How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)

How Courts Construe Legal Privileges (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts construe legal privileges? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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HOW COURTS CONSTRUE LEGAL PRIVILEGES (WA STATE)

Generally, a “privilege” is “[a] special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. [ ] A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004).

In Washington State, “[t]here are two types of privileges: common law privileges and statutory privileges. See Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020).

COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES: courts have more latitude to interpret

“Common law privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, are those privileges whose codifications are ‘merely declaratory of the common law.'” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845 (1953)) (emphasis added).

“The court has more latitude to interpret common law privileges.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 815, 259 P.2d 845 (although not specified in the statute codifying the attorney-client privilege, we held that “[t]he same privilege accorded the attorney is extended to the client under the common-law rule (citing State v. Ingels, 4 Wash.2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940))).

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES: courts strictly construe

“In contrast, when a privilege is created by statute and thus is not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly construed.” Id., 466 P.3d 1077 (citing Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychologist-client privilege is created by statute in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed); Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 212-13, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (physician-patient privilege is created by statute and is strictly construed (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979))) (parenthetical emphasis added).

“Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the marital counseling privilege is [also] created by statute and must be strictly construed by interpreting the specific words in the statute that the legislature has codified.” Id. at 802-03 (citing Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 429, 671 P.2d 230).

CONCLUSION

In Washington State, there are common-law privileges and statutory privileges. Common-law privileges such as the attorney-client privilege are “declaratory of the common law,” and courts have more freedom to construe them. Whereas statutory privileges such a the psychologist-client privilege, physician-patient privilege, and marital-counseling privilege are considered to be an “exemption from the common law,” and courts must strictly construe them.


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The Implied Cause of Action Rule

Implied Cause of Action Rule


Under Washington State laws, what is the Implied Cause of Action Rule? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

(IMPORTANT: This article is for entertainment purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION RULE: WA STATE

Washington State courts may apply the Implied Cause of Action Rule to Washington State statutes that create a right on the part of individuals but do not indicate explicitly an intent to create a remedy. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 921, 784 P.2d 1258, (1990).

a judicial canon of construction

Accordingly, the Implied Cause of Action Rule is a judicial canon directing that “when a statute … [has] provided a right of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to devise a remedy. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland’s Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55.03 (4th ed. 1973).” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing State v. Manuel, 94 Wash.2d 695, 699, 619 P.2d 977 (1980); see also Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (implying a right of action under the state’s labor relations act for an employee who claimed that his employer, in violation of the statute, had interfered with the employee’s labor activities); State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wash.2d 565, 570, 369 P.2d 844 (1962) (“[c]ourts have consistently held that when a statute gives a new right and no specific remedy, the common law will provide a remedy”)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This judicial canon has its roots in federal law as well as the Restatement of Torts.

NOTE: A judicial canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Federal Law

“The federal courts also recognize an implied cause of action under a statute which provides protection to a specified class of persons but creates no remedy.” Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (referencing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); In re WPPSS Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1987)).

THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

The Washington State Supreme Court has found that “The Restatement of Torts recognizes the implied right of action [as well]:

When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.

Bennett, 113 Wn.2d at 920, 784 P.2d 1258 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979)) (emphasis added).

THE ELEMENTS

Washington courts have borrowed “from the test used by federal courts in determining whether to imply a cause of action.” Id. Accordingly, the Washington State Implied Right of Action Rule requires that the following issues be answered in the affirmative:

(1) whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose “especial” benefit the statute was enacted;

(2) whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy;

(3) whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.

Id. at 920-21 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

the assumptions

Lastly, the court may make two important assumptions under the Implied Right of Action Rule:

(1) “[t]he [Washington State Legislature] is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action [when it drafts legislation;] and

[(2) the court can] also assume that the legislature would not enact a remedial statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights.”

See id. at 919-20 (paragraph formatting added).


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» Employment Law 101: Legal Theory


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What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?

What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?
Q: What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?

IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?

(This article will only address claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. However, there are other laws (both state and federal) that might support a claim of wrongful termination.)

answer:

In Washington State, the statute of limitations for commencing wrongful-termination lawsuit in a state court, under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), is 3 years pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(2). See Lewis v. Lockheed Shipbuilding and Const. Co., 36 Wn.App. 607, 676 P.2d 545 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1984). However, there could also be earlier deadlines.

(Warning: It can be a complicated and difficult process to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run for individual WLAD claims, and an improper determination can bar both claims for administrative relief (see below) and prospective lawsuits (see above). Therefore, the reader is strongly encouraged to contact an employment attorney to determine both the statute of limitations and when it begins to run for individual WLAD claims — please see our DISCLAIMER.)

