IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
WLAD — LIABILITY FOR KILLING OR INJURING DOG GUIDE OR SERVICE ANIMAL
In Washington State, the rights of individuals with disabilities are protected under a variety of laws, including those governing the treatment of dog guides and service animals. One key WLAD provision is RCW 49.60.370*, which outlines the penalties and remedies for the killing or injury of such animals.
Under this law, if a person negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal, they are liable for a penalty of $1,000, which must be paid to the user of the animal. This penalty is in addition to any other civil or criminal penalties that may apply. Not only does this law provide financial compensation for the user of the animal, but it also enables the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if legal action is required.
Importantly, RCW 49.60.370* clarifies that the Washington State Human Rights Commission has no duty to investigate incidents of negligent or malicious acts against a dog guide or service animal. This means that individuals seeking justice under this statute must take legal action themselves to pursue civil remedies.
THE BLACK-LETTER LAW — RCW 49.60.370
The relevant WLAD section states as follows:
RCW 49.60.370
Liability for killing or injuring dog guide or service animal—Penalty in addition to other remedies or penalties—Recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs—No duty to investigate.
(1) A person who negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal is liable for a penalty of one thousand dollars, to be paid to the user of the animal. The penalty shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies or penalties, civil or criminal, provided by law.
(2) A user or owner of a dog guide or service animal, whose animal is negligently or maliciously injured or killed, is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing any civil remedy.
(3) The commission has no duty to investigate any negligent or malicious acts referred to under this section.
For employers, this law reinforces the need for a respectful and inclusive environment for employees who rely on service animals. It’s crucial that workplace policies support the safety and well-being of both employees and their service animals or guide dogs. In doing so, employers not only comply with the law but also foster a more inclusive and supportive workplace culture. By understanding and respecting the legal rights of employees with disabilities and their service animals and guide dogs, businesses can ensure they provide an environment that is safe, fair, and legally compliant.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
“Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, however, because [d]irect, ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since [t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 179, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated in part by Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
“Because intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, Washington follows the three-part evidentiary burden-shifting formula set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464). “The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” Id. at 1077-78 (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original).
the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework — three steps
For purposes of wrongful discharge claims, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework has three steps, or prongs:
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that
(4) after her discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
Second, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext.
See id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis, hyperlinks, and paragraph formatting added).
the third STEP — pretext PRONG
In Scrivener v. Clark College*, the Washington State Supreme Court “explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the pretext prong[:]
An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either
(1) that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or
(2) that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.
An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.
Litvack, 546 P.3d at 1078 (citing Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (paragraph formatting added). There are various ways of proving pretext.
proving pretext — the disparate-discipline method
In Washington, “[o]ne test for pretext is whether[:]
(1) an employee outside the protected class[;]
(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness[;]
(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash. App. 212, 227, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996); Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541 (“employer’s reason ‘was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances'”)). I call this approach the disparate-discipline method.
Accordinly, under the disparate-discipline method of proving pretext, “[t]he appropriate comparators are employees that are ‘similarly situated‘ to the plaintiff and doing ‘substantially the same work‘ as the plaintiff.” Id. at 1079-80 (citingJohnson, 80 Wash. App. at 227, 907 P.2d 1223; Ellingson v. Spokane Mortg. Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978)) (emphasis added).
Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added). “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).
Substantial Factor:
“A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Id. at 1078-79 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The protected characteristic need not be the sole factor in the decision.” Id. at 1079 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant motivating factor means that the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons.” Id. (citingFell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wash.2d 618 n.32, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s (employee’s) Burden:
“Because an employer may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, an employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor.” Id. (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464). “A plaintiff need not ‘disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons.'” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation omitted).
Circumstantial, Indirect, and Inferential Evidence — opinions & conclusory statements:
“Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“But an employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements; the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 20 Wash. App. 2d 493, 510, 500 P.3d 203 (2021)). “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Chen v. State*, 86 Wash. App. 183, 191, 937 P.2d 612 (1997).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework plays a vital role in advancing wrongful discharge claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), particularly in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. By establishing a structured, three-step process, the framework provides a clear path for plaintiffs to make their case, starting with the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in making this initial showing, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The final step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, meaning that discrimination was either the true motivation or a substantial factor in the decision.
The pretext inquiry, as clarified by Washington case law, allows plaintiffs to challenge an employer’s defense by presenting evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Methods such as the disparate-discipline test provide a framework for comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees outside the protected class, thereby helping to uncover discriminatory motives hidden behind seemingly legitimate reasons. Importantly, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, but they are not required to disprove every reason articulated by the employer.
Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework serves not only as a procedural tool but also as a safeguard for employees, ensuring they have a fair opportunity to seek redress when faced with unjust dismissal. By facilitating a fair and systematic evaluation of discrimination claims, the framework upholds the principles of equality and accountability in the workplace, giving plaintiffs the necessary tools to contest unlawful employment practices and promoting broader compliance with anti-discrimination laws.
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)
In Washington State, “[a] person is guilty of a hate crime offense if the person maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of their perception of another person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:
(a) Assaults another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property.
The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a “reasonable person” is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim.
Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.
RCW 9A.36.080(1)* (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). For purposes of this article, the above law may also be referred to as “subsection (1).”
NOTE: “It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.” RCW 9A.36.080(3)*.
A Class C Felony
“Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.” RCW 9A.36.080(7)*. And the associated penalties “do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.” See RCW 9A.36.080(8)*.
