Sexual Harassment Policy Requirements for Specific WA Employers

Sexual Harassment Policy Requirements for Specific WA Employers


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, what are the sexual harassment and assault policy requirements for hotel, motel, retailer, and security guard entities, and property services contractors? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WA State’s Sexual Harassment and Assault Policy Requirements for Specific WA State Employers — Hotel, Motel, Retail, or Security Guard Entity, and Property Services Contractors

Washington State has long been at the forefront of promoting workplace equality and safety. One of the key provisions in this regard is RCW 49.60.515*, a statute within the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), which imposes specific responsibilities on the following employers–who employ an employee–to combat sexual harassment and assault:

» Hotel, Motel, Retail, and Security Guard Entities; and

» Property Services Contractors.

This provision aims to create safer work environments in sectors that may face heightened risks of such behaviors. Below is a breakdown of the law’s requirements and its impact on employers and employees.

1. Adopting a Sexual Harassment Policy (RCW 49.60.515(1)(a))

Under the law, every employer in the specified sectors is required to adopt a comprehensive sexual harassment policy. This policy must explicitly address how sexual harassment will be prevented, identified, and responded to in the workplace. The inclusion of this policy is an essential step in setting clear standards of behavior and ensuring that employees are aware of their rights and responsibilities.

For employers, having a well-defined sexual harassment policy provides guidance on what constitutes inappropriate behavior and how to handle complaints. This policy serves as a preventative measure and a tool for addressing complaints effectively when they arise.

2. Mandatory Training for Employees and Management (RCW 49.60.515(1)(b))

One of the core requirements of this provision is the mandatory training for managers, supervisors, and employees. The training aims to:

  Prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace

•  Prevent sexual discrimination

•  Educate employees about protections for those who report violations of state or federal laws, rules, or regulations

The training sessions ensure that employees at all levels are aware of the importance of maintaining a respectful and safe work environment. By providing this education, employers can foster a culture of accountability and respect. Additionally, the inclusion of protections for whistleblowers is essential for encouraging employees to report violations without fear of retaliation.

3. Resources for Employees (RCW 49.60.515(1)(c))

In addition to training, employers are required to provide their workforce with a list of resources for those who may experience or witness sexual harassment or assault. At a minimum, this resource list must include contact information for:

•  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

•  The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC)

•  Local advocacy groups focused on preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault

These resources are critical for providing employees with the support and guidance they need to address harassment issues, report incidents, or seek external help if necessary.

4. Panic Buttons for Employees (RCW 49.60.515(1)(d))

In an effort to further enhance the safety of workers in potentially vulnerable situations, the statute mandates that employers in the specified industries provide a panic button to each employee. This panic button is a critical tool for immediate assistance in emergencies, allowing workers to quickly signal for help if they feel threatened or are in danger of harassment or assault.

For employers with fewer than 50 employees, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries* (L&I) is tasked with providing additional guidance on how this requirement will be applied. This provision does not extend to contracted security guard companies licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW, which have separate regulations in place.

5. Reporting and Documentation Requirements for Property Services Contractors (RCW 49.60.515(2))

Property services contractors, including janitorial companies, must adhere to specific reporting requirements. These include submitting the following information to the L&I:

•  The date when the sexual harassment policy was adopted

•  The number of managers, supervisors, and employees who have completed the mandated training

•  The physical address of each work location where janitorial services are performed, along with details about the workforce and hours worked

These reporting measures ensure that contractors are in compliance with the law and provide valuable data for oversight. This information will be made available in aggregate form to the public, allowing for transparency and accountability.

6. Why This Law Matters

RCW 49.60.515* is designed to address specific vulnerabilities in industries where workers may be at higher risk of harassment or assault, such as hotels, motels, and retail spaces. By instituting preventive measures such as training, panic buttons, and clear policies, the law works to ensure that employees have the tools and protections needed to maintain a safe workplace.

Moreover, the law helps reinforce a broader commitment to workplace equality and safety in Washington State, which aligns with national efforts to curb sexual harassment and assault in the workplace.

7. the statutory provision — rcw 49.60.515

The relevant WLAD statutory provision states as follows:

RCW 49.60.515
Sexual harassment and assault policy—Adoption of by hotel, motel, retail, or security guard entity, or property services contractors—Requirements.

