LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

April 27, 2023October 21, 2024

Illegal Contracts in Washington State

Under Washington State law, are illegal contracts enforceable when they are in conflict with a statutory law? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

Advertisement

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

“A contract that is in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.” Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social and Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (Medicaid reimbursement schedules promulgated in violation of statutory requirements were void and unenforceable).

Accordingly, where “a contract is illegal or grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal contract, Washington courts leave the parties to the contract where they find them.” State v. Pelkey, 58 Wn.App. 610, 615, 794 P.2d 1286 (Div. 1 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “as a general rule, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

For example, in State v. Pelkey, a criminal defendant allegedly attempted to bribe a city police officer by giving him goods and money to be kept appraised of vice surveillance; however, Pelkey’s criminal case was ultimately dismissed, and Pelkey sought return of said goods and money. Id. at 611-12. The City argued that the property did not have to be returned, because no seizure had occurred and Pelkey filed his motion in the wrong court. The court refused to honor the parties’ so-called contractual agreement, leaving them as the court found them, after reasoning that a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment [i.e., bribery] is illegal and unenforceable. See id.

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, a contract that is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and unenforceable.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

April 20, 2023October 21, 2024

WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

Under Washington State laws, what are certain functions, powers, and duties of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (“WSHRC”)? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): EMPLOYMENT

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Chapter 49.60 RCW, “is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower* complaints.” WSHRC Official Website, last accessed 4/19/23 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (WSHRC): CERTAIN FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND DUTIES

The Washington State Legislature established the WSHRC* in 1949 as “a state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination.” WSHRC Official Website, last accessed 4/19/23. The agency has certain functions, powers, and duties, as follows:

RCW 49.60.120

Certain powers and duties of commission.

The commission shall have the functions, powers, and duties:

(1) To appoint an executive director and chief examiner, and such investigators, examiners, clerks, and other employees and agents as it may deem necessary, fix their compensation within the limitations provided by law, and prescribe their duties.

(2) To obtain upon request and utilize the services of all governmental departments and agencies.

(3) To adopt, amend, and rescind suitable rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and the policies and practices of the commission in connection therewith.

(4) To receive, impartially investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging unfair practices as defined in this chapter.

(5) To issue such publications and results of investigations and research as in its judgment will tend to promote good will and minimize or eliminate discrimination because of sex, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, marital status, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

(6) To make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this chapter and to publish and distribute the reports of such studies.

(7) To cooperate and act jointly or by division of labor with the United States or other states, with other Washington state agencies, commissions, and other government entities, and with political subdivisions of the state of Washington and their respective human rights agencies to carry out the purposes of this chapter. However, the powers which may be exercised by the commission under this subsection permit investigations and complaint dispositions only if the investigations are designed to reveal, or the complaint deals only with, allegations which, if proven, would constitute unfair practices under this chapter. The commission may perform such services for these agencies and be reimbursed therefor.

(8) To foster good relations between minority and majority population groups of the state through seminars, conferences, educational programs, and other intergroup relations activities.

RCW 49.60.120 (emphasis added).

* (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Commission (WLAD)

» Remedies for Breach of Conciliation Agreements**

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC**

» The Washington State Human Rights Commission**

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Damages for Humiliation & Suffering**

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

LEARN MORE

April 13, 2023November 27, 2024

The Local Government Tort-Claim Filing Statute: Guiding Policies

Under Washington State law, what are the guiding policies (i.e., purposes) of the local government tort-claim filing statute? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. Prospective plaintiffs intending to pursue tort claims against a Washington State local-governmental entity are required to conform to certain statutory requirements. See RCW 4.96. The relevant law states as follows:

RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

(1) All local governmental entities, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct, or the tortious conduct of their past or present officers, employees, or volunteers while performing or in good faith purporting to perform their official duties, to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation.

Filing a claim for damages within the time allowed by law shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action claiming damages.

The laws specifying the content for such claims shall be liberally construed so that substantial compliance therewith will be deemed satisfactory.

(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, for the purposes of this chapter, “local governmental entity” means a county, city, town, special district, municipal corporation as defined in RCW 39.50.010, quasi-municipal corporation, any joint municipal utility services authority, any entity created by public agencies under RCW 39.34.030, or public hospital.

