LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

June 4, 2026June 4, 2026

Employment Law 101: Protected Classes

Under Washington State laws, what are “protected classes” within the context of employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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INTRODUCTION: PROTECTED CLASSES (WA STATE)

Washington State has comprehensive employment-discrimination laws to shield workers from unjust treatment rooted in specific attributes. An integral facet of these legal provisions is the acknowledgment of “protected classes.” This article will enumerate the protected classes within the employment-rights framework of the Washington Law Against Discrimination.

I. The Washington Law Against Discrimination: EMPLOYMENT

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories including, but not limited to employment, as follows:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

…

RCW 49.60.030(1)(a) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.

II. Unfair Practices of Employers: generally

Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer:

[Refuse To Hire]

(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.

[Discharge or Bar From Employment]

(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

[Discriminate in Compensation or in Other Terms/Conditions of Employment]

(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.

[Statements, Advertisements, Publications, Applications for Employment, Inquiries in Connection With Prospective Employment]

(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.

RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

III. unfair practices of employers: filing or participating in a disrimination complaint (UNLAWFUL RETALIATION)

The WLAD also outlaws certain types of retaliation: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination], or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination].” RCW 49.60.210. Moreover, “[i]t is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.” RCW 49.60.210.

NOTE: The foregoing unfair practices are based upon specific protected classes.

IV. Defining Protected Classes

Protected classes encompass groups of individuals shielded from discrimination under governmental statutes. Washington State explicitly delineates these classes under the WLAD, recognizing various categories within, inter alia, the realm of employment, including the following:

→ Age (40+)
→ Citizenship/Immigration Status
→ Creed;
→ Filing or Participating in an Employment Discrimination Complaint
→ HIV or Hepatitis C Status;
→ Honorably Discharged Veteran or Military Status;
→ Marital Status;
→ National Origin;
→ Presence of any sensory, mental, or physical Actual Disability or Perceived Disability;
→ Race / Color;
→ Sex (including pregnancy);
→ Sexual Orientation, including Gender Identity;
→ State-Employee or Health-Care Whistleblower Status;
→ Use of a Trained Dog Guide or Service Animal.

v. WLAD remedies

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the exploration of protected classes within Washington State’s employment discrimination laws highlights the state’s commitment to fostering a workplace environment rooted in equality and fairness. The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), a robust statute enacted in 1949, serves as a powerful safeguard against unjust treatment based on specific attributes.

In essence, the WLAD stands as a cornerstone in Washington State’s pursuit of equal opportunities, reinforcing the principles of fairness, justice, and non-discrimination in employment. As we navigate the complexities of the modern workplace, understanding and upholding the rights of protected classes are crucial steps towards creating a truly inclusive and equitable work environment in the Evergreen State.

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Employment Law 101: Legal Theory

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

June 4, 2026

WSHRC: Reconsideration

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what is the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulation concerning reconsideration (WAC 162-08-311)? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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WAC 162-08-311 Explained: What Happens When a Party Asks an Administrative Law Judge to Take Another Look?

In administrative proceedings, a final order is often viewed as the end of the case before the agency. However, Washington law provides a limited opportunity for a party to ask an administrative law judge (ALJ) to revisit a decision before the matter moves into the appellate stage. That opportunity is found in WAC 162-08-311*, which addresses motions for reconsideration.

For attorneys, the rule presents an important procedural tool. For individuals representing themselves, it offers a way to bring a potential oversight to the judge’s attention without immediately pursuing an appeal.

THE BLACK LETTER LAW

The relevant regulation states as follows:

WAC 162-08-311
Reconsideration.

(1) Motion. Within ten days after being served with the final order of an administrative law judge, any party may serve and file a motion for reconsideration with the commission clerk. The motion shall identify the points that the party desires to have reconsidered and shall fully state the reasons for reconsideration. The motion shall in all other respects proceed as provided in RCW 34.05.470*.

(2) Finality for appeal. When a motion for reconsideration has been filed, the order of the administrative law judge shall not be deemed final for purposes of appeal until the ruling on the motion has been served.

(3) Reconsideration not necessary for appeal. Motions for reconsideration should be made only when a party feels that the administrative law judge has overlooked or misunderstood something. It is not necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in order to appeal. RCW 34.05.470(5)*.

WAC 162-08-311*.

A Narrow Opportunity to Revisit a Decision

WAC 162-08-311* allows any party to request reconsideration of an ALJ’s final order. The request must be filed with the commission clerk within ten days after the order has been served.