Administrative Agencies (WSHRC & EEOC):

Generally, the jurisdictional time limitation for filing wrongful-termination complaints through administrative agencies such as the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is significantly shorter; however, this topic is beyond the scope of this article — speak to an attorney for more information. See “Warning,” above.

Other Relevant Laws:

Other employment laws (both state and federal) might also support a claim of “wrongful termination” in Washington State including, but not limited to the following:

→ Washington State Common Law (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (when the termination is discriminatory, based on a protected class)

→ Section 1981 (42 U.S.C. §1981) (when the termination supports a viable legal theory of racial discrimination)

Talk to an attorney to determine the statute of limitations for relevant state and federal laws. See “Warning,” above.

Additional Information:

A “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1451 (Deluxe 8th ed. 2004). “The purpose of such a statute is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.” Id. The Washington State statute concerning limitation of actions is contained under chapter 4.16 RCW.


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Constructive Discharge in WA State**

» Discriminatory Discharge

» Effective Date For Constructive Discharge (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: Statute of Limitations

» Retaliatory Discharge (WA State)

» EEOC: The Notice of Right to Sue

» Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WA State Torts: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy**

» WLAD Statute of Limitations

» WLAD Statute of Limitations: Equitable Tolling

**NOTE: This link will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.


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Canon: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Canon Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

A canon of construction is “[a] rule used in construing legal instruments, esp. contracts and statutes.” Black’s Law Dictionary 219 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).

NOTE: “A frequent criticism of the canons [of construction], made forcefully by Professor Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon. This is an exaggeration; but what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 276 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Canon Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

According to the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius:

[W]here a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature.

Magney v. Pham, 195 Wash.2d 795, 803, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020) (citing Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 77 Wash.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969)).


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WSHRC: Procedure When None Is Specified

WSHRC: Procedure When None Is Specified


Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning procedure when none is specified? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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WSHRC–PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE–PROCEDURE WHEN NONE IS SPECIFIED (WAC 162-08-019)

When it comes to legal or administrative procedures, rules are essential—but what happens when there’s no clear rule in place? That’s where WAC 162-08-019 steps in for the Washington State Human Rights Commission. The relevant rule states as follows:

WAC 162-08-019
Procedure when none is specified.

(1) Any orderly procedure. To take care of a problem for which no procedure is specified by this chapter, the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05* RCW, or the law against discrimination, chapter 49.60* RCW, any orderly procedure may be used. Appropriate procedures may be taken from the Washington civil rules for superior courts, the federal rules of civil procedure, or the rules of other administrative agencies of the state of Washington or of the United States.

(2) By chairperson. The chairperson of the commission or an administrative law judge may specify the procedure to be used to dispose of any matter not covered by this chapter, or any matter covered by a rule that has been waived or altered in the interest of justice under authority of WAC 162-08-013*.

WAC 162-08-019* (emphasis added).

WAC 162-08-019 — A CLOSER LOOK

Thus, WAC 162-08-019* provides guidance for situations where no specific procedure is outlined in the WAC, the Administrative Procedure Act (RCW 34.05*), or the state’s Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60*). Essentially, if there’s no official roadmap, the commission can use any “orderly procedure” to resolve the issue. These procedures might be borrowed from Washington’s civil court rules, federal court procedures, or even rules from other state or federal agencies.

Additionally, the chairperson of the commission or an administrative law judge has the authority to decide what procedure should be followed in these cases—especially when an existing rule has been waived or adjusted for fairness under WAC 162-08-013*.

CONCLUSION

In short, WAC 162-08-019* ensures flexibility and fairness, making sure the WSHRC can still act efficiently and justly, even when the rulebook is silent.


RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion



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Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)

Absence of Agency Implementing Rules (WA State)


Under Washington State laws, how do courts proceed in the absence of agency implementing rules when addressing associated statute-based issues? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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ABSENCE OF AGENCY IMPLEMENTING RULES (WA STATE)

A Washington State agency “cannot promulgate a rule that exceeds its statutory mandate … neither can it diminish statutory protections by failing to act.Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 495, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, when authorized Washington agencies fail to promulgate any implementing rules for statutes, courts must still recognize implicit requirements in those subject statutes. See id. at 496 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'”)) (internal citation omitted).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

EXAMPLE: KUMAR v. GATE GOURMET, INC.

