WA Courts Archives — LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

September 19, 2024October 21, 2024

Notices of Disqualification

Under Washington State laws and court rules, what are notices of disqualification when engaged in civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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NOTICES OF DISQUALIFICATION — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

The General Law

“Notices of disqualification” concern disqualification of judges during civil litigation. The relevant Washington State law concerning disqualification of judges is, in part, as follows:

Disqualification of judge, transfer to another department, visiting judge—Change of venue generally, criminal cases.

(1) No judge of a superior court of the state of Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding if that judge has been disqualified pursuant to RCW 4.12.050. …

RCW 4.12.040(1) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The Notice of Disqualification — RCW 4.12.050

Thus, pursuant to RCW 4.12.050*, any party to a lawsuit may disqualify a judge of a superior court from hearing a matter–subject to certain limitations–as follows:

Notice of disqualification.

(1) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any action or proceeding in a superior court may disqualify a judge from hearing the matter, subject to these limitations:

(a) Notice of disqualification must be filed and called to the attention of the judge before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the case.

(b) In counties with only one resident judge, the notice of disqualification must be filed not later than the day on which the case is called to be set for trial.

(c) A judge who has been disqualified under this section may decide such issues as the parties agree in writing or on the record in open court.

(d) No party or attorney is permitted to disqualify more than one judge in any matter under this section and RCW 4.12.040*.

(2) Even though they may involve discretion, the following actions by a judge do not cause the loss of the right to file a notice of disqualification against that judge: Arranging the calendar, setting a date for a hearing or trial, ruling on an agreed continuance, issuing an arrest warrant, presiding over criminal preliminary proceedings under CrR 3.2.1*, arraigning the accused, fixing bail, and presiding over juvenile detention and release hearings under JuCR 7.3* and 7.4*.

…

RCW 4.12.050* (emphasis, hyperlinks, and asterisks added).

The Discretionary Ruling Limitation — Timeliness

There are several limitations concerning disqualification of judges. “One limitation is that a notice of disqualification must be filed ‘before the judge has made a discretionary ruling in the case.'” Austin v. King Cnty., 58124-8-II (Wash. App. Jul 02, 2024) (footnote omitted). NOTE:

[The affidavit of prejudice]

“What RCW 4.12.050* calls a ‘notice of disqualification’ is also referred to as an ‘affidavit of prejudice,’ based on previous versions of RCW 4.12.050.”

Austin, 58124-8-II at 3 n.1 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 961-62, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

“In other words, an affidavit of prejudice is timely if it is filed before the superior court judge makes any order or ruling involving discretion.” Id. at 3 (citing Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., 194 Wn.2d 957, 962, 453 P.3d 992 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A Matter of Right if All Requirements Met

“If the requirements of RCW 4.12.050(1)* are met, a party can disqualify the judge presiding over the action as a matter of right.” Id. (citing State v. Gentry, 183 Wn.2d 749, 759, 356 P.3d 714 (2015)) (hyperlink added). “A timely notice of disqualification must be granted.” Id. (citing Godfrey, 194 Wn.2d at 961).

A Question of Law Reviewed De Novo

“Whether a judge has made a discretionary decision under RCW 4.12.050* is a question of law that … [courts] review de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 776, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017)) (hyperlink added).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

August 29, 2024October 21, 2024

Cat’s Paw Theory of Liability (WA State)

In Washington State, what is the cat’s paw theory of liability? Here’s my point of view.

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CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY — SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY

In Washington State, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability is consistent with the law on subordinate bias liability. See Boyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 20, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015). “Under the cat’s paw theory, the animus of a non-decision-maker who has a singular influence may be imputed to the decision-maker.” Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).

THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule is as follows:

[I]f a supervisor* performs an act motivated by … animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.

Id.* at 20 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) (footnote omitted)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and hyperlink added). Note: the term proximate cause is undefined.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

“Under Washington law, in order for the act to be a proximate cause, it must be a substantial factor.” Id.* (citing City of Vancouver v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 180 Wn.App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) (“a complainant seeking to use the subordinate bias theory of liability must show that the subordinate’s animus was a substantial factor in the decision”)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS & CAUSATION

Oftentimes, the employer-defendant under a cat’s paw theory of liability will claim that it conducted an “independent investigation” and found an unrelated basis for the adverse employment actions upon which the plaintiff-employee seeks recourse. In such a case, employers will typically argue that the so-called independent investigation was a supervening cause of any retaliatory animus. Nevertheless: “[A]n independent investigation does not necessarily relieve the employer of liability for an adverse employment action.” Id.* (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).

If the independent investigation “relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability—then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decision maker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.” Id.* at 18. Accordingly, the plaintiff may have a firm basis to argue that a causal connection exists, depending on the evidence. See, e.g., id.*

However: “[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action … then the employer will not be liable.” Id.* at 18 (citing Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1193) (alteration in original).

ORIGINS OF CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY

“The term ‘cat’s paw’ originated in the fable, ‘The Monkey and the Cat,’ by Jean de La Fontaine[:]

As told in the fable, the monkey wanted some chestnuts that were roasting in a fire. Unwilling to burn himself in the fire, the monkey convinced the cat to retrieve the chestnuts for him. As the cat carefully scooped the chestnuts from the fire with his paw, the monkey gobbled them up. By the time the serving wench caught the two thieves, no chestnuts were left for the unhappy cat.

Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Julie M. Covel, The Supreme Court Writes A Fractured Fable of the Cat’s Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital [Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)], 51 Washburn L.J. 159, 159 (2011) (footnotes omitted)) (citation alteration in original).

