Perceived Obesity Is a Protected Class

Perceived Obesity Is a Protected Class


Under Washington Law Against Discrimination, is perceived obesity considered a protected class for purposes of disparate-treatment claims (based on failure to hire)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy*); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status*.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

DEFINITION OF DISABILITY

WLAD “generally prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because the employee has a disability.” Certification (9th Cir.): Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 611, 614 (Wash. 2019) (citing RCW 49.60.180). “An employee has a disability if they have an ‘impairment’ that ‘[i]s medically cognizable or diagnosable,’ ‘[e]xists as a record or history,’ or ‘[i]s perceived to exist whether or not it exists in fact.'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.040(7)(a)) (alteration in original).

OBESITY ALWAYS QUALIFIES AS AN IMPAIRMENT

In 2018, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to … [the Washington State Supreme Court]: Under what circumstances, if any, does obesity qualify as an ‘impairment’ under the [WLAD, RCW] 49.60.040?” Taylor, 193 Wn.2d at 614-15 (citing Order Certifying Question to Wash. Supreme Ct., Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., 904 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2018)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court held as follows: “We answer that obesity always qualifies as an impairment under the plain language of RCW 49.60.040(7)(c)(i) because it is recognized by the medical community as a ‘physiological disorder, or condition’ that affects multiple body systems listed in the statute.” Id. at 615 (hyperlink and emphasis added). Moreover, for purposes of failure-to-hire disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff doesn’t need to prove that they’re actually impaired (i.e., obese).

DISPARATE TREATMENT (FAILURE TO HIRE): PERCEIVED DISABILITY IS A PROTECTED CLASS

“In order to prevail in a [failure-to-hire] disparate treatment case … [based on obesity,] a plaintiff need show only that the employer perceived the employee as having an ‘impairment.'” See id. at 622 (citing RCW 49.60.040(7)) (internal citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). “Unlike in a reasonable accommodation case, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case need not show that they are actually impaired or that the impairment has any actual or potential substantially limiting effect.” Id. at 637 (referencing RCW 49.60.040(7)(d)).

Thus, “if an employer refuses to hire someone because the employer perceives the applicant to have obesity, and the applicant is able to properly perform the job in question, the employer violates … the WLAD.” Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination, perceived obesity is considered a protected class for purposes of failure-to-hire disparate treatment claims.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Vicarious Liability (WA State)

Vicarious Liability (WA State)


Under WA State laws, what is the proper inquiry for vicarious liability within the scope of employment law? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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VICARIOUS LIABILITY

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Vicarious liability is “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004).

Under Washington State law, after “an employee’s underlying tort is established, the employer will be held vicariously liable if ‘the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.'” Robel v. Roundup Corporation*, 148 Wn.2d 35, 53 (Wash. 2002) (citing Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 469, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Washington Employment Law Digest.)

THE PROPER INQUIRY

The proper vicarious-liability inquiry is whether the employee was fulfilling his or her job functions at the time he or she engaged in the injurious conduct. See id. An employer may not insulate itself from vicarious liability merely by adopting a general policy proscribing bad behavior that would otherwise be actionable. Id.

DEFEATING A CLAIM OF VICARIOUS LIBAILITY

“An employer can defeat a claim of vicarious liability by showing that the employee’s conduct was[:]

(1) ‘intentional or criminal’ and

(2) ‘outside the scope of employment.’

Id. (citing Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 56, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)) (paragraph formatting added).

However, intentional or criminal conduct is not per se outside the cope of employment. Id. at 53. Moreover, it is not the case that an employer will be vicariously liable only where it has specifically authorized an employee to act in an intentionally harmful or negligent manner. See id.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our tort-related blog articles:

» Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation

» Negligent Hiring (WA State)

» Negligent Retention (WA State)

» The Tort of Battery

» The Tort of Outrage

» WA State Torts: Public Disclosure of Private Facts


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Noncompetition Covenants (WA State)

Noncompetition Covenants (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, when are employee noncompetition covenants void and unenforceable? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS (WA STATE)

Generally, a noncompetition covenant is “[a] promise , usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” Black’s Law Dictionary 392 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). In Washington State, a “‘[n]oncompetition covenant’ includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” RCW 49.62.010(4)*.

