Under Washington State law, what is the “after-acquired evidence doctrine” (hereinafter, “after-acquired evidence doctrine” or “Doctrine”) when applied to employment-discrimination law cases? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
In my plaintiff’s-side, employment-discrimination law practice, clients must occasionally address the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “The ‘after-acquired evidence’ doctrine precludes or limits an employee from receiving remedies for wrongful discharge if the employer later ‘discovers’ evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to the employee‘s termination had the employer known of the misconduct.” Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wash.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (Wash. app. 2015), review denied, 185 Wash.2d 1038, 377 P.3d 744(Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the Doctrine, “[a]n employer can avoid back pay and other remedies by coming forward with after-acquired evidence of an employee‘s misconduct, but only if it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. (citing McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis added); accord Janson v. N. Valley Hosp., 93 Wn.App. 892, 971 P.2d 67 (1999) (“adopting after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon“)).
CONCLUSION
If an employer discovers misconduct by a plaintiff-employee, then the after-acquired evidence doctrine can reduce that plaintiff’s lost-wage damages. Specifically, “An employer can reduce back pay damages and preclude front pay damages by demonstrating it would have terminated the employee if it had known of the employee’s misconduct at the time.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.00 (7th ed.) (citing Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 192 Wn.App. 30, 60, 366 P.3d 1246 (2015)).
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT
Disparate treatment is a legal theory that occurs “when an employer treats some people less favorably than others” because of membership in a protected class. SeeAlonso v. Qwest Communications Company*, 178 Wn.App. 734, 753-54, 315 P.3d 610 (Wash.App.Div. 2 2013). “To esablish a prima facie* disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show that his employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their protected status.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)) (hyperlink added).
There are various formulations for the prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Washington State, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016) (citing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (remainder of footnote omitted) (hyperlinks added).
*NOTE: The link will take the reader to either our Court Slips Blog or our Williams Law Group Blog – external websites.
REASONABLE INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION — SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES (COMPARATORS)
Plaintiff-employees typically use similarly-situated employees (also known as “comparators”) to show that their employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on one or more protected classes. Accordingly, to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, a “[s]imilarly situated employee[ ] must have[:]
[1] the same supervisor,
[2] be subject to the same standards, and
[3] have engaged in the same conduct.
Id. (citing Kirby v. City of Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 475 n.16, 98 P.3d 827 (2004); see also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)) (paragraph formatting added).
(NOTE: additional elements are required to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, however this article only addresses the “reasonable inference of discrimination” element.)
EXAMPLE: MARIN v. KING COUNTY
For example, in Marin v. King County*, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2016), review denied, 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 124 (Table) (Wash. 2016), Plaintiff-employee Marin worked for King County as an operator at a wastewater treatment plant. Therein, Marin alleged King County unlawfully discriminated against him based on a variety of incidents. In one incident, Marin “did not follow the correct procedure to ‘lock out’ and ‘tag out’ a sewage pump.” Id. at 803. Consequently, Marin’s supervisor, Read, issued Marin a Teach/Lead/Coach memo, or TLC. “A TLC is not discipline, though management may base future discipline on a TLC.” Id. “Read saw it as a basic error for someone with Marin’s experience. Marin perceived Read to be yelling at him and became anxious.” Id. “Marin eventually gave notice he would retire in May 2011.” Id. at 804.
trial court
Thereafter, “Marin sued the County in July 2011[,] alleg[ing] six causes of action: disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate disabilities under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), wrongful discharge, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (footnote omitted). Inter alia, “[t]he trial court dismissed Marin’s disparate treatment claim on summary judgment.” Id. at 801.
court of appeals — division one
Marin appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. See id. at 801. On appeal, Division One, held that Marin failed to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination.
Different Supervisor
“Marin … contended the County treated him differently than a nonprotected employee, … Burton, who also made a lockout error. ” Id at 810. However, the Court found that “[e]ven if Marin had shown Burton’s error to be analogous to his own, Burton is still not a valid comparator because he worked under a different supervisor.” Id. (footnote omitted).
same treatment
The Court then found that “the record does not show that the County treated Marin differently than Burton, who also received a TLC–albeit an oral one–after his error.” Id. It reasoned: “A reasonable employee would not interpret Marin’s TLC as setting ‘impossible or terrifying unique performance standards’ or threatening termination.”
HOLDING
Accordingly, the Court held that “the trial court properly dismissed Marin’s claim of disparate treatment based on protected status.” Id. at 810-11.
*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what is a retainer fee? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their professional conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:
…
The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
The retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” RPC 1.5. Importantly, a retainer fee:
• must be agreed to in writing.
• must be signed by the client.
• is the lawyer’s property as soon as it is received and is not to be put into the lawyer’s trust account, unless otherwise agreed.
See id. This fee structure is sometimes referred to as an “availability retainer,” “engagement retainer,” “true retainer,” “general retainer,” or “classic retainer.” See id. (Washington Comment 13).
RETAINER FEE SECURES AVAILABILITY ALONE
As mentioned above, retainer fees in Washington State are also known as “availability retainers.” That’s because “[a] retainer secures availability alone, i.e., it presumes that the lawyer is to be additionally compensated for any actual work performed.” Id. (Washington Comment 13). Thus, “a payment purportedly made to secure a lawyer’s availability, but that will be applied to the client’s account as the lawyer renders services, is not a retainer under … [RPC 1.5](f)(1).” Id. (Washington Comment 13).
GOOD PRACTICES
For those drafting retainers, “[a] written retainer agreement should clearly specify the time period or purpose of the lawyer’s availability, that the client will be separately charged for any services provided, and that the lawyer will treat the payment as the lawyer’s property immediately on receipt and will not deposit the fee into a trust account.” Id. (Washington Comment 13).