Definitions
For the purposes of the hate crime offense, the following definitions apply:
(a) “Gender expression or identity” means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.
(b) “Sexual orientation” means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.
(c) “Threat” means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.
“In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact’s satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person’s perception of the victim’s or victims’ race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a Nazi emblem, symbol, or hakenkreuz;
(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;
(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;
(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim’s person without the victim’s authorization; or
(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.
RCW 9A.36.080(2)*. “This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state’s ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.” Id.
Scope
Nothing under the relevant law–RCW 9A.36.080* (Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty)–“confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.” RCW 9A.36.080(9)*.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Washington State’s approach to hate crimes underscores a commitment to protecting individuals from acts of violence and intimidation rooted in bias against their identity. By defining hate crimes and outlining specific behaviors that constitute such offenses, the law aims to foster a safer environment for all residents. The recognition of various forms of discrimination, from race and religion to gender identity and disability, reflects a broader societal effort to combat prejudice and promote inclusivity. Furthermore, the legal provisions not only establish criminal penalties but also ensure that victims retain the right to seek additional remedies, reinforcing the state’s dedication to justice and equality. As communities continue to navigate issues of hate and discrimination, these laws serve as vital tools in the fight against intolerance.
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
WSHRC: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RELATIONSHIP OF COMMISSION TO COMPLAINANT
Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 162-08-061* outlines the Washington State Human Rights Commission’s neutral and public-focused role in investigating discrimination complaints. The Commission is tasked with determining whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe an unfair practice has occurred under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60*), without favoring either party. Its ultimate goal is to eliminate and prevent discrimination—not merely to secure individual remedies for complainants.
While the Commission often seeks to restore a complainant to their prior position, it prioritizes broader systemic remedies when necessary. Notably, the Commission operates independently of a complainant’s personal interests; it may pursue different outcomes if doing so better serves the public interest. Complainants focused solely on personal relief are encouraged to consider pursuing their claims in court, as the law preserves their right to do so.
THE BLACK LETTER LAW: WAC 162-08-061
The relevant WAC provision states as follows:
WAC 162-08-061
Relationship of commission to complainant.
(1)Commission’s role and objectives. In investigating cases the commission seeks to ascertain the facts in order to make an impartial finding of “reasonable cause” or “no reasonable cause.” It has no predisposition in favor of either complainants or respondents. If “reasonable cause” is found, then the objective of the commission is to obtain the remedy that will best eliminate the unfair practices and prevent their recurrence. The judgment as to what will eliminate an unfair practice for purposes of reaching an agreement under RCW 49.60.240* is made initially by the executive director, or other staff persons pursuant to the executive director’s direction, and ultimately by the commissioners. The judgment as to what will eliminate an unfair practice and carry out the purposes of the human rights law after hearing under RCW 49.60.250* is made by the administrative law judge. The commission was not designed to compete with the courts as a forum for the vindication of private rights; its task is to work for the public good of eliminating and preventing discrimination. Although the facts and circumstances giving rise to a claim of discrimination may sometimes give rise to other claims based upon other statutes or principles of common law, the commission will investigate only claims of unfair practices arising under chapter 49.60* RCW et seq. The law against discrimination expressly preserves the right of complainants and/or aggrieved parties to seek other civil or criminal remedies in court or other available forums, either simultaneously with a complaint filed with the commission or in lieu of such a complaint, subject to any limitations or conditions provided in WAC 162-08-062* or elsewhere.
(2)Independence from complainant. The commission’s primary objective is to eliminate and prevent discrimination, which may or may not be consistent with the goals or objectives of a particular complainant or aggrieved person. In negotiating a settlement or seeking an order, the commission generally works for provisions restoring the complainant as nearly as possible to the position he or she would be in if he or she had not been discriminated against, because this is usually an effective way to eliminate the discrimination and prevent its recurrence. But where, in the commission’s judgment, provisions fully restoring the complainant (for instance, reinstatement to the job with back pay) would be inadequate to eliminate a pattern of discrimination, the commission will hold out for additional terms, even though the respondent is willing to settle on the basis of full relief for the complainant only. Except as may be otherwise provided for complaints alleging unfair practices in real estate transactions, the commission may determine that discrimination will be effectively eliminated and prevented by an order that does not afford the complainant every item of relief to which he or she may have a legal claim. The commission assumes that persons who complain to it are as interested in the elimination and prevention of discrimination in general as in their individual cases. If a person is interested only in relief for himself or herself, he or she is advised to seek his or her remedy directly in court pursuant to RCW 49.60.020*, 49.60.030* and/or WAC 162-08-062*.
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what is the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is based upon the “principle that a promise made without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to the promisee’s detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 591 (8th ed. 2004). Accordingly, to establish a viable claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must show:
(1) a promise which
(2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and
(3) which does cause the promisee to change his position
(4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that
(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Chen v. State, 86 Wn.App. 183, 194 n.1 (Div. 2 1997), petition denied, 133 Wn.2d 1020, 948 P.2d 387 (1997) (citing Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 158, 172, 876 P.2d 435 (1994), quoting Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 255, 259 n. 2, 616 P.2d 644 (1980)) (emphasis added).
