Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Pari Materia Rule? Here’s my point of view.
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CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
THE PARI MATERIA RULE: INTERPRETING CONFLICTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Legal statutes can sometimes be difficult to interpret, particularly when different sections of a law appear to contradict one another. In such cases, courts rely on certain principles of interpretation to clarify the law’s intent. One such principle is known as pari materia, a rule of construction used when two provisions within the same statute or related statutes seem to conflict. The rule states as follows:
Reading the statutes in parimateria the rule of construction applies, that as between two conflicting parts of a statute, that part latest in order of position will prevail, where the first part is not more clear and explicit than the last part.
Thus, the pari materia rule states that, when conflicting provisions exist, the more recent one—meaning the provision that comes last in the text—should generally take precedence. However, there’s an important exception to this. If the earlier provision is more precise or clearer in its wording, then it may still outweigh the later provision. This ensures that the most unambiguous and straightforward part of the law is followed, even if it isn’t the most recent.
THE POLICY BEHIND THE RULE
The rationale behind this rule is based on the idea that legal texts evolve over time through amendments, updates, or revisions. As laws change, they may introduce new provisions that supersede older ones. However, if the latest change is unclear or in conflict with the earlier law, courts prioritize clarity and explicit meaning to maintain consistency and avoid confusion in the legal system.
In practice, this rule helps resolve contradictions in a way that reflects the likely intent of lawmakers, allowing the law to adapt to new circumstances while maintaining a logical structure. By applying pari materia, judges can ensure that the most recent and relevant expression of the law is given proper weight, unless it conflicts with the clear intent of previous provisions.
CONCLUSION
The pari materia rule is an essential tool for interpreting statutes that contain conflicting sections. By giving preference to the most recent provisions, while allowing earlier, clearer provisions to take precedence when necessary, it helps ensure that the law remains consistent, coherent, and true to its original intent. This rule strikes a balance between respecting legislative changes and honoring the clarity of earlier laws.
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE (WA STATE)
In Washington State, “[t]he ‘litigation privilege’ is a judicially created privilege that protects participants—including attorneys, parties, and witnesses—in a judicial proceeding against civil liability for statements they make in the course of that proceeding.” Young v. Rayan, 27 Wn.App. 2d 500, 533 P.3d 123 (Wash. App. 2023), review denied, 2 Wash.3d 1008 (Wash. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
witness immunity
When applied to witnesses, this privilege is often referred to as “witness immunity.” See id. Under this principle, witnesses in judicial proceedings are generally granted absolute immunity from legal action based on their testimony, provided their statements are related to the litigation at hand. See id. “Statements are absolutely privileged if they are pertinent or material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally sufficient to obtain that relief.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
However, statements that are unrelated to the litigation do not receive this protection; not every incidental remark made in court will escape liability. See id. But the threshold for determining relevance is not overly stringent: “As the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates, a statement ‘need not be strictly relevant to any issue’ so long as it bears ‘some reference to the subject matter of the … litigation.'” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 586, comment c).
THE GENERAL RULE
Thus, the Litigation Privilege “prohibits liability stemming from statements
(1) made in the course of a judicial proceeding
(2) that are pertinent to the litigation.
Id. “Pertinency is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
THE POLICY
“The purpose of the litigation privilege doctrine is to encourage frank, open, untimorous argument and testimony and to discourage retaliatory, derivative lawsuits.” Id.
ATTORNEYS
“As applied to attorneys, it furthers ‘a public policy of securing to [counsel] as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
WITNESS TESTIMONY
“As applied to witness testimony, it preserves ‘the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging full and frank testimony.'” Id. (internal citations omitted). “The rule addresses the concern that a witness may either be reluctant to come forward to testify in the first place or shade their testimony ‘to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Under Washington State laws, what is the definition of hearsay? Here’s my point of view.
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Definition of Hearsay (WA State)
In the legal profession, there are specific guidelines that dictate how evidence can be used and presented in court. One such guideline involves hearsay, a rule that is central to maintaining fairness and ensuring that the evidence admitted is credible. Washington State law generally follows the principle of excluding hearsay, though there are notable exceptions (NOTE: this article will not address those exceptions). A clear understanding of what hearsay entails, particularly in the context of Washington law, is crucial for litigators.
Rule 801: What Constitutes Hearsay?
In Washington State, Evidence Rule (ER) 801 defines hearsay as follows:
…
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
ER 801(c)*. In simpler terms, this means that if someone is recounting what they heard or read from another person, that statement is generally regarded as hearsay. (NOTE: Within the ER 801 definition, the term “statement” means “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” Id.* And the term “declarant” means “a person who makes a statement.” Id.*)
example
Thus, Hearsay is essentially an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what is being asserted. In other words, it involves a statement made outside the courtroom, brought into court to establish that the information in the statement is accurate. As a general rule, hearsay is typically not allowed in court due to its inherent unreliability. Since these statements are not made under oath or subjected to cross-examination, they do not undergo the same level of scrutiny as in-court testimony, which can raise questions about their accuracy.
