In Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 500 P.3d 203 (Wash. App. 2021), Defendant Jefferson Healthcare terminated Plaintiff Crabtree’s employment following her pregnancy. Consequently, Crabtree filed a sex discrimination lawsuit against Jefferson Healthcare, but the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing her claims of sex discrimination. Crabtree appealed.
SNAPSHOT: This is a case summary of Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 500 P.3d 203 (Wash. App. 2021). It contains multiple sections. The following section is a snapshot of key data including case citation, description, categories, and impact on Legal Trees. (TIP: Look for the green button throughout this article for more helpful information)
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I. SNAPSHOT
case citation
Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 500 P.3d 203 (Wash. App. 2021)
DESCRIPTION
“Jillian Crabtree appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing her claims of sex discrimination against her employer, Jefferson Healthcare.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 203.
“Jefferson Healthcare fired Crabtree after she became pregnant.” Id.
“On appeal, Crabtree argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) Jefferson Healthcare’s stated reasons for her termination were a pretext for discrimination, and (2) Jefferson Healthcare was substantially motivated by Crabtree’s pregnancy when it made the decision to discharge her. Id.
“Because issues of material fact exist regarding both these issues, we reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.” Id.
CATEGORIES
(1) Discriminatory Discharge (Sex/Pregnancy)
(2) Evidence of Pretext
(3) Evidence of Discrimination as a Motivating Factor
LEGAL TREEs
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CASE SUMMARY SECTION: The following section contains material facts and evidence that the Court considered in this case.
II. CASE SUMMARY
Material Facts & Evidence (30 Items):
[1] “Crabtree started working at Jefferson Healthcare as the manager of patient access services in May 2018.” Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 500 P.3d 203 (Wash. App. 2021).
[2] “Crabtree’s direct supervisor was Jennifer Goodwin, who was in turn supervised by Hilary Whittington.” Id. at 213.
[3] “About seven months after Crabtree started her position, she received her first performance evaluation on November 26, 2018. ” Id. at 207.
[4] “Goodwin evaluated Crabtree as ‘meeting expectations’ in most categories.” Id. at 214.
[5] “Crabtree told Whittington that she was pregnant in December of 2018.” Id. at 208.
[6] “When Whittington learned of Crabtree’s pregnancy, she remarked ‘Wow. Poor Jen. She’s going to be without a whole staff this spring/summer.'” Id. at 214. (internal citation omitted).
[7] “[W]hen Crabtree told Goodwin that she was pregnant, Goodwin asked if Crabtree would be taking leave, and Crabtree said she would[][;] Goodwin then followed up by asking if Crabtree planned on coming back after her leave, and Crabtree responded “yes[]”[;] Goodwin then asked if Crabtree was interested in returning to a lesser role, to which Crabtree responded ‘No. I like my job.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
[8] “Goodwin was supervising four managerial positions, one of which was vacant when Crabtree announced her pregnancy.” Id.
[9] “Straughn-Morse was … [another] manager on Goodwin’s team who was pregnant at the same time as Crabtree.” Id. at 211.
[10] “During a staff meeting, Whittington noted that Crabtree and Straughn-Morse were pregnant and that Jefferson Healthcare expected to be short-staffed for the spring and summer.” Id. at 214.
[11] “In February 2019, Crabtree met with HR to discuss her options for taking maternity leave.” Id. at 209
[12] “Crabtree was placed on a PIP only a day after she discussed maternity leave with HR.” Id. at 214
[13] “Only a few weeks before Goodwin placed Crabtree on a PIP, Goodwin evaluated Crabtree as ‘meeting expectations’ in most categories.” Id.
[14] “Goodwin informed … [Crabtree] that a good faith effort to comply with the PIP was enough and … had been giving her positive feedback.” Id. at 213.
[15] “More than half way through the PIP and following Crabtree’s second to last checkpoint meeting on March 5, Goodwin told Crabtree that she was ‘doing well’ on all of her goals on the PIP.” Id.
[16] “Goodwin then expressed her lack of confidence in Crabtree’s ability to complete the PIP, and she urged Crabtree to consider lesser roles.” Id. at 214.
[17] “Crabtree chose to continue in her role and was terminated [on March 15,] before the PIP period ended.” Id.
[18] “At the same time that Crabtree was placed on a PIP, Straughn-Morse, the other pregnant manager, assumed a lesser role.” Id.