THE “PROMISE” REQUIREMENT
“Promissory estoppel requires the existence of a promise.” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435) (hyperlink added). “A promise is defined as ‘a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.'” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 2(1))).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as a vital legal principle that ensures fairness and prevents unjust outcomes when a promise, lacking formal consideration, leads a promisee to alter their position based on that promise. By establishing specific criteria—including the existence of a promise, reasonable reliance, and the necessity of enforcement to avert injustice—this doctrine safeguards individuals from detrimental reliance on assurances that may otherwise go unfulfilled. As courts continue to interpret and apply this doctrine, it underscores the importance of honoring commitments in both personal and commercial contexts, fostering trust and accountability in our interactions.
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)
A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, as follows:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageousconduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.”
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION & THE TORT OF OUTRAGE
Racially discriminatory action can form the basis for a claim of outrage. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:
In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.
Id.* at 739, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added). Within the context of employment discrimination, positions of authority are significant when evaluating associated claims based on the tort of outrage.
Positions of authority
“When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.” Contreras*, 88 Wn.2d at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e). Thus, “[t]he relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe racially discriminatory actions in employment can form the basis for the tort of outrage. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is a crucial legal framework for addressing severe emotional harm caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. Defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, this tort highlights the accountability of individuals whose actions lead to significant emotional distress, even in the absence of physical injury.
Notably, racially discriminatory actions can serve as a foundation for such claims, as established by Washington case law. Furthermore, the dynamics of authority between the parties play a vital role in evaluating these claims, emphasizing that abusive behavior from those in positions of power can significantly exacerbate the impact of the distress. Depending on the circumstances of each case, understanding these elements may be useful for adequately addressing the complexities of emotional distress claims in civil law.
READ MORE OF OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what are considered unfair practices of labor unions? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)
The WLAD, enacted in 1949, is a potent statute covering a broad array of categories, including the following:
RCW 49.60.030
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD also protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of labor organizations.
(16) “Labor organization” includes any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances or terms or conditions of employment, or for other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment.
RCW 49.60.040(16) (emphasis and hyperlinks added).
UNFAIR PRACTICES OF LABOR UNIONS
The WLAD prohibits both labor unions and labor organizations from engaging in unfair practices, as follows:
RCW 49.60.190
Unfair practices of labor unions.
It is an unfair practice for any labor union or labor organization:
RCW 49.60.190*. Under the WLAD, labor unions engaging in unfair practices are subject to liability.
WLAD REMEDIES
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2) (hyperlinks added).
need help?
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws and court rules, what are notices of disqualification when engaged in civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
NOTICES OF DISQUALIFICATION — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The General Law
“Notices of disqualification” concern disqualification of judges during civil litigation. The relevant Washington State law concerning disqualification of judges is, in part, as follows:
Disqualification of judge, transfer to another department, visiting judge—Change of venue generally, criminal cases.
(1) No judge of a superior court of the state of Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding if that judge has been disqualified pursuant to RCW 4.12.050. …
Thus, pursuant to RCW 4.12.050*, any party to a lawsuit may disqualify a judge of a superior court from hearing a matter–subject to certain limitations–as follows:
Notice of disqualification.
(1) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any action or proceeding in a superior court may disqualify a judge from hearing the matter, subject to these limitations:
(a) Notice of disqualification must be filed and called to the attention of the judge before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the case.
(b) In counties with only one resident judge, the notice of disqualification must be filed not later than the day on which the case is called to be set for trial.
(c) A judge who has been disqualified under this section may decide such issues as the parties agree in writing or on the record in open court.
(d) No party or attorney is permitted to disqualify more than one judge in any matter under this section and RCW 4.12.040*.
(2) Even though they may involve discretion, the following actions by a judge do not cause the loss of the right to file a notice of disqualification against that judge: Arranging the calendar, setting a date for a hearing or trial, ruling on an agreed continuance, issuing an arrest warrant, presiding over criminal preliminary proceedings under CrR 3.2.1*, arraigning the accused, fixing bail, and presiding over juvenile detention and release hearings under JuCR 7.3* and 7.4*.
…
RCW 4.12.050* (emphasis, hyperlinks, and asterisks added).
The Discretionary Ruling Limitation — Timeliness
There are several limitations concerning disqualification of judges. “One limitation is that a notice of disqualification must be filed ‘before the judge has made a discretionary ruling in the case.'” Austin v. King Cnty., 58124-8-II (Wash. App. Jul 02, 2024) (footnote omitted). NOTE:
[The affidavit of prejudice]
“What RCW 4.12.050* calls a ‘notice of disqualification’ is also referred to as an ‘affidavit of prejudice,’ based on previous versions of RCW 4.12.050.”
Austin, 58124-8-II at 3 n.1 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 961-62, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).
“In other words, an affidavit of prejudice is timely if it is filed before the superior court judge makes any order or ruling involving discretion.” Id. at 3 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 962, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Matter of Right if All Requirements Met
“If the requirements of RCW 4.12.050(1)* are met, a party can disqualify the judge presiding over the action as a matter of right.” Id. (citing State v. Gentry, 183 Wn.2d 749, 759, 356 P.3d 714 (2015)) (hyperlink added). “A timely notice of disqualification must be granted.” Id. (citing Godfrey, 194 Wn.2d at 961).
A Question of Law Reviewed De Novo
“Whether a judge has made a discretionary decision under RCW 4.12.050* is a question of law that … [courts] review de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 776, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017)) (hyperlink added).
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what are considered adverse employment actions when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Boyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 11-12, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015) (citing Estevez v. Faculty Club of Univ. of Wash., 129 Wn.App. 774, 797, 120 P.3d 579 (2005); Scrivener v. Clark Coll.*, 181 Wn.2d 439, 446, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (hyperlinks added) (footnote omitted).