(3) For the purposes of this chapter, “volunteer” is defined according to RCW 51.12.035.

RCW 4.96.010 (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT

Thus, a “local government entity is liable for damages arising from its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” Renner v. City of Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571, 168 Wash.2d 540 (Wash. 2010) (citing RCW 4.96.010(1)). “However, prospective plaintiffs must file a tort claim with the local government at least 60 days prior to filing a lawsuit.” Id. The relevant law is as follows:

RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

…

(4) No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any local governmental entity’s officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof.

The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period.

For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.

RCW 4.96.020(4) (paragraph formatting and emphasis added).

(IMPORTANT: There are additional filing requirements (e.g., access to standard forms, content, delivery, etc.) that will not be discussed in this article for the sake of brevity. Failure to conform to these additional requirements could result in severe consequences during litigation. The reader is strongly encouraged to both seek legal counsel and refer to RCW 4.96 for more information.)

GUIDING POLICIES

the CLAIM FILING STATUTE

“The claim filing statute is intended to provide local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general information about the claim.” Renner, 230 P.3d at 571 (emphasis added).

The TORT CLAIM

“The purpose of … [the tort] claim is ‘to allow government entities time to investigate, evaluate, and settle claims’ before they are sued.” Id (citing Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 147 Wash.2d 303, 310, 53 P.3d 993 (2002)) (emphasis added).

LEARN MORE

April 6, 2023October 21, 2024

The Tort of Outrage

Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

**THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)**

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and

(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.

Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (footnote omitted).

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

“Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:

Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.

Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (internal citations omitted). However, this tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. Lastly, objective symptomatology is not required to establish the tort of outrage.

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

LEARN MORE

March 30, 2023October 21, 2024

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).

CONCLUSION

If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).

LEARN MORE

March 23, 2023October 21, 2024

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Under Washington State court rules, how do judges generally address a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

Pursuant to the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) may be presented as follows:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

…

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]

CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.” Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citing Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).

LEARN MORE

March 16, 2023October 21, 2024

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, how does a plaintiff establish similarly situated employees for purposes of raising a reasonable inference of discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment is a legal theory that occurs “when an employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of membership in a protected class. See Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App.Div. 2 2013). “To esablish a prima facie* disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)) (hyperlink added).

There are various formulations for the prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Washington State, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (remainder of footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.

REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)

Plaintiff-employees typically use similarly-situated employees (also known as “comparators”) to show that their employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on one or more protected classes. Accordingly, to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, a “[s]imilarly situated employee[ ] must have[:]

[1] the same supervisor,

[2] be subject to the same standards, and

[3] have engaged in the same conduct.

Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 475 n.16, 98 P.3d 827 (2004); see also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (paragraph formatting added).

(NOTE: additional elements are required to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, however this article only addresses the “reasonable inference of discrimination” element.)

EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY

For example, in Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016), Plaintiff-employee Marin worked for King County as an operator at a wastewater treatment plant. Therein, Marin alleged King County unlawfully discriminated against him based on a variety of incidents. In one incident, Marin “did not follow the correct procedure to ‘lock out’ and ‘tag out’ a sewage pump.” Id. at 803. Consequently, Marin’s supervisor, Read, issued Marin a Teach/Lead/Coach memo, or TLC. “A TLC is not discipline, though management may base future discipline on a TLC.” Id. “Read saw it as a basic error for someone with Marin’s experience. Marin perceived Read to be yelling at him and became anxious.” Id. “Marin eventually gave notice he would retire in May 2011.” Id. at 804.

trial court

Thereafter, “Marin sued the County in July 2011[,] alleg[ing] six causes of action: disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate disabilities under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), wrongful discharge, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (footnote omitted). Inter alia, “[t]he trial court dismissed Marin’s disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.” Id. at 801.

court of appeals — division one

Marin appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. See id. at 801. On appeal, Division One, held that Marin failed to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Different Supervisor

“Marin … contended the County treated him differently than a nonprotected employee, … Burton, who also made a lockout error. ” Id at 810. However, the Court found that “[e]ven if Marin had shown Burton’s error to be analogous to his own, Burton is still not a valid comparator because he worked under a different supervisor.” Id. (footnote omitted).

same treatment

The Court then found that “the record does not show that the County treated Marin differently than Burton, who also received a TLC–albeit an oral one–after his error.” Id. It reasoned: “A reasonable employee would not interpret Marin’s TLC as setting ‘impossible or terrifying unique performance standards’ or threatening termination.”

