The Dictionary Rule

The Dictionary Rule


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the dictionary rule? Here’s my point of view

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE DICTIONARY RULE

Generally, “Legislative definitions provided in a statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, courts may give a term its plain and ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001)).

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Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State


Under Washington State law, how do courts view ambiguous contracts at summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”

However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”

The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.


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Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation


Unlawful retaliation is common legal theory that plaintiff-employees assert under employment discrimination law; causation is one of several elements that must be proven. The Washington State Supreme Court has considered several standards of causation pursuant to claims of unlawful retaliation under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

“To establish a prima facie case of [unlawful] retaliation, an employee must show three things: (1) the employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018) (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn.App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp, 118 Wn.2d 46, 68, 821 P.2d 18 (1991) (“establishing the retaliation test in the worker’s compensation context”)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The focus of this article is the third element: causal link (or causation). “An employee [shows a causal link (i.e., causation)] ‘by [revealing] … that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.’ ” Cornwell, 430 P.3d at 235 (Wash. 2018) (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

“[T]o avoid summary judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 235 (internal citation omitted). “Employees may rely on the following facts to show this: (1) the employee took a protected action, (2) the employer had knowledge of the action, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69, 821 P.2d 18) (emphasis added).

In this article, the 2nd element (i.e., the employer had knowledge of the action) is at issue, and the Washington State Supreme Court has considered several associated standards of causation.

TOP 3 STANDARDS OF UNLAWFUL-RETALIATION CAUSATION (WA STATE):

Here are my top 3 standards of unlawful-retaliation causation (WA State):

#3 — THE GENERAL-CORPORATE-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

The general-corporate-knowledge standard is somewhat of a misnomer, because the Washington State Supreme Court both raised and dismissed it in Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 235 (Wash. 2018) (“We decline to address the ‘general corporate knowledge’ standard in this case.”) (footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court declared, “Under this standard, the jury can still find retaliation in circumstances where the particular decision-maker denies actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activities, ‘so long as … the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.’ ” Id. at 241, n. 6 (citing Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original; second alteration added).

This standard “may be useful in situations where many individuals act collectively in a large company[ ] [.]” Id.

#2 — THE KNEW-OR-SUSPECTED STANDARD

“The knew-or-suspected standard incorporates the ‘actual knowledge’ standard, infra, and also encompasses cases in which the employer suspects that an employee engaged in protected action.” Id. at 237 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

This standard “[r]equires sufficient evidence to reasonably infer ‘both that [a supervisor] either knew or suspected’ that an employee took a protected action ‘and that there was a causal connection between this knowledge or suspicion and [the employee’s] termination.’ ” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original).

EXAMPLE: “This standard applies, for example, when a supervisor has actual knowledge that a complaint was made but has only a suspicion regarding who made the complaint and subsequently takes an adverse employment action based on that suspicion.” Id.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “So long as an employee produces evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that retaliation had taken place, this is sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Hernandez at 1114). “And while, a jury could believe the supervisor’s version of events rather than the employee’s, the jury must be permitted to consider and weigh evidence.” Id.

#1 — THE ACTUAL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

Under the actual-knowledge standard, “the employer [must] have actual knowledge of the employee’s protected action in order to prove causation.” Id. at 235. (internal citations omitted).

The policy behind the actual-knowledge standard is that “[b]ecause retaliation is an intentional act, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an action of which the employer is unaware.” Id. at 235-36.

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE IRRELEVANT: But “[a] decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action.” Id. at 236 (emphasis added). “Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: At summary judgment, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the … evidence suggests a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).


READ MORE ARTICLES

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.



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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

The Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule

The Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.


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THE RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS-AND-PHRASES RULE

In Washington State, “[c]ourts construe relative and qualifying words and phrases, both grammatically and legally, to refer to the last antecedent if a contrary intention does not appear in the statute.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 240, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing In re Application of Andy, 49 Wn.2d 449, 302 P.2d 963 (1956); see, e.g. Caughey v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 81 Wn.2d 597, 602, 503 P.2d 460 (1972) (“[W]here no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.”)).

“The reason for this rule … is to make clear what is being modified.” Id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit

The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit


Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, entitled to costs when the court finally adjudges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, United States District Courts have original jurisdiction (Diversity Jurisdiction) of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States; there are additional provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Further, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have Supplemental Jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution; but, there are exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b).

In Washington State, employment discrimination cases typically involve these two jurisdictional bases; Plaintiffs often combine Title VII claims with Washington Law Against Discrimination claims and associated state tort claims. Employer-defendants in such cases are often incorporated out of state. This article addresses the scenario wherein the plaintiff elects to initially file suit in federal court based on similar circumstances.

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

There may be risks for the discrimination plaintiff that initially files in Federal court. The relevant law is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b), and it states as follows:

(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.

Id. According to this statute, a plaintiff may be denied costs and/or required to pay costs in the event of a favorable verdict that is below $75,000.

CONCLUSION

Subject to exceptions, a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court based on diversity jurisdiction must, arguably, recover $75,000 or more (without regard to setoff and counterclaim; and exclusive of interest and costs), or the court may deny costs authorized by statute to the plaintiff. Moreover, the court may also impose costs on the plaintiff.

But this law may be superseded by an express provision in a statute of the United States. In any event, this is a gambit that some plaintiffs may not want to take – proceed with caution.