ELEMENT #2 — ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
Within the context of unlawful retaliation claims, “[a]n adverse employment action involves a change in employment that is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities.” Boyd*, 187 Wn.App. at 13 (citing Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co.*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 746, 315 P.3d 610 (2013)).
THE GENERAL STANDARD
To establish an adverse employment action, “[t]he employee must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, meaning that it would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'” Id. (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Ultimately, “whether a particular action would be viewed as adverse by a reasonable employee is a question of fact appropriate for a jury.” Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
Demotions, Adverse Transfers, or Hostile Work Environments
An adverse employment action “includes[, but is not limited to,] a demotion or adverse transfer, or a hostile work environment.” Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 465, 98 P.3d 827 (2004) (quotingRobel v. Roundup Corp.*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 74 n.24, 59 P.3d 611 (2002))).
Materially Adverse Reassignments
“Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and ‘should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.'” Id. (citing Tyner v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 137 Wn.App. 545, 565, 154 P.3d 920 (2007)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY — SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY
In Washington State, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability is consistent with the law on subordinate bias liability. SeeBoyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 20, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015). “Under the cat’s paw theory, the animus of a non-decision-maker who has a singular influence may be imputed to the decision-maker.” Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).
THE GENERAL RULE
The general rule is as follows:
[I]f a supervisor* performs an act motivated by … animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.
Id.* at 20 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) (footnote omitted)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and hyperlink added). Note: the term proximate cause is undefined.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
“Under Washington law, in order for the act to be a proximate cause, it must be a substantial factor.” Id.* (citing City of Vancouver v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 180 Wn.App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) (“a complainant seeking to use the subordinate bias theory of liability must show that the subordinate’s animus was a substantial factor in the decision”)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS & CAUSATION
Oftentimes, the employer-defendant under a cat’s paw theory of liability will claim that it conducted an “independent investigation” and found an unrelated basis for the adverse employment actions upon which the plaintiff-employee seeks recourse. In such a case, employers will typically argue that the so-called independent investigation was a supervening cause of any retaliatory animus. Nevertheless: “[A]n independent investigation does not necessarily relieve the employer of liability for an adverse employment action.” Id.* (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).
If the independent investigation “relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability—then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decision maker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.” Id.* at 18. Accordingly, the plaintiff may have a firm basis to argue that a causal connection exists, depending on the evidence. See, e.g., id.*
However: “[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action … then the employer will not be liable.” Id.* at 18 (citing Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1193) (alteration in original).
ORIGINS OF CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY
“The term ‘cat’s paw’ originated in the fable, ‘The Monkey and the Cat,’ by Jean de La Fontaine[:]
As told in the fable, the monkey wanted some chestnuts that were roasting in a fire. Unwilling to burn himself in the fire, the monkey convinced the cat to retrieve the chestnuts for him. As the cat carefully scooped the chestnuts from the fire with his paw, the monkey gobbled them up. By the time the serving wench caught the two thieves, no chestnuts were left for the unhappy cat.
Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Julie M. Covel, The Supreme Court Writes A Fractured Fable of the Cat’s Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital [Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)], 51 Washburn L.J. 159, 159 (2011) (footnotes omitted)) (citation alteration in original).
THE CAT & THE MONKEY
“In the workplace, the cat represents an unbiased decision-maker who disciplines an employee unknowingly due to a supervisor’s bias, represented by the monkey.” Id.* (citing Edward G. Phillips, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: The Cat’s Paw Theory Gets Its Claws Sharpened, 47 Tenn. B.J. June, 2011, at 21).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
THE WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Created by the Washington State Legislature in 1949, the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is a key state agency tasked with both administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). See Washington State Human Rights Commission Website, https://www.hum.wa.gov/about-us* (last visited August 21, 2024). Its “mission … is to eliminate and prevent discrimination in Washington State through the fair application of the law, efficient use of resources, and establishment of productive partnerships in the community.” Id.
WAC 162-16-250
Discrimination because of marital status.
(1) General rule. It is an unfair practice to discriminate against an employee or job applicant because of marital status. Examples of unfair practices include, but are not limited to:
(a) Refusing to hire a single or divorced applicant because of a presumption that “married persons are more stable.”
(b) Refusing to promote a married employee because of a presumption that he or she “will be less willing to work late and travel.”
WAC 162-16-250(1)* (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
There are exceptions to the general rule, as follows:
WAC 162-16-250
Discrimination because of marital status.
(a) If a bona fide occupational qualification applies (please see WAC 162-16-240*).
(b) If an employer is enforcing a documented conflict of interest policy limiting employment opportunities on the basis of marital status:
(i) Where one spouse would have the authority or practical power to supervise, appoint, remove, or discipline the other;
(ii) Where one spouse would be responsible for auditing the work of the other;
(iii) Where other circumstances exist which would place the spouses in a situation of actual or reasonably foreseeable conflict between the employer’s interest and their own; or
(iv) Where, in order to avoid the reality or appearance of improper influence or favor, or to protect its confidentiality, the employer must limit the employment of close relatives of policy level officers of customers, competitors, regulatory agencies, or others with whom the employer deals.
WAC 162-16-250(2)* (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added).
WLAD REMEDIES
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the WLAD] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter* or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601* et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2)*.