(1) Every hotel, motel, retail, or security guard entity, or property services contractor, who employs an employee, must:

(a) Adopt a sexual harassment policy;

(b) Provide mandatory training to the employer’s managers, supervisors, and employees to:

(i) Prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace;

(ii) Prevent sexual discrimination in the workplace; and

(iii) Educate the employer’s workforce regarding protection for employees who report violations of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation;

(c) Provide a list of resources for the employer’s employees to utilize. At a minimum, the resources must include contact information of the equal employment opportunity commission, the Washington state human rights commission, and local advocacy groups focused on preventing sexual harassment and sexual assault; and

(d) Provide a panic button to each employee. The department must publish advice and guidance for employers with fifty or fewer employees relating to this subsection (1)(d). This subsection (1)(d) does not apply to contracted security guard companies licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW.

(2)(a) A property services contractor shall submit the following to the department on a form or in a manner determined by the department:

(i) The date of adoption of the sexual harassment policy required in subsection (1)(a) of this section;

(ii) The number of managers, supervisors, and employees trained as required by subsection (1)(b) of this section; and

(iii) The physical address of the work location or locations at which janitorial services are provided by workers of the property services contractor, and for each location: (A) The total number of workers or contractors of the property services contractor who perform janitorial services; and (B) the total hours worked.

(b) The department must make aggregate data submitted as required in this subsection (2) available upon request.

(c) The department may adopt rules to implement this subsection (2).

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) “Department” means the department of labor and industries.

(b) “Employee” means an individual who spends a majority of her or his working hours alone, or whose primary work responsibility involves working without another coworker present, and who is employed by an employer as a janitor, security guard, hotel or motel housekeeper, or room service attendant.

(c) “Employer” means any person, association, partnership, property services contractor, or public or private corporation, whether for-profit or not, who employs one or more persons.

(d) “Panic button” means an emergency contact device carried by an employee by which the employee may summon immediate on-scene assistance from another worker, a security guard, or a representative of the employer.

(e) “Property services contractor” means any person or entity that employs workers: (i) To perform labor for another person to provide commercial janitorial services; or (ii) on behalf of an employer to provide commercial janitorial services. “Property services contractor” does not mean the employment security department or individuals who perform labor under an agreement for exchanging their own labor or services with each other, provided the work is performed on land owned or leased by the individuals.

(f) “Security guard” means an individual who is principally employed as, or typically referred to as, a security officer or guard, regardless of whether the individual is employed by a private security company or a single employer or whether the individual is required to be licensed under chapter 18.170* RCW.

(4)(a) Hotels and motels with sixty or more rooms must meet the requirements of this section by January 1, 2020.

(b) All other employers identified in subsection (1) of this section must meet the requirements of this section by January 1, 2021.

RCW 49.60.515* (emphasis added).

Conclusion

The implementation of RCW 49.60.515 represents a significant step forward in ensuring that employers in high-risk industries take proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment and assault. By requiring sexual harassment policies, training, resources, panic buttons, and regular reporting, this law aims to create safer, more equitable work environments across Washington State. Employers in the specified sectors must familiarize themselves with these requirements to ensure compliance and to create a culture of safety and respect within their organizations. For employees, this law serves as an important safeguard, providing them with the resources and support necessary to navigate and report harassment if it arises.


READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our related blog articles:

» Definition of Sex (WLAD)

» Sexual Harassment in the Workplace

» The Silenced No More Act (WA State)*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)



NEED HELP?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WSHRC: Voluntary Dismissal

WSHRC: Voluntary Dismissal


Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning a party’s voluntary dismissal? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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Understanding Voluntary Dismissal Under WAC 162-08-268

In Washington State, parties involved in discrimination cases before the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) sometimes choose to withdraw their claims or end their participation in an administrative proceeding. WAC 162-08-268*, titled Voluntary Dismissal, outlines how and when a party may do so—and what legal consequences follow.