THE CAT & THE MONKEY

“In the workplace, the cat represents an unbiased decision-maker who disciplines an employee unknowingly due to a supervisor’s bias, represented by the monkey.” Id.* (citing Edward G. Phillips, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: The Cat’s Paw Theory Gets Its Claws Sharpened, 47 Tenn. B.J. June, 2011, at 21).

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress & Supervisors*

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» Suing Supervisors for Discrimination in Washington*

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August 15, 2024October 21, 2024

The Litigation Privilege (WA State)

In Washington State, what is the litigation privilege? Here’s my point of view.

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THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE (WA STATE)

In Washington State, “[t]he ‘litigation privilege’ is a judicially created privilege that protects participants—including attorneys, parties, and witnesses—in a judicial proceeding against civil liability for statements they make in the course of that proceeding.” Young v. Rayan, 27 Wn.App. 2d 500, 533 P.3d 123 (Wash. App. 2023), review denied, 2 Wash.3d 1008 (Wash. 2023) (internal citations omitted).

witness immunity

When applied to witnesses, this privilege is often referred to as “witness immunity.” See id. Under this principle, witnesses in judicial proceedings are generally granted absolute immunity from legal action based on their testimony, provided their statements are related to the litigation at hand. See id. “Statements are absolutely privileged if they are pertinent or material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally sufficient to obtain that relief.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE

However, statements that are unrelated to the litigation do not receive this protection; not every incidental remark made in court will escape liability. See id. But the threshold for determining relevance is not overly stringent: “As the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates, a statement ‘need not be strictly relevant to any issue’ so long as it bears ‘some reference to the subject matter of the … litigation.'” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 586, comment c).

THE GENERAL RULE

Thus, the Litigation Privilege “prohibits liability stemming from statements

(1) made in the course of a judicial proceeding

(2) that are pertinent to the litigation.

Id. “Pertinency is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

THE POLICY

“The purpose of the litigation privilege doctrine is to encourage frank, open, untimorous argument and testimony and to discourage retaliatory, derivative lawsuits.” Id.

ATTORNEYS

“As applied to attorneys, it furthers ‘a public policy of securing to [counsel] as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).

WITNESS TESTIMONY

“As applied to witness testimony, it preserves ‘the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging full and frank testimony.'” Id. (internal citations omitted). “The rule addresses the concern that a witness may either be reluctant to come forward to testify in the first place or shade their testimony ‘to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).

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August 9, 2024October 21, 2024

Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

Under Washington State Court Rules, what is Evidence Rule (ER) 201 — judicial notice of adjudicative facts? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WA STATE COURT RULES — RULES OF EVIDENCE — PURPOSE & CONSTRUCTION

The Washington State Court Rules, Rules of Evidence*, must “be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” ER 102*. The WA State Rules of Evidence addresses, inter alia, judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

Generally, “judicial notice” means “[a] court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact <the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit>. Fed. R. Evid. 201.” Black’s Law Dictionary 863-64 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004).

In Washington State, ER 201* is the relevant rule, and it contains the following topics: (a) the kinds of facts subject to it’s mandate, (b) when notice is discretionary, (c) when notice is mandatory, (d) opportunity to be hard, and (e) timing of the notice. ER 201(a)*.

(a) Kinds of Facts

Under the rule, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either[:]

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

ER 201(b)*.

(b) When Discretionary

The “court MAY take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” ER 201(c)* (emphasis added).

(c) When Mandatory

However, a court MUST “take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” ER 201(d)*.

(d) Opportunity To Be Heard

In any event: “A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.” ER 201(e)*.

(e) Timing of Taking Notice

“Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.” ER 201(f)*.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

May 9, 2024October 21, 2024

Civil Procedure: The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), what is the CR 26(i) conference requirement? Here’s my point of view.

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The CR 26(i) Conference Requirement (WA State)

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules is paramount for the smooth functioning of the legal system and ensuring fairness for all parties involved. One such rule that holds significant importance concerning the discovery process is CR 26(i)*. In this article, I delve into what this rule entails and why it’s crucial for civil attorneys practicing in Washington State to understand and comply with it.

Understanding CR 26(i)

Requirement for Conference of Counsel

CR 26(i)* mandates that before presenting any motion or objection concerning Rules 26 through 37 (Depositions and Discovery) of the Washington State Rules of Superior Court*, counsel for the parties involved must confer with each other. This conference should be arranged at a mutually convenient time and can take place either in person or via telephone.

Good Faith Conferencing

The rule emphasizes the necessity of conducting the conference in good faith. This implies that the parties involved should engage in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving issues or reaching agreements regarding the motion or objection at hand.

Sanctions for Non-Compliance

Should the court determine that counsel for any party has willfully refused or failed to confer in good faith as required by CR 26(i)*, it holds the authority to apply sanctions as outlined under Rule 37(b)*. These sanctions can encompass a range of punitive measures, highlighting the seriousness with which the court views non-compliance with procedural requirements.

Certification Requirement

Importantly, any motion seeking an order to compel discovery or obtain protection must include certification from counsel affirming that the conference requirements of CR 26(i)* have been met. This certification serves as evidence of compliance and ensures transparency in the litigation process.

Importance of Compliance

Compliance with CR 26(i)* is not merely a procedural formality; it serves several crucial purposes:

1. Facilitating Communication

By necessitating conference among counsel, the rule promotes open communication and collaboration between parties. This can often lead to the resolution of disputes without the need for court intervention, thereby saving time and resources.

2. Efficient Case Management

Ensuring that parties engage in pre-motion conferences helps streamline the litigation process. By addressing potential issues early on, the court can better manage its docket and expedite proceedings.

