LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

March 24, 2022October 21, 2024

Employee-Handbook Liability

Employment Contracts and At-Will Employment

Under Washington State laws, are employee-handbook promises enforceable, when they address specific treatment in specific situations on which an employee justifiably relies? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

“Generally, an employment contract indefinite in duration is terminable at will.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). According to the “at-will” doctrine, an employer can discharge an at-will employee for no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability. See Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 152, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, an employee has the absolute right to quit his or her employment at-will. See id. However, there are three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment rule: (1) Statutory; (2) Judicial and; (3) Contractual.

EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS: PROMISES OF SPECIFIC TREATMENT IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

“[U]nder certain circumstances, employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees.” Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 539-40 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For example, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).

ELEMENTS OF THE THEORY

“Under this theory, [a plaintiff] … must show [the following:]

[a)] … that a statement (or statements) in an employee manual or handbook or similar document amounts to a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, …

[b)] that the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and …

[c)] that the promise was breached.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Crucial Question

“[T]he crucial question is whether the employee has a reasonable expectation the employer will follow the discipline procedure, based upon the language used in stating the procedure and the pattern of practice in the workplace.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original).

2. Questions of Fact

“[W]hether an employment policy manual issued by an employer contains a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, whether the employee justifiably relied on the promise, and whether the promise was breached are questions of fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Therefore, summary judgment is proper only if reasonable minds could not differ in resolving these questions.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

3. Ambiguous Discipline Policies Create Issue of Fact

“The Court of Appeals has held that ambiguous discipline policies create an issue of fact as to whether the employer made a binding promise to follow certain discipline procedures.” Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted).

4. Summary Judgment May Not Be Appropriate When Discretionary Language Negated by Other Representations

“[T]he presence of discretionary language may not be sufficient for summary judgment when other representations negate that language.” Id. at 544 (referencing, e.g., Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wn.2d 512, 532, 826 P.2d 664 (1992) (“We reject the premise that this disclaimer can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an eternal escape hatch for an employer who may then make whatever unenforceable promises of working conditions it is to its benefit to make.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington State law, “if the employer has made promises of specific treatment in specific situations on which the employee justifiably relies, those promises are enforceable and may modify an employee’s at-will status.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 540 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations omitted).

RELATED: Read more about this topic by viewing our article entitled: Unenforceable Employment-Contract Provisions and Discrimination Claims (the link will redirect the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog — an external website).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

March 17, 2022October 21, 2024

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is an adverse employment action when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.

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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie case* of retaliation [using the McDonnell Douglas ‘evidentiary burden-shifting’ framework*] an employee must show three things:

(1) the employee took a statutorily protected action,

(2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 411, 430 P.3d 229 (2018) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis, paragraphs, and hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

ELEMENT #2: ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION

The WA State Supreme Court, in majority, has not clearly defined the term “adverse employment action.” However, Federal law and the United States Supreme Court offer some useful guidance on the issue.

-Federal Law

The term “adverse employment action” is undefined under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, “the question of what constitutes an adverse employment action has received significant attention from the federal courts, which have not reached a consensus on the issue.” Islamic Society of Fire Department Personnel v. City of New York, 205 F.Supp.2d 75, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal citation omitted).

“Some courts, such as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, have held that an ‘adverse employment action’ relates only to ‘ultimate employment actions,’ such as hiring, firing, promotions and demotions.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

-Ninth Circuit

However, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission‘s broad definition which takes an “expansive view” of what may be considered an adverse employment action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).

-U.S. Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s general approach to this question in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006), and held that an adverse employment action must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of unlawful conduct by the employer.

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, the definition of “adverse employment action” can be derived from Ninth Circuit caselaw to mean an employment action that is harmful to the point that it could deter a reasonable employee “from making or supporting a charge or unlawful conduct by the employer.”

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

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March 16, 2022October 21, 2024

Unlawful Employment Practices: HIV or hepatitis C infections

Employment Discrimination: HIV or Hepatitis C Infections

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), what are unlawful employment practices with respect to HIV or hepatitis C infections? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis and first paragraph hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.

UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES: EMPLOYEES WITH HIV OR HEPATITIS C INFECTIONS

Under the WLAD, unfair employment practices with respect to employees with HIV or hepatitis C infections, follow:

Unfair practices with respect to HIV or hepatitis C infection.

(1) No person may require an individual to take an HIV or hepatitis C test, as a condition of hiring, promotion, or continued employment unless the absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job in question.

