LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

National Bank Act Preemption & Title VII

Within the 9th Circuit, does the National Bank Act preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE NATIONAL BANK ACT

The National Bank Act provides, inter alia, that a national bank shall have the power “[t]o elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.” 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth) (emphasis added).

This is also known as the “at-pleasure provision” of § 24(Fifth) that is part of the scheme of federal laws governing the duties and powers of federally chartered banks. Thus, as a threshold matter, a federally chartered bank seeking to utilize the at-pleasure provision to preempt an employee’s claims for relief under other laws must first show that the employee was (1) appointed by the board of directors, (2) terminated by the board of directors, and (3) an officer.

THE PURPOSE

The original congressional intent behind the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act was to ensure the financial stability of the banking institutions by affording them the means to discharge employees who were felt to compromise an institution’s integrity. Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, courts uniformly have concluded that a bank’s power to dismiss at pleasure is analogous to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship between employer and employee. Id. at 984 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for certain employers (e.g., a bank) to discriminate against an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex; additional organizational forms are within purview of Title VII, but they are beyond the scope of this article.

Title VII also makes it illegal to retaliate against an individual because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

THE INTERSECTION

The intersection of the at-pleasure provision and Title VII presents a potential conflict of laws; and the 9th Circuit, in Kroske v. US Bank Corp, resolved the conflict in favor of bank officers both hired and fired by the board of directors. See Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Kroske, Kathy Kroske was a bank officer that was both hired and fired by the board of directors, and Kroske subsequently filed suit against the bank alleging age discrimination under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). Accordingly, one of the issues the court addressed was whether the at-pleasure provision preempted her age discrimination claim under WLAD?

The court, in reaching its conclusion (the analysis is beyond the scope of this article), found, inter alia, that federal anti-discrimination statutes were relevant to its inquiry because federally chartered banks are not exempt from liability under those laws. Id. at 986 (see Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (holding that members of a class of black employees of a Federal Reserve Bank could maintain separate actions against the bank under Title VII); see also Enforcement Guidance on Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC Decision No. N-915-002 (1993) (concluding that Federal Reserve Banks are not executive agencies and are covered by Title VII, the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as private employers)).

The court went on to find that courts that have addressed the issue consistently have held that banks are subject to liability for discrimination under federal anti-discrimination laws irrespective of the bank’s right to dismiss an officer (or employee) at pleasure. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Thus, it would appear that the National Bank Act does not preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Absurd-Consequences Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Absurd-Consequences Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE ABSURD-CONSEQUENCES RULE

In Washington State, courts “will avoid literal reading of a statute which would result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. McDougal, 120 Wn.2d 334, 350, 841 P.2d 1232 (1992)). “The spirit or purpose of an enactment should prevail over … express but inept wording.” Id. (citing State v. Day, 96 Wn.2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 546 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Section 1981 & Non-Employment Contracts (Ninth Circuit)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under The Law, are non-employment contracts protected in the Ninth Circuit? Here’s my point of view.

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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

The problem is how to adapt the four elements of a prima facie case established in the employment discrimination context to claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Plaintiff-Appellant (“Lindsey” dba “E-Jays Panache Images”) was a business that presented fashion shows; all representatives were African-American, and audience members were primarily African-American as well. The Defendant-Appellee (“SLT Los Angeles” or “the Westin”) owned and operated, inter alia, a Grand Ballroom in their subject Westin Hotel.

Lindsey contracted for use of the Grand Ballroom for an event, but on the day of the event, there was an apparent mix up by the Westin. He essentially alleged that they were denied the Grand Ballroom in favor of a Bar Mitzvah because of their race.

Lindsey sued in U.S. District Court for, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and “the district court concluded that Appellant … [Lindsey] had failed to prove that the Westin’s actions, which had prevented Panache from hosting its annual Mother’s Day Fashion Show in the Grand Ballroom of the Westin Hotel, presented a prima facie case of race discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 1141.

Lindsey appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and it reversed the district court and remanded for trial. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the decisions of other circuits that “the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id.

Accordingly, “the first three elements require a plaintiff to show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right to contract for those services.” Id. (referencing Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir.2001); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir.1996)) (emphasis added).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

However, the court identified that “the Seventh and Sixth Circuits conflict over adaptation of the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement, which, as applied by the district court … [in Lindsey], requires that such services remained available to similarly-situated individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court then pointed out that “the Seventh Circuit adopts this requirement … but the Sixth Circuit concludes that this flat requirement is too rigorous in the context of the denial of services by a commercial establishment, because customers often have no way of establishing what treatment was accorded to other customers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The 9th Circuit reasoned that “the Sixth Circuit distinguishes the commercial services context from the employment context, where records are kept and there is a paper trail disclosing what treatment is given to similarly-situated others.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “the Sixth Circuit alters the elements to require: (a) that plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not; and/or (b) that plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning compelling, but did not decide whether its modification/relaxation of the fourth element of a prima facie case under Section 1981 is required in many or all cases arising in a commercial, non-employment context. The court found that the plaintiff in Lindsey offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, and, thus, it applied all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed.