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
WA STATE COURT RULES — RULES OF EVIDENCE — PURPOSE & CONSTRUCTION
The Washington State Court Rules, Rules of Evidence*, must “be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” ER 102*. The WA State Rules of Evidence addresses, inter alia, judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
Generally, “judicial notice” means “[a] court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact <the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit>. Fed. R. Evid. 201.” Black’s Law Dictionary 863-64 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004).
In Washington State, ER 201* is the relevant rule, and it contains the following topics: (a) the kinds of facts subject to it’s mandate, (b) when notice is discretionary, (c) when notice is mandatory, (d) opportunity to be hard, and (e) timing of the notice. ER 201(a)*.
(a) Kinds of Facts
Under the rule, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either[:]
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The “court MAY take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” ER 201(c)* (emphasis added).
(c) When Mandatory
However, a court MUST “take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” ER 201(d)*.
(d) Opportunity To Be Heard
In any event: “A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.” ER 201(e)*.
(e) Timing of Taking Notice
“Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.” ER 201(f)*.
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)
The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.
UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS
Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATORY BOYCOTTS OR BLACKLISTS
The WLAD defines “discriminatory boycotts or blacklists” as follows:
…
(f) … Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of … [RCW 49.60.030] shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or national origin, citizenship or immigration status, or lawful business relationship:
PROVIDED HOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts as authorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices[.]
RCW 49.60.030(1)(f) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies.
WLAD REMEDIES
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what does the term “alternative dispute resolution” mean within the context of civil legal proceedings? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
Introduction: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Alternative Dispute Resolution plays an important role in Washington State civil law, offering an innovative approach to conflict resolution outside the confines of traditional courtrooms. In this article, I will explore the meaning and importance of Washington State ADR, examining various methodologies and the crucial role it plays in facilitating efficient and harmonious resolutions to civil disputes.
Defining Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative Dispute Resolution refers to a range of processes designed to resolve legal conflicts without resorting to formal litigation. In Washington State, ADR encompasses methods such as mediation, arbitration, conciliation, and negotiation. These processes provide disputing parties with alternatives to the adversarial nature of traditional courtroom proceedings, promoting a collaborative and solution-oriented approach to conflict resolution.
Key ADR Methods in Washington State
Mediation:
Mediation employs a neutral third party, the mediator, to facilitate communication between disputing parties and guide them toward a mutually acceptable resolution.
Arbitration:
Arbitration involves presenting evidence and arguments to a neutral arbitrator, who then renders a binding decision.
Conciliation:
Conciliation engages a conciliator who assists parties in reaching a settlement by identifying common ground and fostering compromise. This method is commonly employed in Washington State for employment disputes, contractual disagreements, and interpersonal conflicts; the Washington State Human Rights Commission incorporates this process in its investigation of employment-discrimination complaints.
Significance of ADR in Washington State Civil Law
Efficiency and Timeliness:
ADR processes are recognized for their efficiency and timeliness, enabling parties to resolve disputes more expeditiously than through traditional litigation.
Cost-Effectiveness:
ADR can be a more cost-effective alternative to court proceedings, saving parties both time and financial resources.
Preserving Relationships:
Emphasizing collaboration and communication, ADR is particularly beneficial in preserving relationships strained by adversarial litigation.
Tailored Solutions:
ADR allows parties to craft customized solutions that better suit their unique circumstances, fostering a sense of ownership and satisfaction with the resolution.
Conclusion
In Washington State, the adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution reflects a commitment to creating a legal environment that prioritizes efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and collaboration. As ADR continues to evolve and gain prominence, it underscores the state’s dedication to providing its citizens with diverse and effective means of resolving civil disputes outside the traditional courtroom setting.
Read Our Related Articles
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
FAQ: What is WA State’s law against employment discrimination?
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
FAQ: What is WA State’s law against employment discrimination?
answer:
The Washington Law Against Discrimination* (WLAD), enacted in 1949, is a potent statute that covers a broad array of categories, including, but not limited to, employment discrimination. The relevant statute states as follows:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.
UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS
Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
The WLAD also outlaws certain types of retaliation: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination], or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination].” RCW 49.60.210*. Moreover, “[i]t is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40* RCW.” RCW 49.60.210*.
WLAD REMEDIES
“Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter* or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964* as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601* et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2)*.
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Construing Municipal Ordinances
According to Washington State courts:
[W]e construe municipal ordinances according to the rules of statutory interpretation.
Hockett v. Seattle Police Department, 85066-1-I (Div. 1 2024) (citing City of Seattle v. Swanson, 193 Wn. App. 795, 810, 373 P.3d 342 (2016)).
The rules of statutory interpretation are also known as the canons of statutory construction. Thus, Washington State courts utilize the canons of statutory construction to construe municipal ordinances.
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
What is considered retaliatory action against state-employee whistleblowers (WA State)?
The relevant law concerning retaliation against state-employee whistleblowers is found under RCW 42.40.050*, as follows:
RCW 42.40.050.
Retaliatory action against whistleblower—Remedies.
(1)(a) Any person who is a whistleblower, as defined in RCW 42.40.020*, and who has been subjected to workplace reprisal or retaliatory action is presumed to have established a cause of action for the remedies provided under chapter 49.60* RCW [(i.e., The Washington Law Against Discrimination)].