For example, in Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.*, 180 Wn.2d 481, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014), an employer’s meal policy that was based on security concerns barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch; it required employees to eat only employer-provided food. However, the policy forced a group of plaintiff-employees to either work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs (i.e., a protected class falling under “creed“).

the plaintiffs filed suit

The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit and alleged that the employer maintained a facially neutral meal policy that fell more harshly on those within a protected class. “The trial court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety, finding that the WLAD [(i.e., Washington Law Against Discrimination)] contains no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious practices.” Id. at 486. The plaintiffs appealed to the WA State Supreme Court.

defendant’s argument

Therein, Defendant-employer, Gate Gourmet, “[made] much of the fact that the HRC [(i.e., WA State Human Rights Commission)] has promulgated rules requiring employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, arguing that the HRC would have issued an identical rule mandating religious accommodations if it believed the WLAD required them.” Id. at 495.

Court’s ANALYSIS

The Court concluded, inter alia, that “the HRC’s rules did not create the reasonable accommodation requirement for disability–they merely implemented a requirement already inherent in the WLAD itself.” Id. (referencing Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 388-89, 583 P.2d 621 (1978) (finding “a reasonable-accommodation-for-disability requirement inherent in the ‘legislative policy’ embodied in the WLAD, even though that statute did not employ the term ‘accommodation'” )) (footnote omitted).

However, the Court declared that “[e]ven if the HRC had failed to promulgate any rules requiring reasonable accommodations for employee disabilities, this court would still have been required to recognize that implicit requirement in the WLAD’s provisions.” Id. at 495-96 (referencing Am. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (“[I]n interpreting a statute, the court’s ‘primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the [legislature’s] intent and purpose'” (citing State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)))) (emphasis added).

the court must implement rcw 49.60.180 so as to give effect to legislature’s intent

Thus, the Court found that “with or without recourse to implementing rules, this court must interpret RCW 49.60.180** so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent. In this case, that means choosing between two competing interpretations of the statute: the interpretation that says it implies a reasonable-accommodation-for-religion requirement and the interpretation that says it lacks such a requirement.” Id. at 496. Ultimately, the Court found, inter alia, that “the employees … stated a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate their religious practices[ ]” – reversing the trial court’s previous dismissal and remanding the case for further proceeding consistent with the opinion. Kumar*, 180 Wn.2d at 503.

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Court Slips Blog – an external website.)

(**NOTE: The link will take the reader to an external Washington State website.)

CONCLUSION

“[W]ith or without recourse to implementing rules, … [Washington] court[s] must interpret … [statutes] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 496.


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Employment Law 101: Requests for Admission

Employment Law 101: Requests for Admission
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

Under Washington State laws, what are “Requests for Admission” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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INTRODUCTION: REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION (CIVIL LITIGATION)

Within the context of Washington State civil litigation, Requests for Admission (RFAs) play an important role in the pre-trial discovery process. This formal procedure allows parties involved in a lawsuit to narrow down the issues and facts that are genuinely in dispute. In this blog post, I discuss Requests for Admission, exploring their purpose and significance in the litigation process.

I. Definition and Purpose of Requests for Admission

Requests for Admission involve the creation of written statements by one party, which are then served on any other party within the pending action. These statements seek admissions or denials regarding particular facts or the authenticity of specific documents pertinent to the case. In contrast to alternative discovery methods, Requests for Admission specifically aim to refine and narrow down the issues in dispute, fostering increased efficiency in the legal proceedings.

The primary purposes of Requests for Admission in Washington State include:

1. Issue Framing:

RFAs help define and clarify the key issues that are genuinely in dispute between the parties. By stipulating certain facts, the parties can streamline the litigation process and avoid unnecessary disputes over uncontested matters.

2. Cost and Time Efficiency:

By admitting facts that are not in dispute, the parties can reduce the scope of the trial, thereby saving time and litigation costs. This promotes a more expeditious resolution of the case.

II. Significance in Litigation Strategy

Requests for Admission can significantly impact the overall litigation strategy. Properly executed RFAs can:

1. Narrow Down Issues:

By compelling the opposing party to admit certain facts, RFAs can help narrow down the issues in dispute, making the trial more focused and efficient.

2. Evidentiary Value:

Admissions made through RFAs can be used as evidence at trial. This can simplify the presentation of evidence and contribute to a more straightforward case presentation.

3. Cost Savings:

Streamlining the issues at an early stage through RFAs can lead to cost savings for both parties by minimizing the time and resources required for trial preparation.

