Uncategorized Archives — LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

January 13, 2022October 21, 2024

Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter, “Section 1983“), may a state official sued in their individual capacity be entitled to qualified immunity? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.

STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

THE POLICY

Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

January 13, 2022October 21, 2024

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Laws

As an employment attorney in Washington State, I often litigate claims on behalf of employee-plaintiffs based on several common employment discrimination laws. Here are the top 3 employment discrimination laws that I litigate in Washington State . . .

Advertisement

#3 — THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (§ 1981)

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981) is a federal law that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2006). And the employment-at-will relationship is a contract for Section 1981 purposes.

Section 1981 is also known as “Equal rights under the law” and it states as follows:

(a) STATEMENT OF EQUAL RIGHTS

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) “MAKE AND ENFORCE CONTRACTS” DEFINED

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981.

#2 — TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) “makes it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex[;] … makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit[;] … and requires that employers reasonably accommodate applicants’ and employees’ sincerely held religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.” U.S. EEOC Website (emphasis added).

Two other federal anti-discrimination laws, inter alia, broaden the protected classes, as follows:

(1) Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA) which protects people who are 40 or older from both discrimination on account of age and unlawful retaliation against a person “because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit”; and

(2) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that prohibits discrimination and unlawful retaliation against a qualified person with a disability. The ADA also “makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.” Further, the ADA requires that “employers reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.”

See id.

#1 — THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status. See RCW 49.60.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee, because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit. See id.

WLAD is a broad and powerful remedial statue that was originally enacted in 1949 as an employment discrimination law. See Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order, 148 Wn.2d 224, 237, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (internal citations omitted); Laws of 1949, ch. 183. Remarkably, Washington State enacted the WLAD 15 years before Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

December 2, 2021October 21, 2024

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is statutorily protected activity when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie case* of retaliation [using the McDonnell Douglas ‘evidentiary burden-shifting’ framework*] an employee must show three things:

(1) the employee took a statutorily protected action,

(2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 411, 430 P.3d 229 (2018) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis, paragraphs, and hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

ELEMENT #1 — STATUTORILY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The first element of the prima facie case requires plaintiffs to establish that they “engaged in a statutorily protected activity.” The meaning of this requirement can be found under the anti-retaliation section of the WLAD statute, as follows:

RCW 49.60.210
Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

(2) It is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.

(3) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, government agency, government manager, or government supervisor to discharge, expel, discriminate, or otherwise retaliate against an individual assisting with an office of fraud and accountability investigation under RCW 74.04.012, unless the individual has willfully disregarded the truth in providing information to the office.

RCW 49.60.210 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

Thus, pursuant to section one, above, statutorily protected activity includes: (1) opposing any practices forbidden by WLAD, or (2) filing a charge, testifying, or assisting in any proceeding under WLAD.

“Violation of this provision [(i.e., RCW 49.60.210)] supports a retaliation claim.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 570 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (referencing Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d at 411).

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

LEARN MORE

November 18, 2021October 21, 2024

Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), how does one establish a prima facie claim of Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Religious Practices? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

FEDERAL LAW

“In the employment context, the WLAD has three federal counterparts:

[(1)] Title VII, [42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,]

[(2)] [T]he Age discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), [29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,] … and

[(3)] [T]he Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)[, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.].

Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 490, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnotes omitted) (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added). However, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never listed the elements of a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate religious practices.” Id. at 501 (footnote omitted).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS: A TEST BASED UPON THE DISPARATE IMPACT BURDEN-SHIFTING SCHEME

“Several Courts of Appeals … have adopted a [failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices] test based on the ‘disparate impact’ burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Kumar, 180 Wn.2d at 490 (referencing, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013); Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008); Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).

WA STATE: FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

In Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, the Washington State Supreme Court applied the above failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices test for the first time. According to that test, “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate religious practices by showing that[:]

(1) he or she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with employment duties;

(2) he or she informed the employer of the beliefs and the conflict; and

(3) the employer responded by subjecting the employee to threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.

Id. at 501-02 (citing Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012); Lawson v. Washington, 296 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2002)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

THE 3RD ELEMENT: IMMEDIATE RISK OF ACTUAL FIRING/DEMOTION IS IRRELEVANT

Regarding the third element of the prima facie case: “An employee need not be at immediate risk of actual firing or demotion to demonstrate threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.” Id. at 514 n.30 (referencing, e.g., Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (“employee established an ‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of prima facie religious accommodation claim where employer ‘formally instruct[ed] him not to pray with or proselytize to clients'” ); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“An employee does not cease to be discriminated against because he temporarily gives up his religious practice and submits to the employment policy.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

November 4, 2021October 21, 2024

The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Impact

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, what is the prima facie case for disparate impact discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

DISPARATE IMPACT: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

The Washington State Supreme Court “has held that the WLAD creates a cause of action for disparate impact.” Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 503, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (citing E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wn.2d 901, 909, 726 P.2d 439 (1986)).