The rule requires more than a statement of disagreement. A party must identify the specific aspects of the decision that should be reconsidered and explain why further review is justified. The process is also governed by the requirements set forth in RCW 34.05.470*.

In practical terms, reconsideration is intended to address potential mistakes, omissions, or misunderstandings—not to provide a second chance to argue the entire case.

Timing Matters

The ten-day filing period is one of the most significant features of the rule. Once a final order is issued, parties have a relatively short window in which to seek reconsideration.

Because administrative proceedings often involve strict procedural requirements, missing the deadline may eliminate the opportunity to have the ALJ review the matter again before appellate proceedings begin.

The Relationship Between Reconsideration and Appeals

Many litigants assume they must first seek reconsideration before filing an appeal. WAC 162-08-311* makes clear that this is not the case.

A party may appeal without first asking the ALJ to reconsider the decision. The regulation expressly notes that reconsideration is optional and should generally be reserved for situations in which the judge may have overlooked or misunderstood a relevant issue.

This distinction is important because it allows parties to decide whether further review by the ALJ is likely to be productive or whether appellate review is the better course.

What Happens to the Appeal Clock?

The filing of a reconsideration motion also affects when a decision becomes final for appellate purposes.

Under the rule, a final order does not become final for purposes of appeal while a timely motion for reconsideration remains pending. Finality occurs only after the ruling on reconsideration has been served.

As a result, parties must pay attention not only to the date of the original order but also to the date on which the reconsideration decision is issued.

When Is Reconsideration Worth Considering?

Although every case presents unique circumstances, reconsideration is often most useful when a party believes that:

• Evidence in the record was overlooked;
• A factual finding appears inconsistent with the evidence presented;
• A legal principle was incorrectly applied; or
• An argument central to the case was not fully addressed.

By contrast, a motion that merely repeats arguments already considered by the ALJ is less likely to accomplish its objective.

Final Thoughts

WAC 162-08-311* creates a focused procedure for asking an administrative law judge to revisit a final decision. The rule imposes a ten-day deadline, postpones appellate finality while reconsideration is pending, and confirms that reconsideration is not a required step before an appeal.

For parties evaluating their post-decision options, the key question is whether the ALJ may have missed or misunderstood an important aspect of the case. If so, reconsideration may offer an efficient way to seek correction before turning to the appellate process.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

LEARN MORE

–gw

May 28, 2026July 30, 2026

Law & Logic: Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (False Cause)

Under the rules of logic, what does the term Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc mean as applied in the legal profession? Here’s my point of view.

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog*, an official governmental website, or a well-recognized organization. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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“Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc” in Employment Litigation: Why Timing Alone Is Not Proof

Latin phrases remain deeply embedded in the legal profession, and one logical principle frequently encountered in employment litigation is cum hoc ergo propter hoc — meaning “with this, therefore because of this.” In modern terms, it is commonly referred to as the “false cause” fallacy.

The concept describes a common error in reasoning: assuming that because two events occur close together in time, one event necessarily caused the other. Employment-law trial attorneys regularly confront this issue in discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wrongful termination cases.

An Example: Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (False Cause)

The Role of Timing in Employment Disputes

Workplace conflicts often involve emotionally charged timelines. An employee reports discrimination and is later terminated. A worker requests medical leave and subsequently receives discipline. A manager complains about performance shortly after an employee engages in protected activity.

To many people, these sequences naturally appear suspicious. Jurors, employers, employees, and even experienced professionals may instinctively connect the events and conclude that one caused the other.

However, employment litigation requires more than suspicion or coincidence. Courts generally require evidence showing an actual causal relationship between the protected conduct and the employer’s adverse action.

This is where the false cause fallacy becomes highly relevant.

How Plaintiff Attorneys Use Circumstantial Evidence

Employment-law plaintiffs’ attorneys often rely on circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of unlawful motive is rare. Employers seldom admit that a termination, demotion, or disciplinary action was motivated by retaliation or discrimination.

As a result, timing can become an important evidentiary factor. When adverse employment action occurs shortly after an employee files a complaint, requests an accommodation, or participates in an investigation, attorneys may argue that the close temporal proximity supports an inference of unlawful intent.

In many cases, this argument can be persuasive — particularly when combined with inconsistent explanations, shifting justifications, hostile communications, or unequal treatment of similarly situated employees.

Still, experienced litigators understand that timing alone rarely ends the analysis.