(b) For the purpose of this section, “reprisal or retaliatory action” means, but is not limited to, any of the following:
(i) Denial of adequate staff to perform duties;
(ii) Frequent staff changes;
(iii) Frequent and undesirable office changes;
(iv) Refusal to assign meaningful work;
(v) Unwarranted and unsubstantiated letters of reprimand or unsatisfactory performance evaluations;
(vi) Demotion;
(vii) Reduction in pay;
(viii) Denial of promotion;
(ix) Suspension;
(x) Dismissal;
(xi) Denial of employment;
(xii) A supervisor or superior behaving in or encouraging coworkers to behave in a hostile manner toward the whistleblower;
(xiii) A change in the physical location of the employee’s workplace or a change in the basic nature of the employee’s job, if either are in opposition to the employee’s expressed wish;
(xiv) Issuance of or attempt to enforce any nondisclosure policy or agreement in a manner inconsistent with prior practice; or
(xv) Any other action that is inconsistent compared to actions taken before the employee engaged in conduct protected by this chapter, or compared to other employees who have not engaged in conduct protected by this chapter.
(2) The agency presumed to have taken retaliatory action under subsection (1) of this section may rebut that presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there have been a series of documented personnel problems or a single, egregious event, or that the agency action or actions were justified by reasons unrelated to the employee’s status as a whistleblower and that improper motive was not a substantial factor.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits an agency from making any decision exercising its authority to terminate, suspend, or discipline an employee who engages in workplace reprisal or retaliatory action against a whistleblower. However, the agency also shall implement any order under chapter 49.60* RCW (other than an order of suspension if the agency has terminated the retaliator).
Under Washington State laws, state-employee whistleblowers who experience retaliatory actions have various remedies available to them. As defined under RCW 42.40.050, retaliatory actions encompass a wide range of behaviors, including but not limitedto denial of adequate staff, unwarranted demotion, and hostile behavior from supervisors or coworkers. However, agencies have the opportunity to rebut these claims by demonstrating documented personnel issues or justifying actions unrelated to whistleblowing.
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State Court Rules, how may litigators utilize WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 (Pretrial Procedure and Formulating Issues)? Here’s my point of view.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators
In the legal arena, rules and procedures govern every aspect of a case, ensuring fairness and efficiency in the pursuit of justice. Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16* is one such crucial guideline that sets the stage for the orderly progression of civil litigation. Understanding CR 16 is essential for attorneys and litigants alike to navigate the complexities of the legal process in Washington State courts effectively.
What is CR 16?
CR 16, short for Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure 16, outlines the requirements and procedures for pretrial conferences and the development of a litigation plan. It serves as a roadmap for streamlining the litigation process, promoting early settlement, and ensuring that cases proceed expeditiously through the court system. The court rule states as follows:
CR 16
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE AND FORMULATING ISSUES
(a) Hearing Matters Considered. By order, or on the motion of any party, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
(b) Pretrial Order. The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.
1. Pretrial Conferences: CR 16 allows–by order, or on the motion of any party–pretrial conferences to facilitate communication between parties and the court during the litigation process. These conferences aim to identify and narrow the issues in dispute, explore opportunities for settlement, and establish a framework for the efficient resolution of the case.
2. Litigation Plan: One of the central features of CR 16 is the formulation of a litigation plan. This plan outlines the parties’ proposed course of action, including simplifying the issues, amendments to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents, limiting the number of expert witnesses, and any other pertinent matters essential for the progression of the case. The litigation plan helps parties and the court manage expectations and timelines effectively.
3. Pretrial Orders: The court must issue an order documenting the proceedings of the conference, including any amendments permitted to the pleadings and agreements reached by the parties on relevant matters. The order must delineate the issues remaining for trial, excluding those resolved through admissions or agreements of counsel. Once entered, this order governs the subsequent progression of the case unless modified during the trial to prevent clear injustice. Additionally, the court, at its discretion, may institute a pretrial calendar system for cases to undergo similar consideration. This calendar may be limited to either jury or nonjury cases, or expanded to encompass all types of actions.
Benefits of CR 16
1. Efficiency: By promoting early communication and establishing clear guidelines for case management, CR 16 helps expedite the litigation process, reducing delays and unnecessary expenses for all parties involved.
2. Clarity and Predictability: The requirement to develop a litigation plan provides clarity and predictability regarding the progression of the case, enabling parties to allocate resources more effectively and plan their litigation strategies accordingly.
3. Encouragement of Settlement: Through pretrial conferences and the exploration of settlement options, CR 16 encourages parties to resolve their disputes outside of court, potentially saving time, money, and emotional energy associated with protracted litigation.
4. Judicial Oversight: By empowering the court to actively manage the case through case management orders, CR 16 ensures that proceedings are conducted in a fair and orderly manner, with judicial oversight to address any procedural issues that may arise.
Conclusion
Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 plays a vital role in promoting efficiency, fairness, and effective case management in civil litigation. By allowing pretrial conferences, formulating litigation plans, and providing for judicial oversight, CR 16 helps streamline the litigation process and facilitates the early resolution of disputes. Attorneys and litigants should familiarize themselves with CR 16’s requirements to navigate the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State courts successfully.
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
Is Washington State an at-will employment state?
answer:
Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. SeeFord v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (referencing Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878 (1928); see also Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 40 Wash. 354, 357, 82 P. 606 (1905) (Mount, C.J., dissenting) (“where [an employment] contract is general and for an indefinite time, it is terminable at will.”)).
According to the at-will doctrine, “an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability.” See id. (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, in the absence of a contract stating otherwise, an employee has the absolute right to abandon … [their] employment at-will.” See id.