Conclusion

Requests for Admission serve as a powerful tool in the toolkit of litigators in Washington State. When utilized effectively, RFAs can contribute to a more streamlined and cost-effective litigation process, ultimately facilitating the swift resolution of disputes. Understanding the procedural aspects and strategic implications of Requests for Admission is essential for legal professionals navigating the complex landscape of civil litigation in Washington State.


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Depositions

» Employment Law 101: Discovery (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: Interrogatories

» Employment Law 101: Requests for Production


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Employment Law 101: Requests for Production

Employment Law 101: Requests for Production
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

Under Washington State laws, what are “requests for production” within the context of civil litigation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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INTRODUCTION: REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

In the context of Washington State civil litigation, effective discovery processes play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and transparent legal system. One essential component of the discovery phase is the “request for production.” This legal mechanism serves as a powerful tool for parties involved in civil litigation, allowing them to obtain relevant documents and information from the opposing party. In this blog post, I explain the request for production within the context of Washington State civil-litigation law.

Definition and Purpose

A request for production is a formal legal request made by one party to another, seeking the production of documents, electronically stored information, and things; or entry onto land for inspection and other purposes. Generally, the requested production must be relevant to the pending litigation. This process is governed by the Washington State civil rules (and associated local court rules), which outline the procedures and guidelines for civil cases within the state.

The primary purpose of a request for production is to facilitate the exchange of information between parties, ensuring that each side has access to the necessary evidence to build and present their case. This mechanism promotes transparency, fairness, and the efficient resolution of legal disputes.

Key Components of a Request for Production

Specificity and Relevance:

Requests must be specific and clearly state the documents or items being sought.

Generally, the requested items must be relevant to the issues in the case.

Timing and Procedure:

Requests for production are typically made after the initial pleadings but before trial.

Parties must adhere to the timelines and procedures outlined in the Washington State civil rules (and associated local court rules).

Format and Delivery:

Requests must be in writing and served on the opposing party.

The requesting party must “specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the production and performing the related acts[.]” See CR 34(b)(2)(B).

Objections and Responses:

The party responding to the request is entitled to raise objections. It is imperative that objections be voiced promptly, and the corresponding responses must be furnished within the specified time constraints.

Privilege and Confidentiality:

Generally, the requesting party cannot demand the production of documents protected by attorney-client privilege or other recognized privileges.

The responding party may redact or withhold certain information based on privilege or confidentiality.

Consequences of Non-Compliance

Failure to comply with a valid request for production can have serious consequences. The court may impose sanctions, including monetary penalties or adverse inferences against the non-compliant party. Therefore, parties should approach the request for production process with diligence and in full accordance with the established legal framework.

Conclusion

Requests for production are a fundamental element in the Washington State civil-litigation, discovery process. Ensuring compliance with the Washington rules of civil procedure enables parties to establish an equitable exchange of information, fostering an environment of fairness and ultimately supporting the equitable resolution of legal conflicts. Given the intricacies involved in requests for production and other discovery mechanisms, parties are encouraged to seek the counsel of seasoned legal professionals for effective navigation of the legal processes.


READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Depositions

» Employment Law 101: Discovery (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: Interrogatories

» Employment Law 101: Requests for Admission


LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Employment Law 101: Interrogatories

Employment Law 101: Interrogatories
INTERROGATORIES

Under Washington State laws, what are “interrogatories” within the context of civil legal proceedings? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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Introduction: Interrogatories (WA State)

Within the context of legal proceedings, the effective utilization of discovery tools is essential for building a strong case. The interrogatory is a discovery tool that plays a substantial role in shaping the pre-trial phase. This article will address the purpose, scope, and essential guidelines of interrogatories.

What Are Interrogatories?

Interrogatories function as a written discovery technique that involves one party creating a set of questions for the opposing side in a legal dispute. The main goal is to elicit specific information essential to the case, assisting both parties in gathering facts, defining issues, and developing a well-grounded legal strategy. Unlike other discovery methods like requests for production of documents or requests for admission, interrogatories specifically focus on obtaining information through written responses.

Purpose and Scope in Washington State Law

In Washington State, interrogatories serve several essential purposes in civil litigation:

Fact Gathering

Interrogatories allow parties to obtain detailed information about the facts surrounding the case. This can include details about the opposing party’s claims, defenses, and the evidence they intend to present.

Issue Clarification

Interrogatories help to define and clarify the legal and factual issues in dispute. By asking targeted questions, parties can narrow down the focus of the case and streamline subsequent legal proceedings.

Preventing Surprises at Trial

Through the exchange of interrogatories, parties can reduce the element of surprise at trial. This promotes fair and transparent proceedings, giving each side an opportunity to understand the other’s position thoroughly.