CONCLUSION
A retainer fee “is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to be available to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, in addition to and apart from any compensation for legal services performed.” Id.
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Under Washington State laws, what is an attorney’s contingency fee? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON STATE COURT RULES: RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) guide attorneys in their practice of law by, inter alia, regulating their ethical conduct. According to the RPC — Fundamental Principles of Professional Conduct:
…
The Rules of Professional Conduct point the way to the aspiring lawyer and provide standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his or her own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his or her actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of the legal profession and the society which the lawyer serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
The contingency fee is regulated by RPC 1.5. Accordingly, an attorney’s fee “may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See id. The relevant portions of that RPC describe the contingency fee in detail, as follows:
…
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. If a fee is contingent on the outcome of a matter, a lawyer shall comply with the following
(1) A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client;
(2) A contingent fee agreement shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable, whether or not the client is the prevailing party;
(3) upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination; and
(4) a contingent fee consisting of a percentage of the monetary amount recovered for a claimant, in which all or part of the recovery is to be paid in the future, shall be paid only
(i) by applying the percentage to the amounts recovered as they are received by the client; or
(ii) by applying the percentage to the actual cost of the settlement or award to the defendant.
The contingency fee has limitations. One limitation prohibits lawyers in Washington from entering into contingency fee agreements for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances. The relevant rule follows:
…
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or annulment of marriage or upon the amount of maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
Under RPC 1.5 (Fees), an attorney may charge a contingency fee: meaning, one that is “contingent on the outcome of a matter for which the service is rendered.” See RPC 1.5. However, an attorney may not charge a contingency fee for domestic relations and criminal defense cases under certain circumstances.
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Under Washington State laws, what is the tort of negligent retention? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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NEGLIGENT RETENTION IN WASHINGTON STATE
To successfully litigate an employment-based negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish the basic elements of negligence: duty; breach of duty; causation; and damages. The theory of negligent retention is a tort. A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, entitling the victim to remedies typically in the form of damages. According to the Washington State Supreme Court:
Negligent retention consists of … retaining the employee with knowledge of his unfitness, or of failing to use reasonable care to discover it before … retaining him.
Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist., 423 P.3d 197, 206 (Wash. 2018) (citing Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash. App. 285, 288, 827 P.2d 1108 (1992)) (alterations in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
NEGLIGENT RETENTION VS. NEGLIGENT HIRING
Negligent hiring is also a Washington State tort. According to the Anderson Court:
The difference between negligent hiring and negligent retention is timing. Negligent hiring occurs at the time of hiring, while negligent retention occurs during the course of employment.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Negligent retention occurs when an employer either retains an employee with knowledge of the employee’s unfitness, or fails to use reasonable care to discover unfitness before retaining the employee.
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Under federal laws and regulations, what is the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOCs) Notice of Right to Sue? NOTE: This article addresses public and private employment and does not address federal government employees or applicants.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)
The EEOC is a federal agency “responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and related conditions, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” U.S. EEOC Website,https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited 11/29/22).
eeoc functions
“The laws apply to all types of work situations, including hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and benefits.” Id. Accordingly, the EEOC has authority to perform several functions:
(1) To investigate charges of discrimination against employers who are covered by the law.
(2) To prevent discrimination before it occurs through outreach, education, and technical assistance programs.
(3) To provide leadership and guidance to federal agencies on all aspects of the federal government’s equal employment opportunity program.
Id. As part of its investigative function, the EEOC is responsible for issuing the Notice of Right to Sue.
THE 90-DAY NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
Charge Filing
The claimant must first file a charge with the EEOC if the claimant plans “to file a lawsuit under federal law alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic information, or retaliation, … (except for lawsuits under the Equal Pay Act, see below).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22). I will explain certain exceptions later in this article.
Notice of Right to Sue
The EEOC Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See id. The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id.
90-Day Limitation
When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. Id. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
Federal Government Employees and Applicants
This article does not address federal government employees or applicants. “The procedures for filing a complaint of discrimination against a federal government agency differ from those for filing a charge against a private or public employer.” Id. To learn more, visit the EEOC Website page: Overview Of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process.
EXCEPTIONS WHEN FILING A LAWSUIT
Age Discrimination Lawsuits (ADEA)
“If you plan to file an age discrimination lawsuit, you must have filed a charge but you don’t need a Notice of Right to Sue to file a lawsuit in court. You can file a lawsuit in court any time after 60 days have passed from the day you filed your charge (but no later than 90 days after you receive notice that our investigation is concluded).” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
Equal Pay Lawsuits (EPA)
“If you plan to file a lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act, you don’t have to file a charge or obtain a Notice of Right to Sue before filing. Rather, you can go directly to court, provided you file your suit within two years from the day the pay discrimination took place (3 years if the discrimination was willful).” Id.
Filing a Lawsuit Before Investigation is Completed
“If you want to file a lawsuit before … [the EEOC has] finished … [their] investigation, you can request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.
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HOW TO REQUEST A NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
There are a few ways to request a Notice of Right to Sue depending on your circumstances. “If you have registered in EEOC’s Public Portal, you can submit your request by logging in to your charge account and uploading your request. If you don’t have an online charge account, send your request for a Notice of Right to Sue to the EEOC office responsible for investigating your charge and include your EEOC charge number and the names of the parties.” U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).
In any event, the EEOC has time limitations in fulfilling requests for Notices of Right to Sue.
Before 180 Days Have Passed
Before 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC will give the claimant the notice only if the EEOC will be unable to complete their investigation within 180 days. See id. According to the EEOC, “If you want the EEOC to continue investigating your charge, don’t request a Notice of Right to Sue.” Id.