1. Dismissal Before the Hearing

Before a hearing begins, the Commission or any party supporting the complaint (hereinafter, “complainant”) may voluntarily dismiss their case or specific claims by filing and serving written notice. See WAC 162-08-268(1)*. This step effectively withdraws those issues from consideration. See id. The only exception applies to cases involving alleged unfair practices in real estate transactions, which are governed by separate rules. See id.

2. Dismissal After the Hearing Has Started

Once a hearing has commenced, the Commission or a complainant may move for voluntary dismissal of the complainant’s case or claim(s) therein; thus, a formal motion is required. See WAC 162-08-268(2)*. If the motion is made before the complainant finishes presenting its opening case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) must grant the dismissal as a matter of right. See id. However, if the motion is made after the complainant has rested, dismissal is discretionary—the ALJ may allow it only for “good cause” and may impose appropriate terms or conditions. See id.

Again, the only exception applies to cases involving alleged unfair practices in real estate transactions, which are governed by separate rules. See id.

3. Legal Effect of a Voluntary Dismissal

Importantly, a voluntary dismissal does not decide the case on the merits. See WAC 162-08-268(2)*. It merely ends the administrative proceeding for the dismissed claim or complainant. See id. The dismissed complainant may still pursue their claims in another forum—such as superior court—if permitted by law and filed within the required time limits. See id.

A dismissal of one claim does not affect any remaining claims, and one complainant’s dismissal does not automatically remove other complainants from the case. See id. However, if the Commission takes a voluntary dismissal of the case in support of the complaint the entire case is closed—”unless the complainant has appeared independently under WAC 162-08-261* or another party has intervened on the complainant’s side pursuant to WAC 162-08-288(4)*, in which circumstance the hearing shall proceed with the remaining parties.” Id.

4. iMPLICATIONS

For complainants and counsel, WAC 162-08-268* provides flexibility to reassess strategy mid-process. Whether to dismiss depends on procedural posture, alternative remedies, and timing. Because dismissal is not a ruling on the merits, parties who wish to pursue their claims in court can generally do so—so long as they act promptly and within statutory deadlines.


RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

» WSHRC: Withdrawal of Complaint



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Definition of State (Title VII)

Definition of State (Title VII)


Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, what is the definition of the term “State”? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) is a vital federal law that protects certain individuals (including employees) against certain types of discrimination and retaliation; it also safeguards certain types of accommodations.

DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTED CLASSES

Title VII outlaws discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity). The law “also makes it unlawful to use policies or practices that seem neutral but have the effect of discriminating against people because of their race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or national origin.” U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce* (last visited 1/10/23).

AGE & DISABILITY: Other federal laws protect against age discrimination (i.e., Age Discrimination in Employment Act or “ADEA”) and disability discrimination (i.e., Americans with Disabilities Act or “ADA”). However, this article will address solely Title VII.

RETALIATION

Retaliation against an individual who has reported discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or taken part in an employment discrimination investigation or litigation is likewise prohibited by Title VII.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

Lastly, applicants’ and employees‘ genuinely held religious practices must be reasonably accommodated by employers under the legislation, unless doing so would put an undue burden on the employer‘s ability to conduct business.

SCOPE OF TITLE VII

Title VII applies to certain employers (both private and public with 15 or more employees), employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs and makes it “unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:

» Hiring and firing;
»Compensation, assignment, or classification of workers;
»Transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;
»Job advertisements and recruitment;
»Testing;
»Use of employer facilities;
»Training and apprenticeship programs;
»Retirement plans, leave, and benefits; or
»Other terms and conditions of employment.

U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce* (last visited 1/10/23) (emphasis added). Certain Title VII terms are defined by law.

TITLE VII DEFINITION OF “STATE”

Title VII defines the term “State” as follows:

42 U.S. Code § 2000e – Definitions

(i)The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act* [43 U.S.C. 1331* et seq.].

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i)* (emphasis added). Victims of discrimination in violation of Title VII may seek enforcement through the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

ENFORCEMENT

“The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws[, including Title VII,] that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” US E.E.O.C. Website, Overview* (last visited 1/10/23).

