The Rundown

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The Tort of Outrage

The Tort of Outrage

Under Washington State law, what is the tort of outrage (hereinafter, “tort of outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress”)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE TORT OF OUTRAGE (ALSO KNOWN AS INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS)

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements:

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,

(2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and

(3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.

Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (Wash. 2003) (internal citations omitted). According to the Washington State Supreme Court: “These elements were adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) by this court in Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (footnote omitted).

LEVEL OF OUTRAGE

“Grimsby held any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be predicated on behavior ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (emphasis in original). Further, “[t]hat must be conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim ‘Outrageous!'” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

MERE INSULTS, INDIGNITIES, THREATS, ANNOYANCES, PETTY OPPRESSIONS, OR OTHER TRIVIALITIES NOT ENOUGH

“Consequently, the tort of outrage does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. In this area plaintiffs must necessarily be hardened to a certain degree of rough language, unkindness and lack of consideration.” Id. (citing Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59, 530 P.2d 291 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY

“Many states, including … [Washington], have distinguished negligent infliction of emotional distress from intentional infliction of emotional distress by making bodily harm or objective symptomatology a requirement of negligent but not intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS REQUIRES objective symptomatology

In Washington, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove “he has suffered emotional distress by ‘objective symptomatology,’ and the ’emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.'” Id. at 633, 149 Wash.2d 192 (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wash.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). “The symptoms of emotional distress must also constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESs DOES NOT REQUIRE objective symptomatology

However, Washington State courts “have never applied the objective symptomatology requirement to intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 633 (citing Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (“Washington cases have limited the objective symptom requirement to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.”); see also Brower v. Ackerley, 88 Wash.App. 87, 99-100, 943 P.2d 1141 (1997) (“No Washington case has incorporated [the objective symptomatology requirement] into the tort of outrage.”)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The basic elements remain unchanged since their adoption from the Restatement in Grimsby, and … [Washington courts] have not grafted an objective symptomatology requirement to them.” Id. (citing Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wash.2d 35, 51, 59 P.3d 611 (2002)).

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has found, as follows:

Quite simply, objective symptomatology is not required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress. The general rule is firmly established that physical injury or bodily harm—’objective symptomology’—is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages where intentional (and, in most states, reckless) emotional harm has been inflicted.

Id. (citing 4 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause & Alfred W. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 16:17, at 1076 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which remedies may be obtained. The tort of outrage is one type of tort that is also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress; it “requires the proof of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Kloepfel, 66 P.3d at 632, 149 Wash.2d 192 (internal citations omitted). However, this tort “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id. Lastly, objective symptomatology is not required to establish the tort of outrage.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic (for purposes of this section, “IIED” means “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or “tort of outrage”):

» IIED & Supervisors*

» IIED, Vicarious Liability & Proscribing Bad Behavior*

» The Tort of Outrage and Racially Discriminatory Action

» WA Tort of Outrage: A Brief History*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).

CONCLUSION

If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss Under CR 12(b)(6)

Under Washington State court rules, how do judges generally address a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULES (CR)

Pursuant to the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “CR”), a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) may be presented as follows:

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:

…

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[ ]

CR 12(b)(6) (first emphasis in original). Thus, pleaders may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” by, inter alia, motion (hereinafter, “motion(s) to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss”). Employment discrimination defendants (usually employers) typically file motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) early in the case and file motions for summary judgment near the end of the case. There are significant differences between the two types of motions.

MOTION TO DISMISS VERSUS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“A motion to dismiss questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.”  Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 742 (Wash. 1977). “The court need not find that any support for the alleged facts exists or would be admissible in trial as would be its duty on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (emphasis added).

HOW JUDGES GENERALLY ADDRESS THE  MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CR 12(B)(6)

“The question under CR 12(b)(6) is basically a legal one, and the facts are considered only as a conceptual background for the legal determination.” Id. (citing Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293, 298, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)). Thus, “[t]he only issue Before the trial judge is whether it can be said there is no state of facts which plaintiff could have proven entitling him to relief under his claim.” Id. (citing Barnum v. State, 72 Wash.2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55, 530 P.2d 291 (1975)).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination and Similarly Situated Employees

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, how does a plaintiff establish similarly situated employees for purposes of raising a reasonable inference of discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment is a legal theory that occurs “when an employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of membership in a protected class. See Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App.Div. 2 2013). “To esablish a prima facie* disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)) (hyperlink added).

