The Rundown

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Rendering a Verdict: WA State Versus Federal Court

Rendering a Verdict: WA State Versus Federal Court

Under both Washington State and federal statutes and court rules, what is the difference in number of jurors required to render a jury verdict in a civil trial? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON STATE

In Washington, only five jurors in a jury of six, or ten jurors in a jury of twelve, are required to render a verdict in a civil trial. RCW 4.44.380. The relevant text is as follows:

In all trials by juries of six in the superior court, except criminal trials, when five of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be signed by the presiding juror, and the verdict shall stand as the verdict of the whole jury, and have all the force and effect of a verdict agreed to by six jurors. In cases where the jury is twelve in number, a verdict reached by ten shall have the same force and effect as described above, and the same procedures shall be followed.

Id. However, pursuant to the Superior Court Civil Rules, “The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.” CR 48.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Alternatively, in the United States District Court, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least six members; and a jury must begin with at least six and no more than twelve members. FRCP 48. Each juror must partake in the verdict unless they are excused pursuant to Rule 47(c). Id.

CONCLUSION

A significant difference between federal and Washington State court systems appears to be that, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, Washington Superior Courts generally require a specific majority of jurors to render a verdict whereas the United States District Court requires unanimity.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Individual Capacity State Officials & Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter, “Section 1983“), may a state official sued in their individual capacity be entitled to qualified immunity? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY STATE OFFICIALS

A state official sued in his or her individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity, unless the official violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and that right was “clearly established.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“[Q]ualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, that is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, “qualified immunity safeguards all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This paradigm “allows ample room for reasonable error on the part of the [official].” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And “[i]t encompasses both mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

SECTION 1983 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: THE TWO-STEP PROCESS

Analysis of a Section 1983 qualified-immunity issue involving an individual capacity state official typically involves a two-step process.

STEP 1: The first step requires the following question be answered: “Taken in the light most favorable to the the party asserting injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Rudebusch, 313 F.3d at 514 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

STEP 2: “Only after determining whether the constitutional right was violated does the court proceed to the second step of the two-part inquiry as follows: whether the law was so clearly established that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right?'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Affirmative answers at both steps of the inquiry will typically prevent the state official from claiming qualified immunity. However, “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 528 (citing, Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

THE POLICY

Ultimately, “the concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [official] conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And, thus, the qualified immunity analysis “occurs in the specific context of ‘the situation … confronted’ by the official.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

Under Section 1983, I believe that a state official sued in their individual capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Top 3 Employment Discrimination Laws

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Laws

As an employment attorney in Washington State, I often litigate claims on behalf of employee-plaintiffs based on several common employment discrimination laws. Here are the top 3 employment discrimination laws that I litigate in Washington State . . .

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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#3 — THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 (§ 1981)

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Section 1981) is a federal law that prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80 (2006). And the employment-at-will relationship is a contract for Section 1981 purposes.

Section 1981 is also known as “Equal rights under the law” and it states as follows:

(a)  STATEMENT OF EQUAL RIGHTS

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b)  “MAKE AND ENFORCE CONTRACTS” DEFINED

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c)  PROTECTION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981.

#2 — TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter, “Title VII”) “makes it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex[;] … makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit[;] … and requires that employers reasonably accommodate applicants’ and employees’ sincerely held religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.” U.S. EEOC Website (emphasis added).

Two other federal anti-discrimination laws, inter alia, broaden the protected classes, as follows:

(1) Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA) which protects people who are 40 or older from both discrimination on account of age and unlawful retaliation against a person “because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit”; and

(2) Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that prohibits discrimination and unlawful retaliation against a qualified person with a disability. The ADA also “makes it illegal to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.” Further, the ADA requires that “employers reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.”

See id.

#1 — THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), it is an unfair practice, with very few exceptions, for an employer to refuse to hire any person, to discharge or bar any person from employment, or to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms and conditions of employment because of age (40+); sex (including pregnancy); marital status; sexual orientation (including gender identity); race; color; creed; national origin; citizenship or immigration status; honorably discharged veteran or military status; HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability; and state employee or health care whistleblower status. See RCW 49.60.