The Defense Perspective: Correlation Is Not Causation

Defense attorneys frequently counter these claims by emphasizing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employer’s actions*. Employers may present documentation showing long-standing performance concerns, restructuring plans, attendance problems, misconduct investigations, or policy violations that predated the employee’s protected activity.

From the defense perspective, the plaintiff may be committing the very logical error described by cum hoc ergo propter hoc: assuming that because discipline followed protected conduct, the protected conduct must have caused the discipline.

In other words, correlation does not automatically establish causation.

Employment defense counsel therefore focus heavily on records, timelines, witness testimony, and consistent decision-making processes to demonstrate that the employer’s actions were based on lawful business considerations rather than unlawful motive.

Why the Concept Matters in the Courtroom

The challenge in employment litigation is that timing can be both meaningful and misleading at the same time. A suspicious sequence of events may justify further scrutiny, but it does not necessarily prove liability.

For judges and juries, the central issue is whether the evidence as a whole demonstrates unlawful intent. Strong employment litigators on both sides understand that persuasive cases are built not merely on chronology, but on context, credibility, documentation, and corroborating evidence.

Understanding the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is therefore valuable not only for attorneys, but also for employers, HR professionals, employees, and jurors evaluating workplace disputes.

Conclusion

Employment-law cases often turn on complicated questions of motive and causation. While close timing between events may raise legitimate concerns, the legal system ultimately requires proof that one event actually caused the other.

The principle of cum hoc ergo propter hoc serves as an important reminder that in employment litigation, coincidence and causation are not always the same thing — and effective trial attorneys know the difference.

Read Our Related Articles

» How Lawyers Utilize Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

» Law & Logic: Ad Hominem

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Antiquitam (Appeal to Tradition)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Baculum (Appeal to Force)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Populum

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Vercundiam (Appeal to Authority)

» Law & Logic: Confirmation Bias & Sunk Cost Fallacy

» Law & Logic: Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Conclusion)

» Law & Logic: Petitio Principii (Circular Reasoning)

» Law & Logic: Proper Reasoning (Valid Logic)

» Law & Logic: The False Compromise

» Law & Logic: The Straw Man Fallacy

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

May 21, 2026May 21, 2026

WLAD: Who Counts As an Employer

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), who counts as an employer for purposes of pursuing viable claims of employment discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

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Who Counts as an “Employer” Under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination?

Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) is a powerful statute designed to protect, among other things, employees from discrimination in the workplace based on race, sex, religion, disability, and other protected characteristics. A key question often arises: who exactly is considered an “employer” under this law? Understanding this is crucial for both workers seeking protection and businesses/entities aiming to comply.

WLAD Definition of Employer

The WLAD defines the terms “employer” and “person” as follows:

(11) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit.

(19) “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees and receivers, or any group of persons; it includes any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent, or employee, whether one or more natural persons; and further includes any political or civil subdivisions of the state and any agency or instrumentality of the state or of any political or civil subdivision thereof.

RCW 49.60.040(11), (19)* (emphasis added).

Meaning of Employer

Thus, under the WLAD, an “employer” is defined broadly, and the statute includes:

• Any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly – This means that it’s not only the company or organization itself that can be liable, but also individuals or entities making employment decisions on the employer’s behalf. For example, human resources managers, corporate officers, and staffing agencies might fall under this umbrella if they influence hiring, firing, or workplace conditions.

• Entities employing 8 or more people – WLAD protections generally apply to businesses, organizations, and entities that have a minimum workforce of eight employees. This threshold matters: small businesses or entities with fewer than eight employees are typically outside the WLADs reach.

• Exemptions for certain religious organizations – The statute specifically excludes religious or sectarian organizations not organized for private profit. For example, in practical terms, a nonprofit church or religious charity acting in a ministerial or faith-based capacity may not be treated as an “employer” for WLAD purposes, though this exemption can be nuanced depending on how secular versus religious the roles in question are. Talk to an attorney to learn more and review our Disclaimer.

See RCW 49.60.040(11).

Implications

For employees, understanding who counts as an employer helps identify the correct party to hold accountable in cases of discrimination. For legal professionals advising clients, it’s essential to consider both direct and indirect actors, as liability can extend beyond the traditional business owner. Additionally, knowing the eight-employee threshold and the religious organization exception can prevent misunderstandings about whether the law applies.

In short, WLAD casts a wide net, ensuring that most workplaces in Washington are covered, while carving out specific, intentional exceptions. Employers subject to the WLAD should be mindful that both their actions and those of anyone acting on their behalf can trigger liability under the law.