“To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must show that[:]

(1) a facially neutral employment practice

(2) falls more harshly on a protected class.

Id. at 503 (citing Oliver v. P. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 106 Wn.2d 675, 679, & n.1, 724 P.2d 1003 (1986)) (internal citation omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

EXAMPLE: KUMAR v. GATE GOURMET, INC.

For example, in Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014), an employer’s meal policy that was based on security concerns barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch; and it required employees to eat only employer-provided food. However, the policy forced a group of plaintiff-employees to either work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs (i.e., a protected class falling under “creed“).

The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit and alleged that the employer maintained a facially neutral meal policy that fell more harshly on those within a protected class, and the court found a viable claim of disparate impact discrimination–reversing the trial court’s previous dismissal and remanding the case for further proceeding consistent with the opinion.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Origin of the Disparate Impact Claim

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

September 30, 2021October 21, 2024

Public Accommodations Discrimination

The Prima Facie Case: Public Accommodations Discrimination

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is the prima facie case for public accommodations discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

WLAD: PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

“The [Washington State] legislature has … directed … [the courts] to liberally construe WLAD to eradicate discrimination, including discrimination in places of public accommodation.” Floeting v. Group Health Cooperative, 192 Wn.2d 848 (Wash. 2019) (citing RCW 49.60.010, .020; see also Jin Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. Dist.-ESD 171, 189 Wn.2d 607, 614, 404 P.3d 504 (2017) (“quoting Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 108, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)”)). “The fundamental object of laws banning discrimination in public accommodations is to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” Id. at 855 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION–DECLARATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (RCW 49.60.030(1)(B))

“Under RCW 49.60.030(1)(b), WLAD secures the right to ‘full enjoyment’ of any place of public accommodation, including the right to purchase any service or commodity sold by any place of public accommodation ‘without acts directly or indirectly causing persons of [a protected class] to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.'” Floeting, 192 Wn.2d at 852-53 (referencing RCW 49.60.040(14)) (hyperlink added).

MEANING OF “FULL ENJOYMENT”

Thus, “WLAD protects the customer’s ‘full enjoyment’ of the services and privileges offered in public accommodations.” Id. at 855 (citing RCW 49.60.030(1)(b)). “WLAD’s broad definition of ‘full enjoyment’ extends beyond denial of service to include liability for mistreatment that makes a person feel ‘not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.040(14)). “Denial or deprivation of services on the basis of one’s protected class is an affront to personal dignity.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE (FELL STANDARD (RCW 49.60.215))

“More than twenty years ago, … [the Washington State Supreme Court] set forth the standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in a place of public accommodation under RCW 49.60.215.” Floeting, 192 Wn.2d at 853 (referencing Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wn.2d 618, 637, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).

“Fell established that in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under RCW 49.60.215[ ][:]

a plaintiff must prove that

(1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class,

(2) the defendant’s establishment is a place of public accommodation,

(3) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff when it did not treat the plaintiff in a manner comparable to the treatment it provides to persons outside that class, and

(4) the plaintiff’s protected status was a substantial factor that caused the discrimination.

Floeting, 192 Wn.2d at 583-84 (citing Fell, 128 Wn.2d at 637) (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting, hyperlinks, and emphasis added).

LEARN MORE

September 19, 2021October 21, 2024

Canon of Presumed Awareness

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of presumed awareness? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

THE CANON OF PRESUMED AWARENESS

Under the canon of presumed awareness: “The Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretation of its statutes.” Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Company, 129 Wn.2d 572, 581 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (reasoning that the Washington State Legislature “clearly understood it was adopting exemplary damages as part of Washington’s antidiscrimination law when it amended RCW 49.60.030(2) in 1993 and 1995.” (citing Friends of Snoqualmie Valley v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 118 Wash.2d 488, 496, 825 P.2d 300 (1992))).

In Dailey, the majority opinion essentially held that punitive damages are not available for employment discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, because the legislature has not expressly authorized them. See id at 574-75.