[19] “After Straughn-Morse became pregnant, Goodwin gave Straughn-Morse the responsibility of managing an additional team with no additional pay, and she informed her that the added responsibility was not optional if she wanted to continue in her role.” Id.
[20] “Straughn-Morse then started at a lesser role with a corresponding reduction in pay and went on maternity leave shortly after.” Id.
[21] “[B]oth pregnant women on Goodwin’s team lost their managerial roles after becoming pregnant.” Id.
[22] “Jefferson Healthcare relied on evidence of Crabtree’s PIP and November evaluation as the reason for her termination.” Id. 213.
[23] “In Crabtree’s termination letter, Goodwin claimed that she terminated Crabtree because she failed to complete or start her PIP goals.” Id.
[24] “[T]he termination letter stated that Crabtree had not started on a SWOT analysis or an impact analysis[.]” Id.
[25] “[I]n the termination letter, Goodwin wrote that the registration staffing plan ‘had not been started.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
[26] “However, Crabtree had already completed steps towards achieving that goal[ ][;] Her work on that goal was put on pause because Jefferson Healthcare was imposing new duties on the registration staff, so Crabtree had to stop working because the change directly affected her ability to implement a new registration staffing plan because it ‘significantly change[d] how many … interactions the registrants have.'” Id. (last two alterations in original) (internal citation omitted).
[27] Moreover, “the PIP did not require Crabtree to ‘draft’ a staffing plan or an impact analysis[ ][;] [i]t simply required her to learn Epic, define productivity expectations, and schedule staff meetings.” Id.
[28] “Crabtree filed a lawsuit against Jefferson Healthcare alleging that Jefferson Healthcare terminated her because of her pregnancy in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).” Id. at 211.
[29] “After discovery, Jefferson Healthcare moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.” Id.
[30] “Crabtree appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing her claims of sex discrimination against Jefferson Healthcare.” Id.
Crabtree v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 500 P.3d 203 (Wash. App. 2021).
GENERAL RULES SECTION: The following section contains general rules. Our website uses the term “general rules” to mean the Court’s statement of relevant laws in this case.
III. GENERAL RULES
The General Rules Section for this case includes the following topics:
1. Summary Judgment: Standard of Review
2. Washington Law Against Discrimination: Discriminatory Discharge
3. Burden-Shifting Framework (McDonnell Douglas)
4. Establishing Pretext
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: STANDARD OF REVIEW
(a) DISMISSALS REVIEWED DE NOVO
The Court “review[s] dismissals on summary judgment de novo.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 211 (citing Frausto v. Yakima HMA, LLC , 188 Wash.2d 227, 231, 393 P.3d 776 (2017)).
(b) EVIDENCE & REASONABLE INFRENCES REVIEWED IN LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO NONMOVING PARTY
The Court “review[s] all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[.]” Id. (citing Keck v. Collins, 184 Wash.2d 358, 368, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015)).
(c) AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court “affirm[s] an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing CR 56(c); Keck, 184 Wash.2d at 370, 357 P.3d 1080).
(d) DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMPETING INFERENCES OF BOTH DISCRIMINATION AND NONDISCRIMINATION: When the record contains “reasonable but competing inferences of both discrimination and nondiscrimination, it is the jury’s task to choose between such inferences—not the court’s.” Id. at 214 (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wash.2d 516, 536, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT: Thus: “A motion for summary judgment must be denied if the nonmoving party … shows specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 212 (citing Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, LLC, 200 Wash. App. 178, 183, 401 P.3d 468 (2017)).
HOW TO DETERMINE WHEN A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS: “A genuine issue of fact exists when reasonable minds could disagree on the facts controlling the outcome of the case.” Id. (citing Sutton v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 180 Wash. App. 859, 864-65, 324 P.3d 763 (2014)).
HOW EMPLOYEES MAY AVOID SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “To avoid summary judgment, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 528, 404 P.3d 464).
(e) RARELY APPROPRIATE IN DISCRIMINATORY-DISCHARGE CASES
“Summary judgment for an employer is rarely appropriate in a discriminatory discharge case because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory motivation.” Id. at 212 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE
“The WLAD bars employers from discharging an employee because of certain characteristics, including sex.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 211 (citing RCW 49.60.180(2)).
(a) SEX DISCRIMINATION INCLUDES PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
“The ban on discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” Id. (citing WAC 162-30-020).
