LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Ejusdem Generis Rule

Under Washington canons of statutory construction, what is the Ejusdem Generis Rule? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE

“The ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific terms. In short, specific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms where both are used in sequence.” Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930, 965 P.2d 1124 (Wash.App.Div. 1 1998) (citing Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972)) (hyperlink added).

EXAMPLE: MALO v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.

In Malo, the statute at issue states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

Id. (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)) (emphasis added).

In this case, there was an issue as to the meaning of the term “or other person.” The court applied two canons: (1) “[p]rovisions in a statute are to be read in the context of the statute as a whole[,]” and (2) the Ejusdem Generis Rule–holding that “the general term ‘or other person’ is restricted by the words ’employer,’ ’employment agency’ and ‘labor union.'” Id. (citing Pope v. University of Washington, 121 Wash.2d 479, 489, 852 P.2d 1055 (1993); RCW 49.60.210(1)).

Thus, “[t]he section, read as a whole, is directed at entities functionally similar to employers who discriminate by engaging in conduct similar to discharging or expelling a person who has opposed practices forbidden by RCW 49.60.” Id. (hyperlink added).

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June 25, 2021October 20, 2024

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability

Under Section 1983, may an individual bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an illegal custom — even if the custom was not officially established? Here’s my point of view.

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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

Local governmental entities may be sued under Section 1983 for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom,’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity’s official decisionmaking channels.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 412 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

“Showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity is one way to establish municipal liability.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) a police officer turned a police dog loose on Chew and it assaulted Chew directly causing injury; the city argued that the unofficial policy of using dogs to apprehend suspects was attributable only to the non-policymaking officers responsible for training the canine units and not the police chief or commission — policymaking officials.

The court found that “[a] city could not escape liability for the consequences of established and ongoing departmental policy regarding the use of force simply by permitting such basic policy decisions to be made by lower level officials who are not ordinarily considered policymakers.” Id. at 1445.

Furthermore, the court found that “if the city in fact permitted departmental policy regarding the use of canine force to be designed and implemented at lower levels of the department, a jury could, and should, nevertheless find that the policy constituted an established municipal ‘custom or usage’ regarding the use of police dogs for which the city is responsible.” Id. (referencing City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127)

Thus, the court held that the city acted under color of law in injuring Chew.

CONCLUSION

Under § 1983, I believe an individual may bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an unofficial illegal custom.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 19, 2021October 20, 2024

Presumption of Prospective Application

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is Presumption of Prospective Application? Here’s my point of view.

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THE PRESUMPTION OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

Under the Washington State canon Presumption of Prospective Application, the court “presumes that a statute applies prospectively, unless (1) the legislature intends otherwise, or (2) unless the amendment is remedial in nature.” Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 271 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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June 18, 2021October 20, 2024

Agency Rules

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, how do courts interpret agency rules–particularly those of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC/HRC)? Here’s my point of view.

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“PLAIN MEANING” CANON ALSO APPLIES TO AGENCY RULES

Washington State Human Rights Commission is a state agency. “As is true of statutes, [Washington courts] … interpret agency rules according to their plain meaning.” Mikolajczak v. Mann, 1 Wn.App.2d 493, 498 (Wash.App. Div. 3 2017) (citing Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d 340, 349, 172 P.3d 688 (2007)) (hyperlink added). “Each word in an agency rule must be given its common and ordinary meaning, unless the word is ambiguous or defined in the regulation.” Id. (citing Grays Harbor Energy, LLC. v. Grays Harbor County, 175 Wn.App. 578, 584, 307 P.3d 754 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION APPLIED TO WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (HRC) RULES

Washington courts also “liberally construe the terms of the [Washington State Human Rights Commission’s] … rules to protect against discrimination.” Id. (citing Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989)).

REGULATORY REDRAFTING PROHIBITED

“However, [courts] … cannot engage in statutory or regulatory redrafting.” Id. (citing Hegwine, 162 Wn.2d at 352, 172 P.3d 688). “If a particular discrimination claim is plainly left uncovered by both the [Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”)] … and the HRC’s implementing rules, it will not merit relief.” Id. at 498-99.

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June 9, 2021October 20, 2024

The Harmonizing Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Harmonizing Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE HARMONZING RULE

According to Washington State courts, “[a]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized, and both given effect if possible.” Nearing v. Golden State Foods Corporation, 114 Wn.2d 817, 821, 792 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1990) (citing Emwright v. King Cy., 96 Wash.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981)).

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June 8, 2021October 20, 2024

The General-Terms Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the General-Terms Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE GENERAL-TERMS RULE

In Washington State, “[a] general term used at the end of a sequence in a statute is restricted in its application by the preceding words.” Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930 (Div. 1, 1998).

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June 3, 2021October 20, 2024

Inadvertent Waiver of Res Judicata

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, how is the inadvertent waiver of the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and claim splitting addressed? Here’s my point of view.

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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Washington State Supreme Court developed two relevant tests to determine whether a waiver of affirmative defenses has occurred:

(1) waiver based on civil rules; and

(2) common law waiver.

Compare, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) (explaining waiver pursuant to civil rules), with Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc., 163 Wn.2d 236, 178 P.3d 981 (2008) (explaining common law doctrine of waiver).

It is not uncommon for defendant-employers in employment discrimination cases to inadvertently waive the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and/or claim splitting under the civil rules (this article does not address common law waiver).

WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES: RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING

Under CR 8(c), res judicata is listed as an affirmative defense and must be specifically pled. See, e.g., Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 422, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1981) (holding “failure of consideration” is an affirmative defense under CR 8(c) and must be specifically pled).