It is also an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee, because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit. See id.

WLAD is a broad and powerful remedial statue that was originally enacted in 1949 as an employment discrimination law. See Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order, 148 Wn.2d 224, 237, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (internal citations omitted); Laws of 1949, ch. 183. Remarkably, Washington State enacted the WLAD 15 years before Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

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Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme

Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon of a total harmonious statutory scheme? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE CANON OF HARMONIOUS STATUTORY SCHEME

According to the Canon of Harmonious Statutory Scheme:

Where possible, statutes should be read together to determine the legislative purpose and to achieve a total harmonious statutory scheme.

Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 119 (Wash. 1996) (citing King County Fire Protection Dist., No. 16 v. Housing Auth., 123 Wash.2d 819, 826-27, 872 P.2d 516 (1994)). In addition:

The meaning of ambiguous statutes must be determined by examining the statutory scheme as a whole, and legislative history may serve as an important tool in divining legislative intent.

Id. (citing In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., 127 Wash.2d 774, 778, 903 P.2d 443 (1995)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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Canon of Section Headings

Canon of Section Headings

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the canon regarding section headings? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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CANON OF SECTION HEADINGS

“Where a statute is ambiguous, section headings enacted as a part of the act may assist in determining legislative intent, but they do not control the plain meaning.” Matter of Estate of Ray, 15 Wn. App. 2d 353, 362, 478 P.3d 1126 (2020), review denied sub nom. Stine v. Dep’t of Revenue, 197 Wn.2d 1009, 484 P.3d 1264 (2021).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what is statutorily protected activity when pursuing a claim of unlawful retaliation? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

“To establish a prima facie case* of retaliation [using the McDonnell Douglas ‘evidentiary burden-shifting’ framework*] an employee must show three things:

(1) the employee took a statutorily protected action,

(2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and

(3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 411, 430 P.3d 229 (2018) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis, paragraphs, and hyperlinks added).

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

ELEMENT #1 — STATUTORILY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The first element of the prima facie case requires plaintiffs to establish that they “engaged in a statutorily protected activity.” The meaning of this requirement can be found under the anti-retaliation section of the WLAD statute, as follows:

RCW 49.60.210
Unfair practices—Discrimination against person opposing unfair practice—Retaliation against whistleblower.

(1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

(2) It is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.

(3) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, government agency, government manager, or government supervisor to discharge, expel, discriminate, or otherwise retaliate against an individual assisting with an office of fraud and accountability investigation under RCW 74.04.012, unless the individual has willfully disregarded the truth in providing information to the office.

RCW 49.60.210 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

Thus, pursuant to section one, above, statutorily protected activity includes: (1) opposing any practices forbidden by WLAD, or (2) filing a charge, testifying, or assisting in any proceeding under WLAD.

“Violation of this provision [(i.e., RCW 49.60.210)] supports a retaliation claim.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn.App.2d 557, 570 (Div. 2 2020), review denied, 468 P.3d 616 (2020) (referencing Cornwell, 192 Wn.2d at 411).

READ MORE

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices

Failure to Accommodate Religious Practices

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), how does one establish a prima facie claim of Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Religious Practices? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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FEDERAL LAW

“In the employment context, the WLAD has three federal counterparts:

[(1)]  Title VII, [42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,]

[(2)]  [T]he Age discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), [29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,] … and

[(3)]  [T]he Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)[, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.].

Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 490, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (footnotes omitted) (hyperlinks and paragraph formatting added). However, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has never listed the elements of a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate religious practices.” Id. at 501 (footnote omitted).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS: A TEST BASED UPON THE DISPARATE IMPACT BURDEN-SHIFTING SCHEME

“Several Courts of Appeals … have adopted a [failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices] test based on the ‘disparate impact’ burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Kumar, 180 Wn.2d at 490 (referencing, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013); Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008); Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).

WA STATE: FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 

In Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, the Washington State Supreme Court applied the above failure-to-accommodate-religious-practices test for the first time. According to that test, “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate religious practices by showing that[:]

(1) he or she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with employment duties;

(2) he or she informed the employer of the beliefs and the conflict; and

(3) the employer responded by subjecting the employee to threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.

