LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY A. WILLIAMS

June 27, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

In Washington State, unlawful retaliation claims fail for a variety of reasons. Unlawful retaliation is a form of unlawful employment discrimination in Washington State.

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. This article may be a repost from one of our retired blogs. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: UNLAWFUL RETALIATION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) prohibits an employer from retaliating against a person for opposing a discriminatory practice forbidden by WLAD or for participating in a proceeding to determine whether discrimination occurred. See RCW 49.60.210.

To establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he/she] engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) [his/her] employer took an adverse employment action against [him/her], and (3) there is a causal link between the activity and the adverse action. Alonso v. Qwest Communications Co., 178 Wn.App. 734, 754, 315 P.3d 610 (2013).

TOP 3 REASONS UNLAWFUL RETALIATION CLAIMS FAIL

Here’s my opinion of the top 3 reasons why unlawful retaliation claims fail in Washington State:

#3 – No Causation

A plaintiff bringing suit based on unlawful retaliation, RCW 49.60.210, must prove causation by showing that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision. Allison v. Housing Authority of City of Seattle, 118 Wn.2d 79, 96 (Wash. 1991).

Two common ways (but not the only ways) to establish causation include (1) proximity in time, and (2) abrupt change in performance reviews. It should be clear how an abrupt change in performance reviews from satisfactory to poor can support an argument for causation; however, “proximity in time” requires further explanation.

“Proximity in time” supports an argument for causation if the plaintiff can show the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and that the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment action is minimal.

This element can pose a problem in litigation if the employee-plaintiff is unable to argue either “proximity in time” or “change in performance reviews”, and there is no other evidence that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.

#2 – No Adverse Employment Action

To establish an adverse employment action, “the employee must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, meaning that it would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Boyd v. State, 187 Wn.App. 1, 13, 349 P.3d 864 (Div. 2 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It includes but is not limited to a demotion or adverse transfer, or a hostile work environment. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The problem typically occurs when the employee alleges an adverse employment action that is merely bothersome; because a viable “adverse employment action involves a change in employment that is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities.” Alonso v. Qwest Communications Co., 178 Wn.App. at 746.

#1 – No Protected Activity

An employee engages in WLAD-protected activity when he opposes employment practices forbidden by antidiscrimination law or other practices that he reasonably believed to be discriminatory. Id. at 753.

However, a general complaint about an employer’s unfair conduct does not rise to the level of protected activity in a discrimination action under WLAD absent some reference to the plaintiff’s protected status. Id.

A common problem that occurs is when an employee-plaintiff either completely fails to complain of discrimination to the employer or fails to properly complain of discrimination to the employer by omitting reference to one or more specific protected classes.

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

Employment-Discrimination Hotlines & Unlawful Retaliation

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

–gw

June 27, 2021October 20, 2024

The Canon of Statutory Parallelism

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is statutory parallelism? Here’s my point of view (NOTE: please read our DISCLAIMER before proceeding).

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THE CANON OF STATUTORY PARALLELISM

Statutory parallelism is a term that I’ve coined for the following assumption commonly held by Washington State courts:

[W]hen the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout.

Certification From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Zhu v. North Central ESD 171, 404 P.3d 504, 509 (Wash. 2017) (citing Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972)).

EXAMPLE: CERT. FROM U.S. DIST. CT. FOR EAST DIST. OF WA IN ZHU v. NORTH CENTRAL ESD 171

In Zhu, the WA State Supreme Court decided that the Washington Law Against Discrimination (i.e., RCW 49.60.210(1)) creates “a cause of action for job applicants who claim a prospective employer refused to hire them in retaliation for prior opposition to discrimination against a different employer[.]”

This was an issue of first impression. As part of its decision, the WA Court evaluated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) definition of the term “employer.” In so doing, the Court concluded:

For purposes of WLAD, an ’employer’ is broadly defined as ‘any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit. . . .

This definition clearly includes prospective employers, and nothing about the statutory context indicates that ‘any employer’ means something different for purposes of the antiretaliation statute than it does for the purposes of the rest of WLAD. See Champion v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 81 Wn.2d 672, 676, 504 P.2d 304 (1972) (we assume that when the legislature uses the same word in different parts of a single statutory scheme, that word has the same meaning throughout).

Zhu Cert., 404 P.3d at 509 (emphasis added).

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-gw

June 27, 2021October 20, 2024

Washington Priority of Action Rule: Same Relief

Under the Washington Priority of Action Rule, how do Washington State courts determine if the relief is the same? Here’s my point of view.

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PRIORITY OF ACTION RULE

The Washington Priority of Action Rule (Rule) will only apply if the two relevant cases involve identical (1) subject matter, (2) parties, and (3) relief. Am. Mobile Homes of Wash. Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990).

These factors must be established before the Rule should be applied. Id. The identity of the above elements must be such that a decision in one tribunal would bar proceedings in the other because of res judicata. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Foundation v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 111 Wn.App. 586, 607, 49 P.3d 894 (Div. 2 2002).

If the Rule applies, the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved. Am. Mobile Home, 115 Wn.2d at 316-17.

ELEMENT #3: IDENTICAL RELIEF

The Washington State Supreme Court has established the following factors to determine if “the relief is the same” for purposes of the Washington Priority of Action Rule:

(1) whether the form of relief available to each tribunal is the same (FORM OF RELIEF); and

(2) whether the first tribunal can resort to another to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available between the first and second lawsuits (EQUALIZE DISPARITY)?

