LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

November 6, 2025November 6, 2025

Can you prove employment discrimination without direct evidence?

IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our Williams Law Group Blog* or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.

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Can you prove employment discrimination without direct evidence?

answer:

Yes, plaintiffs can prove employment discrimination without direct evidence. In Washington State, “[a] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case [of employment discrimination] by either[:]

[1.] offering direct evidence of an employer‘s discriminatory intent, or …

[2.] satisfying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

Alonso v. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, 178 Wn.App 734, 743-44 (Div. 2 2013) (citing Kastanis v. Educ. Emps. Credit Union, 122 Wn.2d 483, 491, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1993)) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added).

Accordingly, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test provides an alternative way for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination using indirect, circumstantial evidence instead of direct evidence.

The McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework* has three steps:

STEP 1*: The “plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a presumption of discrimination.” Scrivener v. Clark College*, 181 Wn.2d 439, 446, 334 P.3d 541, (2014) (citing Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 149-50; Kastanis v. Educ. Emps. Credit Union, 122 Wn.2d 483, 490, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1993)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis & hyperlink added).

STEP 2*: “[T]he burden shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason* for the adverse employment action.” Mikkelsen v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County*, 189 Wn.2d 516, 527 (Wash. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis & hyperlink added).

STEP 3*: “[I]f the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext*.” Id.* (internal citations omitted) (emphasis & hyperlink added).

Read Our Related Articles

»Employment Law 101: Definition of Circumstantial Evidence (WA State)

»McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 1): The Prima Facie Case*

»McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 2): The Employer’s Burden*

»McDonnell Douglas Framework (Step 3): Proving Pretext*

»Proving Discrimination: The Direct-Evidence Method

»The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

»The Pretext Element: Self-Evaluations*

»The Pretext Element: Six Limitations*

»The Pretext Element: Two Methods of Proof*

»Using Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Employment Discrimination

*NOTE: This link will take you to our Williams Law Group Blog, an external website.

NEED HELP?

If you need legal assistance, consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

November 6, 2025December 4, 2025

WSHRC: Termination of Case Without Findings of Fact

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning termination of a case without findings of fact? Here’s my point of view.

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Understanding WAC 162-08-099*: When the Washington State Human Rights Commission May End a Case Without Findings of Fact

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is responsible for enforcing the state’s anti-discrimination laws under RCW 49.60*, also known as the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). Typically, once a complaint is filed, the Commission investigates and—if warranted—issues findings of fact to determine whether an unfair practice occurred. However, WAC 162-08-099* outlines circumstances in which the Commission may terminate a case before reaching findings of fact.

1. Voluntary Withdrawal of a Complaint

If the complainant requests to withdraw their complaint and the Commission consents (as described in WAC 162-08-091), no findings or further formal procedures are required. This allows individuals to end their case voluntarily without a full investigation or determination.

2. Settlement Before Findings (Prefinding Settlement)

In many cases, disputes are resolved through settlement agreements before the Commission completes its investigation. When the Commission’s staff and a respondent have entered into a written settlement agreement (i.e., a prefinding settlement), the agreement is presented to the commissioners for approval.

• The Commission must vote to accept the agreement before it becomes binding.

• Once approved, the Commission issues an order formalizing the settlement.

• “A prefinding settlement is not binding on the commission until the commissioners vote to accept it and issue their order.” WAC 162-08-099(3)*.

This procedure encourages early resolution while maintaining the Commission’s oversight role to ensure fairness and compliance with the law. NOTE: This process does not apply to a complaint alleging an unfair practice in a real estate transaction.

3. Administrative Closure

The Commission may also administratively close a case without findings when certain practical or procedural circumstances arise, such as:

• The complaint has been resolved informally or adjudicated elsewhere,

• The issue has become moot,

• The complainant or respondent cannot be located, or

• Other factors make further investigation impossible or unnecessary.

Administrative closure is an official action that halts further work on a complaint, though the Commission retains the authority to reopen the case later if circumstances change.