Learn more about filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC* by visiting their official website*.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our related blog articles:

» EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue

» Fair Employment Practice Agencies

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC*

» Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

» Unlawful Employment Agency Practices (Title VII)

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)



need help?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Liability for Killing or Injuring Dog Guide or Service Animal (WA State)

Liability for Killing or Injuring Dog Guide or Service Animal (WA State)


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, is there a provision concerning the killing or injuring of a dog guide or service animal? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WLAD — LIABILITY FOR KILLING OR INJURING DOG GUIDE OR SERVICE ANIMAL

In Washington State, the rights of individuals with disabilities are protected under a variety of laws, including those governing the treatment of dog guides and service animals. One key WLAD provision is RCW 49.60.370*, which outlines the penalties and remedies for the killing or injury of such animals.

Under this law, if a person negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal, they are liable for a penalty of $1,000, which must be paid to the user of the animal. This penalty is in addition to any other civil or criminal penalties that may apply. Not only does this law provide financial compensation for the user of the animal, but it also enables the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if legal action is required.

Importantly, RCW 49.60.370* clarifies that the Washington State Human Rights Commission has no duty to investigate incidents of negligent or malicious acts against a dog guide or service animal. This means that individuals seeking justice under this statute must take legal action themselves to pursue civil remedies.

THE BLACK-LETTER LAW — RCW 49.60.370

The relevant WLAD section states as follows:

RCW 49.60.370
Liability for killing or injuring dog guide or service animal—Penalty in addition to other remedies or penalties—Recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs—No duty to investigate.

(1) A person who negligently or maliciously kills or injures a dog guide or service animal is liable for a penalty of one thousand dollars, to be paid to the user of the animal. The penalty shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies or penalties, civil or criminal, provided by law.

(2) A user or owner of a dog guide or service animal, whose animal is negligently or maliciously injured or killed, is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing any civil remedy.

(3) The commission has no duty to investigate any negligent or malicious acts referred to under this section.

RCW 49.60.370* (hyperlinks added).

CONCLUSION

For employers, this law reinforces the need for a respectful and inclusive environment for employees who rely on service animals. It’s crucial that workplace policies support the safety and well-being of both employees and their service animals or guide dogs. In doing so, employers not only comply with the law but also foster a more inclusive and supportive workplace culture. By understanding and respecting the legal rights of employees with disabilities and their service animals and guide dogs, businesses can ensure they provide an environment that is safe, fair, and legally compliant.


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Dog Guide (WLAD)

» Definition of Service Animal (WLAD)

» License Waiver for Dog Guide and Service Animals (WLAD)


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Determining Pretext Comparators: The Disparate-Discipline Method

Determining Pretext Comparators: The Disparate-Discipline Method


Under Washington State laws, what is the Disparate-Discipline Method of determining pretext comparators when litigating a claim of wrongful discharge? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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Wrongful Discharge — Determining Pretext Comparators — The Disparate-Discipline Method (WA State)

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) “prohibits employers from discharging any employee on the basis of a protected characteristic[.]” Litvack v. Univ. of Wash, 546 P.3d 1068, 1077 (Div. I 2024) (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 526, 404 P.3d 464 (2017); RCW 49.60.180*) (hyperlink added).

“Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, however, because [d]irect, ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since [t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464 (quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 179, 23 P.3d 440 (2001), abrogated in part by Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).

“Because intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, Washington follows the three-part evidentiary burden-shifting formula set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464). “The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.” Id. at 1077-78 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original).

the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework — three steps

For purposes of wrongful discharge claims, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework has three steps, or prongs:

First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that

(1) she was within a statutorily protected class,

(2) she was discharged by the defendant,

(3) she was doing satisfactory work, and

(4) after her discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff.

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.

Second, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext.

See id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis, hyperlinks, and paragraph formatting added).

the third STEP — pretext PRONG

In Scrivener v. Clark College*, the Washington State Supreme Court “explained what is required for an employee to satisfy the pretext prong[:]

An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either

(1) that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or

(2) that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer.

An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production. Our case law clearly establishes that it is the plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.

Litvack, 546 P.3d at 1078 (citing Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wash.2d 439, 446-47, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)) (paragraph formatting added). There are various ways of proving pretext.

proving pretext — the disparate-discipline method

In Washington, “[o]ne test for pretext is whether[:]

(1) an employee outside the protected class[;]

(2) committed acts of comparable seriousness[;]

(3) but was not demoted or similarly disciplined.

Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash. App. 212, 227, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996); Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541 (“employer’s reason ‘was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances'”)). I call this approach the disparate-discipline method.

Accordinly, under the disparate-discipline method of proving pretext, “[t]he appropriate comparators are employees that are ‘similarly situated‘ to the plaintiff and doing ‘substantially the same work‘ as the plaintiff.” Id. at 1079-80 (citing Johnson, 80 Wash. App. at 227, 907 P.2d 1223; Ellingson v. Spokane Mortg. Co., 19 Wash. App. 48, 54, 573 P.2d 389 (1978)) (emphasis added).

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment for an employer is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 1078 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added). “To overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff needs to show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

Substantial Factor:

“A ‘substantial factor’ means that the protected characteristic was a significant motivating factor bringing about the employer’s decision.” Id. at 1078-79 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The protected characteristic need not be the sole factor in the decision.” Id. at 1079 (citing Scrivener*, 181 Wash.2d at 444, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant motivating factor means that the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons.” Id. (citing Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wash.2d 618 n.32, 911 P.2d 1319 (1996)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s (employee’s) Burden:

“Because an employer may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, an employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial motivating factor.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464). “A plaintiff need not ‘disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons.'” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation omitted).

Circumstantial, Indirect, and Inferential Evidence — opinions & conclusory statements:

“Plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“But an employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements; the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Crabtree v. Jefferson County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, 20 Wash. App. 2d 493, 510, 500 P.3d 203 (2021)). “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Chen v. State*, 86 Wash. App. 183, 191, 937 P.2d 612 (1997).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework plays a vital role in advancing wrongful discharge claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), particularly in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is lacking. By establishing a structured, three-step process, the framework provides a clear path for plaintiffs to make their case, starting with the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in making this initial showing, it creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The final step requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, meaning that discrimination was either the true motivation or a substantial factor in the decision.

The pretext inquiry, as clarified by Washington case law, allows plaintiffs to challenge an employer’s defense by presenting evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Methods such as the disparate-discipline test provide a framework for comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees outside the protected class, thereby helping to uncover discriminatory motives hidden behind seemingly legitimate reasons. Importantly, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, but they are not required to disprove every reason articulated by the employer.

Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework serves not only as a procedural tool but also as a safeguard for employees, ensuring they have a fair opportunity to seek redress when faced with unjust dismissal. By facilitating a fair and systematic evaluation of discrimination claims, the framework upholds the principles of equality and accountability in the workplace, giving plaintiffs the necessary tools to contest unlawful employment practices and promoting broader compliance with anti-discrimination laws.


Read our related articles

» Disparate Treatment: Pretext by Comparison

» Pretext: Scrivener Corrects the Fulton Error*

» The Pretext Element: Self-Evaluations*

» The Pretext Element: Six Limitations*

» The Pretext Element: Two Methods of Proof*



need help?

If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)

The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what is the hate crime offense? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)

The Hate Crime Offense (WA State)

In Washington State, “[a] person is guilty of a hate crime offense if the person maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of their perception of another person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:

(a) Assaults another person;

(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another; or

(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property.

The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a “reasonable person” is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim.

Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.

RCW 9A.36.080(1)* (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). For purposes of this article, the above law may also be referred to as “subsection (1).”

NOTE: “It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.” RCW 9A.36.080(3)*.

A Class C Felony

“Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.” RCW 9A.36.080(7)*. And the associated penalties “do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.” See RCW 9A.36.080(8)*.

Definitions

For the purposes of the hate crime offense, the following definitions apply:

(a) “Gender expression or identity” means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.

(b) “Sexual orientation” means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.

(c) “Threat” means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:

(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or

(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.

RCW 9A.36.080(6)*.

Prosecution — Permissible Inferences

“In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact’s satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person’s perception of the victim’s or victims’ race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:

(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;

(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a Nazi emblem, symbol, or hakenkreuz;

(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;

(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;

(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim’s person without the victim’s authorization; or

(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.

RCW 9A.36.080(2)*. “This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state’s ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.” Id.