3. Promoting Fairness

The requirement for good-faith conferencing underscores the principle of fairness in litigation. It encourages parties to engage in constructive dialogue and seek mutually acceptable solutions, ultimately promoting equitable outcomes.

4. Enhancing Accountability

The certification requirement adds an extra layer of accountability for counsel, reinforcing the importance of compliance with procedural rules. It acts as a safeguard against frivolous or improper motions, thereby promoting the integrity of the legal process.

Conclusion

In civil litigation in Washington State, adherence to procedural rules like CR 26(i) is indispensable. By mandating pre-motion conferences and ensuring good faith engagement among counsel, this rule serves to foster communication, streamline proceedings, and uphold the principles of fairness and accountability within the legal system. Attorneys practicing in Washington State must familiarize themselves with CR 26(i) and diligently adhere to its requirements to navigate civil litigation successfully. Failure to do so can not only result in sanctions but may also undermine the integrity of the litigation process itself.

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April 25, 2024October 21, 2024

WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

Under Washington State Court Rules, how may litigators utilize WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 (Pretrial Procedure and Formulating Issues)? Here’s my point of view.

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WA State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16: A Guide for Litigators

In the legal arena, rules and procedures govern every aspect of a case, ensuring fairness and efficiency in the pursuit of justice. Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16* is one such crucial guideline that sets the stage for the orderly progression of civil litigation. Understanding CR 16 is essential for attorneys and litigants alike to navigate the complexities of the legal process in Washington State courts effectively.

What is CR 16?

CR 16, short for Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure 16, outlines the requirements and procedures for pretrial conferences and the development of a litigation plan. It serves as a roadmap for streamlining the litigation process, promoting early settlement, and ensuring that cases proceed expeditiously through the court system. The court rule states as follows:

CR 16
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE AND FORMULATING ISSUES

(a) Hearing Matters Considered. By order, or on the motion of any party, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:

(1) The simplification of the issues;

(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;

(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;

(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.

(b) Pretrial Order. The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.

CR 16* (emphasis and hyperlink added).

Key Components of CR 16

1. Pretrial Conferences: CR 16 allows–by order, or on the motion of any party–pretrial conferences to facilitate communication between parties and the court during the litigation process. These conferences aim to identify and narrow the issues in dispute, explore opportunities for settlement, and establish a framework for the efficient resolution of the case.

2. Litigation Plan: One of the central features of CR 16 is the formulation of a litigation plan. This plan outlines the parties’ proposed course of action, including simplifying the issues, amendments to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents, limiting the number of expert witnesses, and any other pertinent matters essential for the progression of the case. The litigation plan helps parties and the court manage expectations and timelines effectively.

3. Pretrial Orders: The court must issue an order documenting the proceedings of the conference, including any amendments permitted to the pleadings and agreements reached by the parties on relevant matters. The order must delineate the issues remaining for trial, excluding those resolved through admissions or agreements of counsel. Once entered, this order governs the subsequent progression of the case unless modified during the trial to prevent clear injustice. Additionally, the court, at its discretion, may institute a pretrial calendar system for cases to undergo similar consideration. This calendar may be limited to either jury or nonjury cases, or expanded to encompass all types of actions.

Benefits of CR 16

1. Efficiency: By promoting early communication and establishing clear guidelines for case management, CR 16 helps expedite the litigation process, reducing delays and unnecessary expenses for all parties involved.

2. Clarity and Predictability: The requirement to develop a litigation plan provides clarity and predictability regarding the progression of the case, enabling parties to allocate resources more effectively and plan their litigation strategies accordingly.

3. Encouragement of Settlement: Through pretrial conferences and the exploration of settlement options, CR 16 encourages parties to resolve their disputes outside of court, potentially saving time, money, and emotional energy associated with protracted litigation.

4. Judicial Oversight: By empowering the court to actively manage the case through case management orders, CR 16 ensures that proceedings are conducted in a fair and orderly manner, with judicial oversight to address any procedural issues that may arise.

Conclusion

Washington State Rule of Civil Procedure CR 16 plays a vital role in promoting efficiency, fairness, and effective case management in civil litigation. By allowing pretrial conferences, formulating litigation plans, and providing for judicial oversight, CR 16 helps streamline the litigation process and facilitates the early resolution of disputes. Attorneys and litigants should familiarize themselves with CR 16’s requirements to navigate the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State courts successfully.

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March 28, 2024October 21, 2024

Employment Law 101: How to Commence a Civil Legal Action

Under Washington State laws and court rules, how does a plaintiff commence a civil legal action (i.e., civil lawsuit)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to an external website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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Introduction

In Washington State civil litigation, the commencement of a legal action is a critical step that sets the stage for the entire legal process. Let’s delve into the key aspects of initiating a civil action as outlined in the state’s rules and statutes. NOTE: this article only addresses commencement in Washington State Superior Courts*.

How to Commence a Civil Legal Action

Except as provided in Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (CR), CR 4.1*, a civil action in Washington State can be commenced in two primary ways:

1. Service of Summons and Complaint:

The action is initiated by serving a copy of a summons along with a copy of the complaint, as outlined in Rule 4* of the state’s legal procedures. This service of documents is a fundamental step in officially notifying the defendant of the legal proceedings against them.

2. Filing a Complaint:

Alternatively, a civil action can also be commenced by directly filing a complaint with the court. This formal submission of the complaint initiates the legal process and sets the case in motion.

See CR 3*.