Implications

For both complainants and respondents, understanding WAC 162-08-099* clarifies that not every case will move through the full fact-finding process. Early settlement, voluntary withdrawal, or administrative closure can end a complaint efficiently while preserving fairness and procedural integrity.

In short, this rule gives the Human Rights Commission the flexibility to manage its caseload responsibly while ensuring that every case receives appropriate consideration under Washington’s anti-discrimination laws.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: Agency Contact Information–Public Records Officer

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

» WSHRC: Withdrawal of Complaint

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

October 23, 2025October 23, 2025

Unsworn Statements Versus Affidavits (WA State)

Under Washington State Court Rules, how do courts treat unsworn statements versus affidavits? Here’s my point of view.

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Unsworn Statements Versus Affidavits (WA State)

In Washington State, General Rule (GR) 13* simplifies how parties can submit sworn statements in court. Traditionally, an affidavit—a written statement confirmed by oath before a notary public—was required to prove or support many types of filings. GR 13* modernizes this process by allowing unsworn statements made under penalty of perjury to serve the same purpose in most circumstances.

What GR 13 Allows

When a law or rule requires a matter to be “supported or proved by affidavit,” it may instead be supported by a written statement, declaration, verification, or certificate that:

1. States it is made under penalty of perjury;

2. Includes the date and place of signing; and

3. Declares it is made under the laws of Washington State.

The rule provides a sample form:

——–

“I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.”

(Date and Place) (Signature)

——–

When GR 13 Does Not Apply

There are important exceptions. Under GR 13(b)*, the rule does not apply to documents that legally require an acknowledgment (such as deeds), oaths of office, or oaths that must be administered before a specific official other than a notary.

Implications

For both attorneys and self-represented litigants, GR 13* streamlines filings by eliminating the need for notarization in most court documents. This can save time, reduce costs, and make legal processes more accessible—particularly when remote filing or urgent deadlines are involved.

When drafting pleadings, declarations, or motions that previously required an affidavit, Washington practitioners can confidently rely on GR 13*—provided the unsworn statement contains the correct language and complies with GR 30’s* electronic signature requirements.

In short, GR 13* brings efficiency and flexibility to Washington’s legal system without compromising the integrity of sworn testimony.

LEARN MORE

If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced employment attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

October 9, 2025October 9, 2025

Summary Judgment: Mere Allegations vs. Specific Facts

Under Washington State law, may an employment-discrimination plaintiff rely on mere allegations to overcome a motion for summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: All hyperlinks in this article with an asterisk (*) will take the reader away from this website to either our external blog or an official governmental website. This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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Summary Judgment: Mere Allegations vs. Specific Facts

In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff “need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer‘s motion for summary judgment. This is because ‘the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry-one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.’” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1996)) (hyperlink added).

But even in employment discrimination cases, summary judgment must be granted when there is a “complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings to show a “genuine issue for trial,” but must instead “set forth specific facts[.]” Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). This means that the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (footnote omitted).

Thus, “summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995).

Conclusion

Under Washington State law, an employment-discrimination plaintiff may not rely on mere allegations to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts.

need help?

If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

September 25, 2025January 8, 2026

WSHRC: Nature of Orders and Enforcement

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), what are the Washington State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter, “WSHRC”) regulations concerning the nature of orders and enforcement? Here’s my point of view.

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WAC 162-08-305: Understanding the Public Nature of Commission Orders

WAC 162-08-305* defines how orders issued in Washington State Human Rights Commission proceedings function and who controls their enforcement. The rule emphasizes that these orders are tools of public law enforcement rather than private remedies owned by individual complainants.

Orders Serve a Public Enforcement Role

Under this regulation, orders secured by Commission counsel are characterized as public reparation orders. They are not judgments resolving private disputes between respondents and affected individuals. Even when an order directs a respondent to reinstate or compensate a person harmed by an unfair practice, the beneficiary does not hold a vested property right in that relief until it is actually delivered. This reflects the Commission’s statutory role in advancing compliance with the Law Against Discrimination on behalf of the public at large.