(2) No person may discharge or fail or refuse to hire any individual, or segregate or classify any individual in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive that individual of employment opportunities or adversely affect his or her status as an employee, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of the results of an HIV test or hepatitis C test unless the absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection is a bona fide occupational qualification of the job in question.

(3) The absence of HIV or hepatitis C infection as a bona fide occupational qualification exists when performance of a particular job can be shown to present a significant risk, as defined by the board of health by rule, of transmitting HIV or hepatitis C infection to other persons, and there exists no means of eliminating the risk by restructuring the job.

(4) For the purpose of this chapter, any person who is actually infected with HIV or hepatitis C, but is not disabled as a result of the infection, shall not be eligible for any benefits under the affirmative action provisions of chapter 49.74 RCW solely on the basis of such infection.

(5) Employers are immune from civil action for damages arising out of transmission of HIV or hepatitis C to employees or to members of the public unless such transmission occurs as a result of the employer’s gross negligence.

RCW 49.60.172 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

WLAD REMEDIES

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the WLAD] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).

Employer Liability for Nonemployee Harassment

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), can an employer be held liable for nonemployee harassment? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

EMPLOYMENT

In Washington State, “[t]he right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to … [t]he right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination[.]” RCW 49.60.030(1)(a).

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT (HARASSMENT)

Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant hostile-work-environment (harassment) law states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer:

…

(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability[.]

RCW 49.60.180(3). “Under RCW 49.60.030(2), a person discriminated against in violation of the WLAD may bring a civil action.” Larose v. King Cnty., 8 Wash.App.2d 90, 104, 437 P.3d 701 (Wash.App. 2019) (hyperlink added).

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie claim of a hostile work environment the plaintiff must show that:

(1) the harassment was unwelcome,

(2) the harassment was because of … [membership in a protected class],

(3) the harassment affected the terms and conditions of employment, and

(4) the harassment is imputable to the employer.

See id. (citing Antonius v. King County, 153 Wash.2d 256, 261, 103 P.3d 729 (2004)) (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added).

THE FOURTH ELEMENT (IMPUTABLE TO THE EMPLOYER)

When it comes to nonemployee harassment, the issue is whether the harassment can be imputed to the employer. “[H]arassment will be imputed to the employer if an owner, manager, partner or corporate officer personally participates.” Larose, 8 Wash.App.2d at 105 (citing Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash.2d 401, 407, 693 P.2d 708 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An employer will be responsible for harassment by the plaintiff’s supervisors or coworkers if the employer (a) authorized, knew, or should have known of the harassment and (b) failed to take reasonably prompt and adequate corrective action.” Id. (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 407) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A plaintiff can establish knowledge and failure to take adequate corrective action by showing (a) that complaints were made to the employer through higher managerial or supervisory personnel or by proving such a pervasiveness of sexual harassment at the workplace as to create an inference of the employer’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of it and (b) that the employer’s remedial action was not of such nature as to have been reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” Id. (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 407) (internal quotation marks omitted).

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR NONEMPLOYEE HARASSMENT

In 2019, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2, adopted the federal rule and concluded “that a nonemployee’s harassment of an employee in the workplace will be imputed to an employer if the employer[:]

(a) authorized, knew, or should have known of the harassment and

(b) failed to take reasonably prompt and adequate corrective action.

Id. at 111, (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, “an employer may be subject to liability for a hostile work environment claim based on a nonemployee’s harassment of an employee in the workplace[ ][,]” under certain circumstances.

Rendering a Verdict: WA State Versus Federal Court

Under both Washington State and federal statutes and court rules, what is the difference in number of jurors required to render a jury verdict in a civil trial? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON STATE

In Washington, only five jurors in a jury of six, or ten jurors in a jury of twelve, are required to render a verdict in a civil trial. RCW 4.44.380. The relevant text is as follows:

In all trials by juries of six in the superior court, except criminal trials, when five of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be signed by the presiding juror, and the verdict shall stand as the verdict of the whole jury, and have all the force and effect of a verdict agreed to by six jurors. In cases where the jury is twelve in number, a verdict reached by ten shall have the same force and effect as described above, and the same procedures shall be followed.

Id. However, pursuant to the Superior Court Civil Rules, “The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.” CR 48.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Alternatively, in the United States District Court, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least six members; and a jury must begin with at least six and no more than twelve members. FRCP 48. Each juror must partake in the verdict unless they are excused pursuant to Rule 47(c). Id.