Timely Response and Filing Fee Requirement

Upon commencing the action, there are specific timelines and requirements that parties must adhere to:

Written Demand for Filing:

If any other party in the case makes a written demand, the plaintiff instituting the action must pay the filing fee and file the summons and complaint within 14 days after service of the demand. Failure to do so renders the service void.

Effect on Statute of Limitations:

It’s important to note that an action is not considered commenced for the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations unless specified otherwise in RCW 4.16.170*. This statute outlines exceptions where the commencement of an action may affect the timeline within which legal actions can be pursued.

Ensuring Legal Compliance and Timely Action

Complying with the rules regarding commencement of civil actions is crucial for all parties involved. It ensures that legal proceedings are initiated in a timely and legally valid manner, preventing potential disputes or challenges regarding the validity of service or commencement.

Conclusion

Initiating a civil action in Washington State involves careful adherence to procedural rules regarding service, filing, and responding to demands. Understanding these rules and timelines is essential for legal practitioners and parties involved in civil litigation, ensuring a smooth and legally compliant commencement of the legal process.

—–

*NOTE: Links with a single asterisk (*) will take the reader away from our website to an external governmental website.

Read Our Related Articles

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Statute of Limitations

» Employment Law 101: The Complaint

» Employment Law 101: The Defendant

» Employment Law 101: The Summons

» Tolling and Commencement Are Reconcilable (WA State)**

» WLAD Statute of Limitations

» WLAD Statute of Limitations: Equitable Tolling

—–

**NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

March 21, 2024October 21, 2024

Employment Law 101: Affirmative Defense

Under Washington State laws, what is an “affirmative defense” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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Definition of Affirmative Defense

In civil litigation under Washington State laws, the concept of affirmative defense plays a crucial role in legal proceedings. An affirmative defense is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant in response to a plaintiff‘s claim. Unlike a denial or a simple assertion that the plaintiff’s allegations are false, an affirmative defense asserts new facts or legal theories that, if proven, would defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims.

examples

One common example of an affirmative defense is the statute of limitations. This defense asserts that even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true, the claim is barred because it was not brought within the time period specified by law. Other affirmative defenses may include, but are not limited to failure to mitigate damages, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and duress, among others.

TIMING

In Washington State, it is essential for defendants to raise affirmative defenses promptly during litigation according to court rules. A defendant’s failure to timely do so can lead to the affirmative defense being forfeited and rendered unusable in subsequent stages of the litigation process.

burden of proof

It’s important to note that the burden of proof for an affirmative defense usually falls on the defendant. This means that the defendant must present evidence and convince the court that the affirmative defense applies to the case and should result in a favorable outcome for the defendant.

Conclusion

In summary, an affirmative defense in Washington State civil litigation is a legal argument or justification presented by the defendant to defeat or mitigate the plaintiff’s claims. It introduces new facts or legal theories that, if proven, can provide a legal basis for the defendant’s position in the case. Understanding affirmative defenses is essential for both plaintiffs and defendants in navigating the complexities of civil litigation in Washington State.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Affirmative and Negative Defenses

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

February 15, 2024October 21, 2024

The Campbell & Gwinn Framework

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Campbell & Gwinn Framework? Here’s my point of view.

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**CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION: THE CAMPBELL & GWINN FRAMEWORK**

A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ambiguous Statutes (WA State)

Washington State courts use the Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 803, 805, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

**The Campbell & Gwinn Framework**

Courts apply the Campbell & Gwinn Framework as follows:

(1) DETERMINE the legislative intent OF the STATUTE

When a Washington State court construes “a statute, … [its] goal is to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Magney, 195 Wash.2d at 803, 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash.2d 571, 581, 311 P.3d 6 (2013); Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

(2) EVALUATE the plain and unambiguous language OF the STATUTE

The court will “start with the plain and unambiguous language of a statute.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4).

(3) if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning

“[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original). “[T]he plain meaning is … derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Id (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

(4) if the statute is ambiguous, then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction

“[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Id. (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4) (alteration in original).

Conclusion

Washington State courts use Campbell & Gwinn Framework to inquire whether a statute is ambiguous. If the interpretation of the statute is clear at first glance, the court is obligated to uphold that straightforward interpretation as reflective of the legislature’s intent. Alternatively, if the statute is determined to be ambiguous–meaning, “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning”–then it is appropriate for the court to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. See id.

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February 8, 2024October 21, 2024

How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, how do courts construe legal privileges? Here’s my point of view.

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HOW COURTS CONSTRUE LEGAL PRIVILEGES (WA STATE)

Generally, a “privilege” is “[a] special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. [ ] A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004).

In Washington State, “[t]here are two types of privileges: common law privileges and statutory privileges. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES: courts have more latitude to interpret

“Common law privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, are those privileges whose codifications are ‘merely declaratory of the common law.'” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)) (emphasis added).

“The court has more latitude to interpret common law privileges.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 815, 259 P.2d 845 (although not specified in the statute codifying the attorney-client privilege, we held that “[t]he same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule (citing State v. Ingels, 4 Wash.2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940))).

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES: courts strictly construe

“In contrast, when a privilege is created by statute and thus is not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly construed.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychologist-client privilege is created by statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed); Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 212-13, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (physician-patient privilege is created by statute and is strictly construed (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979))) (parenthetical emphasis added).

“Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the marital counseling privilege is [also] created by statute and must be strictly construed by interpreting the specific words in the statute that the legislature has codified.” Id. at 802-03 (citing Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 429, 671 P.2d 230).

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, there are common-law privileges and statutory privileges. Common-law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are “declaratory of the common law,” and courts have more freedom to construe them. Whereas statutory privileges such a the psychologist-client privilege, physician-patient privilege, and marital-counseling privilege are considered to be an “exemption from the common law,” and courts must strictly construe them.