CONCLUSION

It appears that in the Ninth Circuit, the following may be required to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:

1) membership in a protected class;

2) an attempt to contract for certain services;

3) denial of the right to contract for those services; and (possibly);

4) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not [AND/OR] plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.

See Lindsey, 447 F.3d at 1145. When the plaintiff offers clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, the court will likely apply all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed. See id.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Courts for WLAD Claims

Depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff may have a choice of litigating their Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) case in one of several different courts. Here are my top 3 courts for litigating WLAD claims (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney in Washington State):

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#3 – UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

United States District Courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; this is known as federal question jurisdiction. It is not uncommon for Plaintiffs to bring claims in the same lawsuit under both WLAD and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) — or other federal anti-discrimination laws (e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 1981, etc.). Depending on the circumstances of each case, adding the Title VII claims may give U.S. District Courts original federal-question jurisdiction over the matter.

U.S. District Courts also have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between, inter alia, citizens of different States; this is known as diversity jurisdiction. Again, depending on the circumstances of each case, WLAD plaintiffs that initially sue employers–incorporated outside of Washington State–in state court may end up in U.S. District Court based on diversity jurisdiction.

#2 – WASHINGTON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

Washington State District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. For civil (employment discrimination) matters, this means that the court will have jurisdiction over the matter if, for each claimant, the value of the claim or the amount at issue does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees (check the Revised Code of Washington for current dollar amounts). Thus, this court may also be a viable option for a WLAD plaintiff if the value of the case is appropriate.

#1 – WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURTS

Washington State Superior Courts are courts of general jurisdiction; typically, there is no maximum or minimum dollar amount that must be at issue. And, unlike U.S. District Courts, a unanimous jury is not required in order to render a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. Superior courts are commonly used by plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring WLAD claims.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Dictionary Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the dictionary rule? Here’s my point of view

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THE DICTIONARY RULE

Generally, “Legislative definitions provided in a statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, courts may give a term its plain and ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001)).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State

Under Washington State law, how do courts view ambiguous contracts at summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”

However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”

The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful retaliation is common legal theory that plaintiff-employees assert under employment discrimination law; causation is one of several elements that must be proven. The Washington State Supreme Court has considered several standards of causation pursuant to claims of unlawful retaliation under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.

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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

“To establish a prima facie case of [unlawful] retaliation, an employee must show three things: (1) the employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018) (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn.App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp, 118 Wn.2d 46, 68, 821 P.2d 18 (1991) (“establishing the retaliation test in the worker’s compensation context”)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The focus of this article is the third element: causal link (or causation). “An employee [shows a causal link (i.e., causation)] ‘by [revealing] … that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.’ ” Cornwell, 430 P.3d at 235 (Wash. 2018) (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

“[T]o avoid summary judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 235 (internal citation omitted). “Employees may rely on the following facts to show this: (1) the employee took a protected action, (2) the employer had knowledge of the action, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69, 821 P.2d 18) (emphasis added).

In this article, the 2nd element (i.e., the employer had knowledge of the action) is at issue, and the Washington State Supreme Court has considered several associated standards of causation.

TOP 3 STANDARDS OF UNLAWFUL-RETALIATION CAUSATION (WA STATE):

Here are my top 3 standards of unlawful-retaliation causation (WA State):

#3 — THE GENERAL-CORPORATE-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

The general-corporate-knowledge standard is somewhat of a misnomer, because the Washington State Supreme Court both raised and dismissed it in Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 235 (Wash. 2018) (“We decline to address the ‘general corporate knowledge’ standard in this case.”) (footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court declared, “Under this standard, the jury can still find retaliation in circumstances where the particular decision-maker denies actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activities, ‘so long as … the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.’ ” Id. at 241, n. 6 (citing Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original; second alteration added).

This standard “may be useful in situations where many individuals act collectively in a large company[ ] [.]” Id.

#2 — THE KNEW-OR-SUSPECTED STANDARD

“The knew-or-suspected standard incorporates the ‘actual knowledge’ standard, infra, and also encompasses cases in which the employer suspects that an employee engaged in protected action.” Id. at 237 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

This standard “[r]equires sufficient evidence to reasonably infer ‘both that [a supervisor] either knew or suspected’ that an employee took a protected action ‘and that there was a causal connection between this knowledge or suspicion and [the employee’s] termination.’ ” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original).