For instance, if a witness testifies, “I overheard my co-worker John say he saw Manager Smith covertly sabotage the plaintiff’s work,” this would be considered hearsay. The purpose of the statement is to prove that manager Smith was indeed the individual that set up the plaintiff for failure. However, since co-worker John is not available to testify in person and be questioned, the statement is generally excluded as unreliable evidence under the hearsay rule.
How Washington State Handles Hearsay
Washington State follows the foundational principles of hearsay outlined in the state’s own Rules of Evidence (specifically Rule 801). These rules provide a structure for determining when a statement qualifies as hearsay and when exceptions to the rule might apply (again, this article does not address those exceptions).
Conclusion
In conclusion, hearsay is an important concept in Washington State law that helps maintain the reliability and fairness of legal proceedings. Defined under ER 801, hearsay refers to an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of what is being claimed. Generally, hearsay is not allowed in court because it lacks the safeguards of being made under oath or subject to cross-examination; however, there are exceptions beyond the scope of this article. A clear understanding of this rule is essential for legal professionals to ensure only credible evidence is presented in court.
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Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what criteria do courts use to determine whether workplace harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of employment? Here’s my point of view.
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HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT (WA STATE): THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
“To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show the following four elements:
Loeffelholz v. University of Washington*, 175 Wn.2d 264, 275 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis and hyperlinks added).
ELEMENT 3: TERMS OR CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
“The third element requires that the harassment be sufficiently pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Davis v. West One Automotive Group*, 140 Wn.App. 449 (Div. 3 2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1039 (Wash. 2008) (citingGlasgow v. Georgia-Pac. Corp.*, 103 Wash.2d 401, 406, 693 P.2d 708 (1985)).
criteria COURTS USE to determinE WHETHER harassment affects terms or conditions of employment
The Washington State “Court of Appeals has adopted [the following] criteria ‘[t]o determine whether the harassment is such that it affects the conditions of employment …:
[a] the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct;
[b] whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
[c] whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.'”
Blackburn v. Department of Social and Health Services*, 186 Wn.2d 250, 261 n.4 (Wash. 2016) (citing Washington v. Boeing Co., 105 Wn.App. 1, 10, 19 P.3d 1041 (2000) (citing Sangster v. Albertson’s, Inc.*, 99 Wn.App. 156, 163, 991 P.2d 674 (2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)))) (second alteration in original) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, may an employer require religious affiliation disclosure by employees? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WLAD: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION DISCLOSURE (RCW 49.60.208)
The relevant law can be found under RCW 49.60.208, and it states as follows:
(1) Require an employee to disclose his or her sincerely held religious affiliation or beliefs, unless the disclosure is for the purpose of providing a religious accommodation at the request of the employee; or
(2) Require or authorize an employee to disclose information about the religious affiliation of another employee, unless the individual whose religious affiliation will be disclosed
(a) expressly consents to the disclosure, and
(b) has knowledge of the purpose for the disclosure.
Under this exception, an employer may require an employee to disclose their “sincerely held religious affiliation or beliefs” if it is for the purpose of providing an employee-requested religious accommodation. Read more about this topic by viewing our article: Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices.
EXCEPTION — BOTH EXPRESS CONSENT AND KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSE
Under an additional exception, an employer may either authorize or require an employee (“Revealing Employee”) to reveal information about another employee’s (“Subject Employee’s”) religious affiliation if the Subject Employee both expressly consents to the disclosure and has knowledge of the reason for the revelation.
REMEDIES
Under the WLAD, “[a]ny person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (WA STATE)
The concept of circumstantial evidence plays an important role in establishing claims and defenses in workplace disputes. While many people are familiar with direct evidence–such as eyewitness testimony or a signed contract–circumstantial evidence can often be just as important in shaping the outcome of a case. In the context of Washington State employment law, understanding what circumstantial evidence is and how it is applied can be essential for both employers and employees navigating disputes.
general definition
Circumstantial evidence is defined as follows:
1. Evidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation. — Also termed indirect evidence; oblique evidence. … 2. All evidence that is not given by eyewitness testimony.
Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004) (hyperlink added). Thus, circumstantial evidence refers to evidence that indirectly supports a fact or conclusion by inferring its existence from other facts or circumstances. Unlike direct evidence, which provides straightforward proof of a claim (e.g., a video recording of an event), circumstantial evidence relies on a chain of inferences that help establish a fact or raise a presumption about an event or situation.
circumstantial evidence in employment law
In Washington State, as in many other jurisdictions, circumstantial evidence is commonly used in employment law cases to support claims of wrongful termination, discrimination, retaliation, and other workplace-related issues. In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence can be pivotal in proving or disproving an employer‘s or employee‘s allegations.
example
For example, in cases of alleged wrongful termination, an employee might not have direct evidence (such as a text message explicitly stating the basis for termination) but can offer circumstantial evidence in support of their claim. This could include evidence such as a history of discriminatory comments, a pattern of different treatment between employees of different races, or the timing of the termination shortly after the employee filed a discrimination complaint — NOTE: these are only a few examples of circumstantial evidence that do not exhaust all possibilities or protected classes.
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If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
FAQ: What qualifies as wrongful termination in Washington?
