden of pleading “res judicata” is listed among the affirmative defenses. See, Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 812 (1985) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Moreover, although CR 8(c) specifically delineates 20 affirmative defenses, parties must also affirmatively plead “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 575, 166 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2007). Thus, “claim splitting” and “priority of action” must also be specifically pled as affirmative defenses.

If specific defenses are not (1) affirmatively pled, (2) asserted with a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they will be deemed to have been waived and may not thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case. Rainier Nat. Bank, 30 Wn.App. at 422 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976))(emphasis added).

This affirmative defense requirement will not be abrogated where it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

EXAMPLE:  RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS

For example, in Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, the plaintiff-bank brought an action to recover funds from a default loan guaranteed by defendants, and defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of “failure of consideration” for the first time at summary judgment; the court held that defendants failed to specifically plead the affirmative defense “failure of consideration” in their answer and it was therefore waived. Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div 1 1981) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, or claim splitting may be inadvertently waived if not properly plead.

An employment discrimination plaintiff facing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon defenses of priority of action rule, claim splitting, and/or res judicata would be wise to evaluate whether the defendant has properly asserted such affirmative defenses at the beginning of the case in their responsive pleading; there might be a strong argument for waiver based on the civil rules. I have successfully made this argument on multiple occasions against defendant-employers at summary judgment.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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