Scope

Nothing under the relevant law–RCW 9A.36.080* (Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty)–“confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington.” RCW 9A.36.080(9)*.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Washington State’s approach to hate crimes underscores a commitment to protecting individuals from acts of violence and intimidation rooted in bias against their identity. By defining hate crimes and outlining specific behaviors that constitute such offenses, the law aims to foster a safer environment for all residents. The recognition of various forms of discrimination, from race and religion to gender identity and disability, reflects a broader societal effort to combat prejudice and promote inclusivity. Furthermore, the legal provisions not only establish criminal penalties but also ensure that victims retain the right to seek additional remedies, reinforcing the state’s dedication to justice and equality. As communities continue to navigate issues of hate and discrimination, these laws serve as vital tools in the fight against intolerance.


need help?

If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant


Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the  Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning the relationship of Commission to complainant? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WSHRC: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RELATIONSHIP OF COMMISSION TO COMPLAINANT

Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 162-08-061* outlines the Washington State Human Rights Commission’s neutral and public-focused role in investigating discrimination complaints. The Commission is tasked with determining whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe an unfair practice has occurred under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60*), without favoring either party. Its ultimate goal is to eliminate and prevent discrimination—not merely to secure individual remedies for complainants.

While the Commission often seeks to restore a complainant to their prior position, it prioritizes broader systemic remedies when necessary. Notably, the Commission operates independently of a complainant’s personal interests; it may pursue different outcomes if doing so better serves the public interest. Complainants focused solely on personal relief are encouraged to consider pursuing their claims in court, as the law preserves their right to do so.

THE BLACK LETTER LAW: WAC 162-08-061

The relevant WAC provision states as follows:

WAC 162-08-061
Relationship of commission to complainant.

(1) Commission’s role and objectives. In investigating cases the commission seeks to ascertain the facts in order to make an impartial finding of “reasonable cause” or “no reasonable cause.” It has no predisposition in favor of either complainants or respondents. If “reasonable cause” is found, then the objective of the commission is to obtain the remedy that will best eliminate the unfair practices and prevent their recurrence. The judgment as to what will eliminate an unfair practice for purposes of reaching an agreement under RCW 49.60.240* is made initially by the executive director, or other staff persons pursuant to the executive director’s direction, and ultimately by the commissioners. The judgment as to what will eliminate an unfair practice and carry out the purposes of the human rights law after hearing under RCW 49.60.250* is made by the administrative law judge. The commission was not designed to compete with the courts as a forum for the vindication of private rights; its task is to work for the public good of eliminating and preventing discrimination. Although the facts and circumstances giving rise to a claim of discrimination may sometimes give rise to other claims based upon other statutes or principles of common law, the commission will investigate only claims of unfair practices arising under chapter 49.60* RCW et seq. The law against discrimination expressly preserves the right of complainants and/or aggrieved parties to seek other civil or criminal remedies in court or other available forums, either simultaneously with a complaint filed with the commission or in lieu of such a complaint, subject to any limitations or conditions provided in WAC 162-08-062* or elsewhere.

(2) Independence from complainant. The commission’s primary objective is to eliminate and prevent discrimination, which may or may not be consistent with the goals or objectives of a particular complainant or aggrieved person. In negotiating a settlement or seeking an order, the commission generally works for provisions restoring the complainant as nearly as possible to the position he or she would be in if he or she had not been discriminated against, because this is usually an effective way to eliminate the discrimination and prevent its recurrence. But where, in the commission’s judgment, provisions fully restoring the complainant (for instance, reinstatement to the job with back pay) would be inadequate to eliminate a pattern of discrimination, the commission will hold out for additional terms, even though the respondent is willing to settle on the basis of full relief for the complainant only. Except as may be otherwise provided for complaints alleging unfair practices in real estate transactions, the commission may determine that discrimination will be effectively eliminated and prevented by an order that does not afford the complainant every item of relief to which he or she may have a legal claim. The commission assumes that persons who complain to it are as interested in the elimination and prevention of discrimination in general as in their individual cases. If a person is interested only in relief for himself or herself, he or she is advised to seek his or her remedy directly in court pursuant to RCW 49.60.020*, 49.60.030* and/or WAC 162-08-062*.