(b) DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE FALLS UNDER RCW 49.60.180(2)
“A violation of RCW 49.60.180(2) supports a discriminatory discharge claim.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (hyperlink added)).
3. BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK
EMPLOYEES MAY RELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDIRECT, AND INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: “Because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare, an employee may rely on circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence to establish discriminatory action.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 211 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
EMPLOYEES RELYING ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDRECT, OR INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE DISCRIMINATION MAY USE THE 3-STEP, BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK: “Where the employee lacks direct evidence, Washington has adopted the three step evidentiary burden shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) for discriminatory discharge claims.” Id. (citing Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wash.2d 439, 445-46, 334 P.3d 541 (2014)).
(a) STEP #1: Employee must establish a prima facie claim
(EDITOR’S NOTE: there are different formulations of the prima facie case depending on both the law in question and legal theory pursued. In this case, the plaintiff pursued a claim of discriminatory discharge under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, and the following rule reflects the same.)
“First, [under the burden-shifting framework,] an employee must make a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by showing that she was
(1) within a statutorily protected class,
(2) discharged by the defendant, and
(3) doing satisfactory work.
Id. (citing Mikkelsen , 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (emphasis and paragraph formatting added). “Where the employee establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination exists. Id. at 211-12 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464).
(b) STEP #2: Employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
“Second, the burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.” Id. at 212 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
NOTE: “The employer is not required to persuade the court that it actually was motivated by the nondiscriminatory reason, the employer need only show that the employer’s evidence, if taken as true would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 533, 404 P.3d 464).
(c) STEP #3: Employee must show employer’s reason is pretext
“Third, if the employer meets this burden, the employee must produce sufficient evidence showing that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge was a pretext.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 212 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464).
TWO METHODS TO SATISFY THE PRETEXT PRONG: “An employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either … [(1)] that the defendant’s reason is pretextual or … [(2)] that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer. Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and paragraph formatting added).
(1) FIRST METHOD: Show the defendant’s reason is pretextual
“Employees may satisfy the pretext prong of the [burden shifting] framework by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact … that the employer’s articulated reason for its action is pretextual.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 212 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 441, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “The ways in which an employee can show that a stated reason for termination was pretext for discrimination include, but are not limited to,
[»] that the reason has no basis in fact,
[»] it was not really a motivating factor for the decision …[,]
[»] it lacks a temporal connection to the decision[,] [or]
[»] [it] was not a motivating factor in employment decisions for other employees in the same circumstances.
Id. (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 447-48, 334 P.3d 541) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (sixth alteration in original) (emphasis and paragraph formatting added).
(2) SECOND METHOD: Show that although the employer’s stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer
A discriminatory-discharge plaintiff “can alternatively meet … [their] burden to show pretext by showing that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor for … [their] termination.” See Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 214 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 527, 404 P.3d 464).
PLAINTIFF MAY USE EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYER TREATMENT OF OTHER EMPLOYEES TO SHOW MOTIVE OR INTENT FOR HARASSMENT/DISCHARGE: “In an employment discrimination context, our Supreme Court has recognized that evidence of employer treatment of other employees is permissible to show motive or intent for harassment or discharge.” Id. (citing Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 164 Wash.2d 432, 445, 191 P.3d 879 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(3) LIMITATIONS
a) EMPLOYEE NOT REQUIRED TO DISPROVE EACH OF EMPLOYER’S REASONS OR PROVE DISCRIMINATION WAS ONLY MOTIVATING FACTOR IN TERMINATION: “An employee does not need to disprove each of the employer’s articulated reasons to satisfy the pretext burden of production.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 212 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 447, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does an employee need to prove that discrimination was the only motivating factor in her termination.” Id. at 212-13 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 447, 334 P.3d 541).
b) EMPLOYER MAY BE MOTIVATED BY BOTH LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE PURPOSES AND STILL BE LIABLE UNDER WLAD: “An employer may be motivated by multiple purposes, both legitimate and illegitimate, when making employment decisions and still be liable under the WLAD.” Id. at 213 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 447, 334 P.3d 541) (internal quotation marks omitted).
c) CIRCUMSTANTIAL, INDIRECT, & INFERENTIAL EVIDENCE ENOUGH TO DISCHARGE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN: “Circumstantial, indirect, and inferential evidence is sufficient to discharge the plaintiff’s burden.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 526, 404 P.3d 464).