After 180 Days Have Passed
After 180 days have passed from the date the claimant’s charge was filed, the EEOC is required by law to give the claimant the notice upon their request. See id.
CONCLUSION
The EEOCs Notice of Right to Sue gives the claimant permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court based on certain federal laws. See U.S. EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited 11/29/22).The EEOC will provide the claimant a Notice of Right to Sue when it closes its investigation. See id. In addition, claimants can request a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC office investigating the charge if the claimant seeks to file a lawsuit in court before the investigation is completed. See id. When the claimant receives a Notice of Right to Sue, the claimant must file an associated lawsuit within 90 days. “This deadline is set by law. If you don’t file in time, you may be prevented from going forward with your lawsuit.” Id.
The reader is strongly encouraged to seek legal counsel when first considering claims of employment discrimination.
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As an employment attorney in Washington, I often converse with employment discrimination victims that believe their cases are weak, because they lack direct evidence. They’re unaware that using circumstantial evidence to prove employment discrimination is a common litigation practice that can sometimes lead to successful outcomes.
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), may an employment discrimination victim rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to prove employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS
Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.
[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.
[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]
(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.
“First, [under the burden-shifting framework,] an employee must make a prima facie case …[.]” Crabtree*, 500 P.3d at 211 (Wash. App. 2021) (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)) (hyperlinks added). “Where the employee establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination exists. Id. at 211-12 (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464).
STEP 2 – LEGITIMATE NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON
“Second, the burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the … [adverse employment action].” See id. at 212 (citingMikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added). “The employer is not required to persuade the court that it actually was motivated by the nondiscriminatory reason, the employer need only show that the employer’s evidence, if taken as true would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 533, 404 P.3d 464).
STEP 3 – PRETEXT
“Third, if the employer meets this burden, the employee must produce sufficient evidence showing that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge was a pretext*.” Crabtree*, 500 P.3d at 212(citing Mikkelsen*, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (hyperlinks added).
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).
CONCLUSION
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, I believe employment-discrimination plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to prove employment discrimination. This is primarily because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare.
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Under the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission laws and regulations, what are Fair Employment Practice Agencies? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, “EEOC”) is an independent federal agency, headquartered in Washington, D.C., that maintains 53 field offices serving the entire country. It’s charged with “enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, transgender status, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.” See Official EEOC Website, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last accessed 11/2/22).
The EEOC “laws apply to all types of work situations, including hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and benefits”; those same laws also cover most labor unions and employment agencies. See id.
DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER
Generally, employers with at least 15 employees (20 employees in age discrimination cases) are subject to EEOC laws, however there are a few exceptions. For example, the EEOC is responsible for enforcing, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”); under Title VIIs definition of employer, not all are subject to its reach. The relevant provision states as follows:
(b) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include[:]
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or
(2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(Definitions) (NOTE: the EEOC also enforces other laws beyond Title VII; the preceding was only one example) (emphasis added).
FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AGENCIES (FEPAs)
The term Fair Employment Practices Agency or FEPA is a term coined by the EEOC. They are state and local government agencies charged with enforcing their own jurisdictional laws prohibiting discrimination; and their laws are similar to those enforced by the EEOC. However, it’s important to note:
In some cases, these agencies enforce laws that offer greater protection to workers, such as protection from discrimination because you are married or unmarried, have children or because of your sexual orientation. There also may be different deadlines for filing a charge, different standards for determining whether you are protected by these laws, and different types of relief available to victims of discrimination.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this article only, the following definitions apply unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
…
(1) “Criminal record” includes any record about a citation or arrest for criminal conduct, including records relating to probable cause to arrest, and includes any record about a criminal or juvenile case filed with any court, whether or not the case resulted in a finding of guilt.
(2) “Employer” includes public agencies, private individuals, businesses and corporations, contractors, temporary staffing agencies, training and apprenticeship programs, and job placement, referral, and employment agencies.
(3) “Otherwise qualified” means that the applicant meets the basic criteria for the position as set out in the advertisement or job description without consideration of a criminal record.
In 2018, the Washington State Legislature passed the Washington Fair Chance Act (Act), RCW Chapter 49.94. The Act is designed “to protect job applicants with a criminal record so they may fairly compete for job opportunities for which they are otherwise qualified.” See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022). It contains several sections, and the primary section follows:
RCW 49.94.010
Inquiries about criminal records—Timing—Advertisements—Exceptions.
(1) An employer may not include any question on any application for employment, inquire either orally or in writing, receive information through a criminal history background check, or otherwise obtain information about an applicant’s criminal record until after the employer initially determines that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Once the employer has initially determined that the applicant is otherwise qualified, the employer may inquire into or obtain information about a criminal record.
(2) An employer may not advertise employment openings in a way that excludes people with criminal records from applying. Ads that state “no felons,” “no criminal background,” or otherwise convey similar messages are prohibited.
(3) An employer may not implement any policy or practice that automatically or categorically excludes individuals with a criminal record from consideration prior to an initial determination that the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position. Prohibited policies and practices include rejecting an applicant for failure to disclose a criminal record prior to initially determining the applicant is otherwise qualified for the position.
(4) This section does not apply to:
(a) Any employer hiring a person who will or may have unsupervised access to children under the age of eighteen, a vulnerable adult as defined in chapter 74.34 RCW, or a vulnerable person as defined in RCW 9.96A.060;
(b) Any employer, including a financial institution, who is expressly permitted or required under any federal or state law to inquire into, consider, or rely on information about an applicant’s or employee’s criminal record for employment purposes;
(c) Employment by a general or limited authority Washington law enforcement agency as defined in RCW 10.93.020 or by a criminal justice agency as defined in RCW 10.97.030(5)(b);
(d) An employer seeking a nonemployee volunteer; or
(e) Any entity required to comply with the rules or regulations of a self-regulatory organization, as defined in section 3(a)(26) of the securities and exchange act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(26).