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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What qualifies as wrongful termination in Washington?
answer:
The terms “wrongful termination” and “wrongful discharge” are synonymous in Washington State and are typically evaluated within the scope of the “at-will” doctrine (hereinafter, “Doctrine”); Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. Under this doctrine, an employer can terminate an at-will employee for any reason—whether it’s no reason at all, a legitimate reason, or even an unethical one—without worrying about legal repercussions. Likewise, unless there is a contract that specifies different terms, employees have the unrestricted right to leave their job at any time (i.e., at will). However, the following three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine qualify as wrongful termination in Washington:
(1) The Statutory Exception;
(2) The Judicial Exception; and
(3) The Contractual Exception.
(1) THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION
“First, both Congress and the Washington State Legislature have modified the employment at-will doctrine by limiting employers’ rights to discharge employees.” Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 153, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)* (1994); chapter 49.60* RCW (Washington’s law against discrimination); see also chapter 49.12* RCW (prohibiting discharge of employees for testifying in investigations regarding labor conditions, worker earnings, or sex discrimination); RCW 49.44.090* (prohibiting discharge of employee for being age 40 and over)).
These statutory laws provide an exception to the at-will doctrine that protects the employee’s rights and limits the employer’s ability to discharge an employee at-will.
(2) THE JUDICIAL EXCEPTION
Second, Washington courts “have recognized a narrow public-policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge an employee”; this exception is commonly known as “wrongful termination in violation of public policy*.” Id. (referencing Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 991 P.2d 1135 (2000) (public policy exception to “for-cause” employees); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (discharge of armored truck driver who abandoned post to prevent murder violated public policy)).
“Under this exception, an employer does not have the right to discharge an employee when the termination would frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. “By recognizing this public policy exception, … [Washington State Supreme Court has] expressed its unwillingness to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
(3) THE CONTRACTUAL EXCEPTION
“Third, employers and employees can contractually modify the at-will employment relationship, eschewing the common law rule in favor of negotiated rights and liabilities.” Id. at 154 (internal citation omitted). “An employer can bargain away its right to discharge an employee without cause by contracting not to do so.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“The law governing this exception is not a species of the employment at-will doctrine; it is the law of contracts.Therefore, the law of contracts governs an injured party’s right to recover damages under this exception.” Id. at 155 (internal citation omitted). “Unlike a wrongful discharge, a breach of contract is neither immoral nor wrongful; it is simply a broken promise.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Did you resign from your job?
Even if you resigned from your job, you might still be able to claim wrongful termination in Washington. Take our Constructive Discharge Test (video) to learn more:
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, what are the sexual harassment and assault policy requirements for hotel, motel, retailer, and security guard entities, and property services contractors? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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WA State’s Sexual Harassment and Assault Policy Requirements for Specific WA State Employers — Hotel, Motel, Retail, or Security Guard Entity, and Property Services Contractors
Washington State has long been at the forefront of promoting workplace equality and safety. One of the key provisions in this regard is RCW 49.60.515*, a statute within the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), which imposes specific responsibilities on the following employers–who employ an employee–to combat sexual harassment and assault:
» Hotel, Motel, Retail, and Security Guard Entities; and
» Property Services Contractors.
This provision aims to create safer work environments in sectors that may face heightened risks of such behaviors. Below is a breakdown of the law’s requirements and its impact on employers and employees.
1. Adopting a Sexual Harassment Policy (RCW 49.60.515(1)(a))
Under the law, every employer in the specified sectors is required to adopt a comprehensive sexual harassment policy. This policy must explicitly address how sexual harassment will be prevented, identified, and responded to in the workplace. The inclusion of this policy is an essential step in setting clear standards of behavior and ensuring that employees are aware of their rights and responsibilities.
For employers, having a well-defined sexual harassment policy provides guidance on what constitutes inappropriate behavior and how to handle complaints. This policy serves as a preventative measure and a tool for addressing complaints effectively when they arise.
2. Mandatory Training for Employees and Management (RCW 49.60.515(1)(b))
One of the core requirements of this provision is the mandatory training for managers, supervisors, and employees. The training aims to:
• Prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace
• Prevent sexual discrimination
• Educate employees about protections for those who report violations of state or federal laws, rules, or regulations
The training sessions ensure that employees at all levels are aware of the importance of maintaining a respectful and safe work environment. By providing this education, employers can foster a culture of accountability and respect. Additionally, the inclusion of protections for whistleblowers is essential for encouraging employees to report violations without fear of retaliation.
3. Resources for Employees (RCW 49.60.515(1)(c))
In addition to training, employers are required to provide their workforce with a list of resources for those who may experience or witness sexual harassment or assault. At a minimum, this resource list must include contact information for:
• The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
• The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC)
• Local advocacy groups focused on preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault
These resources are critical for providing employees with the support and guidance they need to address harassment issues, report incidents, or seek external help if necessary.
4. Panic Buttons for Employees (RCW 49.60.515(1)(d))
In an effort to further enhance the safety of workers in potentially vulnerable situations, the statute mandates that employers in the specified industries provide a panic button to each employee. This panic button is a critical tool for immediate assistance in emergencies, allowing workers to quickly signal for help if they feel threatened or are in danger of harassment or assault.