LEARN MORE

–gw

May 14, 2026July 30, 2026

Law & Logic: Petitio Principii (Circular Reasoning)

Under the rules of logic, what does the term Petitio Principii mean as applied in the legal profession? Here’s my point of view.

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Law and Logic: Petitio Principii in Employment Discrimination Litigation

The legal profession depends upon persuasive reasoning, but persuasion becomes problematic when an argument assumes its own conclusion. One of the oldest logical fallacies—petitio principii, or circular reasoning—appears more often in litigation than many attorneys realize, particularly in employment discrimination cases.

Although the phrase is commonly misused in casual conversation, its true meaning has significant implications for lawyers, judges, and juries alike.

What Is Petitio Principii?

Petitio principii occurs when an argument assumes the very fact it is attempting to prove. A simple example is:

“The witness is truthful because she is credible, and she is credible because she is truthful.”

The conclusion merely repeats itself in different language. No independent evidence supports the claim. In legal disputes, circular reasoning often hides beneath persuasive narratives or conclusory statements that sound evidentiary but are actually assumptions.

An Example: Petitio Principii (Circular Reasoning)

Why It Matters in Employment Law

Employment discrimination cases frequently depend upon circumstantial evidence because direct proof of discriminatory intent is rare. That reality creates a greater risk of circular reasoning. For example:

“The employee was terminated because of discrimination because the termination itself was discriminatory.”

That statement sounds persuasive, but it provides no independent proof of discriminatory motive. The legal issue is not whether an adverse action occurred. The issue is why it occurred.

Circular Reasoning and the Burden-Shifting Framework

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework*, courts evaluate circumstantial discrimination claims through a multi-step process involving prima facie* evidence, employer explanations*, and potential pretext*.

Problems arise when attorneys argue:

“The employer’s explanation is false because discrimination occurred, and discrimination occurred because the explanation is false.”

Without independent evidence, the reasoning becomes circular rather than analytical.

The same problem appears when litigants assume that procedural unfairness automatically proves unlawful bias, or when every workplace disagreement is retroactively characterized as discriminatory simply because litigation followed.

The Danger of “Inference Stacking”

Employment cases often rely on inference, which is entirely proper when grounded in evidence. But attorneys sometimes build one unsupported inference upon another.

For example:

• The employee received criticism;
• Therefore management disliked the employee;
• Therefore management was biased;
• Therefore the termination was discriminatory.

Each conclusion depends upon the prior assumption rather than independent proof. That is not careful reasoning. It is speculation layered into narrative form.

Defense Counsel Can Commit the Same Error

Circular reasoning is not limited to plaintiffs. Employers sometimes argue:

“The company could not have discriminated because it maintains anti-discrimination policies.”

But a policy is not proof of compliance. Assuming lawful intent merely because policies exist can become circular as well. Likewise, arguing that a supervisor cannot be biased because the supervisor previously hired or promoted protected employees may oversimplify a far more fact-specific inquiry. Cf., Same Actor Inference Doctrine (my article supporting how this argument might be viable in some employment discrimination cases).

Distinguishing Inference from Circularity

Not every inference is improper. Legitimate discrimination claims often rely on:

• Comparator evidence;
• Discriminatory remarks;
• Statistical disparities;
• Suspicious timing; or
• Inconsistent explanations supported by other facts.

The distinction is simple:

• A valid inference moves from evidence to conclusion.
• Circular reasoning treats the conclusion itself as evidence.

Why Logical Discipline Matters

Employment discrimination law occupies an important place in the justice system because it balances workplace accountability with fairness to both employees and employers.

When courts or attorneys rely on circular reasoning, weak claims may appear stronger than they are, while legitimate defenses—or legitimate claims—may receive inadequate analysis. For trial attorneys, recognizing petitio principii is therefore more than an academic exercise. It is part of effective advocacy and ethical legal reasoning.

The strongest employment cases are not built upon assumptions repeated persuasively. They are built upon evidence that independently supports the conclusion the advocate seeks to prove.

Read Our Related Articles

» How Lawyers Utilize Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

» Law & Logic: Ad Hominem

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Antiquitam (Appeal to Tradition)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Baculum (Appeal to Force)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Populum

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Vercundiam (Appeal to Authority)

» Law & Logic: Confirmation Bias & Sunk Cost Fallacy

» Law & Logic: Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (False Cause)

» Law & Logic: Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Conclusion)

» Law & Logic: Proper Reasoning (Valid Logic)

» Law & Logic: The False Compromise

» Law & Logic: The Straw Man Fallacy

LEARN MORE

–gw

May 7, 2026May 7, 2026

Severance Agreements and Employment Discrimination (WA State)

In Washington State, how do employer severance/separation agreements typically limit an employee’s right to pursue claims of employment discrimination against the employer? Here’s my point of view.