See, State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found., 111 Wn. App. at 607, 49 (holding that the remedy was the same in both suits, because the type of relief available to both courts was the same, and because the administrative agency could otherwise seek relief in superior court in the first case to equalize any disparity in the amount of relief available in the administrative tribunal).

EXAMPLE: EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUND v. WASHINGTON EDUC. ASS’N

In Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, plaintiff attempted to amend its citizens lawsuit in superior court by adding claims that were contemporaneously being pursued by an administrative agency with statutory authority to preempt plaintiffs’ lawsuit; plaintiff sought, inter alia, the same form of remedy (i.e., a fine) as the administrative agency based on the same statute.

The court ruled that the relief was the same in both actions and upheld the trial court’s application of the priority of action rule, because the relief in both cases was a monetary fine pursuant to RCW 42.17.395(4), and because any disparity in the amount of relief available could be eliminated if the administrative tribunal ushered the claim to superior court.

The court then analyzed res judicata and concluded jurisdiction in the second court was improper under Washington Priority of Action Rule. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Washington Educ., 111 Wn. App. 586, 49 P.3d 894 (2002).

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Affirmative and Negative Defenses

Under federal law, are defendants allowed to plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court? Here’s my point of view.

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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

“An affirmative defense, under the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.” Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 598 (D.N.M. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (hyperlinks added). The burden for establishing affirmative defenses generally lies on the defendant. Id. (internal citation omitted).

NEGATIVE DEFENSES

However, “negative” defenses are merely rebuttal to plaintiff’s claims and should be stricken; the courts have held these so-called affirmative defenses (or negative defenses) simply provide a basis to negate an element of the prima facie case for relief and are restatements of denials present in earlier parts of the complaint. See id. (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking eight “negative” defenses); see Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof [as to an element plaintiff is required to prove] is not an affirmative defense.”(citing Flav-O-Rich v. Rawson Food Service, Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir.1988))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlinks added).

CONCLUSION

It appears that under federal law, defendants may plead “negative” defenses in answer to a federal complaint in federal court, but such negative defenses are not affirmative defenses and should be stricken as a defense. A fundamental consideration is whether the time, expense, and risk in bringing the motion to strike is outweighed by the benefit. Obviously, that is only a question for a party or party representative to answer relative to their particular matter.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Reasons Disparate Treatment Claims Fail

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), disparate treatment (also known as “classic discrimination”) is a form of unlawful employment discrimination.

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

WLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of membership in certain protected classes. See Blackburn v. Department of Social and Health Services, 186 Wn.2d 250, 258, 375 P.3d 1076 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And “the elements of a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on protected status are not absolute but vary based on the relevant facts.” Marin v. King County, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808, 378 P.3d 203, (Div. 1 2016) (referencing Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)) (hyperlink added).

To learn more about protected classes and disparate treatment, view our YouTube videos:

MY TOP 3 REASONS DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS FAIL

Here are my top 3 reasons WLAD disparate treatment claims fail (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney in Washington State):

#3 – Failed to Perform Satisfactorily

One of the elements that a plaintiff must typically prove to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination is that he/she was performing satisfactorily. Marin v. King County, 194 Wn.App. 795, 808-09, 378 P.3d 203, (Div. 1 2016) (citing Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn.App. 481, 488, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004)). A history of, inter alia, poor performance reviews, suspensions, and/or write-ups, can derail a disparate treatment case.

#2 – Failed to Suffer an Adverse Employment Action

Generally, “this means a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Keep in mind that this is merely a sample and not an exhaustive list.

Plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment often find their claim dismissed at summary judgment, because they failed to prove that they suffered an associated adverse employment action.

#1 – Failed to Raise Reasonable Inference of Unlawful Discrimination

The plaintiff must show that the unlawful actions occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. (citing Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn.App. 481, 488, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004)). The plaintiff must typically point to evidence that the employer took an adverse action against the plaintiff because of his/her protected class. See id. at 810. One way to prove this is by showing that similarly situated employees (also known as “comparators”) outside of the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably.

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–gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Behind Closed Doors: WLAD & ESD Appeals

Under Washington State law, may an employment discrimination plaintiff use favorable findings from a previous unemployment benefits appeal against the associated defendant employer, when pursuing a claim under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD)? Here’s my point of view.

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A COMMON ISSUE

Occasionally, one of my employment discrimination clients will vigorously attempt to convince me that they received favorable findings against their employer during their unemployment benefits appeal conducted through the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings; and that the findings will help them win their subsequent discrimination lawsuit under WLAD. Unfortunately, I usually have bad news for those clients.

Stated differently, the issue is whether findings made by an administrative law judge (ALJ) during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing may be admitted in a separate employment discrimination lawsuit outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer?

WA STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT

The Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD) was created in 1939. Its mission is to “partner to connect employers and job seekers – supporting transitions to new jobs and empowering careers.”

If an individual applies for unemployment benefits through the ESD and is denied; then the individual can request an appeal. In that case, the ESD will forward the appeal to the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) which is not part of the ESD. The OAH will then assign an administrative law judge to hear the case.