Read our related article entitled Presumption of Acquiescence concerning a similar Washington State canon of statutory construction.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

August 5, 2021October 21, 2024

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is the prima facie case for unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, “prohibits retaliation against a party asserting a claim based on a perceived violation of his civil rights or participating in an investigation into alleged workplace discrimination.” Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, 178 Wn.App 734, 753 (Div. 2 2013) (citing RCW 49.60.210).

There are additional protections. The relevant law states as follows:

RCW 49.60.210
Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

(2) It is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.

RCW 49.60.210 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

“Violation of this provision supports a retaliation claim.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 570 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (referencing Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 411, 430 P.3d 229 (2018)).

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that[:]

(1) he or she engaged in a statutorily protected activity,

(2) the employer took an adverse employment action against the employee, and

(3) there is a causal connection between the employee‘s activity and the employer‘s adverse action.

Id. at 574 (citing Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d at 411) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added).

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

LEARN MORE

August 1, 2021October 21, 2024

The Prima Facie Case: Reasonable Accommodations

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is the prima facie case for failure to provide reasonable accommodations? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

FAILURE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS (WA STATE)

AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE: Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) “gives employers an affirmative duty to accommodate an employee‘s disability.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 586 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (citing RCW 49.60.180(2); LaRose v. King County, 8 Wn.App.2d 90, 125, 437 P.3d 701 (2019)) (hyperlinks added).

SCOPE: “A reasonable accommodation must allow the employee to work in the environment and perform the essential functions of her job without substantially limiting symptoms.” Id. (citing Frisino v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn.App. 765, 777-78, 249 P.3d 1044 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

MULTIPLE METHODS OF ACCOMMODATION: “Where multiple potential methods of accommodation exist, the employer is entitled to select the appropriate method.” Id. (citing Frisino, 160 Wn.App. at 779).

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE (WA STATE)

“An employee claiming his or her employer failed to accommodate a disability must prove that[:]

(1) the employee suffered from a disability,
(2) the employee was qualified to do the job at issue,
(3) the employee gave his or her employer notice of the disability, and
(4) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate that disability.

Id. (citing LaRose, 8 Wn.App.2d at 125-26) (paragraph formatting and emphasis and hyperlinks added).

TAKE OUR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS TEST (VIDEO):

WA State Torts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts

Under Washington State laws, what is the tort of “public disclosure of private facts“? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

COMMON LAW RIGHT TO PRIVACY

“Washington recognizes a common law right to privacy.” White v. Township of Winthrop, 128 Wn.App. 588, 593-94, 116 P.3d 1034, (Div. 3 2005) (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash.2d 195, 207, 961 P.2d 333 (1998)). A violation of this right is considered a tort. A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS

“Public disclosure of private facts” is a privacy tort in Washington State. Washington courts “base actions for … [commission of this tort] as articulated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977):

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that

(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and

(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.

White, 128 Wn.App at 593-94 (citing Reid, 136 Wash.2d at 205, 961 P.2d 333)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE

“As concerns the general nature of matters protected by the right of privacy:

Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close personal friends.

Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, and some of his past history that he would rather forget.

When these intimate details of his life are spread [b]efore the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of legitimate public interest.

White, 128 Wn.App. at 594 (citing Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wash.2d 712, 721, 748 P.2d 597 (1988)) (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

THE POLICY

CONCLUSION

LEARN MORE

#3 — THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (§ 1981)

#2 — TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

#1 — THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

LEARN MORE

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

ELEMENT #1 — STATUTORILY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

READ MORE

LEARN MORE

FEDERAL LAW

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS: A TEST BASED UPON THE DISPARATE IMPACT BURDEN-SHIFTING SCHEME

WA STATE: FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

THE 3RD ELEMENT: IMMEDIATE RISK OF ACTUAL FIRING/DEMOTION IS IRRELEVANT

LEARN MORE

DISPARATE IMPACT: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

LEARN MORE

WLAD: PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION–DECLARATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (RCW 49.60.030(1)(B))

MEANING OF “FULL ENJOYMENT”

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE (FELL STANDARD (RCW 49.60.215))

LEARN MORE

THE CANON OF PRESUMED AWARENESS

RELATED ARTICLE

LEARN MORE

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

READ MORE

LEARN MORE

FAILURE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS (WA STATE)

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE (WA STATE)

TAKE OUR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS TEST (VIDEO):

READ MORE ABOUT THIS TOPIC

LEARN MORE

COMMON LAW RIGHT TO PRIVACY

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS

EXAMPLE

LEARN MORE