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Agencies

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Agencies


In Washington State, employees may seek recourse for employment discrimination through federal, state, and local governmental agencies. Here’s my countdown of the top 3 employment discrimination agencies in the state of Washington (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney):

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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#3 — MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENTS

Some municipalities (e.g., Seattle Office for Civil Rights, Tacoma Human Rights Commission, etc.) have established departments that work to resolve, inter alia, employment discrimination and retaliation complaints based on protected classes. The services offered by these departments vary from city to city, and not all municipalities in Washington State maintain such departments.

#2 — U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. You may seek recourse through the EEOC if you experience employment discrimination that involves:

1. Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

2. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

3. Denial of a reasonable workplace accommodation that you need because of your religious beliefs or disability.

4. Retaliation because you complained about job discrimination, or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

Visit the EEOC Website to learn more.

#1 — WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions based on protected classes.

Protected classes include the following: race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

WLAD also prohibits retaliation against persons who engage in protected activity in relation to discriminatory practices, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower complaints.

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination. It works to prevent and eliminate discrimination through complaint investigation, alternative dispute resolution, and education, training and outreach activities.

Visit the WSHRC Website to get more information.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

The Ejusdem Generis Rule

The Ejusdem Generis Rule


Under Washington canons of statutory construction, what is the Ejusdem Generis Rule? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE

“The ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific terms. In short, specific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms where both are used in sequence.” Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930, 965 P.2d 1124 (Wash.App.Div. 1 1998) (citing Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972)) (hyperlink added).

EXAMPLE: MALO v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.

In Malo, the statute at issue states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

Id. (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)) (emphasis added).

In this case, there was an issue as to the meaning of the term “or other person.” The court applied two canons: (1) “[p]rovisions in a statute are to be read in the context of the statute as a whole[,]” and (2) the Ejusdem Generis Rule–holding that “the general term ‘or other person’ is restricted by the words ’employer,’ ’employment agency’ and ‘labor union.'” Id. (citing Pope v. University of Washington, 121 Wash.2d 479, 489, 852 P.2d 1055 (1993); RCW 49.60.210(1)).

Thus, “[t]he section, read as a whole, is directed at entities functionally similar to employers who discriminate by engaging in conduct similar to discharging or expelling a person who has opposed practices forbidden by RCW 49.60.” Id. (hyperlink added).


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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability


Under Section 1983, may an individual bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an illegal custom — even if the custom was not officially established? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

Local governmental entities may be sued under Section 1983 for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom,’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity’s official decisionmaking channels.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 412 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

“Showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity is one way to establish municipal liability.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) a police officer turned a police dog loose on Chew and it assaulted Chew directly causing injury; the city argued that the unofficial policy of using dogs to apprehend suspects was attributable only to the non-policymaking officers responsible for training the canine units and not the police chief or commission — policymaking officials.

The court found that “[a] city could not escape liability for the consequences of established and ongoing departmental policy regarding the use of force simply by permitting such basic policy decisions to be made by lower level officials who are not ordinarily considered policymakers.” Id. at 1445.

Furthermore, the court found that “if the city in fact permitted departmental policy regarding the use of canine force to be designed and implemented at lower levels of the department, a jury could, and should, nevertheless find that the policy constituted an established municipal ‘custom or usage’ regarding the use of police dogs for which the city is responsible.” Id. (referencing City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127)

Thus, the court held that the city acted under color of law in injuring Chew.

CONCLUSION

Under § 1983, I believe an individual may bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an unofficial illegal custom.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

Presumption of Prospective Application

Presumption of Prospective Application


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is Presumption of Prospective Application? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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THE PRESUMPTION OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

Under the Washington State canon Presumption of Prospective Application, the court “presumes that a statute applies prospectively, unless (1) the legislature intends otherwise, or (2) unless the amendment is remedial in nature.” Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 271 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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-gw

 

Agency Rules

Agency Rules


Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, how do courts interpret agency rules–particularly those of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC/HRC)? Here’s my point of view.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy before proceeding.)


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“PLAIN MEANING” CANON ALSO APPLIES TO AGENCY RULES

Washington State Human Rights Commission is a state agency. “As is true of statutes, [Washington courts] … interpret agency rules according to their plain meaning.” Mikolajczak v. Mann, 1 Wn.App.2d 493, 498 (Wash.App. Div. 3 2017) (citing Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d 340, 349, 172 P.3d 688 (2007)) (hyperlink added). “Each word in an agency rule must be given its common and ordinary meaning, unless the word is ambiguous or defined in the regulation.” Id. (citing Grays Harbor Energy, LLC. v. Grays Harbor County, 175 Wn.App. 578, 584, 307 P.3d 754 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION APPLIED TO WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (HRC) RULES

Washington courts also “liberally construe the terms of the [Washington State Human Rights Commission’s] … rules to protect against discrimination.” Id. (citing Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989)).

REGULATORY REDRAFTING PROHIBITED

“However, [courts] … cannot engage in statutory or regulatory redrafting.” Id. (citing Hegwine, 162 Wn.2d at 352, 172 P.3d 688). “If a particular discrimination claim is plainly left uncovered by both the [Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”)] … and the HRC’s implementing rules, it will not merit relief.” Id. at 498-99.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

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