Enforcement Is Reserved to the Commission

The rule also centralizes enforcement authority. With limited statutory and regulatory exceptions (see RCW 49.60.260* and WAC 162-08-288*, respectively), only the Commission—acting through its legal counsel—may enforce an administrative law judge’s order. See RCW 49.60.260*. Individual complainants or beneficiaries do not have independent standing to enforce these orders, reinforcing the distinction between Commission proceedings and private civil actions.

Authority to Modify or Settle Orders

Finally, WAC 162-08-305* authorizes the Commission to compromise an order in good faith, even without the agreement of the individuals who would benefit from it. Except in certain real estate-related cases, this discretion allows the Commission to manage enforcement in a way that accounts for practical realities, legal risk, and broader policy objectives.

Implications

WAC 162-08-305* underscores that remedies issued through the Human Rights Commission are designed to vindicate public interests. While individuals may benefit from these orders, ultimate control over enforcement and resolution remains with the Commission itself.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» WA State Human Rights Commission Complaints

» WA State Human Rights Commission: Functions, Powers, and Duties

» WSHRC: From Complaint to Conclusion

» WSHRC: Organization and Operations

» WSHRC: Relationship of Commission to Complainant

» WSHRC: Withdrawal of Complaint

LEARN MORE

–gw

September 11, 2025September 11, 2025

WSHRC: Breach of Conciliated Agreement

Under the Washington State Administrative Code (hereinafter, “WAC”), how may the Washington State Human Rights Commission address the breach of a conciliated agreement? Here’s my point of view.

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Breach of Conciliated Agreement Under Washington Law

When discrimination complaints are resolved through Washington’s administrative process, the parties may enter into a conciliated agreement approved by the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC). These agreements are designed to eliminate unlawful practices under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60*. But what happens if one party fails to honor the terms of that agreement?

WAC 162-08-109* addresses this issue by outlining the tools available to the Commission’s executive director when a conciliation agreement is breached; it states as follows:

WAC 162-08-109
Breach of conciliated agreement.

If an agreement and order for the elimination of an unfair practice made under RCW 49.60.240* is breached, the executive director may take action appropriate in the circumstances, including one or more of the following:

(1) Specific enforcement. Bringing an action in superior or district court for specific enforcement of the agreement, or for damages pursuant to the conciliation agreement;

(2) Setting aside. Recommending to the commissioners that the agreement and order be set aside, in whole or in part, and that the case be returned to the staff for renewed conference, conciliation and persuasion, or to be referred to commission counsel for hearing; or

(3) Report to prosecuting attorney. Reporting the violation to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for prosecution under RCW 49.60.310*.

WAC 162-08-109* (emphasis and paragraph formatting added).

Options Available to the Commission

Thus, if a party violates the agreement, the executive director may choose one or more of the following steps, depending on the circumstances:

1. Specific Enforcement in Court

The Commission may file an action in superior or district court to enforce the agreement. This could mean seeking a court order that compels compliance with the original terms, or pursuing damages that were provided for in the agreement.

2. Setting Aside the Agreement

The executive director may recommend that the Commissioners void the agreement, in whole or in part. If this occurs, the case can be reopened for further conciliation efforts, or it may be referred to the Commission’s legal counsel for a formal hearing.

3. Referral for Prosecution

In certain cases, the violation may be referred to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for enforcement under RCW 49.60.310*, which provides for criminal penalties in connection with violations of the WLAD.

Why This Rule Matters

For individuals, this rule ensures that entering into a conciliation agreement is not the end of the road—there is accountability if the other party fails to follow through. For attorneys, it highlights the importance of drafting and reviewing conciliation agreements carefully, since breach can lead to renewed litigation, enforcement actions, or even criminal referral.