For employers with fewer than 50 employees, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries* (L&I) is tasked with providing additional guidance on how this requirement will be applied. This provision does not extend to contracted security guard companies licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW, which have separate regulations in place.
5. Reporting and Documentation Requirements for Property Services Contractors (RCW 49.60.515(2))
Property services contractors, including janitorial companies, must adhere to specific reporting requirements. These include submitting the following information to the L&I:
• The date when the sexual harassment policy was adopted
• The number of managers, supervisors, and employees who have completed the mandated training
• The physical address of each work location where janitorial services are performed, along with details about the workforce and hours worked
These reporting measures ensure that contractors are in compliance with the law and provide valuable data for oversight. This information will be made available in aggregate form to the public, allowing for transparency and accountability.
6. Why This Law Matters
RCW 49.60.515* is designed to address specific vulnerabilities in industries where workers may be at higher risk of harassment or assault, such as hotels, motels, and retail spaces. By instituting preventive measures such as training, panic buttons, and clear policies, the law works to ensure that employees have the tools and protections needed to maintain a safe workplace.
Moreover, the law helps reinforce a broader commitment to workplace equality and safety in Washington State, which aligns with national efforts to curb sexual harassment and assault in the workplace.
7. the statutory provision — rcw 49.60.515
The relevant WLAD statutory provision states as follows:
RCW 49.60.515
Sexual harassment and assault policy—Adoption of by hotel, motel, retail, or security guard entity, or property services contractors—Requirements.
(1) Every hotel, motel, retail, or security guard entity, or property services contractor, who employs an employee, must:
(a) Adopt a sexual harassment policy;
(b) Provide mandatory training to the employer’s managers, supervisors, and employees to:
(i) Prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace;
(ii) Prevent sexual discrimination in the workplace; and
(iii) Educate the employer’s workforce regarding protection for employees who report violations of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation;
(c) Provide a list of resources for the employer’s employees to utilize. At a minimum, the resources must include contact information of the equal employment opportunity commission, the Washington state human rights commission, and local advocacy groups focused on preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault; and
(d) Provide a panic button to each employee. The department must publish advice and guidance for employers with fifty or fewer employees relating to this subsection (1)(d). This subsection (1)(d) does not apply to contracted security guard companies licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW.
(2)(a) A property services contractor shall submit the following to the department on a form or in a manner determined by the department:
(i) The date of adoption of the sexual harassment policy required in subsection (1)(a) of this section;
(ii) The number of managers, supervisors, and employees trained as required by subsection (1)(b) of this section; and
(iii) The physical address of the work location or locations at which janitorial services are provided by workers of the property services contractor, and for each location: (A) The total number of workers or contractors of the property services contractor who perform janitorial services; and (B) the total hours worked.
(b) The department must make aggregate data submitted as required in this subsection (2) available upon request.
(c) The department may adopt rules to implement this subsection (2).
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) “Department” means the department of labor and industries.
(b) “Employee” means an individual who spends a majority of her or his working hours alone, or whose primary work responsibility involves working without another coworker present, and who is employed by an employer as a janitor, security guard, hotel or motel housekeeper, or room service attendant.
(c) “Employer” means any person, association, partnership, property services contractor, or public or private corporation, whether for-profit or not, who employs one or more persons.
(d) “Panic button” means an emergency contact device carried by an employee by which the employee may summon immediate on-scene assistance from another worker, a security guard, or a representative of the employer.
(e) “Property services contractor” means any person or entity that employs workers: (i) To perform labor for another person to provide commercial janitorial services; or (ii) on behalf of an employer to provide commercial janitorial services. “Property services contractor” does not mean the employment security department or individuals who perform labor under an agreement for exchanging their own labor or services with each other, provided the work is performed on land owned or leased by the individuals.
(f) “Security guard” means an individual who is principally employed as, or typically referred to as, a security officer or guard, regardless of whether the individual is employed by a private security company or a single employer or whether the individual is required to be licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW.
(4)(a) Hotels and motels with sixty or more rooms must meet the requirements of this section by January 1, 2020.
(b) All other employers identified in subsection (1) of this section must meet the requirements of this section by January 1, 2021.
The implementation of RCW 49.60.515 represents a significant step forward in ensuring that employers in high-risk industries take proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment and assault. By requiring sexual harassment policies, training, resources, panic buttons, and regular reporting, this law aims to create safer, more equitable work environments across Washington State. Employers in the specified sectors must familiarize themselves with these requirements to ensure compliance and to create a culture of safety and respect within their organizations. For employees, this law serves as an important safeguard, providing them with the resources and support necessary to navigate and report harassment if it arises.
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We invite you to read more of our related blog articles:
If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) is a vital federal law that protects certain individuals (including employees) against certain types of discrimination and retaliation; it also safeguards certain types of accommodations.
DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTED CLASSES
Title VII outlaws discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity). The law “also makes it unlawful to use policies or practices that seem neutral but have the effect of discriminating against people because of their race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or national origin.” U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce* (last visited 1/10/23).
AGE & DISABILITY: Other federal laws protect against age discrimination (i.e., Age Discrimination in Employment Act or “ADEA”) and disability discrimination (i.e., Americans with Disabilities Act or “ADA”). However, this article will address solely Title VII.