Witness Identification

Interrogatories often include questions about potential witnesses, helping parties identify and locate individuals with relevant information. This aids in the preparation of witness lists and deposition schedules.

Key Guidelines for Interrogatories in Washington State

To maximize the effectiveness of interrogatories in Washington State, parties must adhere to specific guidelines:

Timeliness

Interrogatories must be served within the stipulated timeframes established by the Washington Civil Rules. Non-compliance may result in objections or the exclusion of sought-after information.

Relevance

Generally, questions posed in interrogatories may include “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” See CR 26. Parties have the right to object to overly broad, unduly burdensome, or privileged information-seeking questions.

Format and Style

Clear, concise, and easily comprehensible questions are essential. Ambiguous or convoluted inquiries may lead to objections, potentially causing delays in the discovery process.

Comprehensive Responses

Responding parties are obligated to furnish complete and truthful answers. Failure to do so may result in sanctions, including adverse inferences or the exclusion of evidence.

CONCLUSION

Within the context of Washington State civil litigation, interrogatories are an indispensable discovery tool. They enable parties to improve their capacity for collecting crucial information, clarifying legal issues, and constructing a persuasive case. Adhering to the guidelines set forth by Washington State law ensures that the discovery process maintains fairness and transparency within adversarial legal proceedings. Given the intricacies involved in interrogatories and other discovery mechanisms, parties are encouraged to seek the counsel of seasoned legal professionals for effective navigation of the legal processes.


Read Our Related Articles

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Depositions

» Employment Law 101: Discovery (WA State)

» Employment Law 101: Requests for Production

» Employment Law 101: Requests for Admission


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer


Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination’s antiretaliation provision, RCW 49.60.210, is there a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status*.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader directly to our Williams Law Group Blog.)

WLAD ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION

The relevant WLAD antiretaliation provision is as follows:

Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

RCW 49.60.210(1) (emphasis added). The term “employer” is vague.

WLAD DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER

The WLAD definition of the term “employer” is found under RCW 49.60.040(11) and states as follows:

(11) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit.

Id. The issue is whether this definition also applies to prospective employers. In other words, does the WLAD prohibit retaliatory discrimination by prospective employers against job applicants? The Washington State Supreme Court addressed this issue in Certification From the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of WA in Jin Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2017) .

CERTIFICATION FROM U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR EASTERN DIST. OF WA in JIN ZHU v. NORTH CENTRAL EDUCATIONAL SERVICE DISTRICT–ESD 171

In Cert. From U.S. District Court for Eastern Dist. of WA in Jin Zhu v. North Central Educational Service District-ESD 171, the plaintiff (Zhu) was a job applicant who claimed that “a prospective employer refused to hire [him] in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer[.]” See id. at 506. Zhu subsequently filed suit against the prospective employer in federal district court alleging, inter alia, that it violated WLAD’s antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1).

Plaintiff Zhu ultimately “prevailed on his WLAD antiretaliation claim and was awarded damages.” Id. at 507. The defendant (ESD 171) then filed a motion asking, inter alia, “that the district court certify to . . . [the Washington State Supreme Court] the question of RCW 49.60.210(1)’s scope.” Id. (hyperlink added). Accordingly, “the district court granted the motion in part and certified the following question regarding the scope of RCW 49.60.210(1) to . . . [the Washington State Supreme Court]:”

Does RCW 49.60.210(1) create a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer?

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

(*NOTE: The link will take the reader directly to our  Washington Employment Law Digest Blog.)

DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER NOT LIMITED TO CURRENT EMPLOYER

The Washington State Supreme Court answered the certified question in Zhu affirmatively and addressed the plain language and scope of WLAD’s antiretaliation provision, WLAD’s definition of employer, and the policy of WLAD.

The Court ultimately held that “[i]n accordance with the plain language of the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Chapter 49.60 RCW, retaliatory discrimination against job applicants by prospective employers is prohibited by RCW 49.60.210(1)”; therefore, Zhu stated a valid cause of action based on his claim of unlawful retaliation. See Zhu, 404 P.3d at 506 (hyperlinks added).

During its analysis, the Court also expounded on WLAD’s definition of the term “employer” as follows:

[The WLAD definition of employer (RCW 49.60.040(11))] clearly includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates that ‘any employer’ means something different for purposes of the antiretaliation statute than it does for the purposes of the rest of WLAD.

Zhu, 404 P.3d at 509 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination’s antiretaliation provision, RCW 49.60.210, there is a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer.

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our blog articles about this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Personality Tests and Employment Discrimination

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.



LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.