TITLE 50 RCW

The Washington State laws relating to the ESD are contained in Title 50 RCW, and the relevant law states as follows:

Any finding, determination, conclusion, declaration, or final order made by the commissioner, or his or her representative or delegate, or by an appeal tribunal, administrative law judge, reviewing officer, or other agent of the department for the purposes of Title 50 RCW, shall not be conclusive, nor binding, nor admissible as evidence in any separate action outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between an individual and the individual’s present or prior employer before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts or was reviewed pursuant to RCW 50.32.120.

RCW 50.32.097 (emphasis and hyperlink added).

CONCLUSION

Findings made by an administrative law judge during a Washington State unemployment benefits appeal hearing are generally not admissible in a subsequent WLAD employment discrimination lawsuit (before an arbitrator, court, or judge) outside the scope of Title 50 RCW between the employee and the employee’s present or prior employer.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Property Interests in Continued Employment: WA State

In Washington State, do Washington State civil service employees–dischargeable only for cause–have property interests in continued employment? Here’s my point of view.

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GOLDBERG TWO-STEP PROCESS

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), “[t]he Supreme Court … enunciated a two-step process for analyzing cases involving deprivation of a governmental benefit” in violation of due process, as follows:

1. it must first be ascertained whether the interest at issue is a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; and

2. if the interest is a protected one, the court must determine if the deprived beneficiary has been afforded due process.

See Belnap v. Chang, 707 F.2d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In relation to element 1 above, “property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created, and their dimensions are defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state law. . . .” Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 53 USLW 4306 (1985) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

RELEVANT WA STATE LAW

Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that “protected property interests can arise from express or implied contracts for continued employment, objective representations of tenure, . . . or even collective bargaining agreements providing for continued employment.” Danielson v. City of Seattle, 108 Wn.2d 788, 796, 742 P.2d 717 (1987) (internal citations omitted). As a result, “constitutionally protected property interests may arise in public employment where civil service laws provide an express or implied contract for continued employment.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Thus, I believe that civil service employees dischargeable only for cause have protected property interests in continued employment. See id. at 796-97 (internal citations omitted).

Example: Danielson v. City of Seattle

For example, in Danielson, a Seattle police officer committed theft and was subsequently discharged. The Seattle Municipal Code and the Seattle City Charter established that no civil service employees may be discharged from employment except for cause. As a result, the court held that the police office had a property interest in continued employment. Id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

WLAD Civil Suits & Administrative Actions

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), may plaintiffs bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals? Here’s my point of view.

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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

“Washington’s law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, is a broad remedial statute, the purpose of which is to eliminate and prevent discrimination on the basis of” specific protected classes. Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries, 143 Wn.App. 832, 181 P.3d 843 (Wash.App. Div. 3 3008) (citing RCW 49.60.010).

THE CIVIL SUIT REQUIREMENT

“[WLAD] declares that the right to be free from such discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil action by members of the enumerated protected classes.” Id. (citing RCW 49.60.030(1), (2)) (emphasis added).

The issue is whether an administrative proceeding is considered a civil action for purposes of WLAD claims. The Washington State Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Rhoades v. Department of Labor and Industries. Id.

EXAMPLE: RHOADES v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES

In Rhoades, plaintiff Tammy Rhoades “filed a claim with the Department [of Labor and Industries] after she was injured in the course of employment[.]” Rhoades, 143 Wn.App. at 836. “The Department awarded her a permanent partial disability benefit.” Id. She appealed, and “in March 2001, the Department determined that Ms. Rhoades was totally disabled and she was placed on the pension rolls.” Id. “The Department affirmed this order after reconsideration in September 2002.” Id.

However, “Ms. Rhoades disagreed with the Department’s calculation of her monthly pension amount [and] appealed the September 2002 pension order to the Board of Industrial Appeals (Board).” Id. In 2004, “the Board found that the Department’s September 2002 order was correct” except for a small interest calculation. Id. at 837.

Plaintiff Rhoades “appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board’s order.” Id. She then appealed to Division 3 of the Washington State Court of Appeals wherein she included, inter alia, a claim that the Department violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Id. at 835-36. The court of appeals found that “an administrative action and appeal is an inappropriate vehicle for” claims under RCW 49.60. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). “[A] civil suit is required.” Id.

CONCLUSION

Under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), plaintiffs cannot bring private civil suits through administrative actions and associated appeals.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

National Bank Act Preemption & Title VII

Within the 9th Circuit, does the National Bank Act preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Here’s my point of view.

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THE NATIONAL BANK ACT

The National Bank Act provides, inter alia, that a national bank shall have the power “[t]o elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.” 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth) (emphasis added).

This is also known as the “at-pleasure provision” of § 24(Fifth) that is part of the scheme of federal laws governing the duties and powers of federally chartered banks. Thus, as a threshold matter, a federally chartered bank seeking to utilize the at-pleasure provision to preempt an employee’s claims for relief under other laws must first show that the employee was (1) appointed by the board of directors, (2) terminated by the board of directors, and (3) an officer.

THE PURPOSE

The original congressional intent behind the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act was to ensure the financial stability of the banking institutions by affording them the means to discharge employees who were felt to compromise an institution’s integrity. Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, courts uniformly have concluded that a bank’s power to dismiss at pleasure is analogous to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship between employer and employee. Id. at 984 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for certain employers (e.g., a bank) to discriminate against an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex; additional organizational forms are within purview of Title VII, but they are beyond the scope of this article.