d) IF EMPLOYEE PRODUCES EVIDENCE COUNTERING EMPLOYER’S REASONS, CASE MUST BE SUBMITTED TO JURY: “If a plaintiff produces evidence at this [ ] stage to counter the employer’s reasons, the case must be submitted to the jury; if not, the employer is entitled to a dismissal.” Id. (citing Chen v. State, 86 Wash. App. 183, 190, 937 P.2d 612 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
e) EMPLOYEE MUST DO MORE THAN EXPRESS OPINION OR MAKE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS – FACTS MUST BE SPECIFIC & MATERIAL: “To overcome an employer’s summary judgment motion, the employee must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements.” Id. (citing Chen, 86 Wash. App. at 190, 937 P.2d 612). “Instead, the facts must be specific and material.” Id. (citing Chen, 86 Wash. App. at 190, 937 P.2d 612).
f) ASSERTION OF GOOD PERFORMANCE TO CONTRADICT THAT OF BAD PERFORMANCE IS NOT ENOUGH: “An employee’s assertion of good performance to contradict the employer’s assertion of poor performance does not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Id. (citing Chen, 86 Wash. App. at 191, 937 P.2d 612).
(d) Employee NOT required to show discrimination was the ONLY motivating factor
“The employee is not required to show that discrimination was the only motivating factor for the discharge because an employer’s decision may be based on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 212 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464).
HOW TO SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT: Thus, “To survive summary judgment, the employee need only present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination was a substantial factor in an adverse employment action, not the only motivating factor.” Id. at 214 (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 534, 404 P.3d 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ISSUES SECTION: The following section explains the court’s treatment of this case by separately presenting each issue followed by associated rules, analysis, and conclusion. The text color of each issue statement is always blue.
IV. ISSUES
ISSUE #1: Did sufficient evidence of pretext exist to survive summary judgment?
THE PARTIES AGREE THAT STEPS ONE AND TWO OF THE BURDEN SHIFTING FRAMEWORK ARE MET: “The parties agree, for the purpose of summary judgment, that steps one and two of the burden shifting framework are met. Therefore, … [the Court] analyze[s] only the third step—whether Jefferson Healthcare’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge was a pretext.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 212 (hyperlink added).
IT IS THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN TO SHOW PRETEXT (STEP THREE): “In this step of the burden shifting framework, the employee, Crabtree, bears the burden of showing sufficient facts supporting pretext to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 441, 334 P.3d 541).
(A) YES: Crabtree produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons provided by Jefferson Healthcare were pretext for discrimination.
THE RULES: See § III(3)(C) (General Rules: Burden-Shifting Framework: Step 3 – Employee Must Show Employer’s Reason is Pretext), supra.
(1) Defendant’s Argument #1
Plaintiff Crabtree Failed to Complete/Start Her PIP Goals.
◊ In this case, “Jefferson Healthcare relied on evidence of Crabtree’s PIP and November evaluation as the reason for her termination.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 213. “In Crabtree’s termination letter, Goodwin claimed that she terminated Crabtree because she failed to complete or start her PIP goals.” Id.
a) Plaintiff’s Response
Goodwin Told Plaintiff She Was Doing Well on All Her PIP Goals.
♦ “Crabtree rebuts that evidence by showing that Goodwin informed her that a good faith effort to comply with the PIP was enough and that Goodwin had been giving her positive feedback. More than half way through the PIP and following Crabtree’s second to last checkpoint meeting on March 5, Goodwin told Crabtree that she was ‘doing well’ on all of her goals on the PIP.” Id.
(2) Defendant’s Argument #2
Plaintiff Crabtree failed to start the Registration Staffing Plan; Crabtree was not making progress; Goldwin told Crabtree to continue working on Registration Staffing Plan despite new duties.
◊ “[I]n the termination letter, Goodwin wrote that the registration staffing plan ‘had not been started.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
◊ “Jefferson Healthcare argues that Crabtree was not actually making progress on the registration plan because she ‘was no closer to actually drafting a Registration Staffing Plan,’ and had only been reviewing data. Id. (internal citation omitted).