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Severance Agreements and Employment Discrimination (WA State)

When a job ends suddenly, employers often move quickly to present a severance or separation agreement. These documents can look routine — even generous — especially when you’re under financial pressure. But in Washington State, severance agreements often require you to give up significant legal rights, including the ability to bring discrimination, retaliation, or wrongful‑termination claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD); bring associated WA State common‑law claims; and bring similar federal statutory claims against the employer.

Before you sign anything, it’s important to understand what you may be giving up — and what you might lose if you don’t sign.

What a Severance Agreement Actually Does

A severance agreement is not just a paycheck. It’s a binding contract typically drafted by the employer’s lawyers. In relation to claims of employment discrimination (and related claims), those contracts often contain a plurality of restrictive provisions requiring the employee‘s agreement, such as the following:

• Release the employer from all claims, whether you know about them or not

• Waive rights under, inter alia, Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ADA, ADEA, and Washington common law

• Keep the terms confidential

• Avoid criticizing the employer

• Accept limits on future employment or communication

These agreements are designed to protect the company. They are not written with your interests in mind.

Why Signing Too Quickly Can Be Risky

You May Be Waiving Claims Worth Far More Than the Severance

If you were treated unfairly, pushed out after reporting misconduct, denied accommodations, or terminated shortly after taking protected leave (or after engaging in other protected activities), you might have legal claims with substantial value. WLAD and WA State common law allows recovery for, inter alia, lost wages, emotional harm, and attorney’s fees — often far exceeding the severance amount.

You Might Not Realize You Have a Claim

Many employees don’t know that:

• Washington’s disability and pregnancy* protections are broader than federal law

• Retaliation can occur even after a single complaint

• Hostile work environment claims can develop gradually

• Timing matters — terminations following medical leave or accommodation requests are often scrutinized

These are just a sample of potentially unrealized issues–not obvious at first glance–that a lawyer can help you identify.

Once You Sign, You MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO Go Back

Most releases are final. Even if new facts emerge or you later realize you had a strong case, the agreement might prevent you from pursuing it.

The Other Side of the Decision: What If You Don’t Sign?

It’s important to acknowledge the real trade‑off. If you decline the severance and pursue discrimination or retaliation claims instead, there is always a possibility that:

• Your claims don’t succeed

• The evidence isn’t strong enough

• The case settles for less than the severance — or not at all

If that happens, the severance offer is typically gone for good. Employers rarely re‑extend the same deal once it’s rejected. This is why understanding the strength of your claims — and the fairness of the offer — before the deadline to sign can be essential before making a decision.

Why Promptly Talking to an Attorney First Makes a Difference

You Get a Clear Picture of Your Rights

An employment lawyer can help you evaluate whether the severance amount is reasonable compared to the potential value of your employment-discrimination claims and can flag problematic or overly broad terms.

You May Be Able to Negotiate Better Terms

Employees who seek legal advice/representation might be able to secure:

• Higher severance payments

• More favorable confidentiality or non‑disparagement language

• Neutral references

• Narrower releases

• Extended benefits

Employers often anticipate negotiation — and they might take represented employees more seriously.

You Protect Your Future Employment Options

Some agreements include non‑compete or non‑solicitation clauses that can affect your next job. A lawyer may be able to help you avoid signing something that limits your career.

You May Not Have to Decide on the Spot

Even if your employer sets a short deadline to sign the agreement, you might be able request more time. There may also be other related protections if both (1) the release includes a waiver of U.S. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) age-discrimination claims; and (2) the employee is 40 or older. Talk to an attorney first to learn more.

Conclusion

Signing a severance agreement is a decision that deserves careful thought. These contracts often require employees to give up important legal claims, while declining them can mean losing compensation that won’t be offered again. Because both choices carry real consequences, getting advice from an employment attorney before you commit can help you understand your options and choose the path that best protects your related rights.

IMPORTANT: The potential outcomes discussed herein are not guaranteed and the outcome of any particular case may vary significantly and unexpectedly from the same; consult with an attorney first both to discuss the specific details of your case and to learn more.

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–gw

April 30, 2026July 30, 2026

Law & Logic: Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Conclusion)

Under the rules of logic, what does the term Ignoratio Elenchi mean as applied in the legal profession? Here’s my point of view.