There are various formulations for the prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Washington State, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (remainder of footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.

REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)

Plaintiff-employees typically use similarly-situated employees (also known as “comparators”) to show that their employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on one or more protected classes. Accordingly, to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, a “[s]imilarly situated employee[ ] must have[:]

[1] the same supervisor,

[2] be subject to the same standards, and

[3] have engaged in the same conduct.

Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 475 n.16, 98 P.3d 827 (2004); see also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (paragraph formatting added).

(NOTE: additional elements are required to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, however this article only addresses the “reasonable inference of discrimination” element.)

EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY

For example, in Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016), Plaintiff-employee Marin worked for King County as an operator at a wastewater treatment plant. Therein, Marin alleged King County unlawfully discriminated against him based on a variety of incidents. In one incident, Marin “did not follow the correct procedure to ‘lock out’ and ‘tag out’ a sewage pump.” Id. at 803. Consequently, Marin’s supervisor, Read, issued Marin a Teach/Lead/Coach memo, or TLC. “A TLC is not discipline, though management may base future discipline on a TLC.” Id. “Read saw it as a basic error for someone with Marin’s experience. Marin perceived Read to be yelling at him and became anxious.” Id. “Marin eventually gave notice he would retire in May 2011.” Id. at 804.

trial court

Thereafter, “Marin sued the County in July 2011[,] alleg[ing] six causes of action: disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate disabilities under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), wrongful discharge, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id.  (footnote omitted). Inter alia, “[t]he trial court dismissed Marin’s disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.” Id. at 801.

court of appeals — division one

Marin appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. See id. at 801. On appeal, Division One, held that Marin failed to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Different Supervisor

“Marin … contended the County treated him differently than a nonprotected employee, … Burton, who also made a lockout error. ” Id at 810. However, the Court found that “[e]ven if Marin had shown Burton’s error to be analogous to his own, Burton is still not a valid comparator because he worked under a different supervisor.” Id. (footnote omitted).

same treatment

The Court then found that “the record does not show that the County treated Marin differently than Burton, who also received a TLC–albeit an oral one–after his error.” Id. It reasoned: “A reasonable employee would not interpret Marin’s TLC as setting ‘impossible or terrifying unique performance standards’ or threatening termination.”

HOLDING

Accordingly, the Court held that “the trial court properly dismissed Marin’s claim of disparate treatment based on protected status.” Id. at 810-11.

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Definition of Prima Facie Case**

» Disparate Treatment

» Disparate Treatment: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

» Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment**

» McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case**

» Prima Facie Case: The Replacement Element**

» The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment via Direct Evidence

» WLAD: Disparate Treatment via Hostile Work Environment

** (NOTE: This is an external link that will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

 

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Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Canon of Administrative-Agency Interpretations

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of administrative-agency interpretations? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE CANON OF ADMINISTRATIVE-AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

According to the canon of administrative-agency interpretations:

Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight.

Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc., 131 Wn.2d 171, 177, 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) (“[The Washington Law Against Discrimination,] RCW 49.60[,] does not define ‘handicap’; deference is given by court to Human Rights Commission administrative rule defining ‘handicap'”).

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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WSHRC: Findings

WSHRC: Findings

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning findings? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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Understanding WAC 162-08-098: Findings in Human Rights Commission Investigations

When the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) investigates a discrimination complaint, its ultimate goal is to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair practice has occurred. WAC 162-08-098* outlines how the Commission formalizes those determinations through official findings, which serve as a critical turning point in the complaint process.

Purpose of the Findings Document

Every investigation concludes with a written findings document containing two key elements:

1.  Findings of fact — A summary of what the investigation determined actually occurred, based on evidence gathered.

2.  Ultimate finding — A formal conclusion stating whether there is:

• Reasonable cause to believe discrimination or another unfair practice has occurred,

• No reasonable cause, or

• A jurisdictional finding, as discussed below.

This document provides transparency and structure, ensuring that both parties understand the Commission’s basis for its conclusions.

Jurisdictional Findings

Sometimes, the facts reveal that the matter is not within the Commission’s jurisdiction—for example, if the complaint involves a federal agency or an employer too small to be covered under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). In such cases, the Commission issues a finding of “no jurisdiction.”

