This is a case summary of Sangster v. Albertson’s Inc., 99 Wn.App. 156, 991 P.2d 674 (Div. 3 2000). Subjects include, but are not limited to the following:
» SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISOR
» IMPUTING HARASSMENT
» FARAGHER-ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
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case summarY – 12 Facts:
[1] In 1989, Brenda Sangster started working in the service deli Department of the Albertson’s store in Lewiston, Idaho.
[2] In December 1992, she was promoted to service deli manager in the Clarkston[, Washington] Albertson’s store.
[3] Approximately two and one-half years later, she resigned her position at the Clarkston store and returned to a nonmanager position at the Lewiston Albertson’s.
[4] During Ms. Sangster’s tenure as deli manager at the Clarkston Albertson’s, the store director was Terry Myers.
[5] Ms. Sangster claims that while she was an employee at the Clarkston Albertson’s store, she was the victim of Mr. Myers’ sexual harassment.
[6] In October 1996, she filed a sexual harassment action against Albertson’s and Mr. Myers.
[7] The type of conduct about which Ms. Sangster complains is summarized as follows:
[A] Ms. Sangster was constantly referred to as “honey,” “sweety,” and “little girl” by Mr. Myers.
[B] Mr. Myers made sexually suggestive and demeaning comments to Ms. Sangster regarding shorts. Regarding this incident, Ms. Sangster asked Mr. Myers if it was possible for the deli department employees to wear shorts at the outdoor Albertson’s store promotions. Mr. Myers told Ms. Sangster that this was okay if she bought or wore a size too small for her.
[C] Ms. Sangster was present at a managers’ meeting concerning Vicki Fuson as employee of the month. At the meeting, Mr. Myers nominated Ms. Fuson as the employee of the month since she looked great in a bathing suit and made a gesture regarding Ms. Fuson’s breasts.
[D] There were numerous statements and comments by Mr. Myers to Ms. Sangster in which he stated to Ms. Sangster, “What’s the matter — didn’t you get any last night?” This particular comment was not limited to one incident but was repeatedly made by Mr. Myers to Ms. Sangster in the presence of co-workers and at the Thursday managers’ meeting in front of other department managers.
[E] On one occasion, a friend dropped a dress off at the store for Ms. Sangster. Mr. Myers, in the presence of other employees, asked Ms. Sangster to try the dress on in front of them.
[F] Mr. Myers made the statement to Ms. Sangster in the service deli department while looking at a display, “Damn that makes my titt[-] hard.”
[G] At one of the managers’ meetings, Mr. Myers made the comment regarding hot mustard, “Try it, it will make your pecke[-] stand out.”
[H] Mr. Myers made a comment regarding Ms. Sangster’s flying lessons. He remarked that she should join his mile high club. When she asked what that was, Mr. Myers turned and walked away laughing. Ms. Sangster felt that this comment was of a sexual nature and carried sexual overtones.
[I] Mr. Myers made comments about the problem with dating younger men. He stated that Ms. Sangster should go out with older men like himself. In this same conversation, Mr. Myers commented to Ms. Sangster that she should travel with him.
[J] Mr. Myers made other vulgar and demeaning sexual comments to Ms. Sangster at the weekly managers’ meetings.
[K] Mr. Myers stated that he noticed Ms. Sangster’s performance as service deli manager began to slip the four to six months Before she left the Clarkston store in July 1995.
[8] Albertson’s and Mr. Myers filed a motion for summary judgment.
[9] The court found that these actions did not rise to the level of sexual harassment and, accordingly, granted Albertson’s and Mr. Myers’ motion for summary judgment.
[10] Ms. Sangster filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to CR 59 and submitted a new affidavit containing additional information.
[11] The court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating “[t]he new affidavit is an attempt to bring in new evidence[.]”
[12] The court further ruled that “the requirements of CR 59 have not been satisfied.” Ms. Sangster appeals.
Sangster v. Albertson’s Inc., 99 Wn.App. 156, 991 P.2d 674 (Div. 3 2000) (hyperlinks added).
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court err in granting Albertson’s and Mr. Meyers’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Sangster’s sexual harassment claim?