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Law and Logic: Understanding Ignoratio Elenchi in the Courtroom

In both law and logic, precision matters. Arguments are not merely about persuasion—they are about relevance, structure, and ultimately, truth. One of the most persistent logical missteps encountered in legal advocacy is ignoratio elenchi, often translated as “irrelevant conclusion.” While the term may sound esoteric, the underlying concept is both common and consequential in trial practice.

What Is Ignoratio Elenchi?

At its core, ignoratio elenchi occurs when an argument purports to prove one thing but actually proves something else. The conclusion may be valid in isolation, even compelling, but it fails to address the issue that is actually in dispute. In other words, the argument “misses the point.”

For example, imagine a defendant on trial for breach of contract. In response, their counsel spends considerable time demonstrating that the defendant is a generous community member who donates to charity. While this may be true—and even admirable—it does nothing to resolve whether a contract was breached. The conclusion (the defendant is a good person) is irrelevant to the legal question at hand.

An Example: Ignoratio Elenchi (Irrelevant Conclusion)

Why It Matters in Trial Advocacy

Trial lawyers operate within a structured framework defined by pleadings, elements of claims, burdens of proof, and rules of evidence. Every argument must connect directly to a material issue in the case. When an attorney commits ignoratio elenchi, they risk undermining their own credibility and distracting the judge or jury.

This misstep can appear in several ways

In the legal profession, ignoratio elenchi can appear in several ways, including the following:

• Misaligned Evidence: Presenting evidence that does not relate to any element of the claim or defense.

• Emotional Diversions: appealing to sympathy or prejudice without tying those appeals to legally relevant facts.

• Shifting the Issue: subtly reframing the dispute into a more favorable—but legally irrelevant—question.

While such tactics may occasionally have rhetorical force, they are logically unsound and often vulnerable to objection.

Judicial and Jury Implications

Judges are trained to identify irrelevance and may exclude such arguments under evidentiary rules*. For instance, under Rule 401* of the Federal Rules of Evidence*, evidence must have a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Arguments rooted in ignoratio elenchi frequently fail this test.

Jurors, however, are not always as equipped to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant conclusions. This creates a tension: an argument may be logically flawed yet psychologically persuasive. Skilled trial lawyers must navigate this carefully—advocating persuasively without straying into irrelevance that could draw objections or appellate scrutiny.

Avoiding the Fallacy

To guard against ignoratio elenchi, attorneys should continually ask:

• What is the precise issue the court must decide?

• What elements must be proven?

• Does this argument directly support or refute one of those elements?

This discipline ensures that advocacy remains anchored to the legal questions that matter.

Strategic Use—and Ethical Boundaries

It would be naïve to suggest that irrelevant arguments never influence outcomes. In practice, some attorneys may intentionally introduce peripheral themes to shape narratives or juror perceptions. However, there is a fine line between persuasive storytelling and logical misdirection.

Ethically, lawyers are bound to present arguments grounded in law and fact. See WA State Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.1*. Overreliance on irrelevant conclusions risks not only objections and judicial reprimand but also damage to professional reputation.

Conclusion

Ignoratio elenchi is more than an abstract logical fallacy—it is a practical hazard in legal argumentation. For trial lawyers, mastering the distinction between relevant and irrelevant conclusions is essential to effective advocacy. For the public, understanding this concept offers insight into how legal arguments can sometimes persuade without truly proving their point.
In the courtroom, as in logic, the question is not just whether an argument is convincing—but whether it actually answers the question being asked.

Read Our Related Articles

» How Lawyers Utilize Deductive and Inductive Reasoning

» Law & Logic: Ad Hominem

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Antiquitam (Appeal to Tradition)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Baculum (Appeal to Force)

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Populum

» Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Vercundiam (Appeal to Authority)

» Law & Logic: Confirmation Bias & Sunk Cost Fallacy

» Law & Logic: Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (False Cause)

» Law & Logic: Petitio Principii (Circular Reasoning)

» Law & Logic: Proper Reasoning (Valid Logic)

» Law & Logic: The False Compromise

» Law & Logic: The Straw Man Fallacy

LEARN MORE

–gw

April 25, 2026April 30, 2026

What Qualifies as Wrongful Termination in Washington?