HOLDING

Accordingly, the Court held that “the trial court properly dismissed Marin’s claim of disparate treatment based on protected status.” Id. at 810-11.

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

LEARN MORE

February 16, 2023October 21, 2024

Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of administrative-agency interpretations? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

According to the canon of administrative-agency interpretations:

Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight.

Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 177, 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) (“[The Washington Law Against Discrimination,] RCW 49.60[,] does not define ‘handicap’; deference is given by court to Human Rights Commission administrative rule defining ‘handicap'”).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

January 13, 2023November 27, 2025

WSHRC: Findings

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning findings? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

Advertisement

Understanding WAC 162-08-098: Findings in Human Rights Commission Investigations

When the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) investigates a discrimination complaint, its ultimate goal is to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair practice has occurred. WAC 162-08-098* outlines how the Commission formalizes those determinations through official findings, which serve as a critical turning point in the complaint process.

Purpose of the Findings Document

Every investigation concludes with a written findings document containing two key elements:

1. Findings of fact — A summary of what the investigation determined actually occurred, based on evidence gathered.

2. Ultimate finding — A formal conclusion stating whether there is:

• Reasonable cause to believe discrimination or another unfair practice has occurred,

• No reasonable cause, or

• A jurisdictional finding, as discussed below.

This document provides transparency and structure, ensuring that both parties understand the Commission’s basis for its conclusions.

Jurisdictional Findings

Sometimes, the facts reveal that the matter is not within the Commission’s jurisdiction—for example, if the complaint involves a federal agency or an employer too small to be covered under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). In such cases, the Commission issues a finding of “no jurisdiction.”

In extraordinary circumstances, even when the Commission technically has jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise it for overriding reasons of law or policy. A rare example is when the complaint is filed against the Commission itself, which would create a conflict of interest. In these situations, the ultimate finding is “jurisdiction declined.”

Scope of a “Reasonable Cause” Finding

When the Commission finds reasonable cause, it must specify:

• The specific unfair practice found (such as discriminatory discharge or housing denial),

• The individual(s) affected, and

• If applicable, the class of persons impacted.

This level of detail ensures that remedial efforts—such as conciliation or negotiated settlements—address the actual harm uncovered during investigation.

Commissioner Involvement and Actions

Findings of no reasonable cause are reported to the Commissioners at a meeting and become official unless the Commissioners vote to set them aside.

Findings of reasonable cause empower Commission staff to pursue conciliation efforts—attempting to resolve the matter voluntarily through dialogue and agreement.

Proposed findings of “no jurisdiction” or “jurisdiction declined” require formal approval by the Commissioners through a vote at a meeting.

The Legal Effect of Findings

Importantly, a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause is not a legal adjudication. It does not determine whether discrimination actually occurred in the legal sense—it merely reflects the Commission’s administrative conclusion based on its investigation.

Implications

WAC 162-08-098 ensures that the Human Rights Commission’s processes remain fair, consistent, and transparent. By clearly defining how and when findings are made—and distinguishing investigative conclusions from legal determinations—the rule protects the integrity of both complainants’ and respondents’ rights. It also reinforces the Commission’s role as a neutral fact-finder, dedicated to resolving discrimination claims efficiently while maintaining public trust in the enforcement of Washington’s anti-discrimination laws.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

» WSHRC: Withdrawal of Complaint

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

January 12, 2023October 21, 2024

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Under federal laws, how does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protect employees against employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

Advertisement

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) is a crucial federal law that protects certain individuals (including employees) against certain types of discrimination and retaliation; it also safeguards certain types of accommodations.

Discrimination & protected classes

Title VII outlaws discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity). The law “also makes it unlawful to use policies or practices that seem neutral but have the effect of discriminating against people because of their race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or national origin.” U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23).