The Washington State Legislature has found both that “workforce mobility is important to economic growth and development[ ]” and that “agreements limiting competition or hiring may be contracts of adhesion** that may be unreasonable.” RCW 49.62.005* (hyperlink added). Washington’s noncompetition covenants law (hereinafter, “law”), RCW 49.62*, took effect on January 1, 2020 and establishes when such noncompetition covenants are void and unenforceable. See RCW 49.62.900*.

WHEN VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE

In Washington State, a noncompetition covenant is considered void and unenforceable against an employee unless certain conditions are met. The relevant law follows:

RCW 49.62.020*

(1) A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an employee:

(a)(i) Unless the employer discloses the terms of the covenant in writing to the prospective employee no later than the time of the acceptance of the offer of employment and, if the agreement becomes enforceable only at a later date due to changes in the employee’s compensation, the employer specifically discloses that the agreement may be enforceable against the employee in the future; or

(ii) If the covenant is entered into after the commencement of employment, unless the employer provides independent consideration for the covenant;

(b) Unless the employee’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement, when annualized, exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year. This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*;

(c) If the employee is terminated as the result of a layoff, unless enforcement of the noncompetition covenant includes compensation equivalent to the employee’s base salary at the time of termination for the period of enforcement minus compensation earned through subsequent employment during the period of enforcement.

(2) A court or arbitrator must presume that any noncompetition covenant with a duration exceeding eighteen months after termination of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. A party seeking enforcement may rebut the presumption by proving by clear and convincing evidence that a duration longer than eighteen months is necessary to protect the party’s business or goodwill.

RCW 49.62.020*.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

The law also protects independent contractors to a certain extent. “A noncompetition covenant is void and unenforceable against an independent contractor unless the independent contractor’s earnings from the party seeking enforcement exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars per year.” RCW 49.62.030* (emphasis added). “This dollar amount must be adjusted annually in accordance with RCW 49.62.040*.” Id. In addition, “[t]he duration of a noncompetition covenant between a performer and a performance space, or a third party scheduling the performer for a performance space, must not exceed three calendar days.” Id.

UNENFORCEABLE COVENANT PROVISIONS

Lastly, the law determines when noncompetition covenant provisions are unenforceable. “A provision in a noncompetition covenant signed by an employee or independent contractor who is Washington-based is void and unenforceable:

(1) If the covenant requires the employee or independent contractor to adjudicate a noncompetition covenant outside of this state; and

(2) To the extent it deprives the employee or independent contractor of the protections or benefits of this chapter[, RCW 49.62*].”

RCW 49.62.050* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).


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OTHER SECTIONS OF THE LAW

There are additional provisions in the law (e.g., Franchisor Restrictions*, Employees Having an Additional Job*, Remedies*, etc.*) that are beyond the scope of this article. For more information, I encourage the reader to review the entire act* — RCW 49.62*.

DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

RCW 49.62.010*

Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) “Earnings” means the compensation reflected on box one of the employee’s United States internal revenue service form W-2 that is paid to an employee over the prior year, or portion thereof for which the employee was employed, annualized and calculated as of the earlier of the date enforcement of the noncompetition covenant is sought or the date of separation from employment. “Earnings” also means payments reported on internal revenue service form 1099-MISC for independent contractors.

(2) “Employee” and “employer” have the same meanings as in RCW 49.17.020*.

(3) “Franchisor” and “franchisee” have the same meanings as in RCW 19.100.010*.

(4) “Noncompetition covenant” includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. A “noncompetition covenant” does not include:

(a) A nonsolicitation agreement;

(b) a confidentiality agreement;

(c) a covenant prohibiting use or disclosure of trade secrets or inventions;

(d) a covenant entered into by a person purchasing or selling the goodwill of a business or otherwise acquiring or disposing of an ownership interest; or

(e) a covenant entered into by a franchisee when the franchise sale complies with RCW 19.100.020(1)*.

(5) “Nonsolicitation agreement” means an agreement between an employer and employee that prohibits solicitation by an employee, upon termination of employment:

(a) Of any employee of the employer to leave the employer; or

(b) of any customer of the employer to cease or reduce the extent to which it is doing business with the employer.

(6) “Party seeking enforcement” means the named plaintiff or claimant in a proceeding to enforce a noncompetition covenant or the defendant in an action for declaratory relief.

RCW 49.62.010* (paragraph formatting, emphasis, and hyperlinks added).

(*This link refers the visitor to an external website: Washington State Legislature: Revised Code of Washington (RCW).)