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What qualifies as wrongful termination in Washington?

answer:

The terms “wrongful termination” and “wrongful discharge” are synonymous in Washington State and are typically evaluated within the scope of the “at-will” doctrine (hereinafter, “Doctrine”); Washington has been an “at-will” employment state since at least 1928. Under this doctrine, an employer can terminate an at-will employee for any reason—whether it’s no reason at all, a legitimate reason, or even an unethical one—without worrying about legal repercussions. Likewise, unless there is a contract that specifies different terms, employees have the unrestricted right to leave their job at any time (i.e., at will). However, the following three recognized exceptions to the general at-will employment doctrine qualify as wrongful termination in Washington:

(1) The Statutory Exception;

(2) The Judicial Exception; and

(3) The Contractual Exception.

(1) THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION

“First, both Congress and the Washington State Legislature have modified the employment at-will doctrine by limiting employers’ rights to discharge employees.” Ford v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 146 Wn.2d 146, 153, 43 P.3d 1223, (Wash. 2002) (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)* (1994); chapter 49.60* RCW (Washington’s law against discrimination); see also chapter 49.12* RCW (prohibiting discharge of employees for testifying in investigations regarding labor conditions, worker earnings, or sex discrimination); RCW 49.44.090* (prohibiting discharge of employee for being age 40 and over)).

These statutory laws provide an exception to the at-will doctrine that protects the employee’s rights and limits the employer’s ability to discharge an employee at-will.

(2) THE JUDICIAL EXCEPTION

Second, Washington courts “have recognized a narrow public-policy exception to an employer’s right to discharge an employee”; this exception is commonly known as “wrongful termination in violation of public policy*.” Id. (referencing Smith v. Bates Technical Coll., 139 Wash.2d 793, 991 P.2d 1135 (2000) (public policy exception to “for-cause” employees); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (discharge of armored truck driver who abandoned post to prevent murder violated public policy)).

“Under this exception, an employer does not have the right to discharge an employee when the termination would frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. “By recognizing this public policy exception, … [Washington State Supreme Court has] expressed its unwillingness to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(3) THE CONTRACTUAL EXCEPTION

“Third, employers and employees can contractually modify the at-will employment relationship, eschewing the common law rule in favor of negotiated rights and liabilities.” Id. at 154 (internal citation omitted). “An employer can bargain away its right to discharge an employee without cause by contracting not to do so.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

“The law governing this exception is not a species of the employment at-will doctrine; it is the law of contracts. Therefore, the law of contracts governs an injured party’s right to recover damages under this exception.” Id. at 155 (internal citation omitted). “Unlike a wrongful discharge, a breach of contract is neither immoral nor wrongful; it is simply a broken promise.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Did you resign from your job?

Even if you resigned from your job, you might still be able to claim wrongful termination in Washington. Take our Constructive Discharge Test (video) to learn more:

Read Our Related Articles

»Constructive Discharge in WA State*

»Effective Date For Constructive Discharge (WA State)

»Retaliatory Discharge (WA State)

»The Prima Facie Case: Discriminatory Discharge

»WA State Torts: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy*

»What is the Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Termination in WA?

»WLAD: The Discriminatory Discharge Provision*

*NOTE: This link will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.

NEED HELP?

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April 23, 2026April 25, 2026

WA Code of Judicial Conduct: Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment

b WA Code of Judicial Conduct: Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment

Under the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter ,”CJC”), to what extent must a full‑time judge actively identify, prevent, and address bias, prejudice, or harassment while carrying out judicial duties? Here’s my point of view.

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Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment Under Washington’s Code of Judicial Conduct (Canon 2, Rule 2.3)

Washington’s Code of Judicial Conduct* (CJC) requires full‑time judges to do more than avoid discriminatory behavior. The rules place an affirmative responsibility on judges to recognize when bias or harassment is occurring, to stop it, and to prevent it from shaping the courtroom environment. This duty is central to maintaining public confidence in the fairness of the justice system, and it is reinforced by the associated CJC* comments section, as follows:

[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.

WA State CJC*, Canon 2, Rule 2.3, comment 1 (emphasis added).

What the Rules Protect Against

Washington’s judicial‑conduct rules bar judges from engaging in behavior that treats people differently because of personal characteristics, and they also require judges to stop others (i.e., court staff, court officials, or others subject to judge’s direction and control; and parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others) from doing so. These protections are intentionally broad. They cover traits such as race, color, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, disability, age, and financial circumstances. The purpose is straightforward: everyone who enters a courtroom should be treated with equal dignity, regardless of background or identity.