◊ “[Jefferson also] … argues that Goodwin told Crabtree to continue working on the registration staffing plan despite the new duties being imposed on the registration staff.” Id.
a) Plaintiff’s Response
Plaintiff had Already completed steps towards completing goal of Starting Registration Staffing Plan; Defendant paused Plaintiff’s efforts; PIP did not require drafting Staffing Plan or Impact Analysis.
♦ “Crabtree had already completed steps towards achieving the goal of starting the registration staffing plan. Her work on that goal was put on pause because Jefferson Healthcare was imposing new duties on the registration staff, so Crabtree had to stop working because the change directly affected her ability to implement a new registration staffing plan because it “significantly change[d] how many … interactions the registrants have.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
♦ Moreover, “the PIP did not require Crabtree to ‘draft’ a staffing plan …. It simply required her to learn Epic, define productivity expectations, and schedule staff meetings.” Id.
(3) Defendant’s Argument #3
Plaintiff Crabtree failed to start a SWOT Analysis or Impact Analysis.
◊ “[T]he termination letter stated that Crabtree had not started on a SWOT analysis or an impact analysis.” Id.
a) Plaintiff’s Response
Plaintiff Was Gathering Necessary Info for SWOT and Impact Analysis; the PIP did not Require Impact Analysis.
♦ “Crabtree testified that she was gathering the information necessary for the SWOT and impact analysis, a necessary step.” Id.
♦ Moreover, “the PIP did not require Crabtree to ‘draft’ … an impact analysis. It simply required her to learn Epic, define productivity expectations, and schedule staff meetings.” Id.
(4) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
Evidence shows the reasons in the termination letter are not based in fact; Plaintiff does more than just assert her performance was good; a jury could reasonable conclude Plaintiff started working toward her PIP goals.
⇒ “Crabtree introduced evidence to show that the reasons in the termination letter are not based in fact.” Id.
⇒ “These facts are more than just an employee’s assertion that her performance was good. These positive messages during the PIP process undermine Jefferson Healthcare’s assertions about its reasons for terminating Crabtree.” Id.
⇒ Moreover, “A jury could reasonably conclude that Crabtree had, in fact, started working toward her PIP goals.” Id.
∴ CONCLUSION: “Viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Crabtree, Crabtree met her burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Jefferson Healthcare’s stated reasons for terminating Crabtree were pretext for discrimination.” Id.
(b) COURT’S HOLDING → PLAINTIFF
In this case, the Court “[held] that [Plaintiff] Crabtree produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons provided by Jefferson Healthcare were pretext for discrimination.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 213-14.
(c) REVERSED AND REMANDED
“Because genuine issues of material fact exist, the trial court erred in granting Jefferson Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, we reverse the order granting summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.” Id. at 216.
ISSUE #2: Did sufficient evidence of discrimination as a motivating factor exist to survive summary judgment?
(A) YES: CRABTREE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXITS AS TO WHETHER HER PREGNANCY WAS A SUBSTANTIALLY MOTIVATING FACTOR IN HER TERMINATION.
THE RULES: See supra § III(3)(C) (General Rules: Burden-Shifting Framework: Step 3 – Employee Must Show Employer’s Reason is Pretext).
(1) Plaintiff’s Argument
“Crabtree alternatively argues that she presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Jefferson Healthcare was substantially motivated to terminate Crabtree because of her pregnancy.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 214.
a) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
“Viewing the evidence and inferences in Crabtree’s favor, we hold that she presented sufficient evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists ….” Id. at 214.
⇒ “Goodwin was supervising four managerial positions, one of which was vacant when Crabtree announced her pregnancy. Of the three managers, Crabtree and Straughn-Morse were pregnant at the same time. If both managers were to take maternity leave at the same time, Goodwin would have been left with only one manager for the spring and summer.” Id.
⇒ “Only a few weeks before Goodwin placed Crabtree on a PIP, Goodwin evaluated Crabtree as ‘meeting expectations’ in most categories. When Whittington learned of Crabtree’s pregnancy, she remarked ‘Wow. Poor Jen. She’s going to be without a whole staff this spring/summer.'” Id. (internal citation omitted).
⇒ “Likewise, when Crabtree told Goodwin that she was pregnant, Goodwin asked if Crabtree would be taking leave, and Crabtree said she would. Goodwin then followed up by asking if Crabtree planned on coming back after her leave, and Crabtree responded ‘yes.’ Goodwin then asked if Crabtree was interested in returning to a lesser role, to which Crabtree responded ‘No. I like my job.'” Id. (internal citations omitted)
⇒ “During a staff meeting, Whittington noted that Crabtree and Straughn-Morse were pregnant and that Jefferson Healthcare expected to be short-staffed for the spring and summer.” Id.