AGE & DISABILITY: Other federal laws protect against age discrimination (i.e., Age Discrimination in Employment Act or “ADEA”) and disability discrimination (i.e., Americans with Disabilities Act or “ADA”). However, this article will address solely Title VII.

Retaliation

Retaliation against an individual who has reported discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or taken part in an employment discrimination investigation or litigation is likewise prohibited by Title VII.

Reasonable Accommodations

Lastly, applicants’ and employees’ genuinely held religious practices must be reasonably accommodated by employers under the legislation, unless doing so would put an undue burden on the employer‘s ability to conduct business.

READ THE LAW

Read all Title VII provisions to learn more. The link will take the reader to an external website — Cornell Law School (Legal Information Institute).

THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Chapter 49.60 RCW, is distinct and separate from Title VII. The WLAD is a much broader state law that also protects against discrimination. Particularly:

[The Washington Law Against Discrimination, ]Chapter 49.60 RCW[,] is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower* complaints.

Washington State Human Rights Commission Website, About Us (last visited 1/10/23) (emphasis added) (hyperlinks and asterisks added). Learn more about the WLAD by visiting the Washington State Human Rights Commission Website.

(*The “whistleblower” link refers the visitor to our external website: Williams Law Group Blog.)

SCOPE OF TITLE VII

Title VII applies to certain employers (both private and public with 15 or more employees), employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs and makes it “unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:

• Hiring and firing;
• Compensation, assignment, or classification of workers;
• Transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;
• Job advertisements and recruitment;
• Testing;
• Use of employer facilities;
• Training and apprenticeship programs;
• Retirement plans, leave, and benefits; or
• Other terms and conditions of employment.

U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23).

Advertisement

ADDITIONAL EMPLOYER PROHIBITIONS

Title VII also prohibits employers from engaging in the following activities:

Under Title VII, employers also cannot:

→ Harass an employee because of race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin;

→ Refuse or fail to make reasonable adjustments to workplace policies or practices that allow individual workers to observe their sincerely held religious beliefs;

→ Make employment decisions based on stereotypes or assumptions about a person’s abilities, traits, or performance because of their race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin;

→ Deny job opportunities because a person is married to, or associated with, a person of a particular race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin.

U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23) (hyperlink added).

THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)

Additional federal laws prohibit employment discrimination based on age, disability, and genetic information. “The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” U.S. E.E.O.C. Website, Overview (last visited 1/10/23).

Learn more about filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC by visiting their official website.

We invite you to read more of our related blog articles:

» EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue

» Fair Employment Practice Agencies

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC*

» Unlawful Employment Agency Practices (Title VII)

» Washington Law Against Discrimination is Potent*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

need help?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON STATE

EXAMPLE: STATE v. PELKEY

CONCLUSION

LEARN MORE

WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): EMPLOYMENT

WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (WSHRC): CERTAIN FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND DUTIES

RCW 49.60.120

Certain powers and duties of commission.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

LEARN MORE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT-CLAIM FILING STATUTE

RCW 4.96.010 Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

THE 60-DAY REQUIREMENT

RCW 4.96.020 Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

GUIDING POLICIES

the CLAIM FILING STATUTE

The TORT CLAIM

LEARN MORE

THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

CONCLUSION

READ MORE

LEARN MORE

THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

CONCLUSION

LEARN MORE

WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

LEARN MORE

WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)

EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY

trial court

court of appeals — division one

Different Supervisor

same treatment

HOLDING

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

LEARN MORE

THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

LEARN MORE

Understanding WAC 162-08-098: Findings in Human Rights Commission Investigations

Purpose of the Findings Document

Jurisdictional Findings

Scope of a “Reasonable Cause” Finding

Commissioner Involvement and Actions

The Legal Effect of Findings

Implications

RELATED ARTICLES

LEARN MORE

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Discrimination & protected classes

Retaliation

Reasonable Accommodations

READ THE LAW

THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

SCOPE OF TITLE VII

ADDITIONAL EMPLOYER PROHIBITIONS

THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)

READ MORE

need help?

RCW 4.96.010
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities—Liability for damages.

RCW 4.96.020
Tortious conduct of local governmental entities and their agents—Claims—Presentment and filing—Contents.

**THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)**