WAC 162-08-061* (emphasis added).


RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Promissory Estoppel (WA State)

Promissory Estoppel (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what is the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is based upon the “principle that a promise made without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to the promisee’s detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 591 (8th ed. 2004). Accordingly, to establish a viable claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must show:

(1) a promise which

(2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and

(3) which does cause the promisee to change his position

(4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that

(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

Chen v. State, 86 Wn.App. 183, 194 n.1 (Div. 2 1997), petition denied, 133 Wn.2d 1020, 948 P.2d 387 (1997) (citing Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 158, 172, 876 P.2d 435 (1994), quoting Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash.2d 255, 259 n. 2, 616 P.2d 644 (1980)) (emphasis added).

THE “PROMISE” REQUIREMENT

Promissory estoppel requires the existence of a promise.” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435) (hyperlink added). “A promise is defined as ‘a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.'” Id. (citing Havens, 124 Wash.2d at 172, 876 P.2d 435 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 2(1))).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as a vital legal principle that ensures fairness and prevents unjust outcomes when a promise, lacking formal consideration, leads a promisee to alter their position based on that promise. By establishing specific criteria—including the existence of a promise, reasonable reliance, and the necessity of enforcement to avert injustice—this doctrine safeguards individuals from detrimental reliance on assurances that may otherwise go unfulfilled. As courts continue to interpret and apply this doctrine, it underscores the importance of honoring commitments in both personal and commercial contexts, fostering trust and accountability in our interactions.


need help?

If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action


Under Washington State law, can racially discriminatory action in employment form the basis for the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, as follows:

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

(a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or

(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.”

Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.*, 88 Wn.2d 735, 745, n. 1, 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (emphasis added).

The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY ACTION & THE TORT OF OUTRAGE

Racially discriminatory action can form the basis for a claim of outrage. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:

In Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959), we held recovery could be premised upon tort liability for emotional distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury where the victim was injured by racially discriminatory action.

Id.* at 739, 565 P.2d 1173 (emphasis added). Within the context of employment discrimination, positions of authority are significant when evaluating associated claims based on the tort of outrage.

Positions of authority

“When one in a position of authority, actual or apparent, over another has allegedly made racial slurs and jokes and comments, this abusive conduct gives added impetus to the claim of outrageous behavior.” Contreras*, 88 Wn.2d at 741, 565 P.2d 1173 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment e). Thus, “[t]he relationship between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability should be imposed.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe racially discriminatory actions in employment can form the basis for the tort of outrage. The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is a crucial legal framework for addressing severe emotional harm caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. Defined under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, this tort highlights the accountability of individuals whose actions lead to significant emotional distress, even in the absence of physical injury.

Notably, racially discriminatory actions can serve as a foundation for such claims, as established by Washington case law. Furthermore, the dynamics of authority between the parties play a vital role in evaluating these claims, emphasizing that abusive behavior from those in positions of power can significantly exacerbate the impact of the distress. Depending on the circumstances of each case, understanding these elements may be useful for adequately addressing the complexities of emotional distress claims in civil law.


READ MORE OF OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)



Learn More

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Unfair Practices of Labor Unions (WLAD)

Unfair Practices of Labor Unions (WLAD)


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what are considered unfair practices of labor unions? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD, enacted in 1949, is a potent statute covering a broad array of categories, including the following:

RCW 49.60.030
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD also protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of labor organizations.

DEFINITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

The WLAD defines the term “labor organization” as follows:

(16) “Labor organization” includes any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances or terms or conditions of employment, or for other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment.

RCW 49.60.040(16) (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF LABOR UNIONS

The WLAD prohibits both labor unions and labor organizations from engaging in unfair practices, as follows:

RCW 49.60.190
Unfair practices of labor unions.

It is an unfair practice for any labor union or labor organization:

(1) To deny membership and full membership rights and privileges to any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

(2) To expel from membership any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

(3) To discriminate against any member, employer, employee, or other person to whom a duty of representation is owed because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

RCW 49.60.190*. Under the WLAD, labor unions engaging in unfair practices are subject to liability.

WLAD REMEDIES

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2) (hyperlinks added).


need help?

If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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