RCW 49.94.010 (emphasis added) (hyperlinks in original).
LIMITATIONS
The Act also contains several significant limitations concerning collective bargaining agreements, conflict of laws, accommodations/job modifications, baselines, and private right of actions, as follows:
RCW 49.94.020
Limitations on application of chapter.
(1) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish any provision in a collective bargaining agreement or the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own choosing concerning wages, standards, and conditions of employment.
(2) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied to diminish or conflict with any requirements of state or federal law, including Title VII of the civil rights act of 1964; the federal fair credit reporting act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681; the Washington state fair credit reporting act, chapter 19.182 RCW; and state laws regarding unsupervised access to children or vulnerable persons, RCW 43.43.830 through 43.43.845.
(3) This chapter may not be interpreted or applied as imposing an obligation on the part of an employer to provide accommodations or job modifications in order to facilitate the employment or continued employment of an applicant or employee with a criminal record or who is facing pending criminal charges.
(4) This chapter may not be construed to discourage or prohibit an employer from adopting employment policies that are more protective of employees and job applicants than the requirements of this chapter.
(5) This chapter may not be construed to interfere with local government laws that provide additional protections to applicants or employees with criminal records, nor does it prohibit local governments from enacting greater protections for such applicants or employees in the future. Local government laws that provide lesser protections to job applicants with criminal records than this chapter conflict with this chapter and may not be enforced.
(6) This chapter may not be construed to create a private right of action to seek damages or remedies of any kind. The exclusive remedy available under this chapter is enforcement described in RCW 49.94.030. This chapter does not create any additional liability for employers beyond that enumerated in this chapter.
(1) The state attorney general’s office shall enforce this chapter. Its powers to enforce this chapter include the authority to:
(a) Investigate violations of this chapter on its own initiative;
(b) Investigate violations of this chapter in response to complaints and seek remedial relief for the complainant;
(c) Educate the public about how to comply with this chapter;
(d) Issue written civil investigative demands for pertinent documents, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony as required to enforce this chapter;
(e) Adopt rules implementing this chapter including rules specifying applicable penalties; and
(f) Pursue administrative sanctions or a lawsuit in the courts for penalties, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
(2) In exercising its powers, the attorney general’s office shall utilize a stepped enforcement approach, by first educating violators, then warning them, then taking legal, including administrative, action. Maximum penalties are as follows:
A notice of violation and offer of agency assistance for the first violation; a monetary penalty of up to seven hundred fifty dollars for the second violation; and a monetary penalty of up to one thousand dollars for each subsequent violation.
Lastly, the Act contains a provision addressing potential conflicts with federal requirements when federal funds are involved. The relevant provision follows:
RCW 49.94.900
Conflict with federal requirements—2018 c 38.
If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and this finding does not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. Rules adopted under this act must meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to the receipt of federal funds by the state.
As mentioned above, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AG) is solely responsible for enforcing the Washington Fair Chance Act. Accordingly, the AG Civil Rights Division accepts complaints that a covered employer has used criminal-record information to exclude an applicant from a job opportunity before determining whether the applicant is otherwise qualified for the job. Complainants may contact the AG Civil Rights Division at either [email protected] or by leaving a message on their toll-free line at (833) 660-4877. Complainants may also submit a complaint using the AGs online form and a staff member will follow up. See Washington State Office of the Attorney General, https://www.atg.wa.gov/fair-chance-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2022) (hyperlink in original).
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Under Washington State law, what is the failure-to-mitigate-damages affirmative defense and how is it typically applied in Washington State employment-discrimination cases? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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MITIGATING DAMAGES
In Washington State, plaintiffs have “a duty to use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. To mitigate means to avoid or reduce damages.” 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.83 (7th ed.).
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
An affirmative defense is a defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true. Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 451, “defense (affirmative defense)” (Rev 8th Ed. 2004); Bernsen v. Big Bend Elec. Co-op., Inc., 68 Wn.App. 427, 433, 842 P.2d 1047 (1993); CR 8(c).
Defendant-employers usually assert the affirmative defense of “failure to mitigate damages” against plaintiff-employees during litigation of employment-discrimination claims. This particular defense is most often asserted when the plaintiff-employee challenges as discriminatory a discrete employment decision, such as a termination or a failure to hire. 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.83 (7th ed.).
FAILURE TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
In an employment-discrimination suit, the burden of proving a failure to mitigate damages is on the employer, and the employer must show the following to satisfy its burden:
1. There were openings in comparable positions available for plaintiff elsewhere after defendant terminated or refused to hire plaintiff;
2. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking those openings;
3. The amount by which damages would have been reduced if the plaintiff had used reasonable care and diligence in seeking those openings.
Juries are typically instructed that they should take into account the characteristics of the plaintiff and the job market in evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s efforts to mitigate damages. Id. Importantly, the plaintiff’s failure to make an ongoing, concerted effort to find comparable employment does not preclude a back pay award. Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc., 9 P.3d 948, 102 Wn.App. 828 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2000).
AN EXAMPLE: HENNINGSEN v. WORLDCOM, INC.
For example, in Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc., a plaintiff-employee (Henningsen) brought a sex discrimination lawsuit against her defendant-employer (Worldcom), and the trial court (bench trial) entered judgment in Henningsen’s favor; the award included full back pay. Id.