Title VII also makes it illegal to retaliate against an individual because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

THE INTERSECTION

The intersection of the at-pleasure provision and Title VII presents a potential conflict of laws; and the 9th Circuit, in Kroske v. US Bank Corp, resolved the conflict in favor of bank officers both hired and fired by the board of directors. See Kroske v. United States Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005).

In Kroske, Kathy Kroske was a bank officer that was both hired and fired by the board of directors, and Kroske subsequently filed suit against the bank alleging age discrimination under Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). Accordingly, one of the issues the court addressed was whether the at-pleasure provision preempted her age discrimination claim under WLAD?

The court, in reaching its conclusion (the analysis is beyond the scope of this article), found, inter alia, that federal anti-discrimination statutes were relevant to its inquiry because federally chartered banks are not exempt from liability under those laws. Id. at 986 (see Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (holding that members of a class of black employees of a Federal Reserve Bank could maintain separate actions against the bank under Title VII); see also Enforcement Guidance on Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC Decision No. N-915-002 (1993) (concluding that Federal Reserve Banks are not executive agencies and are covered by Title VII, the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as private employers)).

The court went on to find that courts that have addressed the issue consistently have held that banks are subject to liability for discrimination under federal anti-discrimination laws irrespective of the bank’s right to dismiss an officer (or employee) at pleasure. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

Thus, it would appear that the National Bank Act does not preempt Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Absurd-Consequences Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Absurd-Consequences Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE ABSURD-CONSEQUENCES RULE

In Washington State, courts “will avoid literal reading of a statute which would result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. McDougal, 120 Wn.2d 334, 350, 841 P.2d 1232 (1992)). “The spirit or purpose of an enactment should prevail over … express but inept wording.” Id. (citing State v. Day, 96 Wn.2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 546 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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-gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Section 1981 & Non-Employment Contracts (Ninth Circuit)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under The Law, are non-employment contracts protected in the Ninth Circuit? Here’s my point of view.

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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

The problem is how to adapt the four elements of a prima facie case established in the employment discrimination context to claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Plaintiff-Appellant (“Lindsey” dba “E-Jays Panache Images”) was a business that presented fashion shows; all representatives were African-American, and audience members were primarily African-American as well. The Defendant-Appellee (“SLT Los Angeles” or “the Westin”) owned and operated, inter alia, a Grand Ballroom in their subject Westin Hotel.

Lindsey contracted for use of the Grand Ballroom for an event, but on the day of the event, there was an apparent mix up by the Westin. He essentially alleged that they were denied the Grand Ballroom in favor of a Bar Mitzvah because of their race.

Lindsey sued in U.S. District Court for, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and “the district court concluded that Appellant … [Lindsey] had failed to prove that the Westin’s actions, which had prevented Panache from hosting its annual Mother’s Day Fashion Show in the Grand Ballroom of the Westin Hotel, presented a prima facie case of race discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 1141.

Lindsey appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and it reversed the district court and remanded for trial. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the decisions of other circuits that “the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id.

Accordingly, “the first three elements require a plaintiff to show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right to contract for those services.” Id. (referencing Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir.2001); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir.1996)) (emphasis added).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

However, the court identified that “the Seventh and Sixth Circuits conflict over adaptation of the fourth McDonnell Douglas requirement, which, as applied by the district court … [in Lindsey], requires that such services remained available to similarly-situated individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court then pointed out that “the Seventh Circuit adopts this requirement … but the Sixth Circuit concludes that this flat requirement is too rigorous in the context of the denial of services by a commercial establishment, because customers often have no way of establishing what treatment was accorded to other customers.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The 9th Circuit reasoned that “the Sixth Circuit distinguishes the commercial services context from the employment context, where records are kept and there is a paper trail disclosing what treatment is given to similarly-situated others.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “the Sixth Circuit alters the elements to require: (a) that plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not; and/or (b) that plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning compelling, but did not decide whether its modification/relaxation of the fourth element of a prima facie case under Section 1981 is required in many or all cases arising in a commercial, non-employment context. The court found that the plaintiff in Lindsey offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, and, thus, it applied all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed.

CONCLUSION

It appears that in the Ninth Circuit, the following may be required to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:

1) membership in a protected class;

2) an attempt to contract for certain services;

3) denial of the right to contract for those services; and (possibly);

4) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not [AND/OR] plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.

See Lindsey, 447 F.3d at 1145. When the plaintiff offers clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a different protected class was offered the contractual services which were denied to the plaintiff, the court will likely apply all four elements of the more rigorous rule without deciding whether the fourth element must be relaxed. See id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer and Terms of Use for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Courts for WLAD Claims

Depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff may have a choice of litigating their Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) case in one of several different courts. Here are my top 3 courts for litigating WLAD claims (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney in Washington State):

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#3 – UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

United States District Courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; this is known as federal question jurisdiction. It is not uncommon for Plaintiffs to bring claims in the same lawsuit under both WLAD and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) — or other federal anti-discrimination laws (e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 1981, etc.). Depending on the circumstances of each case, adding the Title VII claims may give U.S. District Courts original federal-question jurisdiction over the matter.

U.S. District Courts also have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between, inter alia, citizens of different States; this is known as diversity jurisdiction. Again, depending on the circumstances of each case, WLAD plaintiffs that initially sue employers–incorporated outside of Washington State–in state court may end up in U.S. District Court based on diversity jurisdiction.