In extraordinary circumstances, even when the Commission technically has jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise it for overriding reasons of law or policy. A rare example is when the complaint is filed against the Commission itself, which would create a conflict of interest. In these situations, the ultimate finding is “jurisdiction declined.”

Scope of a “Reasonable Cause” Finding

When the Commission finds reasonable cause, it must specify:

• The specific unfair practice found (such as discriminatory discharge or housing denial),

• The individual(s) affected, and

• If applicable, the class of persons impacted.

This level of detail ensures that remedial efforts—such as conciliation or negotiated settlements—address the actual harm uncovered during investigation.

Commissioner Involvement and Actions

Findings of no reasonable cause are reported to the Commissioners at a meeting and become official unless the Commissioners vote to set them aside.

Findings of reasonable cause empower Commission staff to pursue conciliation efforts—attempting to resolve the matter voluntarily through dialogue and agreement.

Proposed findings of “no jurisdiction” or “jurisdiction declined” require formal approval by the Commissioners through a vote at a meeting.

The Legal Effect of Findings

Importantly, a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause is not a legal adjudication. It does not determine whether discrimination actually occurred in the legal sense—it merely reflects the Commission’s administrative conclusion based on its investigation.

Implications

WAC 162-08-098 ensures that the Human Rights Commission’s processes remain fair, consistent, and transparent. By clearly defining how and when findings are made—and distinguishing investigative conclusions from legal determinations—the rule protects the integrity of both complainants’ and respondents’ rights. It also reinforces the Commission’s role as a neutral fact-finder, dedicated to resolving discrimination claims efficiently while maintaining public trust in the enforcement of Washington’s anti-discrimination laws.

RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

» WSHRC: Withdrawal of Complaint

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Under federal laws, how does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protect employees against employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) is a crucial federal law that protects certain individuals (including employees) against certain types of discrimination and retaliation; it also safeguards certain types of accommodations.

Discrimination & protected classes

Title VII  outlaws discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity). The law “also makes it unlawful to use policies or practices that seem neutral but have the effect of discriminating against people because of their race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or national origin.” U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23).

AGE & DISABILITY: Other federal laws protect against age discrimination (i.e., Age Discrimination in Employment Act or “ADEA”) and disability discrimination (i.e., Americans with Disabilities Act or “ADA”). However, this article will address solely Title VII.

Retaliation

Retaliation against an individual who has reported discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or taken part in an employment discrimination investigation or litigation is likewise prohibited by Title VII.

Reasonable Accommodations

Lastly, applicants’ and employees’ genuinely held religious practices must be reasonably accommodated by employers under the legislation, unless doing so would put an undue burden on the employer‘s ability to conduct business.

READ THE LAW

Read all Title VII provisions to learn more. The link will take the reader to an external website — Cornell Law School (Legal Information Institute).

THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Chapter 49.60 RCW, is distinct and separate from Title VII. The WLAD is a much broader state law that also protects against discrimination. Particularly:

[The Washington Law Against Discrimination, ]Chapter 49.60 RCW[,] is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and prohibits retaliation against persons who oppose a discriminatory practice, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower* complaints.

Washington State Human Rights Commission Website, About Us (last visited 1/10/23) (emphasis added) (hyperlinks and asterisks added). Learn more about the WLAD by visiting the Washington State Human Rights Commission Website.

(*The “whistleblower” link refers the visitor to our external website: Williams Law Group Blog.)

SCOPE OF TITLE VII

Title VII applies to certain employers (both private and public with 15 or more employees), employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs and makes it “unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:

•  Hiring and firing;
•  Compensation, assignment, or classification of workers;
•  Transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;
•  Job advertisements and recruitment;
•  Testing;
•  Use of employer facilities;
•  Training and apprenticeship programs;
•  Retirement plans, leave, and benefits; or
•  Other terms and conditions of employment.

U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23).

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ADDITIONAL EMPLOYER PROHIBITIONS

Title VII also prohibits employers from engaging in the following activities:

Under Title VII, employers also cannot:

→ Harass an employee because of race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin;

→ Refuse or fail to make reasonable adjustments to workplace policies or practices that allow individual workers to observe their sincerely held religious beliefs;

→ Make employment decisions based on stereotypes or assumptions about a person’s abilities, traits, or performance because of their race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin;

→ Deny job opportunities because a person is married to, or associated with, a person of a particular race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), or national origin.

U.S. Department of Justice Website, Laws We Enforce (last visited 1/10/23) (hyperlink added).

THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)

Additional federal laws prohibit employment discrimination based on age, disability, and genetic information. “The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” U.S. E.E.O.C. Website, Overview (last visited 1/10/23).

Learn more about filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC by visiting their official website.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our related blog articles:

» EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue

» Fair Employment Practice Agencies

» The Intersection of WSHRC and EEOC*

» Unlawful Employment Agency Practices (Title VII)

» Washington Law Against Discrimination is Potent*

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.)

need help?

If you need legal help, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case; our law office litigates claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The Retainer Fee (WA State)

The Retainer Fee (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what is a retainer fee? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their professional conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

…

The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the retainer fee.

RPC 1.5: THE RETAINER FEE

The retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” RPC 1.5. Importantly, a retainer fee:

•  must be agreed to in writing.

•  must be signed by the client.

•  is the lawyer’s property as soon as it is received and is not to be put into the lawyer’s trust account, unless otherwise agreed.

See id. This fee structure is sometimes referred to as an “availability retainer,” “engagement retainer,” “true retainer,” “general retainer,” or “classic retainer.” See id. (Washington Comment 13).

RETAINER FEE SECURES AVAILABILITY ALONE

As mentioned above, retainer fees in Washington State are also known as “availability retainers.” That’s because “[a] retainer secures availability alone, i.e., it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed.” Id. (Washington Comment 13). Thus, “a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer’s availability, but that will be applied to the client’s account as the lawyer renders services, is not a retainer under … [RPC 1.5](f)(1).” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

GOOD PRACTICES

For those drafting retainers, “[a] written retainer agreement should clearly specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer’s availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer’s property immediately on receipt and will not deposit the fee into a trust account.” Id. (Washington Comment 13).

CONCLUSION

A retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” Id.

RELATED ARTICLES

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» The Contingency Fee (WA State)

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The Contingency Fee (WA State)

The Contingency Fee (WA State)

Under Washington State laws, what is an attorney’s contingency fee? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their ethical conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:

…

The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

RPC, Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct. One of the primary topics under the RPC is “Fees,” and one common type of fee is the contingency fee.

RPC 1.5: THE CONTINGENCY FEE

The contingency fee is regulated by RPC 1.5. Accordingly, an attorney’s fee “may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See id. The relevant portions of that RPC describe the contingency fee in detail, as follows:

…

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following

(1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client;

(2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;

(3) upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination; and

(4) a contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only

(i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or

(ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.

RPC 1.5(c).

CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITATIONS

The contingency fee has limitations.  One limitation prohibits lawyers in Washington from entering into contingency fee agreements for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances. The relevant rule follows:

…

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

RPC 1.5(d)

CONCLUSION

Under RPC 1.5 (Fees), an attorney may charge a contingency fee: meaning, one that is “contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See RPC 1.5. However, an attorney may not charge a contingency fee for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances.

RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» The Retainer Fee (WA State)

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Canon of Constitutional Presumption

Canon of Constitutional Presumption

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of constitutional presumption? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION

According to the canon of constitutional presumption, Washington courts “presume statutes are constitutional, and the party challenging constitutionality bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, 481 P.3d 1060, 1064 (Wash. 2021) (citing Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals , 158 Wash.2d 208, 215, 143 P.3d 571 (2006), overruled in part by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wash.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019)).

There are two types of lawsuits that challenge the constitutionality of a statute: (1) the as-applied challenge; and (2) the facial challenge.

THE AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE

The as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is based on “a party’s allegation that application of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional.”  Id. (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). According to the Washington Supreme Court in Woods,  “Holding a statute unconstitutional as-applied prohibits future application of the statute in a similar context, but the statute is not totally invalidated.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

THE FACIAL CHALLENGE

A facial challenge is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face — that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally. To ascertain whether a law is facially invalid, “courts must be careful not to exceed the facial requirements and speculate about hypothetical cases.” Id. (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449-50, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 170 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2008)). Washington courts generally disfavor facial claims. See id. (citing State v. McCuistion, 174 Wash.2d 369, 389, 275 P.3d 1092 (2012). Accordingly, a “facial challenge must be rejected unless there is no set of circumstances in which the statute[, as currently written,] can constitutionally be applied.” Id. (In re Det. of Turay , 139 Wash.2d 379, 417 n.27, 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (emphasis and alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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