RETALIATION
Retaliation against an individual who has reported discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or taken part in an employment discrimination investigation or litigation is likewise prohibited by Title VII.
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
Lastly, applicants’ and employees‘ genuinely held religious practices must be reasonably accommodated by employers under the legislation, unless doing so would put an undue burden on the employer‘s ability to conduct business.
SCOPE OF TITLE VII
Title VII applies to certain employers (both private and public with 15 or more employees), employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs and makes it “unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:
» Hiring and firing;
»Compensation, assignment, or classification of workers;
»Transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;
»Job advertisements and recruitment;
»Testing;
»Use of employer facilities;
»Training and apprenticeship programs;
»Retirement plans, leave, and benefits; or
»Other terms and conditions of employment.
U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce* (last visited 1/10/23) (emphasis added). Certain Title VII terms are defined by law.
TITLE VII DEFINITION OF “STATE”
Title VII defines the term “State” as follows:
42 U.S. Code § 2000e – Definitions
…
(i)The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act* [43 U.S.C. 1331* et seq.].
“The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws[, including Title VII,] that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” US E.E.O.C. Website, Overview* (last visited 1/10/23).
If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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WLAD — LIABILITY FOR KILLING OR INJURING DOG GUIDE OR SERVICE ANIMAL
In Washington State, the rights of individuals with disabilities are protected under a variety of laws, including those governing the treatment of dog guides and service animals. One key WLAD provision is RCW 49.60.370*, which outlines the penalties and remedies for the killing or injury of such animals.
Under this law, if a person negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal, they are liable for a penalty of $1,000, which must be paid to the user of the animal. This penalty is in addition to any other civil or criminal penalties that may apply. Not only does this law provide financial compensation for the user of the animal, but it also enables the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if legal action is required.
Importantly, RCW 49.60.370* clarifies that the Washington State Human Rights Commission has no duty to investigate incidents of negligent or malicious acts against a dog guide or service animal. This means that individuals seeking justice under this statute must take legal action themselves to pursue civil remedies.
THE BLACK-LETTER LAW — RCW 49.60.370
The relevant WLAD section states as follows:
RCW 49.60.370
Liability for killing or injuring dog guide or service animal—Penalty in addition to other remedies or penalties—Recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs—No duty to investigate.
(1) A person who negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal is liable for a penalty of one thousand dollars, to be paid to the user of the animal. The penalty shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies or penalties, civil or criminal, provided by law.
(2) A user or owner of a dog guide or service animal, whose animal is negligently or maliciously injured or killed, is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing any civil remedy.
(3) The commission has no duty to investigate any negligent or malicious acts referred to under this section.
For employers, this law reinforces the need for a respectful and inclusive environment for employees who rely on service animals. It’s crucial that workplace policies support the safety and well-being of both employees and their service animals or guide dogs. In doing so, employers not only comply with the law but also foster a more inclusive and supportive workplace culture. By understanding and respecting the legal rights of employees with disabilities and their service animals and guide dogs, businesses can ensure they provide an environment that is safe, fair, and legally compliant.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
“Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, however, because [d]irect, ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since [t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 179, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated in part by Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
“Because intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, Washington follows the three-part evidentiary burden-shifting formula set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464). “The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” Id. at 1077-78 (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original).
the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework — three steps
For purposes of wrongful discharge claims, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework has three steps, or prongs:
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that
(4) after her discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
Second, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext.
See id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis, hyperlinks, and paragraph formatting added).
the third STEP — pretext PRONG
In Scrivener v. Clark College*, the Washington State Supreme Court “explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the pretext prong[:]
An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either
(1) that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or
(2) that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.
An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.
Litvack, 546 P.3d at 1078 (citing Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (paragraph formatting added). There are various ways of proving pretext.
proving pretext — the disparate-discipline method
In Washington, “[o]ne test for pretext is whether[:]
(1) an employee outside the protected class[;]
(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness[;]
(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash. App. 212, 227, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996); Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541 (“employer’s reason ‘was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances'”)). I call this approach the disparate-discipline method.
Accordinly, under the disparate-discipline method of proving pretext, “[t]he appropriate comparators are employees that are ‘similarly situated‘ to the plaintiff and doing ‘substantially the same work‘ as the plaintiff.” Id. at 1079-80 (citingJohnson, 80 Wash. App. at 227, 907 P.2d 1223; Ellingson v. Spokane Mortg. Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978)) (emphasis added).
Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added). “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).
Substantial Factor:
“A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Id. at 1078-79 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The protected characteristic need not be the sole factor in the decision.” Id. at 1079 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant motivating factor means that the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons.” Id. (citingFell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wash.2d 618 n.32, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s (employee’s) Burden:
“Because an employer may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, an employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464). “A plaintiff need not ‘disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons.'” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation omitted).