#2 – WASHINGTON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

Washington State District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. For civil (employment discrimination) matters, this means that the court will have jurisdiction over the matter if, for each claimant, the value of the claim or the amount at issue does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees (check the Revised Code of Washington for current dollar amounts). Thus, this court may also be a viable option for a WLAD plaintiff if the value of the case is appropriate.

#1 – WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURTS

Washington State Superior Courts are courts of general jurisdiction; typically, there is no maximum or minimum dollar amount that must be at issue. And, unlike U.S. District Courts, a unanimous jury is not required in order to render a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. Superior courts are commonly used by plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring WLAD claims.

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–gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Dictionary Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the dictionary rule? Here’s my point of view

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THE DICTIONARY RULE

Generally, “Legislative definitions provided in a statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, courts may give a term its plain and ordinary meaning by reference to a standard dictionary.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 174, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001)).

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Ambiguous Contracts & Summary Judgment: WA State

Under Washington State law, how do courts view ambiguous contracts at summary judgment? Here’s my point of view.

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

Summary judgment is not appropriate on an ambiguous contract. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. 346, 351, 267 P.3d 491 (Div. 2 2011) (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted). Whether a written contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law for the courts. Dice v. City of Montesano, 131 Wn.App. 675, 128 P.3d 1253 (Div. 2 2006), rev. denied, 158 Wn.2d 1017, 149 P.3d 377 (2006).

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Contract provisions can be ambiguous if two reasonable meanings can be attributed to the contract or if a material contract term is uncertain or capable of being understood as having more than one meaning. Marshall v. Thurston County, 165 Wn.App. at 351 (holding the term “incident” as it appeared in the release of liability was ambiguous and therefore the release was not subject to summary judgment)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

In Marshall v. Thurston County, Marshall filed a claim for damages in 2001 against Thurston County based on flooding to his property. Marshall eventually signed a release agreement with the County that exculpated the County from liability related to the 2001 claim as well as further claims arising from the “incident.”

However, in 2009, Marshall brought a new lawsuit for damages against the County as a result of additional flooding occurring after the release was signed. The County asserted that Marshall’s 2009 claim was barred by the previously executed release of liability, but the court found that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word “incident.”

The court then reasoned that the 2001 claim suggested two reasonable interpretations of “incident” and held that the release was ambiguous; “therefore summary judgment was not appropriate based on the meaning of the release.” Id.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful retaliation is common legal theory that plaintiff-employees assert under employment discrimination law; causation is one of several elements that must be proven. The Washington State Supreme Court has considered several standards of causation pursuant to claims of unlawful retaliation under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.

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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

“To establish a prima facie case of [unlawful] retaliation, an employee must show three things: (1) the employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018) (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn.App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp, 118 Wn.2d 46, 68, 821 P.2d 18 (1991) (“establishing the retaliation test in the worker’s compensation context”)) (emphasis and hyperlink added).

The focus of this article is the third element: causal link (or causation). “An employee [shows a causal link (i.e., causation)] ‘by [revealing] … that retaliation was a substantial factor motivating the adverse employment decision.’ ” Cornwell, 430 P.3d at 235 (Wash. 2018) (citing Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wn.2d 79, 96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

“[T]o avoid summary judgment on causation, the employee must show only that a reasonable jury could find that retaliation was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 235 (internal citation omitted). “Employees may rely on the following facts to show this: (1) the employee took a protected action, (2) the employer had knowledge of the action, and (3) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69, 821 P.2d 18) (emphasis added).

In this article, the 2nd element (i.e., the employer had knowledge of the action) is at issue, and the Washington State Supreme Court has considered several associated standards of causation.

TOP 3 STANDARDS OF UNLAWFUL-RETALIATION CAUSATION (WA STATE):

Here are my top 3 standards of unlawful-retaliation causation (WA State):

#3 — THE GENERAL-CORPORATE-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

The general-corporate-knowledge standard is somewhat of a misnomer, because the Washington State Supreme Court both raised and dismissed it in Cornwell v. Microsoft Corporation, 430 P.3d 229, 235 (Wash. 2018) (“We decline to address the ‘general corporate knowledge’ standard in this case.”) (footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court declared, “Under this standard, the jury can still find retaliation in circumstances where the particular decision-maker denies actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s protected activities, ‘so long as … the jury concludes that an agent is acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite knowledge.’ ” Id. at 241, n. 6 (citing Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original; second alteration added).

This standard “may be useful in situations where many individuals act collectively in a large company[ ] [.]” Id.

#2 — THE KNEW-OR-SUSPECTED STANDARD

“The knew-or-suspected standard incorporates the ‘actual knowledge’ standard, infra, and also encompasses cases in which the employer suspects that an employee engaged in protected action.” Id. at 237 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

This standard “[r]equires sufficient evidence to reasonably infer ‘both that [a supervisor] either knew or suspected’ that an employee took a protected action ‘and that there was a causal connection between this knowledge or suspicion and [the employee’s] termination.’ ” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alteration in original).

EXAMPLE: “This standard applies, for example, when a supervisor has actual knowledge that a complaint was made but has only a suspicion regarding who made the complaint and subsequently takes an adverse employment action based on that suspicion.” Id.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: “So long as an employee produces evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that retaliation had taken place, this is sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Id. (citing Hernandez at 1114). “And while, a jury could believe the supervisor’s version of events rather than the employee’s, the jury must be permitted to consider and weigh evidence.” Id.