In short, WAC 162-08-109* underscores that compliance with conciliation agreements is not optional. The Human Rights Commission has meaningful enforcement mechanisms to protect both the integrity of the process and the rights of the parties involved.

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Remedies for Breach of Conciliation Agreements*

» WSHRC: Objective of Conciliation

LEARN MORE

–gw

September 3, 2025October 2, 2025

Unlawful Retaliation via Hostile Work Environment (9th Circuit)

Unlawful Retaliation via Hostile Work Environment

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, may a hostile work environment form the basis for unlawful retaliation when pursuing claims in the 9th Circuit? Here’s my point of view.

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Title VII (9th Circuit): Hostile Work Environment (Harassment) May Form the Basis for Retaliation Claims

The Ninth Circuit* recognizes that a “hostile work environment may be the basis for a retaliation claim under Title VII” since “[h]arassment . . . is the paradigm of ‘adverse treatment that is based on retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.’” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual ¶ 8008) (hyperlinks added). Under either theory, “[h]arassment is actionable only if it is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. at 1245 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).

Read our related articles

» Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

» What are the elements of Hostile Work Environment in WA State?

» What are the elements of Unlawful Retaliation in WA State?

need help?

-gw

July 31, 2025July 31, 2025

Trials by Remote Means (WA State)

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules (hereinafter, “Civil Rule” or “CR”), what are trials by remote means? Here’s my point of view.

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Understanding Trials by Remote Means in Washington State Superior Court: CR 39(d)

Washington State courts continue to adapt to modern technology and the evolving needs of litigants. One example is Civil Rule 39(d)* of the Superior Court Civil Rules*, which addresses how civil trials can proceed remotely—either in part or entirely.

What Is CR 39(d)?

CR 39(d)* allows civil trials to be conducted by remote means, such as videoconferencing, if certain conditions are met. This rule gives parties more flexibility, especially when travel or logistics might otherwise be barriers to participating in court.

Two Paths to a Remote Trial

There are two main ways a trial may proceed remotely under CR 39(d)*:

1. By Agreement (Stipulation):

If all parties agree and the court approves, the trial can take place remotely in whole or in part. In such cases, the technology used must allow all participants—including the judge, attorneys, and witnesses—to see, hear, and speak to each other clearly. Importantly, the court must also ensure that the trial remains open to the public, with full access to video and audio feeds.

2. By Proposal Without Agreement:

If one party requests a remote trial, the court must schedule a hearing at least 30 days before trial (or sooner by mutual agreement) to consider the proposal. If the parties can’t agree, the trial will default to being held in person, although the court may still permit individual parties or attorneys to appear remotely.

Limitations

CR 39(d)* does not apply to jury selection (voir dire) or pretrial proceedings. It also defers to CR 43* on whether witnesses may testify remotely during an in-person trial.

Why It Matters

Remote trials can improve access to justice, reduce costs, and increase scheduling flexibility. However, they also require reliable technology and coordination. Understanding the process outlined in CR 39(d) helps litigants and attorneys make informed decisions about whether a remote trial is right for their case.

If you’re involved in a civil case in Washington State and considering a remote trial, it’s wise to speak with your attorney early in the process to understand your options and the court’s expectations.

LEARN MORE

–gw

July 17, 2025July 17, 2025

Definitions of Service Animal Trainee and Trainer (WLAD)

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), what are the definitions of “service animal trainee” and “service animal trainer”? Here’s my point of view.

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS

Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer:

[REFUSE TO HIRE]

(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.

[dISCHARGE OR BAR FROM EMPLOYMENT]

(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]

(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.

[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]

(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.

RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis and hyperlinks added).

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION

The WLAD also outlaws certain types of retaliation: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination], or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination].” RCW 49.60.210. Moreover, “[i]t is an unfair practice for a government agency or government manager or supervisor to retaliate against a whistleblower as defined in chapter 42.40 RCW.” RCW 49.60.210.

NOTE: The foregoing unfair practices are based upon specific protected classes.