⇒ “In addition to those remarks, Crabtree was placed on a PIP only a day after she discussed maternity leave with HR. Goodwin then expressed her lack of confidence in Crabtree’s ability to complete the PIP, and she urged Crabtree to consider lesser roles. Crabtree chose to continue in her role and was terminated before the PIP period ended.” Id.
⇒ “At the same time that Crabtree was placed on a PIP, Straughn-Morse, the other pregnant manager, assumed a lesser role. After Straughn-Morse became pregnant, Goodwin gave Straughn-Morse the responsibility of managing an additional team with no additional pay, and she informed her that the added responsibility was not optional if she wanted to continue in her role. Straughn-Morse then started at a lesser role with a corresponding reduction in pay and went on maternity leave shortly after.” Id.
⇒ “Importantly, both pregnant women on Goodwin’s team lost their managerial roles after becoming pregnant.” Id.
∴ “Viewing the evidence and inferences in Crabtree’s favor, we hold that she presented sufficient evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Crabtree’s pregnancy was a substantially motivating factor for Jefferson Healthcare to terminate her.” Id. at 214.
(2) Defendant’s First Argument
“Jefferson Healthcare argues that the comments made by Whittington and Goodwin in response to Crabtree’s pregnancy are not sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact because they do not show an intent to discriminate.” Crabtree, 500 P.3d at 214.
a) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
The comments are circumstantial evidence probative of discriminatory intent.
⇒ The Court used the Scrivener case to evaluate this argument. “In Scivener [sic], the Supreme Court held that Scrivener presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether her age was a substantial factor in her termination.” Id. at 214-15 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 448, 334 P.3d 541) (hyperlink added).
⇒ “Scrivener presented evidence of comments from the president noting the ‘glaring need for diversity’ and ‘need for younger talent.'” Id. at 215 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 449, 334 P.3d 541).
⇒ “Even though the Scrivener court considered additional circumstances, it noted ‘[w]hether or not these statements alone would be sufficient to show either pretext or that Scrivener’s age was a substantially motivating factor, they are circumstantial evidence probative of discriminatory intent.'” Id. (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 450, 334 P.3d 541) (alteration in original) (hyperlink added).
(3) Defendant’s Second Argument
Part 1: “Jefferson Healthcare cites to Mikkelsen to support its position that ‘stray remarks’ are not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 215. (internal citation omitted).
Part 2: “Jefferson Healthcare argues that the stray remarks alone would not have been sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and that the court considered additional circumstances in Scrivener not present here.” Id.
◊ “In Mikkelsen, the court affirmed dismissal on summary judgment of Mikkelsen’s age discrimination claim.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 475, 404 P.3d 464) (hyperlink added).
◊ “Mikkelsen presented only two pieces of evidence in support of her age claim: the general manager called her ‘old and stale’ once, and that the general manager had a ‘fixation’ on a 72-year old employee.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 475, 404 P.3d 464).
◊ “Our Supreme Court held that Mikkelsen presented no evidence [that] the [general manager] treated older employees differently.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 475, 404 P.3d 464) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
◊ “Therefore, it affirmed summary judgment dismissal of Mikkelsen’s age discrimination claim.” Id. (citing Mikkelsen, 189 Wash.2d at 475, 404 P.3d 464).
a) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
Stray remarks can be considered in determining whether the evidence in its entirety creates a genuine issue of material fact, and Crabtree does not rely solely on manager remarks
⇒ The Court concluded that “Scrivener made clear that stray remarks can be considered in determining whether the evidence in its entirety creates a genuine issue of material fact, and Crabtree does not rely solely on manager remarks.” Id. at 215 (citing Scrivener, 181 Wash.2d at 450, 334 P.3d 541) (“The Court of Appeals disregarded [the] statements … as stray remarks that do not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent … We disagree.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (hyperlink added).
⇒ “Therefore, Scrivener actually supports Crabtree’s position.” Id. (hyperlink added).