#1 — THE ACTUAL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

Under the actual-knowledge standard, “the employer [must] have actual knowledge of the employee’s protected action in order to prove causation.” Id. at 235. (internal citations omitted).

The policy behind the actual-knowledge standard is that “[b]ecause retaliation is an intentional act, an employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an action of which the employer is unaware.” Id. at 235-36.

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE IRRELEVANT: But “[a] decision-maker need not have actual knowledge about the legal significance of a protected action.” Id. at 236 (emphasis added). “Instead, the decision-maker need have actual knowledge only that the employee took the action in order to prove a causal connection.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: At summary judgment, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the … evidence suggests a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).

We invite you to read more of our blog articles concerning this topic:

Adverse Employment Actions: A Closer Look

Definition of Prima Facie Case*

The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework*

The Prima Facie Case: Unlawful Retaliation

Top 3 Reasons Unlawful Retaliation Claims Fail

Top 3 Causation Standards: Unlawful Retaliation

Unlawful Retaliation: Adverse Employment Action

Unlawful Retaliation and the Prospective Employer

Unlawful Retaliation: The Actual-Knowledge Standard

Unlawful Retaliation: The Causal Link

Unlawful Retaliation: The Functionally-Similar Test

Unlawful Retaliation: Statutorily Protected Activity

*NOTE: The link will take the reader to our Williams Law Group Blog – an external website.

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June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Relative and Qualifying Words-and-Phrases Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS-AND-PHRASES RULE

In Washington State, “[c]ourts construe relative and qualifying words and phrases, both grammatically and legally, to refer to the last antecedent if a contrary intention does not appear in the statute.” Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 240, 59 P.3d 655 (Wash. 2002) (citing In re Application of Andy, 49 Wn.2d 449, 302 P.2d 963 (1956); see, e.g. Caughey v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 81 Wn.2d 597, 602, 503 P.2d 460 (1972) (“[W]here no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.”)).

“The reason for this rule … is to make clear what is being modified.” Id.

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-gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Diversity Jurisdiction Gambit

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, entitled to costs when the court finally adjudges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000? Here’s my point of view.

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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, United States District Courts have original jurisdiction (Diversity Jurisdiction) of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States; there are additional provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Further, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have Supplemental Jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution; but, there are exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b).

In Washington State, employment discrimination cases typically involve these two jurisdictional bases; Plaintiffs often combine Title VII claims with Washington Law Against Discrimination claims and associated state tort claims. Employer-defendants in such cases are often incorporated out of state. This article addresses the scenario wherein the plaintiff elects to initially file suit in federal court based on similar circumstances.

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

There may be risks for the discrimination plaintiff that initially files in Federal court. The relevant law is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b), and it states as follows:

(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.

Id. According to this statute, a plaintiff may be denied costs and/or required to pay costs in the event of a favorable verdict that is below $75,000.

CONCLUSION

Subject to exceptions, a plaintiff that files an employment discrimination case originally in Federal court based on diversity jurisdiction must, arguably, recover $75,000 or more (without regard to setoff and counterclaim; and exclusive of interest and costs), or the court may deny costs authorized by statute to the plaintiff. Moreover, the court may also impose costs on the plaintiff.

But this law may be superseded by an express provision in a statute of the United States. In any event, this is a gambit that some plaintiffs may not want to take – proceed with caution.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

Top 3 Employment Discrimination Agencies

In Washington State, employees may seek recourse for employment discrimination through federal, state, and local governmental agencies. Here’s my countdown of the top 3 employment discrimination agencies in the state of Washington (based on my point of view as an employment discrimination attorney):

(IMPORTANT: This article is for informational purposes only and is based upon my point of view. Due to the rapidly changing nature of the law, we make no warranty or guarantee concerning the accuracy or reliability of the content in this article. No content on this site, regardless of date, should ever be used as a substitute for direct legal advice from your attorney. Please review our Disclaimer|Terms of Use|Privacy Policy before proceeding.)

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#3 — MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENTS

Some municipalities (e.g., Seattle Office for Civil Rights, Tacoma Human Rights Commission, etc.) have established departments that work to resolve, inter alia, employment discrimination and retaliation complaints based on protected classes. The services offered by these departments vary from city to city, and not all municipalities in Washington State maintain such departments.

#2 — U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. You may seek recourse through the EEOC if you experience employment discrimination that involves:

1. Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

2. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.

3. Denial of a reasonable workplace accommodation that you need because of your religious beliefs or disability.

4. Retaliation because you complained about job discrimination, or assisted with a job discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

Visit the EEOC Website to learn more.

#1 — WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, is a state law that prohibits discriminatory practices in the areas of employment, places of public resort, accommodation, or amusement, in real estate transactions, and credit and insurance transactions based on protected classes.

Protected classes include the following: race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, families with children, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability.

WLAD also prohibits retaliation against persons who engage in protected activity in relation to discriminatory practices, and those who file health care and state employee whistleblower complaints.

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Washington Law Against Discrimination. It works to prevent and eliminate discrimination through complaint investigation, alternative dispute resolution, and education, training and outreach activities.

Visit the WSHRC Website to get more information.