CONCLUSION

A significant difference between federal and Washington State court systems appears to be that, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, Washington Superior Courts generally require a specific majority of jurors to render a verdict whereas the United States District Court requires unanimity.

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January 13, 2022October 21, 2024

Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter, “Section 1983“), may a state official sued in their individual capacity be entitled to qualified immunity? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.

STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

THE POLICY

Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.

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January 13, 2022October 21, 2024

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Laws

As an employment attorney in Washington State, I often litigate claims on behalf of employee-plaintiffs based on several common employment discrimination laws. Here are the top 3 employment discrimination laws that I litigate in Washington State . . .

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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#3 — THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (§ 1981)

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981) is a federal law that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2006). And the employment-at-will relationship is a contract for Section 1981 purposes.

Section 1981 is also known as “Equal rights under the law” and it states as follows:

(a) STATEMENT OF EQUAL RIGHTS

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) “MAKE AND ENFORCE CONTRACTS” DEFINED

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981.

#2 — TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) “makes it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex[;] … makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit[;] … and requires that employers reasonably accommodate applicants’ and employees’ sincerely held religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.” U.S. EEOC Website (emphasis added).

Two other federal anti-discrimination laws, inter alia, broaden the protected classes, as follows:

(1) Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA) which protects people who are 40 or older from both discrimination on account of age and unlawful retaliation against a person “because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit”; and

(2) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that prohibits discrimination and unlawful retaliation against a qualified person with a disability. The ADA also “makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.” Further, the ADA requires that “employers reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.”

See id.

#1 — THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status. See RCW 49.60.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee, because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit. See id.

WLAD is a broad and powerful remedial statue that was originally enacted in 1949 as an employment discrimination law. See Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order, 148 Wn.2d 224, 237, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (internal citations omitted); Laws of 1949, ch. 183. Remarkably, Washington State enacted the WLAD 15 years before Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

December 30, 2021October 21, 2024

Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of a total harmonious statutory scheme? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

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THE CANON OF HARMONIOUS STATUTORY SCHEME

According to the Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme:

Where possible, statutes should be read together to determine the legislative purpose and to achieve a total harmonious statutory scheme.

Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 119 (Wash. 1996) (citing King County Fire Protection Dist., No. 16 v. Housing Auth., 123 Wash.2d 819, 826-27, 872 P.2d 516 (1994)). In addition:

The meaning of ambiguous statutes must be determined by examining the statutory scheme as a whole, and legislative history may serve as an important tool in divining legislative intent.

Id. (citing In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., 127 Wash.2d 774, 778, 903 P.2d 443 (1995)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

December 11, 2021October 21, 2024

Canon of Section Headings

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon regarding section headings? Here’s my point of view.

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CANON OF SECTION HEADINGS

“Where a statute is ambiguous, section headings enacted as a part of the act may assist in determining legislative intent, but they do not control the plain meaning.” Matter of Estate of Ray, 15 Wn. App. 2d 353, 362, 478 P.3d 1126 (2020), review denied sub nom. Stine v. Dep’t of Revenue, 197 Wn.2d 1009, 484 P.3d 1264 (2021).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

December 2, 2021October 21, 2024

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is statutorily protected activity when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.

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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie case* of retaliation [using the McDonnell Douglas ‘evidentiary burden-shifting’ framework*] an employee must show three things:

(1) the employee took a statutorily protected action,

(2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 411, 430 P.3d 229 (2018) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis, paragraphs, and hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

ELEMENT #1 — STATUTORILY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The first element of the prima facie case requires plaintiffs to establish that they “engaged in a statutorily protected activity.” The meaning of this requirement can be found under the anti-retaliation section of the WLAD statute, as follows:

RCW 49.60.210
Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

(2) It is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.

(3) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, government agency, government manager, or government supervisor to discharge, expel, discriminate, or otherwise retaliate against an individual assisting with an office of fraud and accountability investigation under RCW 74.04.012, unless the individual has willfully disregarded the truth in providing information to the office.

RCW 49.60.210 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

Thus, pursuant to section one, above, statutorily protected activity includes: (1) opposing any practices forbidden by WLAD, or (2) filing a charge, testifying, or assisting in any proceeding under WLAD.

“Violation of this provision [(i.e., RCW 49.60.210)] supports a retaliation claim.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 570 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (referencing Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d at 411).

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link