(**This link refers the visitor to our external website: Williams Law Group Blog.)


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Employment Reference Checks and Verifications (WA State)

Employment Reference Checks and Verifications (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, what are employer limitations when disclosing employee information in response to employment reference checks and verifications? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE CHECKS AND VERIFICATIONS — IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL/CRIMINAL LIABILITY — PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

Under Washington State law, if an employer discloses information to a prospective employer or employment agency concerning a current or former employee–and that disclosure was specifically requested by the prospective employer or employment agency–then the disclosing employer “is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil and criminal liability for such disclosure or its consequences if the disclosed information relates to:

(a) the employee’s ability to perform his or her job;

(b) the diligence, skill, or reliability with which the employee carried out the duties of his or her job; or

(c) any illegal or wrongful act committed by the employee when related to the duties of his or her job.

RCW 4.24.730(1) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

WRITTEN RECORDS

An employer that discloses employee information pursuant to this section (RCW 4.24.730) to a prospective employer or employment agency “should retain a written record of the identity of the person or entity to which information is disclosed under this section for a minimum of two years from the date of disclosure.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).

“The employee or former employee has a right to inspect any such written record upon request and any such written record shall become part of the employee’s personnel file, subject to the provisions of chapter 49.12 RCW.” RCW 4.24.730(2) (emphasis added).

REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

To rebut the presumption of good faith under this section (RCW 4.24.730), there must be “a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the information disclosed by the employer was knowingly false, deliberately misleading, or made with reckless disregard for the truth.” RCW 4.24.730(3) (emphasis added).


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WLAD Statute of Limitations

WLAD Statute of Limitations


Under Washington State laws, what is the statute of limitations for claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD, chapter 49.60 RCW, “is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower[*] complaints.” Washington State Human Rights Commission Official Website, https://www.hum.wa.gov/about-us (last visited 5/3/23).

_____

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Definition

A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.

THE WLAD Statute of Limitations (3 years)

The statute of limitations for commencing* a WLAD lawsuit is 3 years pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(2). See Lewis v. Lockheed Shipbuilding and Const. Co., 36 Wn.App. 607, 676 P.2d 545 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1984). “RCW 4.16.080 provides in relevant part:

Actions limited to three years. Within three years:

* * *

(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated;

Lewis, 36 Wn.App. at 609, 676 P.2d 545 (hyperlink to external website and emphasis added).

_____

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

FURTHER SUPPORT

“Further support for applying the 3-year statute [to the WLAD] is found in the Legislature’s directive that RCW 49.60 be liberally construed.” Id. (citing Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 334, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 103 S.Ct. 730, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash.2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857 (1980)) (hyperlink to external website added).

WARNING

It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for prospective lawsuits and administrative relief.

NOTE: Generally, the jurisdictional time limitation for filing WLAD and Title VII complaints of discrimination through administrative agencies such as the Washington State Human Rights Commission and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), respectively, is much shorter than the statute of limitations for commencing WLAD and/or Title VII lawsuits through court — speak to an attorney to learn more.

Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to use the assistance of legal counsel to determine when the statute of limitations (or jurisdictional time limitation for administrative agencies) begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Illegal Contracts in Washington State

Illegal Contracts in Washington State


Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).

Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties


Under Washington State laws, what are certain functions, powers, and duties of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (“WSHRC”)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): EMPLOYMENT

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Chapter 49.60 RCW, “is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower* complaints.” WSHRC Official Website, last accessed 4/19/23 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (WSHRC): CERTAIN FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND DUTIES

The Washington State Legislature established the WSHRC* in 1949 as “a state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination.” WSHRC Official Website, last accessed 4/19/23. The agency has certain functions, powers, and duties, as follows:

RCW 49.60.120
Certain powers and duties of commission.

The commission shall have the functions, powers, and duties:

(1) To appoint an executive director and chief examiner, and such investigators, examiners, clerks, and other employees and agents as it may deem necessary, fix their compensation within the limitations provided by law, and prescribe their duties.

(2) To obtain upon request and utilize the services of all governmental departments and agencies.

(3) To adopt, amend, and rescind suitable rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and the policies and practices of the commission in connection therewith.

(4) To receive, impartially investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging unfair practices as defined in this chapter.