Particularly, in order for res judicata to have a preclusive effect, the second court must be advised of the prior proceeding, and the burden of pleading “res judicata” is listed among the affirmative defenses. See, Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 812 (1985) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Moreover, although CR 8(c) specifically delineates 20 affirmative defenses, parties must also affirmatively plead “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 575, 166 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2007). Thus, “claim splitting” and “priority of action” must also be specifically pled as affirmative defenses.

If specific defenses are not (1) affirmatively pled, (2) asserted with a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they will be deemed to have been waived and may not thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case. Rainier Nat. Bank, 30 Wn.App. at 422 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976))(emphasis added).

This affirmative defense requirement will not be abrogated where it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

EXAMPLE: RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS

For example, in Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, the plaintiff-bank brought an action to recover funds from a default loan guaranteed by defendants, and defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of “failure of consideration” for the first time at summary judgment; the court held that defendants failed to specifically plead the affirmative defense “failure of consideration” in their answer and it was therefore waived. Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div 1 1981) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, or claim splitting may be inadvertently waived if not properly plead.

An employment discrimination plaintiff facing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon defenses of priority of action rule, claim splitting, and/or res judicata would be wise to evaluate whether the defendant has properly asserted such affirmative defenses at the beginning of the case in their responsive pleading; there might be a strong argument for waiver based on the civil rules. I have successfully made this argument on multiple occasions against defendant-employers at summary judgment.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

May 30, 2021October 20, 2024

The Plain Meaning Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Plain Meaning Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Certification (9th Cir.): Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 611 (Wash. 2019). (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

THE PLAIN MEANING RULE

“Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

AMBIGUOUS STATUTES

“If the statute is ambiguous, the court resorts to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to assist [the court] in discerning legislative intent.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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April 20, 2021October 20, 2024

Definition of “full enjoyment of” (WLAD)

Definition of "full enjoyment of" (WLAD)

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), what is the definition of “full enjoyment of” in relation to public accommodations discrimination? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(e) The right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions with health maintenance organizations without discrimination: PROVIDED, That a practice which is not unlawful under RCW 48.30.300, 48.44.220, or 48.46.370 does not constitute an unfair practice for the purposes of this subparagraph;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD regulates, inter alia, public accommodations. See supra section (1)(b).

**DEFINITION OF “FULL ENJOYMENT OF” (PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DISCRIMINATION)**

For purposes of public accommodations discrimination, the WLAD defines “full enjoyment of” as follows:

…

(14) “Full enjoyment of” includes the right to purchase any service, commodity, or article of personal property offered or sold on, or by, any establishment to the public, and the admission of any person to accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, without acts directly or indirectly causing persons of any particular race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, or with any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.

RCW 49.60.040(14) (hyperlinks added).

WLAD REMEDIES

Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies. “Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of … [the Washington Law Against Discrimination] shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).” RCW 49.60.030(2).

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If you need help with your employment issue, then consider a consultation with an experienced employment discrimination attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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April 15, 2021October 20, 2024

Definition of Labor Organization (WLAD)

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), what is the definition of “labor organization”? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

The WLAD is a potent statute enacted in 1949, and it covers a broad array of categories, including the following:

Freedom from discrimination—Declaration of civil rights.

(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination;

(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;

(c) The right to engage in real estate transactions without discrimination, including discrimination against families with children;

(d) The right to engage in credit transactions without discrimination;

(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists … ; and

(g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.

RCW 49.60.030(1) (emphasis, paragraph formatting, and hyperlinks added). The WLAD protects, inter alia, employees from the unfair practices of employers.

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS

Under the WLAD, certain employers are prohibited from engaging in specific unfair practices in employment. The relevant law states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer:

[REFUSE TO HIRE]

(1) To refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed to require an employer to establish employment goals or quotas based on sexual orientation.

[dISCHARGE OR BAR FROM EMPLOYMENT]

(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]

(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability: PROVIDED, That it shall not be an unfair practice for an employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where the commission by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of opportunity between the sexes.

[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]

(4) To print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, Nothing contained herein shall prohibit advertising in a foreign language.

RCW 49.60.180 (emphasis and hyperlinks added). The WLAD defines organizational types that are subject it.

DEFINITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

The WLAD defines the term “labor organization” as follows:

…

(16) “Labor organization” includes any organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances or terms or conditions of employment, or for other mutual aid or protection in connection with employment.

RCW 49.60.040(16) (emphasis and hyperlinks added). Victims of discrimination in violation of the WLAD may seek generous remedies.

THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE

EXAMPLE: MALO v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.

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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

CONCLUSION

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THE PRESUMPTION OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

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“PLAIN MEANING” CANON ALSO APPLIES TO AGENCY RULES

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION APPLIED TO WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (HRC) RULES

REGULATORY REDRAFTING PROHIBITED

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THE HARMONZING RULE

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THE GENERAL-TERMS RULE

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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES: RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING

EXAMPLE: RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS

CONCLUSION

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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

THE PLAIN MEANING RULE

AMBIGUOUS STATUTES

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

DEFINITION OF “FULL ENJOYMENT OF” (PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DISCRIMINATION)

WLAD REMEDIES

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (WLAD)

UNFAIR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS

[REFUSE TO HIRE]

[dISCHARGE OR BAR FROM EMPLOYMENT]

[DISCRIMINATE IN COMPENSATION OR IN OTHER TERMS/CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT]

[STATEMENTS, ADVERTISEMENTS, PUBLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT, INQUIRIES IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT]

DEFINITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

WLAD REMEDIES

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**DEFINITION OF “FULL ENJOYMENT OF” (PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS DISCRIMINATION)**