DEFINITIONS OF “SERVICE ANIMAL TRAINEE” AND “SERVICE ANIMAL TRAINER”

As established above, the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is one among a variety of protected classes under the WLAD. Accordingly, the WLAD defines the terms “service animal trainer” and “service animal trainee” as follows:

(26) “Service animal trainee” means any dog or miniature horse that is undergoing training to become a service animal.

(27) “Service animal trainer” means an individual exercising care, custody, and control over a service animal trainee during a course of training designed to develop the service animal trainee into a service animal.

RCW 49.60.040(26-27)* (hyperlink added).

WLAD REMEDIES

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).

READ OUR RELATED ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our articles related to this topic:

» Definition of Service Animal (WLAD)

» Liability for Killing or Injuring Dog Guide or Service Animal (WA State)

» License Waiver for Dog Guide and Service Animals (WA State)

need help?

-gw

July 14, 2025July 16, 2026

Cat’s Paw Theory of Liability (WA State)

Cat's Paw Theory of Liability (WA State)

In Washington State, what is the cat’s paw theory of liability? Here’s my point of view.

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CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY — SUBORDINATE BIAS LIABILITY

In Washington State, the “cat’s paw” theory of liability is consistent with the law on subordinate bias liability. See Boyd v. State*, 187 Wn.App. 1, 20, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015). “Under the cat’s paw theory, the animus of a non-decision-maker who has a singular influence may be imputed to the decision-maker.” Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).

THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule is as follows:

[I]f a supervisor* performs an act motivated by … animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.

Id.* at 20 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) (footnote omitted)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and hyperlink added). Note: the term proximate cause is undefined.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

“Under Washington law, in order for the act to be a proximate cause, it must be a substantial factor.” Id.* (citing City of Vancouver v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 180 Wn.App. 333, 356, 325 P.3d 213 (2014) (“a complainant seeking to use the subordinate bias theory of liability must show that the subordinate’s animus was a substantial factor in the decision”)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS & CAUSATION

Oftentimes, the employer-defendant under a cat’s paw theory of liability will claim that it conducted an “independent investigation” and found an unrelated basis for the adverse employment actions upon which the plaintiff-employee seeks recourse. In such a case, employers will typically argue that the so-called independent investigation was a supervening cause of any retaliatory animus. Nevertheless: “[A]n independent investigation does not necessarily relieve the employer of liability for an adverse employment action.” Id.* (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)).

If the independent investigation “relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary in any case of cat’s-paw liability—then the employer (either directly or through the ultimate decision maker) will have effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation to the biased supervisor.” Id.* at 18. Accordingly, the plaintiff may have a firm basis to argue that a causal connection exists, depending on the evidence. See, e.g., id.*

However: “[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action … then the employer will not be liable.” Id.* at 18 (citing Staub, 131 S.Ct. at 1193) (alteration in original).

ORIGINS OF CAT’S PAW THEORY OF LIABILITY

“The term ‘cat’s paw’ originated in the fable, ‘The Monkey and the Cat,’ by Jean de La Fontaine[:]

As told in the fable, the monkey wanted some chestnuts that were roasting in a fire. Unwilling to burn himself in the fire, the monkey convinced the cat to retrieve the chestnuts for him. As the cat carefully scooped the chestnuts from the fire with his paw, the monkey gobbled them up. By the time the serving wench caught the two thieves, no chestnuts were left for the unhappy cat.

Id.* at 21 n.1 (citing Julie M. Covel, The Supreme Court Writes A Fractured Fable of the Cat’s Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor Hospital [Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011)], 51 Washburn L.J. 159, 159 (2011) (footnotes omitted)) (citation alteration in original).

THE CAT & THE MONKEY

“In the workplace, the cat represents an unbiased decision-maker who disciplines an employee unknowingly due to a supervisor’s bias, represented by the monkey.” Id.* (citing Edward G. Phillips, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: The Cat’s Paw Theory Gets Its Claws Sharpened, 47 Tenn. B.J. June, 2011, at 21).

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