The rules also prohibit harassment, which is understood to include behavior or language that demeans, targets, or expresses hostility toward someone based on these characteristics. This includes obvious misconduct, like insults or slurs, but it also reaches more subtle forms of disrespect that can influence how participants experience the process. The standard is designed to protect both the fairness of the proceeding and the dignity of the individuals involved.

the meaning of bias, prejudice, and harassment

The CJC clarifies the meaning of the terms bias, prejudice, and harassment, as follows:

[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.

[3] Harassment, as referred to in paragraphs (B) and (C)[–see “Black Letter Law” section, below–]is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases such as race, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.

[4] Sexual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome.

Id.* at comments 2-4 (emphasis added).

A Judge’s Duty to Step In

A defining feature of Washington’s approach is that judges cannot remain passive observers. When discriminatory conduct arises — whether from an attorney, litigant, witness, juror, or court staff — the judge is expected to take reasonable steps to address it. That may involve interrupting inappropriate remarks, redirecting questioning, correcting unequal treatment, or giving instructions that reinforce the expectation of respectful behavior.

The responsibility is both supervisory and corrective. Judges are expected to shape the courtroom environment in real time, ensuring that proceedings remain fair and respectful for everyone involved.

When Sensitive Characteristics Are Relevant

There are situations where a judge must discuss characteristics such as race, gender, or disability because the law requires it. For example, discrimination claims, statutory definitions, or credibility assessments may involve these topics. The CJC* recognizes this reality. What matters is the purpose: the discussion must be tied to the legal or factual issues before the court, not personal views or stereotypes. According to the CJC*:

[5] “Bias or prejudice” does not include references to or distinctions based upon race, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, sexual orientation, or social or economic status when these factors are legitimately relevant to the advocacy or decision of the proceeding, or, with regard to administrative matters, when these factors are legitimately relevant to the issues involved.

Id.* at comment 5 (emphasis added).

The Obligation Extends Beyond Hearings

Judicial duties are not limited to trials and hearings. The expectation of impartiality and respectful conduct applies to all judicial activities, including administrative responsibilities, interactions with court staff, and public‑facing functions. A judge’s behavior in any official capacity influences how the public perceives the justice system, and the CJC* requires judges to uphold these standards wherever their role places them.

THE BLACK-LETTER LAW

For purposes of this article, the relevant portion of the CJC* is Canon 2*, as follows:

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY, COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY.

Id. Canon 2* contains, inter alia, Rule 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment) that states as follows:

(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.

(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.

(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.

(D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or lawyers from making reference to factors that are relevant to an issue in a proceeding.

Id.*

Conclusion

I believe Washington’s Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be active stewards of fairness. They must recognize and prevent discriminatory behavior, intervene when it occurs, and maintain an environment where every participant is treated with dignity. These obligations reinforce a simple but essential principle: justice depends not only on the decisions judges make, but also on the atmosphere in which those decisions are reached.

*All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website.

LEARN MORE

–gw

April 16, 2026July 30, 2026

Law & Logic: Argumentum Ad Populum

Under the rules of logic, what does the term Argumentum Ad Populum mean as applied in the legal profession? Here’s my point of view.

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Argumentum Ad Populum: When Popularity Isn’t Proof

In both everyday conversations and legal arguments, it’s common to hear claims supported by phrases like “everyone knows” or “most people agree.” This line of reasoning is known as argumentum ad populum, or the “appeal to the majority.” While it can be persuasive, it is not logically sound.

At its core, argumentum ad populum assumes that a claim must be true simply because many people believe it. But widespread belief does not equal factual accuracy. History offers plenty of examples where majority opinion was later proven wrong. In legal contexts, relying on popularity instead of evidence can weaken an argument and obscure the truth.

An Example: Argumentum Ad Populum (Appeal to the Majority)

Implications

general public

For the general public, this fallacy often appears in discussions about social norms, consumer choices, or public opinion. For example, saying a product is “the best” because it’s widely used does not necessarily mean it is objectively superior.

legal professionals

In the legal field, the stakes are higher. Attorneys must base arguments on statutes, case law, and evidence—not on what the majority thinks. While public opinion can influence areas like jury perception or legislative change, it is not, by itself, proof of a legal claim. Courts are tasked with applying the law, not measuring popularity.

Conclusion

That said, understanding argumentum ad populum is still valuable for legal professionals. Recognizing when opposing counsel subtly relies on popular sentiment rather than legal authority can help sharpen responses and clarify the issues at hand.

In short, popularity may explain why people believe something, but it does not establish whether it is true. Distinguishing between the two is essential for clear thinking—both inside and outside the courtroom.