Torts Archives — LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

October 10, 2024October 21, 2024

The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

Under Washington State law, can racially discriminatory action in employment form the basis for the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

Advertisement

THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, as follows:

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.”

Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 88 Wn.2d 735, 745, n. 1, 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (emphasis added).

RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION & THE TORT OF OUTRAGE

Racially discriminatory action can form the basis for a claim of outrage. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:

In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.

Id.* at 739, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added). Within the context of employment discrimination, positions of authority are significant when evaluating associated claims based on the tort of outrage.

Positions of authority

“When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.” Contreras*, 88 Wn.2d at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e). Thus, “[t]he relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe racially discriminatory actions in employment can form the basis for the tort of outrage. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is a crucial legal framework for addressing severe emotional harm caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. Defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, this tort highlights the accountability of individuals whose actions lead to significant emotional distress, even in the absence of physical injury.

Notably, racially discriminatory actions can serve as a foundation for such claims, as established by Washington case law. Furthermore, the dynamics of authority between the parties play a vital role in evaluating these claims, emphasizing that abusive behavior from those in positions of power can significantly exacerbate the impact of the distress. Depending on the circumstances of each case, understanding these elements may be useful for adequately addressing the complexities of emotional distress claims in civil law.

Learn More

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

September 14, 2023October 21, 2024

Negligent Supervision (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what is the tort of negligent supervision? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION IN WASHINGTON STATE

“Negligent supervision creates a limited duty to control an employee for the protection of a third person, even when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment.” S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wn. App. 511, 517, 54 P.3d 174 (Div. 1 2002) (citing Rodriguez v. Perez, 99 Wn. App. 439, 451, 994 P.2d 874, review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1020, 10 P.3d 1073 (2000) (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 48, 929 P.2d 420 (1997))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

“Employer liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision arises from this duty.” Id. (emphasis and hyperlinks added). “If an employee conducts negligent acts outside the scope of employment, the employer may be liable for negligent supervision.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 99 Wn. App. at 451, 994 P.2d 874) (hyperlink added)).

However: “An employer is not liable for negligent supervision of an employee unless the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the employee presented a risk of danger to others.” Id. (citing Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 48-49, 929 P.2d 420) (hyperlink added).

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

To establish a prima facie case of negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show:

(1) an employee acted outside the scope of his or her employment;

(2) the employee presented a risk of harm to other employees;

(3) the employer knew, or should have known of the risk in the exercise of reasonable case that the employee posed a risk to others; and

(4) the employer’s failure to supervise was the proximate cause of injuries to other employees.

Briggs v. Nova Services, 135 Wn. App. 955, 966-67, 147 P.3d 616 (2006) (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Retention (WA State)

need help?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 29, 2023October 21, 2024

Vicarious Liability (WA State)

Under WA State laws, what is the proper inquiry for vicarious liability within the scope of employment law? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Vicarious liability is “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).

Under Washington State law, after “an employee’s underlying tort is established, the employer will be held vicariously liable if ‘the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.'” Robel v. Roundup Corporation*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 53 (Wash. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 469, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Washington Employment Law Digest.)

THE PROPER INQUIRY

The proper vicarious-liability inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct. See id. An employer may not insulate itself from vicarious liability merely by adopting a general policy proscribing bad behavior that would otherwise be actionable. Id.

DEFEATING A CLAIM OF VICARIOUS LIBAILITY

“An employer can defeat a claim of vicarious liability by showing that the employee’s conduct was[:]

(1) ‘intentional or criminal’ and

(2) ‘outside the scope of employment.’

Id. (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 56, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)) (paragraph formatting added).

However, intentional or criminal conduct is not per se outside the cope of employment. Id. at 53. Moreover, it is not the case that an employer will be vicariously liable only where it has specifically authorized an employee to act in an intentionally harmful or negligent manner. See id.

We invite you to read more of our tort-related blog articles:

» Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Retention (WA State)

» The Tort of Battery

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA State Torts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts

LEARN MORE

April 13, 2023October 21, 2024

The Local Government Tort-Claim Filing Statute

Under Washington State law, what is the purpose of the local government tort-claim filing statute? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements. See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:

RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.

Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.

The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.

(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.

RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT

Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:

RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

…

(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.

The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.

For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.

RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)

THE POLICIES

CLAIM FILING STATUTE

“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571. “The legislature illustrated the general nature of this purpose, stating that ‘[t]he laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.'” Id. (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)) (alteration in original). “Under this directive, exact specificity is not required; the claimant simply must provide enough information to put the government on notice of the claim and its contents.” Id.

TORT CLAIM

“The purpose of this claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citing Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)). “The claim filing statute provides further that it is to be liberally construed such that substantial compliance is satisfactory.” Id; see also RCW 4.96.020(5).

LEARN MORE

April 6, 2023October 21, 2024

The Tort of Outrage

Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

**THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)**

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and

(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.

Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (footnote omitted).

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

“Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:

Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.

Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).