(5) To issue such publications and results of investigations and research as in its judgment will tend to promote good will and minimize or eliminate discrimination because of sex, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, marital status, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

(6) To make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this chapter and to publish and distribute the reports of such studies.

(7) To cooperate and act jointly or by division of labor with the United States or other states, with other Washington state agencies, commissions, and other government entities, and with political subdivisions of the state of Washington and their respective human rights agencies to carry out the purposes of this chapter. However, the powers which may be exercised by the commission under this subsection permit investigations and complaint dispositions only if the investigations are designed to reveal, or the complaint deals only with, allegations which, if proven, would constitute unfair practices under this chapter. The commission may perform such services for these agencies and be reimbursed therefor.

(8) To foster good relations between minority and majority population groups of the state through seminars, conferences, educational programs, and other intergroup relations activities.

RCW 49.60.120 (emphasis added).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Commission (WLAD)

» Remedies for Breach of Conciliation Agreements**

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC**

» The Washington State Human Rights Commission**

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Damages for Humiliation & Suffering**

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The Local Government Tort-Claim Filing Statute: Guiding Policies

The Local Government Tort-Claim Filing Statute: Guiding Policies


Under Washington State law, what are the guiding policies (i.e., purposes) of the local government tort-claim filing statute? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements.  See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:

RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.

Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.

The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.

(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.

RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT

Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:

RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

…

(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.

The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.

For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.

RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)

GUIDING POLICIES

the CLAIM FILING STATUTE

“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571 (emphasis added).

The TORT CLAIM

“The purpose of … [the tort] claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citing Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)) (emphasis added).


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)


Under Washington State court rules, how do judges generally address a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

Pursuant to the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) may be presented as follows:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

…

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]

CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.”  Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE  MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citing Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, how does a plaintiff establish similarly situated employees for purposes of raising a reasonable inference of discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment is a legal theory that occurs “when an employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of membership in a protected class. See Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App.Div. 2 2013). “To esablish a prima facie* disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)) (hyperlink added).

There are various formulations for the prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Washington State, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (remainder of footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.

REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)

Plaintiff-employees typically use similarly-situated employees (also known as “comparators”) to show that their employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on one or more protected classes. Accordingly, to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, a “[s]imilarly situated employee[ ] must have[:]

[1] the same supervisor,

[2] be subject to the same standards, and

[3] have engaged in the same conduct.

Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 475 n.16, 98 P.3d 827 (2004); see also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (paragraph formatting added).

(NOTE: additional elements are required to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, however this article only addresses the “reasonable inference of discrimination” element.)

EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY

For example, in Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016), Plaintiff-employee Marin worked for King County as an operator at a wastewater treatment plant. Therein, Marin alleged King County unlawfully discriminated against him based on a variety of incidents. In one incident, Marin “did not follow the correct procedure to ‘lock out’ and ‘tag out’ a sewage pump.” Id. at 803. Consequently, Marin’s supervisor, Read, issued Marin a Teach/Lead/Coach memo, or TLC. “A TLC is not discipline, though management may base future discipline on a TLC.” Id. “Read saw it as a basic error for someone with Marin’s experience. Marin perceived Read to be yelling at him and became anxious.” Id. “Marin eventually gave notice he would retire in May 2011.” Id. at 804.

trial court

Thereafter, “Marin sued the County in July 2011[,] alleg[ing] six causes of action: disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate disabilities under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), wrongful discharge, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id.  (footnote omitted). Inter alia, “[t]he trial court dismissed Marin’s disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.” Id. at 801.

court of appeals — division one

Marin appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. See id. at 801. On appeal, Division One, held that Marin failed to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Different Supervisor

“Marin … contended the County treated him differently than a nonprotected employee, … Burton, who also made a lockout error. ” Id at 810. However, the Court found that “[e]ven if Marin had shown Burton’s error to be analogous to his own, Burton is still not a valid comparator because he worked under a different supervisor.” Id. (footnote omitted).

same treatment

The Court then found that “the record does not show that the County treated Marin differently than Burton, who also received a TLC–albeit an oral one–after his error.” Id. It reasoned: “A reasonable employee would not interpret Marin’s TLC as setting ‘impossible or terrifying unique performance standards’ or threatening termination.”

HOLDING

Accordingly, the Court held that “the trial court properly dismissed Marin’s claim of disparate treatment based on protected status.” Id. at 810-11.

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.