Worldcom then appealed alleging, inter alia, the trial court erred, because Henningsen failed to mitigate her damages. Id. Worldcom claimed that “there was evidence that she traveled extensively, had a baby, married the baby’s father, and then proceeded to assist him in the management of his own business after she left Worldcom.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The Court found that there was “evidence that Henningsen failed to make an ongoing, concerted effort to find comparable employment” and that the trial court even “expressed some concerns about [Henningsen’s] underemployment[.]” Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). But the Court also found that there was “evidence that she worked on a limited basis for her husband’s business and tried to start a home business.” Id.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “Worldcom presented no evidence that employment comparable to her position at Worldcom was in fact available” and, therefore, ruled that “substantial evidence support[ed] the trial court’s finding that Worldcom did not prove that Henningsen failed to mitigate her back pay damages.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, in the case of Henningsen v. Worldcom, the issue of mitigation of damages was determined in favor of the employee as a result of the employer’s failure to satisfy the first element of the test—evidence that there were openings in comparable positions available for plaintiff elsewhere after defendant terminated (or refused to hire) plaintiff.
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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CLAIM SPLITTING
The general rule for claim splitting is that “if an action is brought for part of a claim, a judgment obtained in the action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 782, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999) (Plaintiffs prohibited from suing for personal injuries after obtaining judgment for property damage arising out of same accident) (emphasis added); see also, Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Medical Center, 97 Wn. App. 728, 987 P.2d 634 (1999) (Plaintiff prohibited from raising a new claim on appeal after summary judgment).
RES JUDICATA
The theory of dismissal based upon claim splitting is “variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action.” Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. 779, 783, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999); see also, Sound Build Homes, Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate/ South, Inc., 118 Wn.App. 617, 628, 72 P.3d 788 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2003) (theory on which dismissal is granted is variously referred to as res judicata or splitting causes of action) (hyperlink added). Thus, the rules of res judicata are typically applied to determine if improper claim splitting has occurred.
DISMISSAL BASED ON RES JUDICATA
Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects:
(1) persons and parties;
(2) cause of action;
(3) subject matter; and
(4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.
Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting added). This res judicata test is a conjunctive one requiring satisfaction of all four elements. Hisle v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 866, 93 P.3d 108 (Wash. 2004).
However, the Washington State Supreme Court has been abundantly clear: “[R]es judicata does not bar claims arising out of different causes of action, or intend to deny the litigant his or her day in court.” Id at 865, 93 P.3d 108 (hyperlink added). Ultimately, res judicata will not apply until there has been a final judicial judgment. See Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 807 (1985) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Dismissal on the basis of res judicata (also known as claim splitting) is inappropriate unless the subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four respects: (1) persons and parties; (2) cause of action; (3) subject matter; and (4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn.App. at 783 (internal citations omitted).
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), how may a plaintiff establish the fourth element–imputing harassment to employer–when pursuing a claim of hostile work environment? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate (i.e., discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate) against person because the person complained about any practices forbidden by the WLAD, or because the person has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under WLAD.
In Washington State, the terms “hostile work environment” and “harassment” are synonymous within the context of employment discrimination law. “To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show the following four elements:
Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 275 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis and hyperlinks added); see alsoGlasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 406-07, 693 P.2d 708 (1985) (explaining what is required to establish a hostile work environment case) . This article will address the fourth element: that harassment can be imputed to the employer.
ELEMENT 4: IMPUTING HARASSMENT TO EMPLOYERS
In Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the Washington State Supreme Court explained how to impute harassment to employers, as follows:
[A. Owners, Managers, Partners or Corporate Officers:]
Where an owner, manager, partner or corporate officer personally participates in the harassment, this element is met by such proof.
[B. Supervisors or Co-Workers:]
To hold an employer responsible for the discriminatory work environment created by a plaintiff’s supervisor(s) or co-worker(s), the employee must show that the employer[:]
(a) authorized, knew, or should have known of the harassment and
(b) failed to take reasonably prompt and adequate corrective action.
This my be shown by proving[:]
(a) that complaints were made to the employer through higher managerial or supervisory personnel or by proving such a pervasiveness of … harassment [based on a protected class] at the work place as to create an inference of the employer’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of it and
(b) that the employer’s remedial action was not of such nature as to have been reasonable calculated to end the harassment. . . .
[C. Avoiding Liability:]
[A]n employer may ordinarily avoid liability by taking prompt and adequate corrective action when it learns that an employee is being . . . harassed [based on a protected class].
Id. at 407-08 (emphasis and paragraph formatting added) (last alteration in original).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
ACCENT DISCRIMINATION IS NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
In Washington, “[n]ational origin discrimination includes discrimination against an employee because he/she shares the linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.” Xieng v. Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington, 63 Wn.App. 572, 578 (Wash.App. Div. I 1991), aff’d, 120 Wn.2d 112 (Wash. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (hyperlinks added). Thus, under the the Washington Law Against Discrimination, national origin discrimination includes discrimination based upon foreign accent.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has found that employers face a heavy burden in accent discrimination cases as they could easily “use an individual’s foreign accent as a pretext for national origin discrimination.” See id. at 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, courts tend to thoroughly scrutinize adverse employment decisions against employees based upon claims of inadequate oral communication skills. See id.
Ultimately, an employer’s adverse employment decision (e.g., demotion, termination, write-ups, etc.) “may be predicated upon an individual’s accent when–but only when–it interferes materially with job performance.” Id. (quoting Fragante v. City and Cy. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1811, 108 L.Ed.2d 942 (1990)). Otherwise, the employer may be facing liability under the Washington Law Against Discrimination for national origin discrimination based upon foreign accent.