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February 1, 2024October 21, 2024

The Implied Cause of Action Rule

Under Washington State laws, what is the Implied Cause of Action Rule? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

(IMPORTANT: This article is for entertainment purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION RULE: WA STATE

Washington State courts may apply the Implied Cause of Action Rule to Washington State statutes that create a right on the part of individuals but do not indicate explicitly an intent to create a remedy. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 921, 784 P.2d 1258, (1990).

a judicial canon of construction

Accordingly, the Implied Cause of Action Rule is a judicial canon directing that “when a statute … [has] provided a right of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to devise a remedy. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55.03 (4th ed. 1973).” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing State v. Manuel, 94 Wash.2d 695, 699, 619 P.2d 977 (1980); see also Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (implying a right of action under the state’s labor relations act for an employee who claimed that his employer, in violation of the statute, had interfered with the employee’s labor activities); State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wash.2d 565, 570, 369 P.2d 844 (1962) (“[c]ourts have consistently held that when a statute gives a new right and no specific remedy, the common law will provide a remedy”)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This judicial canon has its roots in federal law as well as the Restatement of Torts.

NOTE: A judicial canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Federal Law

“The federal courts also recognize an implied cause of action under a statute which provides protection to a specified class of persons but creates no remedy.” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (referencing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); In re WPPSS Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1987)).

THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

The Washington State Supreme Court has found that “The Restatement of Torts recognizes the implied right of action [as well]:

When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.

Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979)) (emphasis added).

THE ELEMENTS

Washington courts have borrowed “from the test used by federal courts in determining whether to imply a cause of action.” Id. Accordingly, the Washington State Implied Right of Action Rule requires that the following issues be answered in the affirmative:

(1) whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose “especial” benefit the statute was enacted;

(2) whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy;

(3) whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.

Id. at 920-21 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

the assumptions

Lastly, the court may make two important assumptions under the Implied Right of Action Rule:

(1) “[t]he [Washington State Legislature] is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action [when it drafts legislation;] and

[(2) the court can] also assume that the legislature would not enact a remedial statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights.”

See id. at 919-20 (paragraph formatting added).

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Legal Theory

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–gw

August 3, 2023October 21, 2024

Self-Serving Declarations (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, must a nonmoving party’s “self-serving” declarations be taken as true on summary judgment in a civil lawsuit? Here’s my point of view.

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT: CIVIL CASES

In my Washington State employment law practice (I only represent employee-plaintiffs), employer-defendants typically file motions for summary judgment against my clients. “Summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another party without a full trial.” See Summary Judgment, Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/summary_judgment (last visited August 3, 2023). “In civil cases, either party may make a pre-trial motion for summary judgment.” Id.

In Washington, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to show sufficient evidence to establish a question of fact as to the existence of an element on which he or she will have the burden of proof at trial.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 569 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (citing Lake Chelan Shores Homeowners Ass’n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 176 Wn.App. 168, 179, 313 P.3d 408 (2013)).

SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS (WA STATE)

When defending against motions for summary judgment, my clients often file declarations that employers claim are “self-serving.” But “on summary judgment a nonmoving party’s declaration must be taken as true and can create a genuine issue of material fact even if it is ‘self-serving.'” Id. at 575 (citing Reagan v. Newton, 7 Wn.App.2d 781, 806, 436 P.3d 411, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1030 (2019)) (emphasis added).

However, “[a] plaintiff cannot contradict unambiguous deposition testimony with a subsequent declaration.” Id. at 587, fn. 3 (citing Robinson v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 106 Wn.App. 104, 121, 22 P.3d 818 (2001)).

CONCLUSION

Thus, under Washington State laws, I believe that a nonmoving party’s “self-serving” declaration must be taken as true on summary judgment of a civil lawsuit unless it contradicts unambiguous deposition testimony.

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May 4, 2023October 21, 2024

WLAD Statute of Limitations: Equitable Tolling

Under Washington State law, what must a civil plaintiff demonstrate to obtain equitable tolling of the statute of limitations when pursuing a Washington Law Against Discrimination (hereinafter, “WLAD”) claim? Here’s my point of view.

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WLAD STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: EQUITABLE TOLLING

THE WLAD

The WLAD, chapter 49.60 RCW, “is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower[*] complaints.” Washington State Human Rights Commission Official Website, https://www.hum.wa.gov/about-us (last visited 5/3/23).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.

“In Fowler v. Guerin, our [Washington State] Supreme Court explained that ‘statutes of limitation reflect the importance of finality and settled expectations in our civil justice system.'” Campeau v. Yakima HMA LLC, 38152-8-III (Wash. App. May 02, 2023) (citing Fowler v. Guerin, 200 Wn.2d 110, 118, 515 P.3d 502 (2022)). Accordingly, “[a] statutory time bar is a legislative declaration of public policy which the courts can do no less than respect, with rare equitable exceptions.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 118, 515 P.3d 502) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

eQUITABLE TOLLING (WA state): tHE MILLAY STANDARD

“In civil cases, Washington has consistently required a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations to demonstrate [the following:]

(1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence,

(2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception interfered with the plaintiff’s timely filing,

(3) tolling is consistent with

(a) the purpose of the underlying statute and

(b) the purpose of the statute of limitations, and

(4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations.

Campeau, 38152-8-III (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 125, 515 P.3d 502 (“describing the four predicates as the Millay standard[, Millay v. Cam, 135 Wn.2d 193, 955 P.2d 791 (1988)]”)) (emphasis added).