Circumstantial, Indirect, and Inferential Evidence — opinions & conclusory statements:
“Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“But an employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements; the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 20 Wash. App. 2d 493, 510, 500 P.3d 203 (2021)). “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Chen v. State*, 86 Wash. App. 183, 191, 937 P.2d 612 (1997).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework plays a vital role in advancing wrongful discharge claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), particularly in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. By establishing a structured, three-step process, the framework provides a clear path for plaintiffs to make their case, starting with the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in making this initial showing, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The final step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, meaning that discrimination was either the true motivation or a substantial factor in the decision.
The pretext inquiry, as clarified by Washington case law, allows plaintiffs to challenge an employer’s defense by presenting evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Methods such as the disparate-discipline test provide a framework for comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees outside the protected class, thereby helping to uncover discriminatory motives hidden behind seemingly legitimate reasons. Importantly, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, but they are not required to disprove every reason articulated by the employer.
Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework serves not only as a procedural tool but also as a safeguard for employees, ensuring they have a fair opportunity to seek redress when faced with unjust dismissal. By facilitating a fair and systematic evaluation of discrimination claims, the framework upholds the principles of equality and accountability in the workplace, giving plaintiffs the necessary tools to contest unlawful employment practices and promoting broader compliance with anti-discrimination laws.
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)
In Washington State, “[a] person is guilty of a hate crime offense if the person maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of their perception of another person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:
(a) Assaults another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property.
The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a “reasonable person” is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim.
Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
RCW 9A.36.080(1)* (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). For purposes of this article, the above law may also be referred to as “subsection (1).”
NOTE: “It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.” RCW 9A.36.080(3)*.
A Class C Felony
“Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.” RCW 9A.36.080(7)*. And the associated penalties “do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.” See RCW 9A.36.080(8)*.
Definitions
For the purposes of the hate crime offense, the following definitions apply:
(a) “Gender expression or identity” means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.
(b) “Sexual orientation” means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.
(c) “Threat” means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
“In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact’s satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person’s perception of the victim’s or victims’ race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a Nazi emblem, symbol, or hakenkreuz;
(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;
(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;
(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim’s person without the victim’s authorization; or
(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.
RCW 9A.36.080(2)*. “This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state’s ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.” Id.
Scope
Nothing under the relevant law–RCW 9A.36.080* (Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty)–“confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.” RCW 9A.36.080(9)*.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Washington State’s approach to hate crimes underscores a commitment to protecting individuals from acts of violence and intimidation rooted in bias against their identity. By defining hate crimes and outlining specific behaviors that constitute such offenses, the law aims to foster a safer environment for all residents. The recognition of various forms of discrimination, from race and religion to gender identity and disability, reflects a broader societal effort to combat prejudice and promote inclusivity. Furthermore, the legal provisions not only establish criminal penalties but also ensure that victims retain the right to seek additional remedies, reinforcing the state’s dedication to justice and equality. As communities continue to navigate issues of hate and discrimination, these laws serve as vital tools in the fight against intolerance.
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what is the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is based upon the “principle that a promise made without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to the promisee’s detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 591 (8th ed. 2004). Accordingly, to establish a viable claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must show:
(1) a promise which
(2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and
(3) which does cause the promisee to change his position
(4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that
(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Chen v. State, 86 Wn.App. 183, 194 n.1 (Div. 2 1997), petition denied, 133 Wn.2d 1020, 948 P.2d 387 (1997) (citing Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 158, 172, 876 P.2d 435 (1994), quoting Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 255, 259 n. 2, 616 P.2d 644 (1980)) (emphasis added).
THE “PROMISE” REQUIREMENT
“Promissory estoppel requires the existence of a promise.” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435) (hyperlink added). “A promise is defined as ‘a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.'” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 2(1))).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as a vital legal principle that ensures fairness and prevents unjust outcomes when a promise, lacking formal consideration, leads a promisee to alter their position based on that promise. By establishing specific criteria—including the existence of a promise, reasonable reliance, and the necessity of enforcement to avert injustice—this doctrine safeguards individuals from detrimental reliance on assurances that may otherwise go unfulfilled. As courts continue to interpret and apply this doctrine, it underscores the importance of honoring commitments in both personal and commercial contexts, fostering trust and accountability in our interactions.
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, as follows:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageousconduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.”
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION & THE TORT OF OUTRAGE
Racially discriminatory action can form the basis for a claim of outrage. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:
In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.
Id.* at 739, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added). Within the context of employment discrimination, positions of authority are significant when evaluating associated claims based on the tort of outrage.
Positions of authority
“When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.” Contreras*, 88 Wn.2d at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e). Thus, “[t]he relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe racially discriminatory actions in employment can form the basis for the tort of outrage. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is a crucial legal framework for addressing severe emotional harm caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. Defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, this tort highlights the accountability of individuals whose actions lead to significant emotional distress, even in the absence of physical injury.
Notably, racially discriminatory actions can serve as a foundation for such claims, as established by Washington case law. Furthermore, the dynamics of authority between the parties play a vital role in evaluating these claims, emphasizing that abusive behavior from those in positions of power can significantly exacerbate the impact of the distress. Depending on the circumstances of each case, understanding these elements may be useful for adequately addressing the complexities of emotional distress claims in civil law.