EXAMPLE: “This standard applies, for example, when a supervisor has actual knowledge that a complaint was made but has only a suspicion regarding who made the complaint and subsequently takes an adverse employment action based on that suspicion.” Id.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “So long as an employee produces evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that retaliation had taken place, this is sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Hernandez at 1114). “And while, a jury could believe the supervisor’s version of events rather than the employee’s, the jury must be permitted to consider and weigh evidence.” Id.

#1 — THE ACTUAL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

Under the actual-knowledge standard, “the employer [must] have actual knowledge of the employee’s protected action in order to prove causation.” Id. at 235. (internal citations omitted).

The policy behind the actual-knowledge standard is that “[b]ecause retaliation is an intentional act, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an action of which the employer is unaware.” Id. at 235-36.

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE IRRELEVANT: But “[a] decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action.” Id. at 236 (emphasis added). “Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: At summary judgment, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the … evidence suggests a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS-AND-PHRASES RULE

In Washington State, “[c]ourts construe relative and qualifying words and phrases, both grammatically and legally, to refer to the last antecedent if a contrary intention does not appear in the statute.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 240, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing In re Application of Andy, 49 Wn.2d 449, 302 P.2d 963 (1956); see, e.g. Caughey v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 81 Wn.2d 597, 602, 503 P.2d 460 (1972) (“[W]here no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.”)).

“The reason for this rule … is to make clear what is being modified.” Id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

-gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, entitled to costs when the court finally adjudges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000? Here’s my point of view.

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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, United States District Courts have original jurisdiction (Diversity Jurisdiction) of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States; there are additional provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Further, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have Supplemental Jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution; but, there are exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b).

In Washington State, employment discrimination cases typically involve these two jurisdictional bases; Plaintiffs often combine Title VII claims with Washington Law Against Discrimination claims and associated state tort claims. Employer-defendants in such cases are often incorporated out of state. This article addresses the scenario wherein the plaintiff elects to initially file suit in federal court based on similar circumstances.

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

There may be risks for the discrimination plaintiff that initially files in Federal court. The relevant law is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b), and it states as follows:

(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.

Id. According to this statute, a plaintiff may be denied costs and/or required to pay costs in the event of a favorable verdict that is below $75,000.

CONCLUSION

Subject to exceptions, a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court based on diversity jurisdiction must, arguably, recover $75,000 or more (without regard to setoff and counterclaim; and exclusive of interest and costs), or the court may deny costs authorized by statute to the plaintiff. Moreover, the court may also impose costs on the plaintiff.

But this law may be superseded by an express provision in a statute of the United States. In any event, this is a gambit that some plaintiffs may not want to take – proceed with caution.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Agencies

In Washington State, employees may seek recourse for employment discrimination through federal, state, and local governmental agencies. Here’s my countdown of the top 3 employment discrimination agencies in the state of Washington (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney):

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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#3 — MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENTS

Some municipalities (e.g., Seattle Office for Civil Rights, Tacoma Human Rights Commission, etc.) have established departments that work to resolve, inter alia, employment discrimination and retaliation complaints based on protected classes. The services offered by these departments vary from city to city, and not all municipalities in Washington State maintain such departments.

#2 — U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. You may seek recourse through the EEOC if you experience employment discrimination that involves:

1. Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

2. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

3. Denial of a reasonable workplace accommodation that you need because of your religious beliefs or disability.

4. Retaliation because you complained about job discrimination, or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

Visit the EEOC Website to learn more.

#1 — WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions based on protected classes.

Protected classes include the following: race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

WLAD also prohibits retaliation against persons who engage in protected activity in relation to discriminatory practices, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower complaints.

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination. It works to prevent and eliminate discrimination through complaint investigation, alternative dispute resolution, and education, training and outreach activities.

Visit the WSHRC Website to get more information.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

THE NATIONAL BANK ACT

THE PURPOSE

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

THE INTERSECTION

CONCLUSION

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THE ABSURD-CONSEQUENCES RULE

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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

CONCLUSION

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#3 – UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

#2 – WASHINGTON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

#1 – WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURTS

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THE DICTIONARY RULE

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

TOP 3 STANDARDS OF UNLAWFUL-RETALIATION CAUSATION (WA STATE):

#3 — THE GENERAL-CORPORATE-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

#2 — THE KNEW-OR-SUSPECTED STANDARD

#1 — THE ACTUAL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

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THE RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS-AND-PHRASES RULE

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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

CONCLUSION

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#3 — MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENTS

#2 — U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

#1 — WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

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