However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.
READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
Under Washington State laws, what is an “affirmative defense” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
Definition of Affirmative Defense
In civil litigation under Washington State laws, the concept of affirmative defense plays a crucial role in legal proceedings. An affirmative defense is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant in response to a plaintiff‘s claim. Unlike a denial or a simple assertion that the plaintiff’s allegations are false, an affirmative defense asserts new facts or legal theories that, if proven, would defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims.
examples
One common example of an affirmative defense is the statute of limitations. This defense asserts that even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true, the claim is barred because it was not brought within the time period specified by law. Other affirmative defenses may include, but are not limitedtofailure to mitigate damages, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and duress, among others.
TIMING
In Washington State, it is essential for defendants to raise affirmative defenses promptly during litigation according to court rules. A defendant’s failure to timely do so can lead to the affirmative defense being forfeited and rendered unusable in subsequent stages of the litigation process.
burden of proof
It’s important to note that the burden of proof for an affirmative defense usually falls on the defendant. This means that the defendant must present evidence and convince the court that the affirmative defense applies to the case and should result in a favorable outcome for the defendant.
Conclusion
In summary, an affirmative defense in Washington State civil litigation is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant to defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims. It introduces new facts or legal theories that, if proven, can provide a legal basis for the defendant’s position in the case. Understanding affirmative defenses is essential for both plaintiffs and defendants in navigating the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State.
READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, rules, and regulations, what is a virtual law office? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Many lawyers are choosing to do some or all their work remotely, from home or other remote locations. Advances in the reliability and accessibility of on-line resources, cloud computing, video conferencing, and email services have allowed the development of the virtual law office, by which the lawyer does not maintain a physical office. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this trend, causing many lawyers to work remotely (virtually), or to split their time between a traditional office and a remote office (a hybrid office)….
Although this modern business model may appear radically different from the traditional brick and mortar law office model, the underlying principles of an ethical law practice remain the same. The core duties of diligence, loyalty, and confidentiality apply whether the office is virtual or physical. For the most part, the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) apply no differently in the virtual office context. However, there are areas that raise special considerations in the virtual law office.
Must in-state attorneys have a physical office address?
In its advisory opinion, the WSBA also addressed whether in-state attorneys are required to have a physical office address by evaluating both its bylaws and Admission to Practice Rules, as follows:
[WSBA BYLAWS]
There is no requirement that WSBA members have a physical office address. Section III(C)(1) of the Bylaws of the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) requires that each member furnish both a “physical residence address” and a “principal office address.” The physical residential address is used to determine the member’s district for Board of Governors elections. The Bylaws do not require that a principal office address be a physical address….
[WSBA ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULES]
Similarly, Admission and Practice Rule (APR) 13(b) requires a lawyer to advise the WSBA of a “current mailing address” and to update that address within 10 days of any change. Nothing in that rule indicates the mailing address must be a physical address.
WSBA Advisory Opinion 201601 (emphasis, and hyperlinks added). Thus, the WSBA and its relevant Advisory Opinion do not require attorneys to have a physical office address.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the landscape of legal practice in Washington State has seen a significant evolution with the emergence of virtual law offices, a trend accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The recent Advisory Opinion by the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) underscores that while the setting may differ from traditional brick-and-mortar establishments, the fundamental ethical principles governing legal practice remain unwavering. Despite the absence of a physical office, attorneys must adhere to core duties of diligence, loyalty, and confidentiality, as outlined in the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC).
Importantly, the opinion clarifies that in-state attorneys are not mandated to maintain a physical office address, as confirmed by both WSBA Bylaws and Admission to Practice Rules. This recognition signals a progressive shift in the legal profession, accommodating modern realities without compromising ethical standards. As attorneys continue to embrace virtual or hybrid models, this guidance provides clarity and assurance, ensuring a seamless integration of technology and tradition in the pursuit of justice and legal excellence.
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Q: Are Compensatory Damages Available Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)?
IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.
Advertisement
Are Compensatory Damages Available Under the WLAD?
answer:
Actual damages are available under the WLAD pursuant to RCW 49.60.030(2) and are synonymous with compensatory damages; thus, compensatory damages are available under the WLAD.
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)
The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD offers a wide array of remedies for violations, including but not limited to compensation for actual damages.
WLAD Remedies
“[T]he [Washington] law against discrimination … expressly provides [remedies, as follows]:
Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964….”
Martini v. The Boeing Company, 137 Wn.2d 357, 366-67 (Wash. 1999) (citing RCW 49.60.030(2)) (emphasis added). NOTE: RCW 49.60.030(2) “unambiguously states that when any violation of the statute occurs, the person injured shall have a claim for ‘actual damages.'” Martini, 137 Wn.2d at 367.
Actual Damages
“‘Actual damages’ is a [t]erm used to denote the type of damage award as well as the nature of injury for which recovery is allowed; thus, actual damages flowing from injury in fact are to be distinguished from damages which are nominal, exemplary or punitive**.” Id. (citing Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash.2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041, 1049).
“‘Actual damages’ are synonymous with compensatory damages.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 35 (6th ed.1990)) (emphasis added). “As the dictionary definition notes, Washington courts have interpreted the term ‘actual damages’ in this manner.” Id. at 367-68 (internal citations omitted).
“Compensatory damages are “[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered — Often shortened to compensatories.” Black’s Law Dictionary 416 (Deluxe Eighth Edition 2004) (emphasis added). “Indemnify” means “[to] reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third party’s or one’s own act or default.” Id. at 783-84.