[1-1] SEXUAL HARASSMENT GENERALLY: “Washington’s law against discrimination [(WLAD)], RCW 49.60, protects employees from sexual harassment.” Sangster v. Albertson’s Inc., 99 Wn.App. 156, 161, 991 P.2d 674 (Div. 3 2000) (citing Coville v. Cobarc Servs., Inc., 73 Wash.App. 433, 438, 869 P.2d 1103 (1994) (citing Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash.2d 401, 405, 693 P.2d 708 (1985))) (hyperlink added).
[1-2] THE WLAD SEXUAL HARASSMENT PROVISION (RCW 49.60.180(3)): “The statute provides in relevant part, ‘[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer … [t]o discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability[.]'” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.180(3)) (alteration in original).
[1-3] TWO TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (QUID PRO QUO & HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT): “Sexual harassment claims are characterized as either ‘quid pro quo harassment’ or ‘hostile work environment’ claims.” Id. (citing DeWater v. State, 130 Wash.2d 128, 134, 921 P.2d 1059 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Children’s Home Soc’y of Wash., Inc., 77 Wash.App. 507, 511 n. 2, 892 P.2d 1102 (1995))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[1-4] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT BASED ON SEX (THE PRIMA FACIE CASE): “To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim, the employee must demonstrate that there was[:]
(1) offensive, unwelcome contact that
(2) occurred because of sex or gender,
(3) affected the terms or conditions of employment, and
(4) can be imputed to the employer.
Id. (citing Doe v. Department of Transp., 85 Wash.App. 143, 148, 931 P.2d 196 (1997) (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 406-07, 693 P.2d 708); Coville, 73 Wash.App. at 438, 869 P.2d 1103)) (paragraph formatting added).
[1-5] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 2ND ELEMENT (OCCURRED BECAUSE OF SEX/GENDER): In the instant case, “[the plaintiff] must prove that she would not have been singled out and caused to suffer the harassment had she been male.” Id. (citing Doe, 85 Wash.App. at 148, 931 P.2d 196). Accordingly, “[t]o defeat a summary judgment motion, [the plaintiff] must produce competent evidence that supports a reasonable inference that [the plaintiff’s] gender was the motivating factor for . . . [the] harassing conduct.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
[1-6] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 3RD ELEMENT (AFFECTED THE TERMS OR CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT): “Casual, isolated or trivial manifestations of a discriminatory environment do not affect the terms or conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate the law.” Id. at 162.
PERVASIVENESS: “The harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. at 162-63 (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 406, 693 P.2d 708).
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: “Whether the harassment is such that it creates an abusive working environment may be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 163 (citing Payne, 77 Wash.App. at 515, 892 P.2d 1102 (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 406-07, 693 P.2d 708)).
CONSIDERATIONS: “[The court] . . . consider[s] the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.'” Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)).
CASUAL, ISOLATED, OR TRIVIAL INCIDENTS NOT ENOUGH: “‘Casual, isolated or trivial’ incidents are not actionable.” Id. (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 406, 693 P.2d 708; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (“isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment’ “)).
[1-7] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 4TH ELEMENT (CAN BE IMPUTED TO EMPLOYER): “[A] coemployee’s sexual harassment can be imputed to an employer if that coemployee is a manager who personally participates in the harassment.” Id. (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 407, 693 P.2d 708). “The Glasgow formulation of the elements of sexual harassment is taken from federal cases interpreting Title VII.” Id. at 164 (citing Glasgow, 103 Wash.2d at 406-07, 693 P.2d 708) (hyperlink added).
[1-8] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 4TH ELEMENT (QUALIFIED IMPUTATION BASED UPON SUPERVISOR MISCONDUCT): THE FARAGHER-ELLERTH TEST: “Since Glasgow was decided, several federal cases have held that there should not be automatic imputation where the harasser is a supervisor at the employment site but does not occupy an upper level management position.” Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 164 (citing Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir.1997); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir.1997); Andrade v. Mayfair Mgt., Inc., 88 F.3d 258 (4th Cir.1996)).
“In response to those cases, the United States Supreme Court clarified federal law in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) and Faragher [v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,] 118 S.Ct. … [2275,] 2292-93[, 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998).]” Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 164 (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[t]he court established [the] [Faragher-Ellerth] test for determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor.” Id. (emphasis added).
THE FARAGHER-ELLERTH TEST: The Faragher-Ellerth test “stated: ‘An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.'” Id. (citing Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2261).
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: “To prevent this rule from imposing automatic liability and to encourage employers to adopt anti-harassment policies, the court provided employers with an affirmative defense that they could assert to avoid vicarious liability for their supervisor’s misconduct:”
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see F. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c).”
Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
[1-9] FARAGHER-ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (THE EMPLOYERS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO SUPERVISOR-BASED VICARIOUS LIABILITY): “The [Faragher-Ellerth affirmative] defense comprises two necessary elements:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”
Id. at 165 (paragraph formatting added).
CAVEAT: This test is only applicable when no tangible employment action is taken by the employer against the employee.
[1-10] SUMMARY: SUPERVISOR-BASED VICARIOUS LIABILITY: “[I]f the harassment is actionable and the harasser has supervisory authority over the victim, the presumption is that the employer is vicariously liable for the harassment.” Id. “This presumption may be overcome only if the alleged harassment has not resulted in a tangible employment action, and then only if the employer can prove both elements of the affirmative defense.” Id.
[1-11] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 1ST ELEMENT (OFFENSIVE & UNWELCOME CONDUCT): In this case, the Court found that “[t]he parties agree[d] that the conduct was offensive and unwelcome.” Id. at 161. Thus, the Plaintiff “fulfill[ed] the first element of [her] prima facie case.” Id.
[1-12] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT — 2ND ELEMENT (OCCURRED BECAUSE OF SEX/GENDER): Next, the Court initially determined that “[s]everal of the incidents Ms. Sangster lists as sexually harassing do not fulfill this element because they were comments made to a group of both males and females and were not motivated by Ms. Sangster’s sex.” Id. at 162. The Court reasoned:
General comments Mr. Myers made at the managers’ meetings like, ‘[t]ry it, it will make your peck[-] stand out,’ or commenting on how a female employee should be employee of the month because she looked good in a swimming suit were not directed at Ms. Sangster and were not motivated by her gender. Also, the comment, ‘[d]amn that makes my titt[-] hard,’ was heard by several other people and was not specifically directed at Ms. Sangster.
Id. (alterations in original).
However, the Court subsequently found that “[t]he remaining incidents appear to have been motivated by Ms. Sangster’s gender[:]
[A] Mr. Myers suggesting that Ms. Sangster order her shorts one size smaller, or try on a dress in front of him, implies that he wanted to look at her in tight shorts or undressed.
[B] Mr. Myers asking Ms. Sangster, “[w]hat’s the matter – didn’t you get any last night?” or remarking that she should join his mile high club, could have been made to either male or female, but were inappropriate comments about her sex life.
[C] Also, Mr. Myers’ comments that Ms. Sangster should go for older men like himself and she could travel with him implied that he wanted to have a relationship with her.
[D] Mr. Myers’ use of the terms, “honey,” “sweety,” and “little girl” in addressing Ms. Sangster and other female employees was definitely based on gender.
The sexual nature of these incidents supports a reasonable inference that the conduct occurred because she was female.
Id.
[1-13] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 3RD ELEMENT (AFFECTED THE TERMS OR CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT): The Court first considered the employer’s arguments:
Albertson’s argues that the alleged sexual harassment was only part of Ms. Sangster’s discontent with her job. Further, Albertson’s minimized the sexual harassment, characterizing it as casual or trivial. Albertson’s maintains that it is not clear that the harassment, without Ms. Sangster’s other problems at the store, was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment.
Id. at 163, 991 P.2d 674. However, it dismissed these arguments finding in favor of the Plaintiff concerning the third element:
[T]he evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact because reasonable persons could reach different conclusions as to whether the harassment altered the conditions of employment. Ms. Sangster has established the third element of her prima facie case.
Id.
[1-14] HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 4TH ELEMENT (CAN BE IMPUTED TO EMPLOYER): This was the main issue on appeal. The Court initially considered the following facts regarding the fourth element:
[a] “Ms. Sangster’s complaints about sexual harassment cover a period of time exceeding two and one-half years.”
[b] “During that time, Albertson’s had in effect a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. This policy was stated in its employee handbook which Ms. Sangster was required periodically to read. It stated:
Employees who have been led to believe that promotions, increases in wages, continued employment or any terms of employment are conditioned on sexual favors, or who feel that they have been subject to any type of sexually offensive work environment or incidents of retaliation, must immediately contact the hotline number 1-800-841-6371. You need not identify yourself to report improper activities via the hotline.
[c] “This policy was effectuated by the hotline number, periodic distribution of notices to each store employee, and special training sessions for store directors.”