However, Washington courts have “cautioned against broadly applying equitable tolling in a manner that would substitute for a positive rule established by the legislature a variable rule of decision based upon individual ideas of justice.” Id. (citing Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 119, 515 P.3d 502) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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April 27, 2023October 21, 2024

Illegal Contracts in Washington State

Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.

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ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).

Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.

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March 23, 2023October 21, 2024

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Under Washington State court rules, how do judges generally address a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

Pursuant to the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) may be presented as follows:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

…

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]

CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.” Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citing Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).

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February 16, 2023October 21, 2024

Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of administrative-agency interpretations? Here’s my point of view.

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THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

According to the canon of administrative-agency interpretations:

Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight.

Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 177, 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) (“[The Washington Law Against Discrimination,] RCW 49.60[,] does not define ‘handicap’; deference is given by court to Human Rights Commission administrative rule defining ‘handicap'”).

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-gw

August 4, 2022October 21, 2024

Effective Date for Constructive Discharge (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, when is the effective date for a constructive discharge? Here’s my point of view.

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CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE (OBJECTIVE STANDARD)

“To establish constructive discharge, an employee must show that an employer engaged in a deliberate act, or a pattern of conduct, that made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 174 Wn.App. 475, 485 (Div. 2 2013) (citing Sneed v. Barna, 80 Wn.App. 843, 849-50, 912 P.2d 1035, review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1023, 919 P.2d 600 (1996)).

“This is an objective standard and an employee’s subjective belief that he had no choice but to resign is irrelevant.” Id. (citing Travis v. Tacoma Pub. Sch. Dist., 120 Wn.App. 542, 551, 85 P.3d 959 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

EFFECTIVE DATE

“A constructive discharge becomes effective on either[:]

[1] the date the employee gives notice to the employer or

[2] the last day of actual employment.

Id. at 486-87 (referencing Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 58 Wn.App. 824, 795 P.2d 162 (1990), aff’d, 117 Wn.2d 805, 816 n. 9, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991)) (paragraph formatting added).

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Constructive Discharge In WA State**

» WLAD & The Constructive Discharge Provision**

» Wrongful Termination

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July 28, 2022October 21, 2024

Overcoming Stare Decisis (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, how does one overcome the doctrine of stare decisis? Here’s my point of view.

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THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS

The doctrine of stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 756, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is a “doctrine developed by courts to accomplish the requisite element of stability in court-made law, but is not an absolute impediment to change.” State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d 673, 678, 374 P.3d 1108 (2016) (citing In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court will typically consider a party’s request for it to reject its prior decision when it’s based upon either one or both of the following two approaches: (1) clear showing; and (2) intervening authority. See State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

1. The Clear-Showing Approach

The clear-showing approach is far more common than the intervening-authority approach, and it requires the requesting party to clearly show the following:

a. That the established rule is incorrect; and

b. That the established rule is harmful.

See id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

2. The Intervening-Authority Approach

The intervening-authority approach is relatively rare. The requesting party essentially asks the court to “eschew prior precedent in deference to intervening authority where the legal underpinnings of … [the court’s] precedent have changed or disappeared altogether.” See id. (citing W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. P. Nw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 180 Wn.2d 54, 66, 322 P.3d 1207 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

FRAMING THE ISSUE

When a party asks the Washington State Supreme Court to reject its prior decision, “it is an invitation … [it] … [does] not take lightly.” Id. (citing State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 863, 248 P.3d 494 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the court, the issue is framed as follows:

The question is not whether we would make the same decision if the issue presented were a matter of first impression. Instead, the question is whether the prior decision is so problematic that it must be rejected, despite the many benefits of adhering to precedent–” ‘promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'”

Otton, 185 Wn.2d at 678 (citing Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 831, 935 P.2d 588 (1997)) (internal citation omitted) (alteration to original) (emphasis added).

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December 30, 2021October 21, 2024

Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of a total harmonious statutory scheme? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

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THE CANON OF HARMONIOUS STATUTORY SCHEME

According to the Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme:

Where possible, statutes should be read together to determine the legislative purpose and to achieve a total harmonious statutory scheme.

Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 119 (Wash. 1996) (citing King County Fire Protection Dist., No. 16 v. Housing Auth., 123 Wash.2d 819, 826-27, 872 P.2d 516 (1994)). In addition:

The meaning of ambiguous statutes must be determined by examining the statutory scheme as a whole, and legislative history may serve as an important tool in divining legislative intent.

Id. (citing In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., 127 Wash.2d 774, 778, 903 P.2d 443 (1995)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

October 28, 2021October 21, 2024

The Absence of Implementing Rules

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the rule regarding absence of implementing rules? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING RULES: COURTS GIVE EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT

In Washington State, agencies are often authorized to promulgate implementing rules for associated statutes. However, issues can arise where agencies fail to enact such rules.

“[W]ith or without recourse to implementing rules, … court[s] must interpret … [Washington statutes] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 496, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014).

WHEN SILENCE MEANS SOMETHING MORE

“It is certainly true that an administrative agency’s silence must be deemed significant where it admits of only one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 494 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For example, “where [an] agency historically engaged in comprehensive regulation of certain industry practices, the agency’s silence regarding an affirmative defense based on a violation of those regulations was deemed significant[.]” Id. at 514 n.20 (referencing S. P. Transp. Co. v. Commercial metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 345, 102 S.Ct. 1815, 72 L.Ed. 2d 114 (1982)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

September 19, 2021October 21, 2024

Canon of Presumed Awareness

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of presumed awareness? Here’s my point of view.