READ MORE OF OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what are considered unfair practices of labor unions? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)
The WLAD, enacted in 1949, is a potent statute covering a broad array of categories, including the following:
RCW 49.60.030
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD also protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of labor organizations.
(16) “Labor organization” includes any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances or terms or conditions of employment, or for other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment.
RCW 49.60.040(16) (emphasis and hyperlinks added).
UNFAIR PRACTICES OF LABOR UNIONS
The WLAD prohibits both labor unions and labor organizations from engaging in unfair practices, as follows:
RCW 49.60.190
Unfair practices of labor unions.
It is an unfair practice for any labor union or labor organization:
RCW 49.60.190*. Under the WLAD, labor unions engaging in unfair practices are subject to liability.
WLAD REMEDIES
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2) (hyperlinks added).
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws and court rules, what are notices of disqualification when engaged in civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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NOTICES OF DISQUALIFICATION — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The General Law
“Notices of disqualification” concern disqualification of judges during civil litigation. The relevant Washington State law concerning disqualification of judges is, in part, as follows:
Disqualification of judge, transfer to another department, visiting judge—Change of venue generally, criminal cases.
(1) No judge of a superior court of the state of Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding if that judge has been disqualified pursuant to RCW 4.12.050. …
Thus, pursuant to RCW 4.12.050*, any party to a lawsuit may disqualify a judge of a superior court from hearing a matter–subject to certain limitations–as follows:
Notice of disqualification.
(1) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any action or proceeding in a superior court may disqualify a judge from hearing the matter, subject to these limitations:
(a) Notice of disqualification must be filed and called to the attention of the judge before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the case.
(b) In counties with only one resident judge, the notice of disqualification must be filed not later than the day on which the case is called to be set for trial.
(c) A judge who has been disqualified under this section may decide such issues as the parties agree in writing or on the record in open court.
(d) No party or attorney is permitted to disqualify more than one judge in any matter under this section and RCW 4.12.040*.
(2) Even though they may involve discretion, the following actions by a judge do not cause the loss of the right to file a notice of disqualification against that judge: Arranging the calendar, setting a date for a hearing or trial, ruling on an agreed continuance, issuing an arrest warrant, presiding over criminal preliminary proceedings under CrR 3.2.1*, arraigning the accused, fixing bail, and presiding over juvenile detention and release hearings under JuCR 7.3* and 7.4*.
…
RCW 4.12.050* (emphasis, hyperlinks, and asterisks added).
The Discretionary Ruling Limitation — Timeliness
There are several limitations concerning disqualification of judges. “One limitation is that a notice of disqualification must be filed ‘before the judge has made a discretionary ruling in the case.'” Austin v. King Cnty., 58124-8-II (Wash. App. Jul 02, 2024) (footnote omitted). NOTE:
[The affidavit of prejudice]
“What RCW 4.12.050* calls a ‘notice of disqualification’ is also referred to as an ‘affidavit of prejudice,’ based on previous versions of RCW 4.12.050.”
Austin, 58124-8-II at 3 n.1 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 961-62, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).
“In other words, an affidavit of prejudice is timely if it is filed before the superior court judge makes any order or ruling involving discretion.” Id. at 3 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 962, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Matter of Right if All Requirements Met
“If the requirements of RCW 4.12.050(1)* are met, a party can disqualify the judge presiding over the action as a matter of right.” Id. (citing State v. Gentry, 183 Wn.2d 749, 759, 356 P.3d 714 (2015)) (hyperlink added). “A timely notice of disqualification must be granted.” Id. (citing Godfrey, 194 Wn.2d at 961).
A Question of Law Reviewed De Novo
“Whether a judge has made a discretionary decision under RCW 4.12.050* is a question of law that … [courts] review de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 776, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017)) (hyperlink added).
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Under Washington State laws, what are considered adverse employment actions when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Boyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 11-12, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015) (citing Estevez v. Faculty Club of Univ. of Wash., 129 Wn.App. 774, 797, 120 P.3d 579 (2005); Scrivener v. Clark Coll.*, 181 Wn.2d 439, 446, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (hyperlinks added) (footnote omitted).
ELEMENT #2 — ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
Within the context of unlawful retaliation claims, “[a]n adverse employment action involves a change in employment that is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities.” Boyd*, 187 Wn.App. at 13 (citing Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co.*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 746, 315 P.3d 610 (2013)).
THE GENERAL STANDARD
To establish an adverse employment action, “[t]he employee must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, meaning that it would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'” Id. (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Ultimately, “whether a particular action would be viewed as adverse by a reasonable employee is a question of fact appropriate for a jury.” Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
Demotions, Adverse Transfers, or Hostile Work Environments
An adverse employment action “includes[, but is not limited to,] a demotion or adverse transfer, or a hostile work environment.” Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 465, 98 P.3d 827 (2004) (quotingRobel v. Roundup Corp.*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 74 n.24, 59 P.3d 611 (2002))).
Materially Adverse Reassignments
“Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and ‘should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.'” Id. (citing Tyner v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 137 Wn.App. 545, 565, 154 P.3d 920 (2007)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY — SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY
In Washington State, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability is consistent with the law on subordinate bias liability. SeeBoyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 20, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015). “Under the cat’s paw theory, the animus of a non-decision-maker who has a singular influence may be imputed to the decision-maker.” Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).