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–gw

June 26, 2021October 20, 2024

The Ejusdem Generis Rule

Under Washington canons of statutory construction, what is the Ejusdem Generis Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE

“The ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific terms. In short, specific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms where both are used in sequence.” Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930, 965 P.2d 1124 (Wash.App.Div. 1 1998) (citing Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972)) (hyperlink added).

EXAMPLE: MALO v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.

In Malo, the statute at issue states as follows:

It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

Id. (citing RCW 49.60.210(1)) (emphasis added).

In this case, there was an issue as to the meaning of the term “or other person.” The court applied two canons: (1) “[p]rovisions in a statute are to be read in the context of the statute as a whole[,]” and (2) the Ejusdem Generis Rule–holding that “the general term ‘or other person’ is restricted by the words ’employer,’ ’employment agency’ and ‘labor union.'” Id. (citing Pope v. University of Washington, 121 Wash.2d 479, 489, 852 P.2d 1055 (1993); RCW 49.60.210(1)).

Thus, “[t]he section, read as a whole, is directed at entities functionally similar to employers who discriminate by engaging in conduct similar to discharging or expelling a person who has opposed practices forbidden by RCW 49.60.” Id. (hyperlink added).

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-gw

June 25, 2021October 20, 2024

Section 1983, Unofficial Custom, and Local Governmental Liability

Under Section 1983, may an individual bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an illegal custom — even if the custom was not officially established? Here’s my point of view.

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UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL CUSTOM

Local governmental entities may be sued under Section 1983 for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom,’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity’s official decisionmaking channels.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 412 (1988) (internal citations omitted).

“Showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity is one way to establish municipal liability.” Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

EXAMPLE: CHEW v. GATES

In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) a police officer turned a police dog loose on Chew and it assaulted Chew directly causing injury; the city argued that the unofficial policy of using dogs to apprehend suspects was attributable only to the non-policymaking officers responsible for training the canine units and not the police chief or commission — policymaking officials.

The court found that “[a] city could not escape liability for the consequences of established and ongoing departmental policy regarding the use of force simply by permitting such basic policy decisions to be made by lower level officials who are not ordinarily considered policymakers.” Id. at 1445.

Furthermore, the court found that “if the city in fact permitted departmental policy regarding the use of canine force to be designed and implemented at lower levels of the department, a jury could, and should, nevertheless find that the policy constituted an established municipal ‘custom or usage’ regarding the use of police dogs for which the city is responsible.” Id. (referencing City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. at 127)

Thus, the court held that the city acted under color of law in injuring Chew.

CONCLUSION

Under § 1983, I believe an individual may bring a civil rights lawsuit against a city based upon allegations that the city engaged in an unofficial illegal custom.

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If you would like to learn more, then consider contacting an experienced attorney to discuss your case. This article is not offered as legal advice and will not establish an attorney-client relationship with Law Office of Gregory A. Williams, or the author of this article; please refer to our Disclaimer | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy for more information.

June 19, 2021October 20, 2024

Presumption of Prospective Application

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is Presumption of Prospective Application? Here’s my point of view.

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THE PRESUMPTION OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

Under the Washington State canon Presumption of Prospective Application, the court “presumes that a statute applies prospectively, unless (1) the legislature intends otherwise, or (2) unless the amendment is remedial in nature.” Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 271 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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-gw

June 18, 2021October 20, 2024

Agency Rules

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, how do courts interpret agency rules–particularly those of the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC/HRC)? Here’s my point of view.

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“PLAIN MEANING” CANON ALSO APPLIES TO AGENCY RULES

Washington State Human Rights Commission is a state agency. “As is true of statutes, [Washington courts] … interpret agency rules according to their plain meaning.” Mikolajczak v. Mann, 1 Wn.App.2d 493, 498 (Wash.App. Div. 3 2017) (citing Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d 340, 349, 172 P.3d 688 (2007)) (hyperlink added). “Each word in an agency rule must be given its common and ordinary meaning, unless the word is ambiguous or defined in the regulation.” Id. (citing Grays Harbor Energy, LLC. v. Grays Harbor County, 175 Wn.App. 578, 584, 307 P.3d 754 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (hyperlink added).

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION APPLIED TO WA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (HRC) RULES

Washington courts also “liberally construe the terms of the [Washington State Human Rights Commission’s] … rules to protect against discrimination.” Id. (citing Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wn.2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989)).

REGULATORY REDRAFTING PROHIBITED

“However, [courts] … cannot engage in statutory or regulatory redrafting.” Id. (citing Hegwine, 162 Wn.2d at 352, 172 P.3d 688). “If a particular discrimination claim is plainly left uncovered by both the [Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”)] … and the HRC’s implementing rules, it will not merit relief.” Id. at 498-99.

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-gw

June 9, 2021October 20, 2024

The Harmonizing Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the Harmonizing Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE HARMONZING RULE

According to Washington State courts, “[a]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized, and both given effect if possible.” Nearing v. Golden State Foods Corporation, 114 Wn.2d 817, 821, 792 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1990) (citing Emwright v. King Cy., 96 Wash.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981)).

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-gw

June 8, 2021October 20, 2024

The General-Terms Rule

Under Washington State canons of statutory construction, what is the General-Terms Rule? Here’s my point of view.

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THE GENERAL-TERMS RULE

In Washington State, “[a] general term used at the end of a sequence in a statute is restricted in its application by the preceding words.” Malo v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 92 Wn.App. 927, 930 (Div. 1, 1998).