Conclusion
Actual damages are available under the WLAD pursuant to RCW 49.60.030(2) and are synonymous with compensatory damages; thus, compensatory damages are available under the WLAD.
READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Campbell & Gwinn Framework? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION: THE CAMPBELL & GWINN FRAMEWORK
A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ambiguous Statutes (WA State)
Washington State courts use the Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 803, 805, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).
The Campbell & Gwinn Framework
Courts apply the Campbell & Gwinn Framework as follows:
(1) DETERMINE the legislative intent OF the STATUTE
When a Washington State court construes “a statute, … [its] goal is to determine and effectuate legislativeintent.” Magney, 195 Wash.2d at 803, 466 P.3d 1077 (citingSwinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash.2d 571, 581, 311 P.3d 6 (2013); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
(2) EVALUATE the plain and unambiguous language OF the STATUTE
The court will “start with the plain and unambiguous language of a statute.” Id. (citingCampbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4).
(3) if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning
“[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original). “[T]he plain meaning is … derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Id (citingCampbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).
(4) if the statute is ambiguous, then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction
“[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Id. (citingCampbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).
Conclusion
Washington State courts use Campbell & GwinnFramework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. If the interpretation of the statute is clear at first glance, the court is obligated to uphold that straightforward interpretation as reflective of the legislature’s intent. Alternatively, if the statute is determined to be ambiguous–meaning, “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning”–then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. See id.
LEARN MORE
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what is the Implied Cause of Action Rule? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).
(IMPORTANT: This article is for entertainment purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
THE IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION RULE: WA STATE
Washington State courts may apply the Implied Cause of Action Rule to Washington State statutes that create a right on the part of individuals but do not indicate explicitly an intent to create a remedy. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 921, 784 P.2d 1258, (1990).
a judicial canon of construction
Accordingly, the Implied Cause of Action Rule is a judicial canon directing that “when a statute … [has] provided a right of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to devise a remedy. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55.03 (4th ed. 1973).” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing State v. Manuel, 94 Wash.2d 695, 699, 619 P.2d 977 (1980); see also Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (implying a right of action under the state’s labor relations act for an employee who claimed that his employer, in violation of the statute, had interfered with the employee’s labor activities); State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wash.2d 565, 570, 369 P.2d 844 (1962) (“[c]ourts have consistently held that when a statute gives a new right and no specific remedy, the common law will provide a remedy”)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This judicial canon has its roots in federal law as well as the Restatement of Torts.
NOTE: A judicial canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Law
“The federal courts also recognize an implied cause of action under a statute which provides protection to a specified class of persons but creates no remedy.” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (referencing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); In re WPPSS Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1987)).
THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
The Washington State Supreme Court has found that “The Restatement of Torts recognizes the implied right of action [as well]:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979)) (emphasis added).
THE ELEMENTS
Washington courts have borrowed “from the test used by federal courts in determining whether to imply a cause of action.” Id. Accordingly, the Washington State Implied Right of Action Rule requires that the following issues be answered in the affirmative:
(1) whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose “especial” benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy;
(3) whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.
Id. at 920-21 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
the assumptions
Lastly, the court may make two important assumptions under the Implied Right of Action Rule:
(1) “[t]he [Washington State Legislature] is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action [when it drafts legislation;] and
[(2) the court can] also assume that the legislature would not enact a remedial statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights.”
See id. at 919-20 (paragraph formatting added).
READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what are “protected classes” within the context of employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
Advertisement
INTRODUCTION: PROTECTED CLASSES (WA STATE)
Washington State has comprehensive employment-discrimination laws to shield workers from unjust treatment rooted in specific attributes. An integral facet of these legal provisions is the acknowledgment of “protected classes.” This article will enumerate the protected classes within the employment-rights framework of the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
I. The Washington Law Against Discrimination: EMPLOYMENT
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD“) is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories including, but not limited to employment, as follows:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;
…
RCW 49.60.030(1)(a) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.
II. Unfair Practices of Employers: generally
Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
[Discriminate in Compensation or in Other Terms/Conditions of Employment]
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
[Statements, Advertisements, Publications, Applications for Employment, Inquiries in Connection With Prospective Employment]
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
III. unfair practices of employers: filing or participating in a disrimination complaint (UNLAWFUL RETALIATION)
The WLAD also outlaws certain types of retaliation: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination], or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination].” RCW 49.60.210. Moreover, “[i]t is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.” RCW 49.60.210.
NOTE: The foregoing unfair practices are based upon specific protected classes.
IV. Defining Protected Classes
Protected classes encompass groups of individuals shielded from discrimination under governmental statutes. Washington State explicitly delineates these classes under the WLAD, recognizing various categories within, inter alia, the realm of employment, including the following:
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the exploration of protected classes within Washington State’s employment discrimination laws highlights the state’s commitment to fostering a workplace environment rooted in equality and fairness. The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), a robust statute enacted in 1949, serves as a powerful safeguard against unjust treatment based on specific attributes.
In essence, the WLAD stands as a cornerstone in Washington State’s pursuit of equal opportunities, reinforcing the principles of fairness, justice, and non-discrimination in employment. As we navigate the complexities of the modern workplace, understanding and upholding the rights of protected classes are crucial steps towards creating a truly inclusive and equitable work environment in the Evergreen State.
READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES
We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