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THE CANON OF PRESUMED AWARENESS

Under the canon of presumed awareness: “The Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretation of its statutes.” Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Company, 129 Wn.2d 572, 581 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (reasoning that the Washington State Legislature “clearly understood it was adopting exemplary damages as part of Washington’s antidiscrimination law when it amended RCW 49.60.030(2) in 1993 and 1995.” (citing Friends of Snoqualmie Valley v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 118 Wash.2d 488, 496, 825 P.2d 300 (1992))).

In Dailey, the majority opinion essentially held that punitive damages are not available for employment discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, because the legislature has not expressly authorized them. See id at 574-75.

Read our related article entitled Presumption of Acquiescence concerning a similar Washington State canon of statutory construction.

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June 27, 2021October 20, 2024

The Canon of Statutory Parallelism

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is statutory parallelism? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE CANON OF STATUTORY PARALLELISM

Statutory parallelism is a term that I’ve coined for the following assumption commonly held by Washington State courts:

[W]hen the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout.

Certification From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Zhu v. North Central ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504, 509 (Wash. 2017) (citing Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972)).

EXAMPLE: CERT. FROM U.S. DIST. CT. FOR EAST DIST. OF WA IN ZHU v. NORTH CENTRAL ESD 171

In Zhu, the WA State Supreme Court decided that the Washington Law Against Discrimination (i.e., RCW 49.60.210(1)) creates “a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer[.]”

This was an issue of first impression. As part of its decision, the WA Court evaluated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) definition of the term “employer.” In so doing, the Court concluded:

For purposes of WLAD, an ’employer’ is broadly defined as ‘any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit. . . .

This definition clearly includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates that ‘any employer’ means something different for purposes of the antiretaliation statute than it does for the purposes of the rest of WLAD. See Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (we assume that when the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout).

Zhu Cert., 404 P.3d at 509 (emphasis added).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

June 27, 2021October 20, 2024

Washington Priority of Action Rule: Same Relief

Under the Washington Priority of Action Rule, how do Washington State courts determine if the relief is the same? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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PRIORITY OF ACTION RULE

The Washington Priority of Action Rule (Rule) will only apply if the two relevant cases involve identical (1) subject matter, (2) parties, and (3) relief. Am. Mobile Homes of Wash. Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990).

These factors must be established before the Rule should be applied. Id. The identity of the above elements must be such that a decision in one tribunal would bar proceedings in the other because of res judicata. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Foundation v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 111 Wn.App. 586, 607, 49 P.3d 894 (Div. 2 2002).

If the Rule applies, the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved. Am. Mobile Home, 115 Wn.2d at 316-17.

ELEMENT #3: IDENTICAL RELIEF

The Washington State Supreme Court has established the following factors to determine if “the relief is the same” for purposes of the Washington Priority of Action Rule:

(1) whether the form of relief available to each tribunal is the same (FORM OF RELIEF); and

(2) whether the first tribunal can resort to another to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available between the first and second lawsuits (EQUALIZE DISPARITY)?

See, State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found., 111 Wn. App. at 607, 49 (holding that the remedy was the same in both suits, because the type of relief available to both courts was the same, and because the administrative agency could otherwise seek relief in superior court in the first case to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available in the administrative tribunal).

EXAMPLE: EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUND v. WASHINGTON EDUC. ASS’N

In Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, plaintiff attempted to amend its citizens lawsuit in superior court by adding claims that were contemporaneously being pursued by an administrative agency with statutory authority to preempt plaintiffs’ lawsuit; plaintiff sought, inter alia, the same form of remedy (i.e., a fine) as the administrative agency based on the same statute.

The court ruled that the relief was the same in both actions and upheld the trial court’s application of the priority of action rule, because the relief in both cases was a monetary fine pursuant to RCW 42.17.395(4), and because any disparity in the amount of relief available could be eliminated if the administrative tribunal ushered the claim to superior court.

The court then analyzed res judicata and concluded jurisdiction in the second court was improper under Washington Priority of Action Rule. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ., 111 Wn. App. 586, 49 P.3d 894 (2002).

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Behind Closed Doors: WLAD & ESD Appeals

Under Washington State law, may an employment discrimination plaintiff use favorable findings from a previous unemployment benefits appeal against the associated defendant employer, when pursuing a claim under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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A COMMON ISSUE

Occasionally, one of my employment discrimination clients will vigorously attempt to convince me that they received favorable findings against their employer during their unemployment benefits appeal conducted through the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings; and that the findings will help them win their subsequent discrimination lawsuit under WLAD. Unfortunately, I usually have bad news for those clients.

Stated differently, the issue is whether findings made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing may be admitted in a separate employment discrimination lawsuit outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer?

WA STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT

The Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD) was created in 1939. Its mission is to “partner to connect employers and job seekers – supporting transitions to new jobs and empowering careers.”

If an individual applies for unemployment benefits through the ESD and is denied; then the individual can request an appeal. In that case, the ESD will forward the appeal to the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) which is not part of the ESD. The OAH will then assign an administrative law judge to hear the case.

TITLE 50 RCW

The Washington State laws relating to the ESD are contained in Title 50 RCW, and the relevant law states as follows:

Any finding, determination, conclusion, declaration, or final order made by the commissioner, or his or her representative or delegate, or by an appeal tribunal, administrative law judge, reviewing officer, or other agent of the department for the purposes of Title 50 RCW, shall not be conclusive, nor binding, nor admissible as evidence in any separate action outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts or was reviewed pursuant to RCW 50.32.120.