⇒ In addition, “Unlike the age discrimination evidence in Mikkelsen, Crabtree presented more evidence than just the remarks made by Whittington and Goodwin.” Id. (hyperlink added).
i) “She presented evidence of another employee, Straughn-Morse, giving up her managerial position shortly before going on maternity leave.” Id.
ii) “Crabtree also introduced evidence of a potential motive behind why Straughn-Morse was moved to a lesser role and why she herself was placed on a PIP a day after discussing maternity leave with HR.” Id.
iii) “As evidenced by Goodwin and Whittington’s remarks, the vacancy on Goodwin’s team was a concern for Jefferson Healthcare.” Id.
iv) “When Crabtree informed Whittington of her pregnancy, Whittington expressed concern for how Goodwin was going to handle two of her managers taking maternity leave.” Id.
v) “In addition, when Crabtree informed Goodwin of her pregnancy, Goodwin asked if Crabtree was going to take leave and whether she was interested in a lesser role.” Id.
vi) “Moreover, the reasons for Crabtree’s termination as listed in her termination letter did not accurately reflect Crabtree’s PIP progress.” Id.
vii) “Also, the PIP came only a few weeks after Goodwin had evaluated Crabtree’s performance as meeting expectations in most categories.” Id.
∴ “Therefore, the facts surrounding Mikkelsen’s age discrimination claim are distinguishable from the facts in this case.” Id.
(4) Defendant’s Third Argument
The evidence of Straughn-Morse’s new position is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible
◊ The Defendant “cites to Brundridge, where the court held that even if evidence is probative of discriminatory intent, it will not be admissible if its value is outweighed by prejudice.” Id. at 215 (citing Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 164 Wash.2d 432, 445, 191 P.3d 879 (2008)).
◊ “In that case, the plaintiffs alleged discriminatory discharge based on retaliation for refusing to install unsafe safety valves.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
◊ “They introduced testimony of another employee who spoke about incidents of dangerous gases and how management downplayed those incidents.” Id. at 215-16 (internal citation omitted).
◊ “The court did not admit that portion of the testimony because the company did not take adverse action against the employee who reported the incidents, and thus, the testimony was irrelevant to a retaliatory discharge claim.” Id. at 216 (internal citation omitted).
a) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
The Straughn-Morse evidence is relevant to the issue of sex discrimination
⇒ “[T]he Brundridge court admitted evidence of retaliation against other employees to show motive because it found it to be relevant.” Id. at 216 (internal citation omitted).
⇒ “Like the admissible testimony about retaliation against employees in Brundridge, the circumstances surrounding Straughn-Morse’s change in position are relevant because they tend to show that the only other pregnant manager under Goodwin’s supervision had to take a lower paying position around the same time.” Id.
⇒ “Both of the pregnant women on Goodwin’s team could not maintain their managerial roles after they announced their pregnancy.” Id.
∴ “Therefore, we consider the Straughn-Morse evidence to be relevant to the issue of sex discrimination.” Id.
(4) Defendant’s Fourth Argument
“Finally, Jefferson Healthcare argues that Straughn-Morse’s decision to move to a lesser role was voluntary because she did not indicate that Jefferson Healthcare pressured or threatened her to take adverse action against her if she did not accept the position.” Id. at 216.
a) Court’s Analysis (⇒)
“There are two rational and competing inferences, and we must view the inferences and evidence in the light most favorable to Crabtree.” Id. at 216.
⇒ “[W]hen reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we view all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
⇒ “Here, there are two inferences that could be made from Straughn-Morse’s position change.” Id.
⇒ “The first inference is that she accepted the position voluntarily without any pressure from Jefferson Healthcare—such an inference would be a nondiscriminatory inference.” Id.
⇒ “Another inference could be that in the conversation Straughn-Morse had with Goodwin, she felt that she had no choice but to accept a lesser role in order to keep her job—such an inference would be a discriminatory inference.” Id.
∴ “There are two rational and competing inferences, and we must view the inferences and evidence in the light most favorable to Crabtree.” Id.
(b) COURT’S HOLDING → PLAINTIFF
“Viewing the evidence and inferences in Crabtree’s favor, we hold that she presented sufficient evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Crabtree’s pregnancy was a substantially motivating factor for Jefferson Healthcare to terminate her.” Id. at 214.
(c) REVERSED AND REMANDED
“Because genuine issues of material fact exist, the trial court erred in granting Jefferson Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, we reverse the order granting summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.” Id. at 216.
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