THE GENERAL RULE
The general rule is as follows:
[I]f a supervisor* performs an act motivated by … animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.
Id.* at 20 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) (footnote omitted)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and hyperlink added). Note: the term proximate cause is undefined.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
“Under Washington law, in order for the act to be a proximate cause, it must be a substantial factor.” Id.* (citing City of Vancouver v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 180 Wn.App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) (“a complainant seeking to use the subordinate bias theory of liability must show that the subordinate’s animus was a substantial factor in the decision”)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS & CAUSATION
Oftentimes, the employer-defendant under a cat’s paw theory of liability will claim that it conducted an “independent investigation” and found an unrelated basis for the adverse employment actions upon which the plaintiff-employee seeks recourse. In such a case, employers will typically argue that the so-called independent investigation was a supervening cause of any retaliatory animus. Nevertheless: “[A]n independent investigation does not necessarily relieve the employer of liability for an adverse employment action.” Id.* (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).
If the independent investigation “relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability—then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decision maker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.” Id.* at 18. Accordingly, the plaintiff may have a firm basis to argue that a causal connection exists, depending on the evidence. See, e.g., id.*
However: “[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action … then the employer will not be liable.” Id.* at 18 (citing Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1193) (alteration in original).
ORIGINS OF CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY
“The term ‘cat’s paw’ originated in the fable, ‘The Monkey and the Cat,’ by Jean de La Fontaine[:]
As told in the fable, the monkey wanted some chestnuts that were roasting in a fire. Unwilling to burn himself in the fire, the monkey convinced the cat to retrieve the chestnuts for him. As the cat carefully scooped the chestnuts from the fire with his paw, the monkey gobbled them up. By the time the serving wench caught the two thieves, no chestnuts were left for the unhappy cat.
Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Julie M. Covel, The Supreme Court Writes A Fractured Fable of the Cat’s Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital [Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)], 51 Washburn L.J. 159, 159 (2011) (footnotes omitted)) (citation alteration in original).
THE CAT & THE MONKEY
“In the workplace, the cat represents an unbiased decision-maker who disciplines an employee unknowingly due to a supervisor’s bias, represented by the monkey.” Id.* (citing Edward G. Phillips, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: The Cat’s Paw Theory Gets Its Claws Sharpened, 47 Tenn. B.J. June, 2011, at 21).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
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THE WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Created by the Washington State Legislature in 1949, the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is a key state agency tasked with both administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). See Washington State Human Rights Commission Website, https://www.hum.wa.gov/about-us* (last visited August 21, 2024). Its “mission … is to eliminate and prevent discrimination in Washington State through the fair application of the law, efficient use of resources, and establishment of productive partnerships in the community.” Id.
WAC 162-16-250
Discrimination because of marital status.
(1) General rule. It is an unfair practice to discriminate against an employee or job applicant because of marital status. Examples of unfair practices include, but are not limited to:
(a) Refusing to hire a single or divorced applicant because of a presumption that “married persons are more stable.”
(b) Refusing to promote a married employee because of a presumption that he or she “will be less willing to work late and travel.”
WAC 162-16-250(1)* (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
There are exceptions to the general rule, as follows:
WAC 162-16-250
Discrimination because of marital status.
(a) If a bona fide occupational qualification applies (please see WAC 162-16-240*).
(b) If an employer is enforcing a documented conflict of interest policy limiting employment opportunities on the basis of marital status:
(i) Where one spouse would have the authority or practical power to supervise, appoint, remove, or discipline the other;
(ii) Where one spouse would be responsible for auditing the work of the other;
(iii) Where other circumstances exist which would place the spouses in a situation of actual or reasonably foreseeable conflict between the employer’s interest and their own; or
(iv) Where, in order to avoid the reality or appearance of improper influence or favor, or to protect its confidentiality, the employer must limit the employment of close relatives of policy level officers of customers, competitors, regulatory agencies, or others with whom the employer deals.
WAC 162-16-250(2)* (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added).
WLAD REMEDIES
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the WLAD] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter* or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601* et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2)*.
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WA STATE COURT RULES — RULES OF EVIDENCE — PURPOSE & CONSTRUCTION
The Washington State Court Rules, Rules of Evidence*, must “be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” ER 102*. The WA State Rules of Evidence addresses, inter alia, judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
Generally, “judicial notice” means “[a] court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact <the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit>. Fed. R. Evid. 201.” Black’s Law Dictionary 863-64 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004).
In Washington State, ER 201* is the relevant rule, and it contains the following topics: (a) the kinds of facts subject to it’s mandate, (b) when notice is discretionary, (c) when notice is mandatory, (d) opportunity to be hard, and (e) timing of the notice. ER 201(a)*.
(a) Kinds of Facts
Under the rule, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either[:]
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The “court MAY take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” ER 201(c)* (emphasis added).
(c) When Mandatory
However, a court MUST “take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” ER 201(d)*.
(d) Opportunity To Be Heard
In any event: “A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.” ER 201(e)*.
(e) Timing of Taking Notice
“Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.” ER 201(f)*.
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