CONCLUSION
An employer’s adverse employment decisions “may be predicated upon an individual’s accent when–but only when–it interferes materially with job performance.” Xieng, 63 Wn.App. at 578 (internal citations omitted). Otherwise, the employer may be facing liability under the Washington Law Against Discrimination for national origin discrimination based upon foreign accent.
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WLAD: THE EIGHT-OR-MORE-EMPLOYEES RULE
The Washington State Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) defines “employer” as including any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons (hereinafter, “Eight-Or-More-Employees Rule“), and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit. Thus, only employers that fall within this definition are subject to the WLAD.
THE WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
The Washington State Human Rights Commission has established the following regulations that dictate who is counted as employed for purposes of the Eight-Or-More-Employees Rule:
(1) PURPOSE AND SCOPE. RCW 49.60.040 defines “employer” for purposes of the law against discrimination in part as “any person . . . who employs eight or more persons.” This section establishes standards for determining who is counted as employed when deciding whether a person is an employer. The standards in this section do not define who is entitled to the protection of the law against discrimination.
(2) TIME OF CALCULATION. A person will be considered to have employed eight if the person either:
(a) Had an employment relationship with eight or more persons for any part of the day on which the unfair practice is alleged to have occurred, or did occur; or
(b) Had an employment relationship with an average of eight or more persons over a representative period of time including the time when the unfair practice is alleged to have occurred.
An employment relationship is most readily demonstrated by a person’s appearance on the employer’s payroll. The representative period of time for (b) of this subsection will ordinarily be the twenty weeks prior to and including the date on which the unfair practice is alleged to have occurred. However, where this period will not accurately reflect the overall employment level, as in a seasonal industry, we will use the month during which the unfair practice is alleged to have occurred plus the preceding eleven months.
(3) PART TIME EMPLOYEES: A person working part time will be counted the same as a person working full-time. Persons subject to call to work (such as volunteer firefighters) will be considered to be employed at all times when they are subject to call.
(4) AREA OF CALCULATION: A person who employs eight or more persons is an “employer” for purposes of the law against discrimination even though less than eight of the employees are located in the state of Washington.
(5) MULTIPLE PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT. The count will include all persons employed by the same legal entity, whether or not the persons work in the same place of business or line of business.
(6) CONNECTED CORPORATIONS. Corporations and other artificial persons that are in common ownership or are in a parent-subsidiary relationship will be treated as separate employers unless the entities are managed in common in the area of employment policy and personnel management. In determining whether there is management in common we will consider whether the same individual or individuals do the managing, whether employees are transferred from one entity to another, whether hiring is done centrally for all corporations, and similar evidence of common or separate management.
(7) PERSONS ON LAYOFF. Persons on layoff will not be counted.
(8) PERSONS ON LEAVE. Persons on paid leave will be counted. Persons on unpaid leave will not be counted.
(9) EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. Independent contractors will not be counted. In determining whether a person is employed or is an independent contractor for the jurisdictional count we will use the same standards that we use for the purpose of determining whether a person comes within the protection of the law against discrimination. These standards are set out in WAC 162-16-230.
(10) PAY. Anyone who is paid for work and who otherwise meets the standards in this section will be counted. This includes paid interns and work study program participants. Pay includes compensation for work by the hour, by commission, by piecework, or by any other measure. For the treatment of unpaid persons, see subsection (11) of this section.
(11) UNPAID PERSONS. An unpaid person will be counted if he or she is generally treated in the manner that employers treat employees. That is, if management selects the person (particularly if selected in competition with other persons), assigns work hours, disciplines the unpaid person like an employee, or provides employment benefits such as industrial insurance, then the person will be counted as an employee. The typical volunteer firefighter would be counted. A person who comes into the food bank when he or she pleases, is put to work if there is anything to do, who leaves when he or she pleases, who has no expectation of paid employment, and who receives no employment benefits, would not be counted.
(12) FAMILY MEMBERS. Because of the definition of “employee” in RCW 49.60.040, we will not count “any individual employed by his or her parents, spouse, or child.” Other family members will be counted.
(13) DOMESTIC HELP. Because of the definition of “employee” in RCW 49.60.040, we will not count a person in the domestic service of the employing person.
(14) DIRECTORS. Directors of corporations, and similar officers of other private or public artificial legal entities, will not be counted simply because they serve in that capacity.
(15) OFFICERS. Officers of corporations, and officers of other private or public artificial legal entities, will be counted unless:
(a) They receive no pay from the corporation or other entity; and
(b) They do not participate in the management of the corporation or other entity beyond participation in formal meetings of the officers.
(16) PARTNERS. Partners will not be counted as employed by the partnership or by each other.
(17) MEMBERS OF A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION. All persons who render professional services for a professional service corporation will be counted as employees of the corporation.
(18) TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE PLACEMENT SERVICES. Persons placed with an on-site employer by a temporary employee placement service:
(a) Will be counted as employees of the temporary placement service; and
(b) Will also be counted as employees of the on-site employer if the on-site employer generally treated them in the manner that employers treat employees (please see the factors listed in WAC 162-16-230).
See WAC 162-16-220 (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added).
CONCLUSION
The Washington Law Against Discrimination defines “employer” in part as “any person . . . who employs eight or more persons.” This is also known as the Eight-Or-More-Employees Rule. The Washington State Human Rights Commission establishes the standards for determining who is counted as employed when deciding whether a person is an employer.
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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT (WA STATE): THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
Hostile work environment is also known as harassment. “To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show the following four elements:
Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 275 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis and hyperlink added).