Id. at 501-02 (citing Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012); Lawson v. Washington, 296 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2002)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

THE 3RD ELEMENT: IMMEDIATE RISK OF ACTUAL FIRING/DEMOTION IS IRRELEVANT

Regarding the third element of the prima facie case: “An employee need not be at immediate risk of actual firing or demotion to demonstrate threatened or actual discriminatory treatment.” Id. at 514 n.30 (referencing, e.g., Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (“employee established an ‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of prima facie religious accommodation claim where employer ‘formally instruct[ed] him not to pray with or proselytize to clients'” ); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“An employee does not cease to be discriminated against because he temporarily gives up his religious practice and submits to the employment policy.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Impact

The Prima Facie Case: Disparate Impact
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, what is the prima facie case for disparate impact discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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DISPARATE IMPACT: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

The Washington State Supreme Court “has held that the WLAD creates a cause of action for disparate impact.” Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 503, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014) (citing E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wn.2d 901, 909, 726 P.2d 439 (1986)).

“To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must show that[:]

(1) a facially neutral employment practice

(2) falls more harshly on a protected class.

Id. at 503 (citing Oliver v. P. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 106 Wn.2d 675, 679, & n.1, 724 P.2d 1003 (1986)) (internal citation omitted) (paragraph formatting added).

EXAMPLE: KUMAR v. GATE GOURMET, INC.

For example, in Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014), an employer’s meal policy that was based on security concerns barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch; and it required employees to eat only employer-provided food. However, the policy forced a group of plaintiff-employees to either work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs (i.e., a protected class falling under “creed“).

The plaintiffs subsequently filed suit and alleged that the employer maintained a facially neutral meal policy that fell more harshly on those within a protected class, and the court found a viable claim of disparate impact discrimination–reversing the trial court’s previous dismissal and remanding the case for further proceeding consistent with the opinion.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

» Origin of the Disparate Impact Claim

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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The Absence of Implementing Rules

The Absence of Implementing Rules

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the rule regarding absence of implementing rules? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING RULES: COURTS GIVE EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT

In Washington State, agencies are often authorized to promulgate implementing rules for associated statutes. However, issues can arise where agencies fail to enact such rules.

“[W]ith or without recourse to implementing rules, … court[s] must interpret … [Washington statutes] so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 496, 325 P.3d 193 (Wash. 2014).

WHEN SILENCE MEANS SOMETHING MORE

“It is certainly true that an administrative agency’s silence must be deemed significant where it admits of only one reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 494 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  For example, “where [an] agency historically engaged in comprehensive regulation of certain industry practices, the agency’s silence regarding an affirmative defense based on a violation of those regulations was deemed significant[.]” Id. at 514 n.20 (referencing S. P. Transp. Co. v. Commercial metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 345, 102 S.Ct. 1815, 72 L.Ed. 2d 114 (1982)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

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Protected Classes

Protected Classes

Under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, what are protected classes for purposes of employment-discrimination claims? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD): EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Under the WLAD, individuals have a right to be free from discrimination because of membership in a protected class. See RCW 49.60.030(1). This is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. Id. This right includes, but is not limited to the right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination. RCW 49.60.030(1)(a).

PROTECTED CLASSES

Accordingly, WLAD prohibits unfair employment practices against persons on account of any of the following protected classifications:

1.  Age (40+)

2.  Creed

3.  Citizenship or Immigration Status

4.  HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C Status

5.  Honorably Discharged Veteran or Military Status

6.  Marital Status

7.  National Origin

8.  Presence of any Sensory, Mental, or Physical Disability

9.  Race or Color

10.  Sex (including Pregnancy)

11.  Sexual Orientation, including Gender Identity

12.  State Employee or Health Care Whistleblower Status

13.  Unlawful Retaliation (it is an unfair practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee complained about job discrimination or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit)

14.  Use of a Trained Dog Guide or Service Animal

WLAD REMEDIES

Pursuant to WLAD:

Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [WLAD] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).

RCW 49.60.030(2).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.