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June 3, 2021October 20, 2024

Inadvertent Waiver of Res Judicata

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, how is the inadvertent waiver of the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and claim splitting addressed? Here’s my point of view.

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WAIVER OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Washington State Supreme Court developed two relevant tests to determine whether a waiver of affirmative defenses has occurred:

(1) waiver based on civil rules; and

(2) common law waiver.

Compare, Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) (explaining waiver pursuant to civil rules), with Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc., 163 Wn.2d 236, 178 P.3d 981 (2008) (explaining common law doctrine of waiver).

It is not uncommon for defendant-employers in employment discrimination cases to inadvertently waive the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, and/or claim splitting under the civil rules (this article does not address common law waiver).

WAIVER BASED ON CIVIL RULES: RES JUDICATA, PRIORITY OF ACTION, AND CLAIM SPLITTING

Under CR 8(c), res judicata is listed as an affirmative defense and must be specifically pled. See, e.g., Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 422, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1981) (holding “failure of consideration” is an affirmative defense under CR 8(c) and must be specifically pled).

Particularly, in order for res judicata to have a preclusive effect, the second court must be advised of the prior proceeding, and the burden of pleading “res judicata” is listed among the affirmative defenses. See, Phillip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 805, 812 (1985) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Moreover, although CR 8(c) specifically delineates 20 affirmative defenses, parties must also affirmatively plead “any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 575, 166 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2007). Thus, “claim splitting” and “priority of action” must also be specifically pled as affirmative defenses.

If specific defenses are not (1) affirmatively pled, (2) asserted with a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they will be deemed to have been waived and may not thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case. Rainier Nat. Bank, 30 Wn.App. at 422 (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 76, 549 P.2d 9 (1976))(emphasis added).

This affirmative defense requirement will not be abrogated where it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

EXAMPLE: RAINIER NAT. BANK v. LEWIS

For example, in Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, the plaintiff-bank brought an action to recover funds from a default loan guaranteed by defendants, and defendants specifically plead the affirmative defense of “failure of consideration” for the first time at summary judgment; the court held that defendants failed to specifically plead the affirmative defense “failure of consideration” in their answer and it was therefore waived. Rainier Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 30 Wn.App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (Wash.App. Div 1 1981) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

Under Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules, the affirmative defenses of res judicata, priority of action, or claim splitting may be inadvertently waived if not properly plead.

An employment discrimination plaintiff facing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon defenses of priority of action rule, claim splitting, and/or res judicata would be wise to evaluate whether the defendant has properly asserted such affirmative defenses at the beginning of the case in their responsive pleading; there might be a strong argument for waiver based on the civil rules. I have successfully made this argument on multiple occasions against defendant-employers at summary judgment.

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: UNLAWFUL RETALIATION

TOP 3 REASONS UNLAWFUL RETALIATION CLAIMS FAIL

#3 – No Causation

#2 – No Adverse Employment Action

#1 – No Protected Activity

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THE CANON OF STATUTORY PARALLELISM

EXAMPLE: CERT. FROM U.S. DIST. CT. FOR EAST DIST. OF WA IN ZHU v. NORTH CENTRAL ESD 171

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PRIORITY OF ACTION RULE

ELEMENT #3: IDENTICAL RELIEF

EXAMPLE: EVERGREEN FREEDOM FOUND v. WASHINGTON EDUC. ASS’N

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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

NEGATIVE DEFENSES

CONCLUSION

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WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE TREATMENT

MY TOP 3 REASONS DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS FAIL

#3 – Failed to Perform Satisfactorily

#2 – Failed to Suffer an Adverse Employment Action

#1 – Failed to Raise Reasonable Inference of Unlawful Discrimination

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A COMMON ISSUE

WA STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT

TITLE 50 RCW

CONCLUSION

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GOLDBERG TWO-STEP PROCESS

RELEVANT WA STATE LAW

CONCLUSION

Example: Danielson v. City of Seattle

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THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

THE CIVIL SUIT REQUIREMENT

EXAMPLE: RHOADES v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES

CONCLUSION

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THE NATIONAL BANK ACT

THE PURPOSE

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

THE INTERSECTION

CONCLUSION

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THE ABSURD-CONSEQUENCES RULE

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ISSUE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: LINDSEY v. SLT LOS ANGELES, LLC

CONFLICTS BETWEEN 6TH & 7TH CIRCUITS

CONCLUSION

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#3 – UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

#2 – WASHINGTON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

#1 – WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURTS

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THE DICTIONARY RULE

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT APPROPRIATE ON AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS

AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS

EXAMPLE: MARSHALL v. THURSTON COUNTY

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UNLAWFUL RETALIATION (WA STATE)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (WA STATE)

TOP 3 STANDARDS OF UNLAWFUL-RETALIATION CAUSATION (WA STATE):

#3 — THE GENERAL-CORPORATE-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

#2 — THE KNEW-OR-SUSPECTED STANDARD

#1 — THE ACTUAL-KNOWLEDGE STANDARD

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THE RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS-AND-PHRASES RULE

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DIVERSITY & SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

THE DIVERSITY JURISDICTION GAMBIT

CONCLUSION

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#3 — MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENTS

#2 — U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

#1 — WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

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THE EJUSDEM GENERIS RULE