ELEMENT 3: TERMS OR CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
“The third element requires that the harassment be sufficiently pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Davis v. West One Automotive Group, 140 Wn.App. 449 (Div. 3 2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1039 (Wash. 2008) (citingGlasgow v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 103 Wash.2d 401, 406, 693 P.2d 708 (1985)).
Totality of the Circumstances Test
“To determine whether … conduct was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, courts … look at the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing Adams v. Able Bldg. Supply, Inc., 114 Wash.App. 291, 296, 57 P.3d 280 (2002)).
EXAMPLE: DAVIS v. WEST ONE AUTOMOTIVE GROUP
The Washington State Court of Appeals, Division 3, applied the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test in Davis v. West One Automotive Group, 140 Wn.App. 449 (Div. 3 2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1039 (Wash. 2008).
Therein:
» … Davis[, an African-American man,] worked for West One Automotive Group (West One) from February 2005 until July 2005.
…
» During the course of his five-month employment, Mr. Davis experienced racially charged comments in the workplace. [For example:]
[1] On one occasion, West One manager and Mr. Davis’s supervisor … asked Mr. Davis if he knew “why blacks have a day off on Martin Luther King Day?” When Mr. Davis said he did not know, … [the supervisor] responded, “Because they shot and killed his black a[##].” Mr. Davis told … [the supervisor] the comment was inappropriate and not to make such a comment again.
[2] Another time, … [Davis’s supervisor] stated, “Blacks on the eastside, Mexicans on the west; hell I don’t know.” Mr. Davis was offended, and told … [the supervisor] so.
[3] A third incident involved … [Davis’s supervisor] walking by Mr. Davis’s desk, kicking it and remarking, “What’s up, bitc[#].” Mr. Davis was offended, regarding “bitc[#]” as a derogatory term some African American men use to refer to each other. Mr. Davis again told … [his supervisor] he was offended.
…
[4] On an occasion when Mr. Davis had customers in the finance office and his telephone rang, … [a fellow sales employee] stopped him from answering stating, “Hey, Buckwheat, you can’t get that call.” Mr. Davis was offended and asked Mr. Klein to refer to him by name.…
» The trial court granted West One’s motion for summary judgment dismissal.
» Mr. Davis appeal[ed to the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division 3].
Id. at 452-54 (internal citations omitted) (paragraph formatting, carets, and hyperlinks added).
THE ANALYSIS: Hostile Work Environment: Element #3 (i.e., harassment affected the terms or conditions of employment):
In this case, the Court (Division 3) initially determined that “[w]hether the comments here affected the conditions of Mr. Davis’s employment is a question of fact.” Id. at 457. Thereafter, the Court found facts reflecting that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, as follows:
» “Mr. Davis asserts he was humiliated by these comments. He claims emotional distress.” Id.
» “The record shows Mr. Davis was often late and absent from work.” Id.
» “There was friction between him and other employees.” Id.
» “When he called in ill a few days before his termination, Mr. Davis testified that he was ‘[p]robably mentally sick, drained.'” Id. at 457-58 (alteration in original).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concluded “[a]n inference could be drawn that this was the result of the hostile work environment.” Id. at 458.
TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES
Next, the Court applied the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test and concluded as follows: “Looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Davis, as required, we conclude he had raised a question of fact with regard to the third element of this claim.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held: “Given the numerous factual issues surrounding Mr. Davis’s hostile work environment claim, we reverse the superior court’s order granting summary judgment dismissal.” Id.
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(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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RELEVANT LAW
According to Washington State law: “Every employer shall, at least annually, upon the request of an employee, permit that employee to inspect any or all of his or her own personnel file(s).” RCW 49.12.240.
(b) On and after May 20, 2003, ‘employer‘ means any person, firm, corporation, partnership, business trust, legal representative, or other business entity which engages in any business, industry, profession, or activity in this state and employs one or more employees, and includes the state, any state institution, state agency, political subdivisions of the state, and any municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporation.
However, this chapter and the rules adopted thereunder apply to these public employers only to the extent that this chapter and the rules adopted thereunder do not conflict with:
(i) Any state statute or rule; and
(ii) respect to political subdivisions of the state and any municipal or quasi-municipal corporation, any local resolution, ordinance, or rule adopted under the authority of the local legislative authority before April 1, 2003.
RCW 49.12.005(3)(b), (4) (paragraph formatting and hyperlinks added). The definition of “employee” follows:
[DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE]
…
(4) “Employee” means an employee who is employed in the business of the employee’s employer whether by way of manual labor or otherwise. “Employee” does not include an individual who is at least sixteen years old but under twenty-one years old, in his or her capacity as a player for a junior ice hockey team that is a member of a regional, national, or international league and that contracts with an arena owned, operated, or managed by a public facilities district created under chapter 36.100 RCW.
RCW 49.12.005(4) (paragraph formatting and first hyperlink added).
CONCLUSION
Under Washington State laws, an employer must allow an employee to inspect their own personnel file upon request. Such inspections may occur at least annually.
Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon regarding presumption of acquiescence? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE
Under the Presumption-of-Acquiescence canon, “Legislative silence regarding the construed portion of the statute in a subsequent amendment creates a presumption of acquiescence in that construction.” Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Company, 129 Wn.2d 572, 581 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (concluding that the Washington State Legislature “clearly understood it was adopting exemplary damages as part of Washington’s antidiscrimination law when it amended RCW 49.60.030(2) in 1993 and 1995.” (citing Baker v. Leonard, 120 Wash.2d 538, 545, 843 P.2d 1050 (1993). State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 393, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995). See also State v. Young, 125 Wash.2d 688, 696, 888 P.2d 142 (1995); In re King County Foreclosure of Liens, 117 Wash.2d 77, 86, 811 P.2d 945 (1991) (“the Legislature is presumed to know existing case law in areas in which it is legislating”))). Id.