RCW 50.32.097 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

CONCLUSION

Findings made by an administrative law judge during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing are generally not admissible in a subsequent WLAD employment discrimination lawsuit (before an arbitrator, court, or judge) outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between the employee and the employee’s present or prior employer.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

WLAD Civil Suits & Administrative Actions

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), may plaintiffs bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

“Washington’s law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, is a broad remedial statute, the purpose of which is to eliminate and prevent discrimination on the basis of” specific protected classes. Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries, 143 Wn.App. 832, 181 P.3d 843 (Wash.App. Div. 3 3008) (citing RCW 49.60.010).

THE CIVIL SUIT REQUIREMENT

“[WLAD] declares that the right to be free from such discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil action by members of the enumerated protected classes.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.030(1), (2)) (emphasis added).

The issue is whether an administrative proceeding is considered a civil action for purposes of WLAD claims. The Washington State Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries. Id.

EXAMPLE: RHOADES v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES

In Rhoades, plaintiff Tammy Rhoades “filed a claim with the Department [of Labor and Industries] after she was injured in the course of employment[.]” Rhoades, 143 Wn.App. at 836. “The Department awarded her a permanent partial disability benefit.” Id. She appealed, and “in March 2001, the Department determined that Ms. Rhoades was totally disabled and she was placed on the pension rolls.” Id. “The Department affirmed this order after reconsideration in September 2002.” Id.

However, “Ms. Rhoades disagreed with the Department’s calculation of her monthly pension amount [and] appealed the September 2002 pension order to the Board of Industrial Appeals (Board).” Id. In 2004, “the Board found that the Department’s September 2002 order was correct” except for a small interest calculation. Id. at 837.

Plaintiff Rhoades “appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board’s order.” Id. She then appealed to Division 3 of the Washington State Court of Appeals wherein she included, inter alia, a claim that the Department violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Id. at 835-36. The court of appeals found that “an administrative action and appeal is an inappropriate vehicle for” claims under RCW 49.60. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). “[A] civil suit is required.” Id.

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), plaintiffs cannot bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Courts for WLAD Claims

Depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff may have a choice of litigating their Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) case in one of several different courts. Here are my top 3 courts for litigating WLAD claims (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney in Washington State):

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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#3 – UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

United States District Courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; this is known as federal question jurisdiction. It is not uncommon for Plaintiffs to bring claims in the same lawsuit under both WLAD and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) — or other federal anti-discrimination laws (e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 1981, etc.). Depending on the circumstances of each case, adding the Title VII claims may give U.S. District Courts original federal-question jurisdiction over the matter.

U.S. District Courts also have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between, inter alia, citizens of different States; this is known as diversity jurisdiction. Again, depending on the circumstances of each case, WLAD plaintiffs that initially sue employers–incorporated outside of Washington State–in state court may end up in U.S. District Court based on diversity jurisdiction.

#2 – WASHINGTON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

Washington State District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. For civil (employment discrimination) matters, this means that the court will have jurisdiction over the matter if, for each claimant, the value of the claim or the amount at issue does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees (check the Revised Code of Washington for current dollar amounts). Thus, this court may also be a viable option for a WLAD plaintiff if the value of the case is appropriate.

#1 – WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURTS

Washington State Superior Courts are courts of general jurisdiction; typically, there is no maximum or minimum dollar amount that must be at issue. And, unlike U.S. District Courts, a unanimous jury is not required in order to render a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. Superior courts are commonly used by plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring WLAD claims.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

June 3, 2021October 20, 2024

Inadvertent Waiver of Res Judicata

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, how is the inadvertent waiver of the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and claim splitting addressed? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Washington State Supreme Court developed two relevant tests to determine whether a waiver of affirmative defenses has occurred:

(1) waiver based on civil rules; and

(2) common law waiver.

Compare, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) (explaining waiver pursuant to civil rules), with Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc., 163 Wn.2d 236, 178 P.3d 981 (2008) (explaining common law doctrine of waiver).

It is not uncommon for defendant-employers in employment discrimination cases to inadvertently waive the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and/or claim splitting under the civil rules (this article does not address common law waiver).

WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES: RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING

Under CR 8(c), res judicata is listed as an affirmative defense and must be specifically pled. See, e.g., Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 422, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1981) (holding “failure of consideration” is an affirmative defense under CR 8(c) and must be specifically pled).

Particularly, in order for res judicata to have a preclusive effect, the second court must be advised of the prior proceeding, and the burden of pleading “res judicata” is listed among the affirmative defenses. See, Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 812 (1985) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Moreover, although CR 8(c) specifically delineates 20 affirmative defenses, parties must also affirmatively plead “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 575, 166 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2007). Thus, “claim splitting” and “priority of action” must also be specifically pled as affirmative defenses.

If specific defenses are not (1) affirmatively pled, (2) asserted with a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they will be deemed to have been waived and may not thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case. Rainier Nat. Bank, 30 Wn.App. at 422 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976))(emphasis added).

This affirmative defense requirement will not be abrogated where it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

EXAMPLE: RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS

For example, in Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, the plaintiff-bank brought an action to recover funds from a default loan guaranteed by defendants, and defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of “failure of consideration” for the first time at summary judgment; the court held that defendants failed to specifically plead the affirmative defense “failure of consideration” in their answer and it was therefore waived. Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div 1 1981) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, or claim splitting may be inadvertently waived if not properly plead.

An employment discrimination plaintiff facing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon defenses of priority of action rule, claim splitting, and/or res judicata would be wise to evaluate whether the defendant has properly asserted such affirmative defenses at the beginning of the case in their responsive pleading; there might be a strong argument for waiver based on the civil rules. I have successfully made this argument on multiple occasions against defendant-employers at summary judgment.