[d] “Ms. Sangster received a notice from Albertson’s informing her that all employees must ‘comply with our policy prohibiting sexual harassment.’ “
[e] “The notice further instructed employees that if they were aware of supervisors or employees who have violated the policy, they “should immediately report such information to our General Office in Boise via our toll-free Hotline number.”
[f] “Ms. Sangster never used the hotline to report the sexual harassment.”
[g] “She did not contact Albertson’s about the sexual harassment until after she announced she was stepping down as the service deli manager at Clarkston.”
[h] “After she contacted Albertson’s, she was interviewed by a member of its senior management. Thereafter, Albertson’s investigated Ms. Sangster’s claims.”
[i] “Although the investigation failed to substantiate her claims, Albertson’s counseled Mr. Myers that no sexual harassment could be tolerated.”
[j] “There is no evidence that Ms. Sangster was subject to any sexual harassment or retaliation after she made her complaint.”
Id. at 165-66.
The Court then found as follows:
In this case, there is evidence that the employer adopted a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. There is also evidence that the employee did not timely report the harassment to her employer as required by its policy. There is a factual basis for the argument that had she done so, the damages to her and the liability to her employer may have been eliminated or limited by its response to her complaints. Nevertheless, under a rule that imputes automatic liability to an employer for the conduct of a manager, Albertson’s would be automatically liable for Mr. Myers’ conduct.
Id. at 166.
[1-15] GLASGOW IS NOT CONTROLLING: The Court then considered whether the Glasgow case was controlling and noted the following:
♦ Glasgow “does not discuss the effect of failure to use an anti-sexual harassment complaint procedure.”
♦ “There is no evidence that the Glasgow employer had such a procedure.”
♦ “[I]n describing the four elements of sexual harassment, the court stated what ‘an employee must prove.”
♦ “It did not attempt to articulate defenses which may have been available to the employer.”
Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 166-67 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that Glasgow was not controlling in the instant case.
[1-16] EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM UNDER RCW 49.60.180 (REVERSED & REMANDED): The Court held as follows:
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Sangster, as the nonmoving party, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a claim of sexual harassment under RCW 49.60.180.
Albertson’s and Mr. Myers should not have been granted summary judgment. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Myers sexually harassed Ms. Sangster and whether such conduct created a hostile work environment.
If these issues should be resolved against Albertson’s, it would be liable for Mr. Myers’ conduct, unless it prevails on the affirmative defense described in Burlington and Faragher.
Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 167 (hyperlink and paragraph formatting added). As a result, the Court reversed the trial court decision and remanded for trial.
NOTABLES & IMPLICATIONS:
POLICY BEHIND THE FARAGHER-ELLERTH DEFENSE
(1) POLICY: “In adopting an affirmative defense limiting employer liability, the Burlington court stated it was consistent with ‘Title VII’s purpose to the extent it would encourage the creation and use of anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures.’ ” Sangster, 99 Wn.App. at 166 (citing Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2261).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT & WLAD
(2) DEFEATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “To defeat summary judgment, the employee must establish specific and material facts to support each element of her prima facie case.” Id. at 160 (citing Marquis, 130 Wash.2d at 105, 922 P.2d 43; Kahn v. Salerno, 90 Wash.App. 110, 117, 951 P.2d 321, review denied, 136 Wash.2d 1016, 966 P.2d 1277 (1998)).
(3) INQUIRY SCOPE: “When reviewing an order of summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court.” Id. at 160 (citing Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 217, 930 P.2d 908, 937 P.2d 1052 (1997)).
(4) MATERIAL FACT: “A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.” Id. at 160 (citing Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash.2d 267, 279, 937 P.2d 1082 (1997)).
(5) STANDARD: “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 160 (citing CR 56(c); Hash v. Children’s Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 110 Wash.2d 912, 915, 757 P.2d 507 (1988)).
(6) STATEMENTS (OPINIONS & CONCLUSORY DECLARATIONS): “[I]n order for a plaintiff alleging discrimination in the workplace to overcome a motion for summary judgment, the worker must do more than express an opinion or make conclusory statements.” Id. at 160 (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 105, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(7) THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ADMONITION: “Summary judgment should rarely be granted in employment discrimination cases.” Id. at 160 (citing Johnson v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wash.App. 212, 226, 907 P.2d 1223 (1996)).
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