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Under Washington State laws, are employee-handbook promises enforceable, when they address specific treatment in specific situations on which an employee justifiably relies? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
“Generally, an employment contract indefinite in duration is terminable at will.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). According to the “at-will” doctrine, an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability. SeeFord v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002)(citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, an employee has the absolute right to quit his or her employment at-will. See id. However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment rule: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS: PROMISES OF SPECIFIC TREATMENT IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
“[U]nder certain circumstances, employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees.” Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 539-40 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).
ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY
“Under this theory, [a plaintiff] … must show [the following:]
[a)] … that a statement (or statements) in an employee manual or handbook or similar document amounts to a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, …
[b)] that the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and …
[c)] that the promise was breached.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (paragraph formatting added).
CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Crucial Question
“[T]he crucial question is whether the employee has a reasonable expectation the employer will follow the discipline procedure, based upon the language used in stating the procedure and the pattern of practice in the workplace.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).
2. Questions of Fact
“[W]hether an employment policy manual issued by an employer contains a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, whether the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and whether the promise was breached are questions of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Therefore, summary judgment is proper only if reasonable minds could not differ in resolving these questions.”Id.(internal citation omitted).
3. Ambiguous Discipline Policies Create Issue of Fact
“The Court of Appeals has held that ambiguous discipline policies create an issue of fact as to whether the employer made a binding promise to follow certain discipline procedures.” Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted).
4. Summary Judgment May Not Be Appropriate When Discretionary Language Negated by Other Representations
“[T]he presence of discretionary language may not be sufficient for summary judgment when other representations negate that language.” Id. at 544 (referencing, e.g., Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wn.2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664 (1992) (“We reject the premise that this disclaimer can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an eternal escape hatch for an employer who may then make whatever unenforceable promises of working conditions it is to its benefit to make.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
Under the Washington State law, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations omitted).
If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)
The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:
Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.
(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;
(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;
(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;
(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;
(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and
(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.
RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis and first paragraph hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.
UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES: EMPLOYEES WITH HIV OR HEPATITIS C INFECTIONS
Under the WLAD, unfair employment practices with respect to employees with HIV or hepatitis C infections, follow:
Unfair practices with respect to HIV or hepatitis C infection.
(1) No person may require an individual to take an HIV or hepatitis C test, as a condition of hiring, promotion, or continued employment unless the absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job in question.
(2) No person may discharge or fail or refuse to hire any individual, or segregate or classify any individual in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive that individual of employment opportunities or adversely affect his or her status as an employee, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of the results of an HIV test or hepatitis C test unless the absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection is a bona fide occupational qualification of the job in question.
(3) The absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection as a bona fide occupational qualification exists when performance of a particular job can be shown to present a significant risk, as defined by the board of health by rule, of transmitting HIV or hepatitis C infection to other persons, and there exists no means of eliminating the risk by restructuring the job.
(4) For the purpose of this chapter, any person who is actually infected with HIV or hepatitis C, but is not disabled as a result of the infection, shall not be eligible for any benefits under the affirmative action provisions of chapter 49.74 RCW solely on the basis of such infection.
(5) Employers are immune from civil action for damages arising out of transmission of HIV or hepatitis C to employees or to members of the public unless such transmission occurs as a result of the employer’s gross negligence.
Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the WLAD] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).
If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.
Under Washington State laws, what is the tort of battery? Here’s my point of view.
(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)
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THE TORT OF BATTERY (WA STATE)
A tort is “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1526 (8th ed. 2004). The tort of “‘battery’ is an intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff’s person.” Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 504, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014).
THE ELEMENTS
“A defendant is liable for battery if[:]
(a) he [or she] acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the [plaintiff or a third party], or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and
(b) a harmful or offensive contact with the [plaintiff] directly or indirectly results.
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965)) (second-fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, “[a] person … commits a battery where he or she performs [a]n act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another’s person and that act is intentional, is not consented to, and is otherwise unprivileged.” Id. at 504 (second alteration in original) (internal citations an quotation marks omitted).
Battery cases often involve one or more of the following Issues: (1) offensive bodily contact, (2) intent, (3) force, and (4) fraud/duress.
(1) OFFENSIVE BODILY CONTACT
In Washington, “[a] bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19). “Thus, an offensive contact does not have to result in physical injury to constitute a battery.” Id. (referencing Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753 (1910) (“facts established claim for battery where defendant pushed plaintiff’s hat back in order to see his face”); Crawford v. Bergen, 91 Iowa 675, 60 N.W. 205 (1894) (“facts established claim for battery where defendant placed his hand on the plaintiff’s shoulder and asked him an insulting question”)).
Nature of the Contact: “[T]he ‘contact’ element of a battery is simply a harmful or an offensive contact with the plaintiff; thus, a battery can occur where, for example, the plaintiff comes in harmful contact with the ground but never touches the defendant.” Id. at 504 (internal citation omitted).
(2) INTENT
“[T]he ‘intent’ element of battery is satisfied where a defendant knows to a ‘substantial certainty’ that his actions will result in the harmful or offensive touching.” Id. at 504-05 (internal citation omitted).
(3) FORCE
“‘[F]orce’ is not an element of battery.” Id. at 504 (internal citation omitted).
(4) FRAUD/DURESS
“A person therefore commits a battery where he or she performs [a]n act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another’s person and that act is intentional, is not consented to, and is otherwise unprivileged.” Id. at 504 (alteration in original) (internal citations an quotation marks omitted). “These elements are met where the plaintiff’s consent to the contact is procured by fraud or duress.” Id. at 505 (internal citations omitted).
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